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ABSTRACT.
The thesis aims to provide a heuristic critique of the meta-theoretical 
foundations of Chomsky's project for an explanatoiy linguistics. The critique is 
’heuristic' in that it attempts to take the considerations adduced to indicate how those 
conceptual foundations are to be re-designed on lines parallel to constructivism in the 
philosophy of mathematics. The net result is the provision of an outline of a meta- 
theoretic rationale for a process orientated linguistic theory (e.g. Kempson et aVs 
LDSnl framework).
The thesis investigates, and is organized around, three central strands of the 
Chomskyan paradigm:
1) The mathematization of linguistics: the use of formal/mathematical systems 
as theory constitutive metaphors.
2) A scientific realist (as opposed to instrumentalist) construal of linguistic 
theories.
3) A conceptualist/psychologist ontology for linguistic objects with a 
concomitant explanation for the nature of the linguistic in terms of properties of the 
modularized human "mind/brain" articulated through a system of mental 
representations.
The central conclusions drawn are:
1) There is a failure to achieve adequate warrant for a scientific realist 
construal of Chomskyan linguistic theories.
2) The object(s) of study that is (are) posited in the Chomskyan paradigm 
require a Platonist or autonomist ontological status. A corollary of this is the inability 
to achieve an adequate explanation for the nature of linguistic phenomena.
These conclusions, together with the observation of certain conceptual 
tensions and antimonies in generativist thinking (e.g. the relation between types and 
tokens), are taken to be sufficient to prompt a re-examination of the (metaphysical 
realist) assumptions that underlie that thinking. The solution that is canvassed, and 
which promises to resolve these tensions, is by way of a linguistic version of 
mathematical constructivism in which the emphasis lies in linguistic phenomena being 
construed as primarily cognitive events in which the constructive procedures are 
crucially constitutive of then linguistically individuating properties.
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INTRODUCTION.
Real progress comes not so much from collecting 
results and storing them away in 'manuals' as from 
inquiry into the ways in which each particular area [o f 
inquiry?] is basically constituted. ... The level which a 
science has reached is determined by how far it is 
capable o f a crisis in its basic concepts.
(M. Heidegger, Being and Time, section 3, 9)
Non ergo grammaticus sed philosophus proprias 
natures rerum diligenter considerans ... grammaticam 
invenit [?]
(Is it, therefore, not the grammarian but the 
philosopher, carefully considering the proper nature of 
things who discovers grammar[?])lr
The presiding aim of this thesis is to attempt to clear the conceptual ground 
such as to provide a rationale for a process-orientated and constructivist2 theoretical 
perspective on the linguistic. The base intuition to which the taking of such a 
perspective answers is that natural language has an ineliminably temporal and 
procedural dimension; that linguistic objects are only identifiable, take on their 
individuating properties and meet proper criteria for existence in psychological event. 
The suggestion is that such a temporal and procedural dimension is crucially 
constructive of the properties and identity of linguistic objects and so is involved in 
their understanding (in both senses of the ambiguity) and in their explanation. It will 
be a contention that this dimension is denied by Chomsky's originary positing of the 
object of study as a competence grammar, with its attendant denumerably infinite set 
of abstract and timeless sentence types, and to which performance factors are in a no 
more than contingent and supplementaxy relation. In veiy brief, Chomsky’s object of 
study, as has been argued by Katz et at., demands to be constiued as having a 
Platonist (or, perhaps, following Carr, an autonomist) ontological status and hence 
embarrasses the attempt to ground an explanatoiy linguistics in terms of properties of 
the mind/brain. Katz' Platonism, however, is not a solution (and nor is Can's 
autonomism) but constitutes the problem for it obstructs any attempt to explain the 
relation between the linguistic and the individual; in other words, exactly the
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relationship that Chomsky set himself the task of elucidating by pitching his enquiry at 
the level of "individual psychology". Precisely the unpalatability of a Platonism is that 
it can only perpetually defer the epistemological question (posed for mathematics by 
McCulloch and here rewritten for the linguistic case: "What is [a language], that a 
man may know if and a man, that he may know [a language]?"3) as to how a 
supposed set of always and already, mind-independent, abstract objects can come to 
be apprehended and known by fleshly denizens of this actual and time-ridden world. 
What is needed, we will suggest, is a reconceptualization of the object of study: a 
language is not so much something that we know as something that we do: in von 
Humboldt's words, "in itself language is ... an activity".4r
The way to grounding the need for such a change in theoretical perspective 
will be through a critique of the conceptual underpinnings and explanatory strategies 
of Chomsky's project for an explanatory and psychological linguistics. The point of 
this critique will be to bring to light certain inadequacies and conceptual difficulties 
attendant on the explanatory strategies and theoretical constructs posited within the 
Chomskyan paradigm. To this end we will take as our motto Chomsky’s contention 
that:
The critics task is to show some fundamental flaw in principle 
or defect in execution or to provide a different and preferable 
account.5r
In suggesting the need for an alternative conceptual foundation there is the onus on 
the proposer, on the basis of if it ain't broke don't fix it, to point out what precisely is 
broke. The hope will be that such a critique will constitute a heuristic so as to point 
toward and act as, to use a rather old-fashioned word, a prolegomenon to a more 
adequate solution.
It is somewhat contrary to fashion to privilege philosophical matters as 
opposed to the hard scientific issue of answerability to data. It is seemingly customary 
to assume, or to pretend, that the foundational problems of linguistics have been 
solved6r and that the interesting and important matters lie at some empirical coal face 
where at least some honest work is done rather than in the effete lounges of the 
philosophers.
One can readily provide a Kuhnian spin to this state of affairs: after 
Chomsky's revolution comes a period of ordinary science conducted on the basis of a
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set of more or less shared assumptions, even if this shared basis is often no more than 
implicit and mediated by a common methodology and practice. Both the confidence 
exhibited and the corresponding lack of contemplation of foundational issues are 
reasonably based on the hard results that are forthcoming and which can be cited as 
evidence for the basic correctness of the underlying assumptions. Newmeyer tells a 
story consistent with this interpretation where he cites as justification for optimism 
about the generativist enterprise the fact that we know hugely more now, at the 
obseivational level, than we did just three or four decades ago, and this despite more 
than two thousand years of previous, reasonably well-organized enquiry.7'
The state of the field is not, however, uniformly considered to be an 
unqualified success. To some the present state of play exhibits no more than 
"intellectual bankruptcy".81' One ground for disquiet is, arguably, the bewildering 
plethora of competing frameworks (there are, to pick up on our prefatoiy quotation, 
so many different and mutually incompatible "manuals"), to which one may also add 
the oscillating universe that revolves around MIT where frameworks get a complete 
overhaul on average, it seems, eveiy ten years or so. To some this diversity is a 
symptom of "health" and vibrancy, no more than an illustration of the under- 
determination of theoiy by data. However, it may equally well be construed as a 
symptom of fracture and chaos in which there are neither sufficient grounds 
evidenced by any one framework for it to be uniformly assented to, but nor, crucially 
("crucially" if we are to have a Popperian view of scientific enquiiy as conducted on 
the basis of discontinuation of theoiy), are there sufficient grounds to discount it or 
any others.
To a certain, puritan turn of mind - mine - there is something deeply 
unsatisfactoiy about a situation in which there are so many stories and no prospect of 
closure; to that turn of mind the field might come to appear as hardly distinguishable 
from gratuitous and idle talk. What licences the proliferation of frameworks (a 
symptom of vibrancy or is it crisis?) is a seemingly radical inability to make some 
reasoned decision either for or against any particular framework on the basis of the 
available empirical data. Precisely the point of focussing on meta-theoretic 
considerations is that it promises, on the one hand, to supplement the apparently 
rampant under-determination of theoiy by empirical data, and, on the other, to 
address the issue of, in Chomsky's words, "the correctness of principles employed".9 
If the conceptual underpinnings, the paradigmatic assumptions, can be shown to be 
sound or to be flawed, one is adducing strong evidence pro or con any given theory.
9
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Chomsky’s revolution, we are told, instituted a properly explanatory and 
scientific linguistics: a grammar is not merely a taxonomic device for more or less 
efficiently characterizing linguistic phenomena, but is "a theoiy of language”, which 
theoiy "constitutes an explanatory hypothesis about the form of language as such.”101 
In attempting an explanation, i.e. in relating a discrete set of phenomena to a cause, 
the received view, at least as received from Chomsky, is that linguistics is involved in 
an enterprise on a par with that of the natural sciences, in which, as noticed as far 
back as Aristotle, the mark of proper understanding, the mark of an explanation, is to 
know not only what is the case but also why it is the case. (Compare our amended 
quotation from McCulloch, above.) Arguably, it is the addressing of this latter 
question at all, just so much as the manner of its addressing, that distinguished 
Chomsky’s enterprise as revolutionary in the intellectual context of linguistics in the 
fifties.11
An explanatoiy hypothesis involves the positing, defining and elucidation of a 
proper and discrete object of study. That object is defined, in the Chomskyan 
paradigm, as an internalized, mentally represented grammar which constitutes one's 
linguistic competence; this grammar, in effect a tuple reflecting a modularization of 
the gross phenomenon and including a syntax, phonology and semantics, is "what one 
knows when one knows a language".121- The explanation of the nature of the linguistic 
invokes this knowledge relation between a speaker and a grammar: this knowledge, as 
instantiated in the mind/brain of a speaker, is what is explanatoiy of the properties of 
linguistic objects; the reason why natural languages are as they are is because of the 
nature of the knowledge instantiated by the mind/brain substrate; the explanation is in 
terms of postulated properties of the mind/brain. It is this object of study, the 
competence grammar that is the central concern of Chomsky's generativist paradigm, 
irrespective of whether or not one is entirely happy with the grammar's putative 
ontological status as a psychological entity.
The aim of what follows is to examine the set of claims and explicit, and 
sometimes implicit, assumptions that ground this enterprise and to bring to question 
the reality of the constiucts of competence-orientated, syntax privileged, linguistic 
theories. Our approach will be in the manner of a somewhat Anglo-Saxon style 
deconstruction of three central strands of Chomsky's revolution:13
1) The application of formal systems to the study of natural language and so 
the fulfilling of Bloomfield's project for the mathematization of linguistics ("to make
our linguistics a kind of maths") first aired in the twenties.14r
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2) The scientific realist construal of the linguist’s grammar, which grammar is 
offered as a theoiy providing an explanation of the nature of natural language. This 
instances a move towards a "God's truth'Vrealist interpretation of the analyses of 
linguistic phenomena as opposed to a "hocus-pocus7instrumentalist view.15r In other 
words, linguists get to attempt to say something true about language rather than simply 
invent classificatoiy and characterizing schemata: a theoiy "carries a truth claim if it is 
serious."161'
3) The move towards viewing language as a phenomenon for which an 
explanation is to be attempted and, crucially, to be attempted in terms of mind: mind 
gets reinstituted as a respectable scientific notion after its years in the Behaviourist 
wilderness and it is instituted on the basis of a concept of mental representation. This 
claim promises to enable a reduction of the linguistic to the psychological and this, in 
turn, promises to be reducible to the neurophysical and biological: linguistics is 
claimed to be a sub-branch of psychology, itself a sub-branch of biology. In positing a 
linguistic theoiy one is also positing a research program in psychology and the brain 
sciences in general.
The first strand enables the precise definition and articulation of an object of 
study, the second introduces a scientific realism in respect of that object of study 
together with a realist construal of posited theoretical constructs, and the third 
provides the object of study's, and the theoretical constructs', ontological 
characterization and enables an explanation that relates the linguistic to its putative 
causal substrate. These three strands, somewhat intertwined, provide the central 
themes, and organization, of our discussion.
11
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Footnotes.
Throughout, where a footnote cites no more than a bibliographical reference 
we will indicate this by a superscripted "r" following the footnote number.
1 Cited by Robins (1967, pg. 86) from a collection of mediaeval linguistic writings (Thurot (1867)).
2 "Constructivist" is a term borrowed from the philosophy of mathematics (Bishop, (1967), this 
following on from Brouwer's intuitionism). The term has both methodological and ontological 
implications: the constructivist in mathematics is suspicious of completed infinite sets and, 
correlatively, of methods of proof that result in the positing of objects that are deemed to exist but 
which cannot be individuated; in other words, objects which cannot be definitively indicated: "when a 
man proves a positive integer to exist, he should show how to find it" (Bishop, 1967). Showing how 
to find it, i.e. some demonstration of how it is to be found/constructed, is criterial for the content of an 
existence claim. For an account of the issues and of the origins of the constructivist/intuitionist 
perspective see M. Kline, (1972 and 1980).
W. McCulloch (1965), cited in S. Dehaene (1998, pg. 231). It is something of a mathematical 
counterpart to, and amplification of, Chomsky's (1986) question as to "what [it is] we know when we 
know a language?"
4 W. von Humboldt (1970, pg. 27).
5 N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 12.)
 ^The point was made in a talk given by J. Katz at SOAS in October, 1994 and repeated by him more 
recently (J. Katz, 1996, pg. 277).
7 F. Newmeyer (1983, pg. 49). The same point is expressed by Chomsky (1986, Chapter 1).
® N. L. Love (1988), cited in R. Harre and R. Harris (eds.) (1993, pg 14).
 ^ Chomsky remarks (1980, pg. 11): "Substantial coverage of data is not a particularly significant 
result; it can be attained in many ways and the result is not very informative as to the correctness of 
the principles employed."
10 N. Chomsky, (1965, pg. 27, and 1980, pg. 109).
H The anti-explanationism of much of pre-Chomskyan, fifties' linguistics is quite overt: "Anything in 
our description that sounds like explanation is simply loose talk." (M. Joos, 1957)
12 N. Chomsky, (1986).
Compare Chomsky's own retrospective sketch (1991, pg. 21).
14 L. Bloomfield (1926).
^  The phrases are F. Householder's (1952) in his review of Z. Hanis (1951). The terms "realist" and 
"instrumentalist" will be provided with some definition below.
^  N. Chomsky (1980, pg. 109).
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CHAPTER I.
The Mathematization of Linguistics,
No one should be afraid that the contemplation o f  
characters will distract us from things, on the contrary 
it will take us to their very heart
(Leibniz).
He proves by algebra that Hamlet's grandson is 
Shakespeare's grandfather and that he himself is the 
ghost o f his own father.
(Joyce, Ulysses).
Then came the revelation. Marini saw the rose as 
Adam might have seen it in the Garden o f Eden, and 
he understood that ... we can refer to or evoke, but 
never express, and that the high and splendid volumes 
... were not (as his vanity had dreamt) a mirror o f the 
world, but one more object added to the world.
(Borges).
My symbolical expression was really a mythological 
description o f the use o f a ride.
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 221.)
1.0 What is a linguistic theory to be about? Carving the world at its joints.
An initial problem for any systematic scientific study is the identification of its 
subject matter: there is always an indefinitely large number of facts, the difficulty lies 
in selecting some subset, the members of which promise to be able to be tied together 
by some unifying account. It is also to be noted that any selection constitutes a 
substantive theoretical claim about the world. In identifying a phenomenon, or general 
area of enquiry, we are already carving the phenomenal world at joints that are 
suggested by whatever categories that we use to apprehend and discriminate between 
the things that we notice.
For example, let's say, in a very pie-scientific way, that we are interested in 
creatures that live in water. We are already, in suggesting that we need a theory drawn
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on such lines, making a substantive claim - a claim itself suggested by the categories of 
a pre-scientific apprehension - and we are also, should we attempt a theoiy that takes 
notice of this categorization, taking a wrong direction. In making this point we are 
merely rehearsing the consensual view of the theory-relativity of observational 
statements. In this case, our observation of creatures in terms of an aquatic/non- 
aquatic distinction is relative to a mistaken theory. It turns out that this manner of 
categorization, while certainly objective, caives the world at neither proper nor 
illuminating joints. Whales live in water, but they are to be better understood in 
respect of their classification as mammals: the aquatic/non-aquatic distinction is not, it 
turns out, an explanatorily productive categorization. Of course, we succeed in getting 
it eventually right, or at least less false, only by initially making such wrong moves. 
What is crucial is that there are means available by which the error can be recognized. 
This, in effect, requires that alternative ways to conceptualize are, or can be made, 
available. One might think of theoiy development as involved in the construction and 
deployment of such means, so re-aligning or reconfiguring categorization and 
providing us with, as it were, alternative spectacles by which to look at the world. As 
we will elaborate below, a central role in such re-alignment and initiation of new 
discourses is played by metaphor.1
For a more sophisticated example of reassessment of pre-scientific categories, 
consider the notion of a fish. Gould points out that membership of some species in 
this pre-scientific category depends on the criteria, what we have figured as 
"spectacles", applied to the task of determining taxonomy. For cladists in biology, for 
whom taxonomy is determined in respect of evolutionaiy branching order and shar ed 
and derived characteristics, it turns out that really "there is no such thing as a fish".2r
The issue is not, unfortunately, quite so clear cut, for while this conclusion "is 
undoubtedly true as an expression of branching order in time ... [, it might be asked 
whether] classifications must be based only on cladistic information." Which is to ask 
either of two questions: is a cladistic taxonomy in fact a case of getting it right, are 
there some better, more accurate spectacles? or, is there one and only one way of 
getting it right, must there be one and only one correct taxonomy? The assumption 
that there is, is the assumption that underlies the standard construal of the scientific 
enterprise: the sciences standardly understand themselves as making truth claims, 
where truth consists in getting it right in relation - a correspondence relation - to how 
the world is in itself.3
For our present purposes, however, the moral of the story is that the world 
does not come ready-labelled with directions as to which conceptualizations, and so
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which sets of phenomena, constitute discrete and proper domains that will admit of a 
unitary explanation. The manner in which we categorize and conceptualize the world 
is no guarantee of how the world is in itself: the joints that our initial and pre-scientific 
conceptual scheme (or "folk theories") carve may not correspond to how the world in 
itself is carved, nor reflect what things there are in the world. One might figur e 
science as an enterprise which is concerned with verifying the correspondence of 
some prior conceptual scheme with how the world actually is, and possibly, indeed 
usually, disabusing us of our pre-scientific folk-theories.4 In our illustrative case from 
biology, science parcels the world into different subsets of phenomena than those of a 
pre-scientific apprehension. A correlative observation is that:
Concepts that have proved useful for ordering things 
easily assume so great an authority over us that we 
forget their' terrestrial origin and accept them as 
unalterable facts.51-
The point is that:
Our intuitive assumptions, and even what seems 
phenomenologically obvious, may be misconceived and 
may thus undergo reconfiguration as new theory 
emerges....61-
These remarks may be taken as a preliminary sketch such as to remind us that 
there is an issue regarding how the gr oss phenomenon of the pre-theoretic linguistic is 
apprehended, and correlatively carved, by some conceptual scheme: there is no 
unrevisable and non-negotiable phenomenological given. The task, now, is to provide 
some finer detail in respect of the assumptions and conceptual apparatus that ground 
Chomsky’s project for linguistics and to remind ourselves of their "terrestrial origin". 
In doing so we will be implementing a set of methodological criteria of meta-theoretic 
accountability - "a principle of irreduction" - that recognizes, in Sellars' phrase "the 
myth of the given",7r that there is no theoretical innocence:
[This principle] mandates that no theoretical 
assumption - empirical premise, ontological framework, 
analytic device, investigative equipment, mathematical 
technique or other methodological paraphernalia - be 
given a priori pride of place. Every piece of 
metatheoretic apparatus should be "left open" in order
15
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to be subjected to critical assessment .... Unless one is 
willing to adopt this strict standard of suspicion, 
ontological biases and unwarranted metaphysical 
assumptions will slip through and derail subsequent 
analysis.81'
This principle suggests, for any theoretical assumption or piece of conceptual 
apparatus, some possible lines of enquiry. These may be expressed in terms of a 
commercial metaphor:
a) Where it was bought (its original home);
b) Why it was bought (the problem addressed); and
c) What is the cost, initially and in maintenance (the consequences);
These lines of enquiry - what they amount to in detail will emerge - will 
constitute a loose agenda for our previously canvassed "Anglo-Saxon deconstruction" 
of the Chomskyan paradigm.
2.0 Instituting an object of study: the formal system metaphor.
The initial problem for a scientific linguistics is to isolate and identify out of 
what Saussure calls "un amas confus de choses heteroclites", which constitutes the 
eveiyday, common-sense and vague notion of "language", those aspects which are 
susceptible to a systematic and explanatoiy account.9r A similar observation of the 
scientific uselessness of the everyday conception of the linguistic is made by 
Chomsky: "it involves too many disparate and obscure concerns and interests. This is 
why [it] is useless for actual enquiiy", "'language* is no well-defined concept of 
linguistic science".101- In respect of this it is needful "to determine the nature of the 
object [linguistics is] studying, ... without this elementary operation a science cannot 
develop an appropriate method. "1:lr
For both Saussure and Chomsky the solution is to postulate an abstract system 
of underlying formal entities and the rules that mediate and relate those entities. The 
system that is posited, Saussure's la longue, Chomsky's competence grammar/I- 
language, is to be rigorously distinguished from all that is external to it, la parole, 
performance/E-language:
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In separating langue from parole we are separating 
what is social from what is individual and what is 
essential from what is ancillary or accidental.12r
Interestingly, while the Saussurean dichotomy instituted a productive enquiry 
into phonological systems, as instanced in the European structuralist tradition, a 
correspondingly productive syntactic enquiry was not also forthcoming. Chomsky 
suggests that this was because:
[Saussure] regards langue as basically a store of signs 
with their grammatical properties .... He was thus quite 
unable to come to grips with the recursive processes 
underlying sentence formation, and he appears to 
regard sentence formation as a matter of parole rather 
than langue, of fr ee and voluntary creation rather than 
systematic rule. There is no place in his scheme for 
"rule-governed creativity" of the kind involved in the 
ordinary everyday use of language.131’
Arguably, what Saussure lacked was the conceptual means to realize and 
articulate the idea of rule-govemed creativity, i.e. the perceived systematicity of that 
creativity. Indeed, this creativity (Humboldt’s "infinite use of finite means") is cited by 
Chomsky, in his early writings, as "the central fact to which any significant linguistic 
theoiy must address itself. "14r It was arguably this lack that constituted an obstacle to 
the institution and development of a syntax based on Saussurean foundations. It was 
the development of such a conceptual apparatus in the field of mathematical logic, 
specifically Post’s theoiy of recursive functions,15r that was enabling of a systematic 
and explanatoiy syntactic theoiy. (This was, in terms of our commercial metaphor, 
where the apparatus was purchased.) What was made available was a means, 
apparently, to capture just this systematic creativity, this putative central fact.16 The 
privileging of this phenomenon, revised (see footnote 16) as the means to creativity, is 
what selected for the formal conceptual apparatus. However, for those of suspicious 
mind, the obverse case might be made: it was not the phenomenon that selected an 
appropriate apparatus, rather the apparatus selected for the central explanandum and 
this has then illicitly been construed as an unnegotiable given:
[Chomsky] picked out for inclusion within his 
explanatoiy theoiy just those aspects of language which 
lent themselves to expression within the terms of a 
formal theory.17
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The point is anticipated by Saussure, and is a corollary of his observation of the 
heterogeneous muddle which, seemingly, is resistant to providing any central and 
privileged facts for explanation, anything that is phenomenologically salient:
Far from it being the case that the object precedes the 
point of view, rather one would say that it is the point 
of view that creates the object.181'
In brief, the Chomskyan paradigm and its privileged object of study - syntactic 
competence - was instituted on the basis of, in Lakoffs phrase, a "formal system 
metaphor for gr ammar". It is this "point of view" - not only an apparatus but also an 
attitude to that apparatus - that "creates the object" with a correlative "commitment to 
tty to understand natural language in terms of such [formal] systems".191* It is this 
commitment with its associated carving of the gross phenomenon, the everyday 
muddle, which, in terms of our commercial metaphor, constitutes the cost of the 
project. What we shall be concerned with is detailing this cost and in asking whether it 
is adequately redeemed; whether that created object answers to some real object in the 
real world.
2.1 Formal systems.
Before taking up these issues, it will be useful to sketch out the notions of a 
formal system and of a model for a formal system, the notions that are central to 
"deductively formulated theory", the manner of theory institution and development in 
the generativist paradigm.20
The concept of a formal system derives from Hilbert's formalist project for 
mathematics. This project was intended as a response to a perceived crisis in the 
foundations of the subject induced by a recognition of the problematic relation 
between mathematics and reality, i.e. between mathematics and what mathematics had 
been confidently assumed, since the time of Pythagoras, to be about; i.e. the real 
world. The source of the problem was the development of non-Euclidean geometries 
in the nineteenth century.
To illustrate:21r the non-Euclidean systems put forward independently, but 
more or less contemporaneously, by Gauss, Lobachevsky and Bolyai all shared the 
standard axioms of Euclidean geometry with the exception of the fifth, the parallels 
axiom. Proceeding on the assumption of the falsity of this axiom, each arrived at a
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different and consistent system. The puzzle that resulted comes from asking the 
question as to which system is tine, or, equivalently, asking what, if anything, each 
system is about. Euclidean geometry had been assumed to be about (the real forms of) 
the real world, understood intuitively in terms of lines and planes. However, from the 
perspective of these new systems - sharing, with the aforementioned exception, the 
same axioms and so, presumably in respect of these axioms, the same content, (i.e. 
these systems should also be about lines and planes) - these contents of the shared 
axioms have to be reinterpreted: in the case of spherical geometry "line" becomes 
"large circle" and "plane" becomes "sphere’s surface". What begins to appear is a 
separation of formal, proof-theoretic properties, from intuitive content; the formal 
properties of the axioms seem to be independent of any particular content ascribed to 
them: the same axioms appear to be about different and mutually exclusive things; 
their foimal properties underdetermine their content. But then, it might be asked, what 
is geometiy about, what is its contact with the world and with which world, for there 
seems to be a plurality of worlds which it can be construed to be about? But is there 
not only one world? The net result was, to quote the title of Kline's book, a "loss of 
certainty" and a loss of confidence in mathematical reasoning as pro\dding a window 
on the world, as providing truth. Another result was subsequent attempts to resecure 
the real world foundations of mathematics elsewhere than in geometiy.
The direction taken, by Dedekind and Weierstrass, was to attempt to posit 
arithmetic as providing that alternative foundation. The point of Frege's, and Russell 
and Whitehead's, logicist project was, in turn, to supply an indubitable foundation for 
arithmetic by deriving it from the logical operations of set theory: the notion of a set 
supplies the intuitive content, the operations of set theory are identified with logical 
relations22 and logic is supposed to be indubitable. What, famously, stymied this move 
was Russell's paradox (amongst others). As Quine has remarked in a different 
connection, paradoxes "pack a punch". In this case a punch that was catastrophic to 
the whole logicist project, for what the paradoxes show is that there is a fundamental 
contradiction in the notion of a set upon which notion the new and secure foundations 
were to be raised. The result that fell out from the discoveiy of non-Euclidean 
geometiy was replicated:
The existence of these and other paradoxes served to 
widen the gulf between mathematics and reality ....
Now one saw that statements could be made in the 
language of mathematics which could not correspond 
to any situation in the real world.231'
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Hilbert’s solution to such ’’intolerable" problems, i.e. problems deriving from 
the content/semantics of foundational notions, was to release mathematics from the 
burden of having any content at all: mathematics is not true of anything, but is to be 
considered as concerned with the study of meaningless symbols.245- It is a view that 
was rehearsed by Wittgenstein: "All mathematical propositions mean the same thing, 
namely nothing. "25r In the light of this, the task of the mathematician is to:
lay down symbols and at the same time prescribe the 
rules according to which they must be combined; these 
rules suffice to characterize these symbols and to give 
them a mathematical value. [The mathematician] 
creates mathematical entities by means of arbitrary 
conventions, in the same way that the several chessmen 
are defined by the conventions which govern their 
moves and relations between them.261
The outcome is a concept of mathematics and, when this approach is extended 
to logic, a concept of formal systems in general, that are content neutral. To put this 
another way, we get an autonomy of syntax (the set of symbols and their combination 
into formulae under systematic and prescribed rule) from semantics, i.e. an autonomy 
of syntax from (sets of) objects of the real world that might supply the interpretations 
of the syntactic terms. What also appears, if such systems are to have any application 
through reference to real world phenomena, is the need for a means to specify 
content. What we get is the notion of a model, i.e. some structured set of entities, the 
members of which set act as the referents/interpretation of the syntactic terms of a 
formal system by way of a function mapping from a calculus' teims onto the 
individual entities of the model (and sets of entities and sets of sets of entities).
It is this idea which is at the heart of deductively formulated theory: 
predictions about the behaviour of real world phenomena are articulated through 
some calculus, through a set of purely formal (i.e. syntactic) operations together with 
a function mapping symbols to entities. If the formal system is up to the job of 
explicating the real world phenomena under study, (i.e. the real world, some subset of 
it, is taken as supplying the model for the formal system), then the behaviour of, and 
relations between, the entities in the model as supplied by these real world entities 
should keep step with the purely formal operations. This in the sense that, given an 
interpreting function, the formal operations express/predict the nature of the relations 
between the entities of the model. All the work is done in the formalism/syntax and it
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is through the formalism/syntax that some phenomenon gets explicated, that some 
understanding is articulated.
In linguistics the notion of a model and of a mapping between formal terms 
and entities works on two axes: a syntactic - where the formalism's terms are mapped 
onto objects that have syntactic content - and a semantic - where those pairings of the 
formalism's terms with natural language syntactic objects are themselves mapped onto 
meanings. The application of a foimal system to natural language (i.e. having natural 
language as the model that interprets a formal system), involves a claim about the 
nature of natural language: that it can be understood as itself constituted on the same 
pattern as a formal language, and hence also consists of a syntax that is discrete of a 
semantics.
A formal system is initially neutral as to its subject matter/applications, i.e. as 
to what it gets to have as a model. Initially it is no more than a syntax. It is not about 
syntax (e.g. of natural language); it is not, indeed, about anything, it is just a system of 
symbols. For a calculus to be interpreted as being about natural language there has to 
be a function mapping the terms of the calculus onto some model, some set of 
entities. In the case of a generativist grammar the calculus’ terms are interpreted by 
sets of lexical and constituent items; for example, a symbol, let’s say N, is mapped 
onto the set {cat, dog, house, which set is itself no more than a set of symbols.271- 
Distinct of this mapping and, as it were orthogonal to it, is the function that provides 
semantic content/meaning to the symbols (where "symbols" is usefully ambiguous 
between calculus and natural language symbols). This is the task taken up by 
Montague's model-theoretic project for semantic theory.
2.2 Theory constitutive metaphors, realism, instrumentalism and formal systems.
The importance of metaphor and the nature of its role in the development of 
scientific theories has come to be stressed in recent years:
There exists an important class of metaphors which 
play an important role in the development and 
articulation of theories in science.... They are used to 
introduce theoretical terminology where none 
previously existed.28
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Such "theoiy constitutive metaphors" accommodate our available conceptual 
apparatus "to the causal structure of the world", they provide a certain epistemic 
access and so institute and enable a domain of discourse by hypothesizing that one 
can understand the previously ill-understood by transposing onto it, and thereby 
articulating it, in terms of the properties of the well-understood. To borrow again 
Wittgenstein's image, such metaphors are like pairs of spectacles which enable us to 
ascribe, or at least hypothesize, properties to whatever we are looking at. Fundamental 
to these remarks is the observation that hypothesis formation is limited by and limited 
to the set of concepts (spectacles) that are ready to hand: "it is undeniable that the 
patterns we can make explicit are limited by the material available to our 
imaginations. "29r
A useful informal example is the metaphor of mind as computer. We 
understand computers and we do not understand minds. By hypothesizing the mind 
as a computer we institute a research program which is designed to test the extent to 
which the metaphoricity can be removed, to test whether, indeed, the mind can be 
understood in computational terms. Note that, in the same movement, one also 
implicitly carves the phenomenon of mind at some joint, i.e. precisely at the 
parameters that are defined by the computational model, for example one invokes a 
distinction between program and algorithm. One can note in the literature a tendency 
(strong AI) to excise the metaphoricity, to take the hypothesis as confirmed, and to 
more or less assume that the mental is coterminous with the computational: if some 
phenomenon cannot be explicated in computational terms then its not mental. The 
sceptical rejoinder30r is standardly to point out that this leaves out some crucial 
element (usually qualia, the "feel" of mental experience) which is evidence either that 
the computational metaphor is simply mistaken, or that it has to be supplemented. 
Either way, the computational metaphor carves the phenomenon of mind at joints that 
are at least questionably in correspondence with the nature of the actual phenomenon. 
On the positive side, adherents can point to the productivity of the primary metaphor, 
its "heuristic fertility" in instituting a domain of discourse whereof before we had to 
remain silent.
These remarks raise a central issue in respect of the institution of a domain of 
discourse by way of some theory constitutive metaphor: whether the initial, heuristic 
metaphoricity is eliminable, and whether there is sufficient warrant for its elimination. 
The issue is that of (dis-)confhmation of hypotheses, where those hypotheses are 
taken to be making a realist truth claim. The elimination of the metaphoricity marks
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the movement from a discourse regarded as an instrument, as a means to talk about 
and characterize some phenomenon, to that discourse being regarded as providing an 
account that is true because corresponding to facts of the matter, which facts are 
inherent to the object of enquiry.31 It is the movement, in short, from hocus pocus to 
God's truth, to a theoiy being taken as true because that theoiy corresponds to how 
the world in fact is. Grounds that may be, and frequently are, adduced for this 
movement being precisely the "heuristic fertility" alluded to above.32 The claim here is 
that a study would not achieve success, we would not be able to say so much, so 
apparently accurately, on the basis of merely a metaphor. (But then again, to get 
ahead of ourselves a little, the same claim to heuristic fertility could be made for our 
categoiy of fish, a categoiy to which, it can be argued, nothing, in fact, answers.)
To use some conceptual apparatus as a metaphor and means to do no more 
than institute talk of some object is harmless, it is no more than to characterize. 
Typically, the sciences understand themselves (and the Chomskyan paradigm 
understands itself - "a theoiy carries a truth claim if it is serious"331) as attempting 
more than characterization, more than talk about some object, rather they attempt 
some expression of properties that are inherent to the object under study. The realist 
assumption is that there are determinate and determinable, mind-independent facts of 
the matter, the discoveiy of which is what counts as getting it right. In the case of 
linguistics, it is just this move from a construal of the enterprise as a characterizing 
enterprise to one which aims for, and supposes the propriety of, a realist interpretation 
that is the second in our list of the principle strands of Chomsky's revolution. It is the 
achievement of adequate warrant for such a realist construal (the redemption of the 
cost of the initial metaphor) with which we will be much concerned.
The distinction between these two construals of the linguistic enterprise is 
reflected in the distinct perspectives which realism (the "God's truth" view) and 
instrumentalism ("hocus-pocus") have in regard of theory-articulating calculi. Realism 
involves the belief that:
the world [is] a totality of language[/calculus]- 
independent things, a totality which is fixed once and 
for all, and, ... , one (and only one) reference relation 
connecting our words[/notation] with that totality is 
supposed to be singled out by the veiy way we 
understand our language[/calculus].34r
Consequently, in respect of a calculus, realism requires, in the linguistic case, that:
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the constants abstracted in an analysis, if the analysis is 
correct, are in some way inherent in the actual material 
of the language under analysis. [When the realism is 
given a psychological ontology, then these constants] 
are part of the content of the speakers' minds or 
brains.351'
On the other hand, an instrumentalism towards a theoiy (which need not be 
accompanied by a corresponding anti-realist metaphysics) involves no such 
correspondence between the terms of a calculus and any putative real entities:
the linguist's abstractions have no other status than as 
part of his scientific terminology, and are justified by 
their utility in stating regularities and making predictions 
about the forms of utterances ...36r
In linguistics, as we have canvassed, a formal system provides a conceptual 
apparatus that, in, as it were, seeking a model, makes possible a domain of theoretic 
discourse by way of the terms and relations of some calculus being hypothesized to 
refer to entities, and relations between those entities, in some real world phenomenal 
domain. This hypothesized domain, as articulated by way of a foimal system (together 
with an interpreting function), canies with it both external and internal 
phenomenological boundaries. In the former case, this is by carving a discrete 
phenomenological domain from the manifold phenomenological world (e.g. we are 
deciding to talk about language, not physics). In the latter case, we are making internal 
distinctions and positing constructs that interpret the teims of the calculus within the 
selected domain. Such hypothesized "joints", the costs of deploying formal systems, 
need to be redeemed, which is to say, they cannot be assumed, without some further 
argument, as givens, but must be available to question.
For example, simply because we have well-defined notions of syntax and 
semantics provided by the study of foimal systems does not mean that, necessarily, 
nor even that we should expect, some real world object to answer to that pattern. Such 
would be to assume that, because we have a concept or some conceptual apparatus, 
then there must be something in the world to which it refers and by virtue of which 
the concept has meaning (consider phlogiston or unicorns, for example, or, more 
pertinently, the concept of a fish or some areas of mathematics that have no known 
application).37 To make such an assumption would be to assume that the world is 
prefigured by, and designed on, the model of our conceptual scheme. To borrow a
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phrase of Chomsky's, it would be to institute an enquiry into a system of the real 
world on the assumption that the world conforms to some sort of "virtual conceptual 
necessity",38 as if the world is guaranteed to provide models for axiomatic systems, as 
if we already see such models there independently of theoiy. Certainly, such a 
demarcation carves language at some joint, but the joint is that of the conceptual 
scheme we apply to the task of talking about the object of study. The question is 
whether it corresponds to the joints the world carves in itself, and so to the properties 
of some real world object. Alternatively, and what might bring to question our use of 
the term "metaphor" in respect of formal systems, is whether any credence and 
content can be given to this notion of conceptual necessity.
Deferring this latter question for the moment, and anticipating the answer to 
be in the negative, the conclusion we are drawn to is a rehearsal and reinforcement of 
the observation of the lack of unrevisable, pre-theoretical givens. In acknowledging 
this, we may also notice what is, perhaps, most remarkable; that is the extent to which 
the substantive truth-claim that is brought in by way of Chomsky's foundational 
metaphor (i.e. that natural language is designed on the model of a formal language) 
has come to appear so natural, so seemingly indefeasible - at least to (many) linguists - 
somewhat in the manner of a linguistic counterpart to the commonsense categoiy of 
fish: in this latter case, it seems we just cannot help but see things, despite what 
biology might tell us, in terms of that categorization. In linguistics the result of a 
similar reflex is, arguably, that the metaphoricity is forgotten and the truth claim that is 
made on the back of the formal system metaphor takes on the appearance of an 
indefeasible obviousness. To reprise Wittgenstein's remark, it is rather as if we forget 
that we are wearing certain conceptual spectacles and, at the same time, it is to 
reinstitute some given, forgetting that any given is likely to be no more than a myth.
The point is made by Putnam. It is simply not the case that the models that are 
the interpretation of formal systems, the referents of theoretical terms, are simply 
stumbled across in the world, as if we do, indeed, already see them there, because 
they are there, piior to theoiy. Rather the entities and phenomenological parameters 
that supply the content of formal systems are projected/hypothesized onto the world 
by our theories; the models themselves are products of the human mind, there is no 
direct access onto the world in itself:
Models are not lost noumenal waifs looking for 
someone to name them; they are constructions within 
our theory itself, and they have names fi om birth.3 9r
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When understood, initially at least, as metaphors, the constructs and 
demarcations brought in by way of a discourse articulated through formal systems 
amount to no more than, and no less than, hypotheses. As such there is nothing to 
which exception may be taken, at least there can be no objection so long as such 
hypotheses remain available for disconfiimation and are not simply assumed. The 
question, and so the possible grounds for disquiet, is whether a postulated 
object/model, a competence grammar, can be sufficiently discerned (the condition on 
it being possibly disconfiimed) as some real, independently existing, theoiy-extemal 
object. Such would fail to be the case (and we will argue that it does fail to be the 
case) if the data were, in practice, insufficient to, or precluded from, the task of 
disconfiimation; for example if the data, and any possible data, were interpretable by 
the theoiy so as always to lit the theoiy. The result would be that rather than the 
investigation properly asking what is required of the formal apparatus if it is to 
correspond to the facts, instead the converse would apply and the object of study 
would be required, and would be interpreted, to conform to, i.e. satisfy, the 
parameters and terms of a calculus. Any apparent success of the theoiy would be 
achieved by way of answering to an object of study which is itself an artefact of the 
theoiy and of the conceptual apparatus through which the theoiy is articulated: the 
object of study would indeed, to reprise Saussure, be created by the linguist, but 
would be no more than the creation of the linguist, because not answering to, and this 
because, as it will turn out, it is insulated from answering to, any real world object. In 
short, it would be no more than a fiction.
The point is quite general:
Suppose an account unquestioningly relies on some 
category a  - by blindly imposing it, deferring to it, 
reducing other phenomena to it, or in any other way 
using it without explanation. It is not too much of a 
stretch to realize that the ontology [and properties] of 
the target subject matter is liable as a result to be biased 
in a's favour.... Thus if one is committed to the use of 
mathematical methods, chances are that one will find 
the phenomena in one's area of inquiry to be of the sort 
to which mathematical methods apply. If one is 
pretheoretically committed to formal methods, certain 
kinds of ambiguity are less likely to be accorded 
theoretical centrality. ...
What is at issue, especially when the ontological 
status of the subject matter is fragile, is any a priori or
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advance commitment to such categories. ... To give 
prior allegiance to any such categories or techniques is 
prejudice, in the sense of being "pre-judged."40
To investigate these issues, we need, firstly, to substantiate our claim as to the 
initial metaphoricity of any formal system, and, secondly, to examine more closely the 
role of formal calculi in the development of linguistic theories. This will amount to an 
enquiiy into the manner that the forgetting of the metaphoricity, and so "the myth of 
the given", takes in Chomskyan linguistic theoiy. In chapter H we take up the issue of 
conditions to be met such as to provide some confidence in the possible excision of 
the metaphoricity and so the possibility of a realist construal of a scientific theoiy.
3.0 Theorizing Galilean stvle: formal systems and metaphysical realism.
The use of foimal calculi in linguistic theorizing is paralleled by the reliance on 
the modelling ability of mathematics in much of the natural sciences. This style of 
theory construction Chomsky refers to as Galilean.41r Underlying the emphasis on the 
mathematization of science is, in some cases, an almost mystical belief in the ability of 
mathematics to articulate the real, inherent-to-the-object nature of things, a sort of 
latter-day "all things are of number" Pythagoreanism:
Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe, 
which stands open to our gaze. But the book cannot be 
understood unless one first leams to comprehend the 
language and read the letters in which it is composed. It 
is written in the language of mathematics.... (Galileo42)
While the idiom of the above might be thought somewhat quaint, it is a 
position that still has adherents, unsurprisingly, perhaps, more frequently amongst 
mathematicians:
Einstein was not just noticing "patterns" in the 
behaviour of physical objects. He was uncovering a 
profound mathematical substructure that was already 
hidden in the very workings of the world 43r
(As we will note, this is not a universally accepted interpretation of the status of 
mathematics, Einstein, for one, appears to dissent.)
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The remarkable success of this Galilean approach to science raises a deep 
question as to why, apparently, mathematics allows such access into the nature of 
things; what is it that gives rise to "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in 
the natural sciences"?44
One answer that might be suggested goes as follows: somewhat in keeping 
with the above quotations, God (either literally or in the guise of creation) is a 
mathematician and mathematical forms, the object of His contemplation, prefigure the 
structure of the world. That world is determinate, containing a totality of objects of 
which the properties are mind-independent; furthermore, that world's structures and 
objects are (perhaps not exhaustively) determinable by us through the identity of our 
language, in this case mathematics, with the language of the world's design which is, 
as it were, written in the world. Mathematics is a transparent language and gives 
directly onto the world. Truth, on this scheme, is a relation of correspondence 
between language and things, and the corresponding theoiy of meaning is 
unreservedly referential (compare footnote 37). To give this view a label we may call 
it (mathematical) metaphysical realism. It is this view, we will suggest, that underlies, 
in the sense of supplies the metaphysics of, the Chomskyan paradigm. Interpretably, it 
is this implicit metaphysics that gives rise to what we aim to show amounts to the 
Chomskyan paradigm’s unreasonable reliance on formal calculi in linguistics; a 
reliance which amounts to a forgetting of their metaphoricity by way of an illicit 
conceptual necessity, as if the world has to conform to some available idea of it as 
articulated by a formal calculus.
The above answer to the question of the effectiveness of mathematics raises a 
further question as to how we sublunary beings get to be in any sort of knowledge 
relation with these mathematical forms that prefigure the world and which the world 
instantiates. (As Einstein remarked, and Chomsky has echoed (1980, pgs. 7 ff), what 
is deeply mysterious about the world is its very understandability.) Plato supplies a 
somewhat mystical answer: these forms are mirrored in our "pristine nature", "the 
motions akin to the divine part in us are the thoughts and revolutions of the 
universe."45 It is an answer worth mentioning because it gets recapitulated by 
Chomsky, only the mysticism is dressed up in a biological guise: the success of the 
Galilean style in the natural sciences might result "from chance convergence of 
biological properties of the human mind with some aspect of the real world."46 It 
seems we need to invoke such "clouds of biological glory'" (Ryle's phrase) to account 
for the fit between our conceptual apparatus and the world which we figure through
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that apparatus. (The same role as Ryle's clouds have (i.e. as explanans and so 
guarantor of a correspondence between mind/language and reality, as guarantor of 
some form of conceptual necessity), is, in idealist metaphysics, played by God in His 
Greek guise as Aoyoo - see, for example, Leibniz' Monadology. God is also, of 
course, what allows Descartes to dispel his epistemological doubts.) However, this 
need for divinity, mysticism or chance in account of this fit, indeed, the very cogency 
of asking the question about this fit, is sufficient to provoke the possibility of the 
suspicion, that it is, in fact, illusory; that our conceptual apparatus is not an 
undistorting minor of the world, but rather, in line with Putnam's contention (and 
Borges' distinctly post-modern revelation (see the prefatory quotation)), it is one more 
object added to the world and that "our way of understanding the world ... is an 
imposition of our conceptual schemes upon external reality".47 This suggests an 
alternative and more sceptical response to the question raised by Wigner's observation 
of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics: that the fit between
mathematics/formal systems and the world is, or can be granted to be, no more than 
apparent: it does not reveal the inherent-to-the-world properties, but rather provides 
us only with, in Wittgenstein's phrase, a "mythological description"; that is a world 
interpreted in terms of our interests, in terms of our means to gain epistemic access, 
and being the only means it is mistaken, when conjoined with the natural impulse to a 
metaphysical realism, for the world in itself.48r
3.1 The problem for (mathematical) metaphysical realism: why a calculus as 
metaphor: whv there is no conceptual necessity.
It is often implied that the correlation of mathematical systems with the 
physical world is absolute and exact, hence the apparent "miracle of the 
appropriateness of the language of mathematics to the formulation of the laws of 
physics".491- It is this observation which grounds the Galilean/Penrose view, expressed 
above, that the world is (with a rninimum of metaphoricity) mathematics, that the 
mathematical representation of the world (i.e. the models that interpret mathematical 
systems) can be more or less conflated with real-world, mind-independent 
phenomena. And it can be so conflated, goes the reasoning, because the world is 
inherently informed (in the sense of "given form") by mathematics; nature is 
intrinsically mathematical: a mathematical system uncovers, because it is identical 
with, Penrose's profound substructure, hiterpretably, a similarly metaphysical realist
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view is evident in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: a mathematical "picture" of the world is 
correct when the logical structure of die mathematical language/notation corresponds 
to the structure of what is depicted:
There must be something identical in a picture, and 
what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the 
other at all.50r
"The logico-syntactical forms [of the notation] minor the metaphysical forms of the 
objects they stand for."51r It is a simple step from this to taking it that the reason why 
a mathematical calculus achieves "coverage" is because that calculus correctly mirrors 
these metaphysical forms, which fonns are inherent in the object represented. What is 
enabling of the "coverage" is the sharing of the same "metaphysical forms". In such a 
manner the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics is "explained" by the language 
of mathematics being construed, (forgive the grandiloquence,) as the language of 
Creation.
There is, as advertised, some quite authoritative (Einstein's) dissension from 
this view:
So far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they 
are not certain. And so far as they are certain they do 
not refer to reality.52
What undermines confidence in the identity of the truths of mathematics and 
of nature, and so what damages the transparency of the relation between mathematics 
and the natural world, and damages the view that the world conforms to some 
mathematical (or formal system) conceptual necessity, is the plurality of axiomatic 
systems in account of the properties of the same set of objects or phenomena and, 
conversely, the plurality of sets of entities that satisfy (are potential models of) any 
one axiomatic system.53 Indeed, it is this veiy plurality that requires a reinterpretation 
of mathematical calculi as non-transparent, as related to the world only through some 
(or several) interpretative function mapping terms onto entities. (Note that these 
remarks ar e a formal science counterpart to our previous discussion of the informal 
categoiy of fish.)
To reprise, with a slightly different modulation, our previous discussion: what 
brought to question the apparently direct epistemic access onto the world provided by 
axiomatic systems was the development of non-Euclidean geometries. These several
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different geometries fit spatial experience equally well. If it is claimed for one of these 
geometries that it reflects some intrinsic mathematical substructure of reality, then 
cannot this also be claimed for the other geometries? But then, there can be only one 
such real substructure: not all, indeed not more than one, can be true in the sense of 
corresponding to some mathematical substructure inherent in world objects. But if all 
are indistinguishable in respect of truth, then this infects the idea of the metaphysical 
reality of mathematics, that some mathematical system is properly tine, intrinsically of 
some aspect of the world.
This plurality of geometries was duplicated in the twenties in the field of logic 
with the demonstration (by Lukasiewicz, Post and Tarski) that there could exist any 
number of consistent logics based on different axioms. The upshot, according to 
Church, is that:
We do not [and can not] attach any character of 
uniqueness or absolute truth to any particular system of 
logic ... We may draw the analogy of a three 
dimensional geometry used in describing physical space 
... there may be, and actually are, more than one 
geometry whose use is feasible in describing physical 
space. Similarly, there exists, undoubtedly more than 
one formal system whose use as a logic is feasible, ... it 
cannot be said that one is right and the other is 
wrong.54*'
The conclusion that is arrived at is that:
apparently mathematical design [is] not inherent in 
nature, or if it [is], man's mathematics [is] not 
necessarily the account of that design. The key to 
reality has been lost.55
Given this plurality, or, to illuminatingly over-extend a phrase, given such 
extensional equivalents, (an illustrative linguistic parallel with the geometric case in 
mathematics being the equivalence of pure categorial and context-free grammars,56) 
then any choice between them is to be made, not in respect of their truth, but in 
respect of the applications to which they are each best suited. Either this or "some 
additional correspondence principle must be used to judge whether a piece of 
mathematics applies to the real world".57*' In short, "coverage" is not by itself adequate
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evidence of the truth of a formal/mathematical system in respect of the properties of a 
phenomenon modelled by that system.
The observation of the lack of inherent fit and contact (one might think of it 
also as lack of transparency) between mathematical/formal systems and real world 
phenomena results, as we noted, in the reconstrual of formal systems with their 
attendant models as involved in a metaphorical relationship with objects and 
phenomena in the world. The result of this reconstrual is a contentful and proper 
distinction between the vehicle for articulating theoretical claims, in this case the 
mathematics, and that which is modelled, the objects of the world. Moreover, beyond 
recognizing this proper distinction, the observation also remarks (compare Einstein's 
comment above) on the possibility of an ineliminable discrepancy between the 
modelling ability of mathematics and the things that it is used to model; that the 
mathematics is not some transparent medium, or undistorting minor, but one more 
object added to the world, through the agency of which we gain some means to talk 
about that world and by which we carve/conceive the world such that it supplies a 
model that satisfies the terms and relations of some calculus. That there is such a 
possible and discernible discrepancy characterizes the mathematics, on the one hand, 
as a vehicle that is instrumental (i.e. acts as a metaphor) in articulating the nature of 
phenomena, and, on the other hand, characterizes the properties and parameters of 
the mathematical system as logically and ontologically distinct from, and autonomous 
of, those of the real world object. It is a distinction that is required to be observed:
For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our 
assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as 
an object of comparison - as, so to speak, a measuring- 
rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must 
correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so 
easily in doing philosophy.)58
In the following our aim will be to trace such a "dogmatism" (effectively, what 
is, in Smith's phrase, "pre-judged") and its consequential costs in the development of 
theoiy within the Chomskyan paradigm for linguistics.
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4.0 Linguistics Galilean stvle.
The extension to linguistics of a Galilean (mathematical) metaphysical realist 
attitude to formal/mathematical systems deserves a name. We might term it Fregean 
(or, in view of our prefatory quotation, Leibnizian, or even, see below, Quine an59) 
and intend by it, firstly, the observation that the formal properties of a calculus drive 
theoiy construction, this being the core of deductively formulated theoiy and post- 
structuralist "top-down" theorizing,60 and, secondly, the tendency to take certain 
properties and parameters of the modelling calculus as more real than, or at least as 
the guarantors of, the reality of that which is being modelled, as if the interpretation of 
the formal system has to be found in reality. It is as if the mark of the reality of the 
object of study is its ability to answer to the terms and parameters of a formal 
calculus: it is to have a quasi-metaphysical expectation that the system under 
investigation is some instantiation of a prefiguring calculus, that it answers to such 
conceptual necessity; in other words (Wittgenstein's), it is to take a calculus as a 
preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. But, who is to say that the mark 
of some object of study's reality is its ability to be captured in a formal theoiy, or, 
indeed, that a mathematical or logical apparatus is, necessarily, as if on some sort of a 
priori grounds, the appropriate language in which to describe, carve and capture a 
phenomenon's intrinsic nature?
That such a view is entertained, at least implicitly, is part of linguistics' 
inheritance from Bloomfield's and the fifties' positivism. (Recall it was Bloomfield 
who suggested the desirability of the mathematization of the subject.) For the Logical 
Positivists (of whom we take, following Quine,611' Carnap as the "embodiment") the 
approved model for a scientific theory was provided by Mach's arrangement of 
Newtonian mechanics into a deductive system: Newton's laws give the axioms, and 
the interpretation rules map the variables onto measurements of mass and time. From 
this basis everything else gets deduced (one might say "generated").
The Vienna Circle ordered all science to conform to 
[this] model. ... To do science, you should:
1) Choose basic observables. [In generativist linguistics, 
sentences.]
2) Find formulas for their relationships.
3) Express all other observables as functions of the 
basic observables.
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4) From (1, 2, 3) derive the rest of the subject by 
mathematics.62r
The presiding idea, as Camap puts it, is that "the logic of science is nothing 
other than the logical syntax of the language of science. ”63r What emerges is a 
(Galilean) idea of formal systems as constituting some sort of logical and real cement 
of the universe. This view gets its most forthright expression in Quine's famous 
contention that "to be is to be the value of a variable".64r It would seem that the 
criterion of existence is the ability to be prefigured in some formal system or, as Hersh 
puts it, it is "like a monomaniac photographer saying, 'To be is to be recorded on my 
film,1 or Geraldo Rivera saying, 'To be is to be seen on the Geraldo Rivera show.'"65r 
A formal system does for Quine what God does for Leibniz (and Berkeley), it is some 
sort of guarantor of reality: esse estpercipi through the agency of a formal system.
Where this tendency pertains the upshot is an enquiry that is not so much 
about the nature of natural language as modelled by some calculus, rather the study 
would become one of formal calculi s im p lic ity the supposed object of enquiry 
would be, to put it somewhat poetically, no more than the shadow cast by the 
calculus. In a less virulent form, a symptom of such a tendency might be identified, in 
Higginbotham's words, as "an over-emphasis on the power of notations to effect 
explanations."66 The reason why the calculus keeps step with the phenomena is 
because the properties of the calculus correctly mirror the properties of the object 
under study.
This is the claim. However, there are two general grounds to demur from any 
realist construal of such a (non-dis)-confirmed theory. Firstly, as in the case of 
mathematical/geometrical models of the physical world, the case of two or more 
extensionally equivalent grammars where the models are non-identical provides 
grounds to at least defer such a realist construal. Secondly, while the formal system 
metaphor drives theoiy construction, what it also drives is a series of sub-hypotheses - 
in effect a modularization of the gross phenomenon - which enable data to be 
interpreted in such a way as to preserve and make unfalsifiable the initial hypothesis. 
The result is the unavailability, in practice, of any potential point of view which is not 
consistent with the literality of the formal system metaphor, as if there could be no 
other perspective. This is to assume as given what is properly requiring to be 
confirmed; it is to assume a certain conceptual necessity.
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The task in the following is to substantiate and illustrate this charge. In doing 
so we will also generate and, to coin a phrase, pre-hearse a series of issues that will 
constitute an agenda for later discussion.
4.1 Top-down theory construction, realism and psychologism.
Theory construction in the Chomskyan paradigm is driven by the properties 
and parameters of the formal systems that are set to the task of modelling linguistic 
phenomena; it is these systems which provide epistemic access and institute a domain 
of discourse.
Standardly, some framework is instituted and argued for on the basis of its 
ability to neatly handle a certain restricted set of data, some fragment of a language. 
This constraint to working on fragments is a function of, to use Postal's and 
Langendoen's phrase, the vastness of natural languages: one cannot stand back far 
enough to see the object whole. Given this starting point, the subsequent analyses 
invoke the formal properties of the calculus applied. These analyses and a set of 
constructs, i.e. those entities and relations that interpret the calculus, are then earned 
over, as an assumption, to the task of broadening the framework's coverage: given the 
success of X theory in respect of a sentence type A, then assume theoiy X in respect 
of the analysis of sentence type B. The economy of information, the set of constructs 
and relations, that is instituted by the initial analysis is then earned down to (or 
recycled in) successive analyses as an assumption.67 This in turn drives the next 
analysis by directing hypotheses, and this the next, with each successive move, 
assuming it is successful, feeding back to reinforce the preceding ones.
The observation to be made is that it is the nature of the initial hypothesis, and 
the properties of the formal apparatus that articulate that hypothesis, that drive and 
create subsequent analyses with then attendant constructs: in brief, "notation systems 
[i.e. calculi] create analyses"681 and, correlatively, different notations, i.e. different 
formal systems, create different analyses, requiring different sets of entities to act as 
the models that interpret the terms of the notation system. One of the factors at play 
here, and what affects the initial choice of the system, is the originary fragment that is 
addressed. For example, if the core problem is perceived to be long-distance 
dependency, then one selects a system of more than context-fr ee power. On the other 
hand, if one considers that "constructions that have been shown to require greater 
power than context-freeness are somewhat unusual, and apparently not run of the mill
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grammatical phenomena, "69r then one selects, perhaps, a phrase structure grammar 
with its formal properties and with a corresponding formal constraint on possible 
analyses.
Let’s accept that a significant fragment of natural language happens to be 
characterizable by a grammar, we can say that it offers a predictively accurate account 
of acceptability judgements of speaker-hearers of the language.
We may be content with what we have and view our grammar as an efficient 
and accurate means to represent, that is characterize, the syntactic facts of the matter. 
What is lacking, though, is an account of why the facts of the matter happen to be as 
they are. So far our grammar has no more than an instrumental status: it is an 
instrument that gives us a means to characterize the language, at least characterize it 
on the syntactic axis.
One might, subsequently, be tempted to go one step further (this is the move 
from "hocus pocus to "God’s truth") and claim that the reason why the grammar is 
able to characterize the language is because the carving of the phenomenon at these 
joints and with these terms and relations corresponds to joints and to objects and 
relations that inhere in the object under investigation. The real properties and 
parameters of the formal system correspond directly to real properties of, and to real 
joints in, linguistic phenomena, not just under description by the grammar, but these 
properties are in and of the language itself: there is, for example, an autonomous 
syntactic component; transformations, or whatever relations and entities are posited, 
exist not just as properties of the mathematical apparatus, but independently of that 
apparatus as real, constitutive elements of natural language. In short, the properties of 
the modelling calculus are taken, when that calculus is shown to be predictively 
successful, to be real of that modelled phenomenon.
A first issue that offers to make problematic this manner of theoiy 
development, and which is potentially undermining of a realist construal, is the issue, 
as canvassed, of extensionally (Chomsky prefers the term "logically") equivalent 
grammars: simple ability to provide coverage, no matter how extensive, is insufficient 
to warrant acceptance of these constructs as real, as "uncovering a profound [and 
real] mathematical substructure", this for the simple reason that, to repeat the findings 
of Lukasiewicz, Post and Tarski:
A grammar is but an axiomatized theoiy, and it is a 
truism that a theoiy that can be axiomatized at all can 
be axiomatized in radically different ways.70r
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If one is to be a realist about the terms and relations of a grammar, what we 
might term its economy of information, then given that realism is committed to the 
view that there is one and only one true theoiy, then this multiplicity of true theories is 
something of an embarrassment: plurality, with no means to select amongst 
equivalents, casts suspicion on the reality of such entities by virtue of the deferral of 
the confirmation of any particular claim. This deferral not only preserves the question 
as to which one, but also asks the question, the Quinean question,71 as to whether 
there is any truth issue at all. What is needed is some account of notational variation,72 
but for this to have point it is necessaiy, firstly, that it is specified what entities one is 
committed to, i.e. what of the formal system is claimed to correspond to elements and 
properties of die real world object care of some explicit interpreting function and, 
secondly, that the existence of these entities can be verified on the basis of appropriate 
evidence, and which evidence must be a supplement to the attainment of coverage. To 
put this another way: realism toward the terms and relations of a formal system 
requires that there are facts of the matter that are, in principle, ascertainable and that 
constitute a truth-issue in respect of the choice between grammars. The general point 
that we have rehearsed is made by Chomsky:
Substantial coverage of data is not a particularly 
significant result; it can be attained in many ways and 
the result is not very informative as to the correctness 
of the principles employed.73r
What is needed is some additional correspondence principle (or principles) 
such as to provide confidence that what allows for decision between frameworks and 
their analyses is the putative real object of the real world.
A reason why such disconfiiming contact is frustrated, and in such a way as to 
question the propriety of a realist construal, is a certain theory-intemality that might be 
observed in our above description of theory development. Given the blunt, radically- 
in-need-of-interpretation, yes/no/maybe nature of speaker’s' intuitions, the constructs 
posited are only observable and identifiable in respect of the available analyses, and 
observable in respect of their ability to provide coverage (it is by way of the 
vocabulary provided by the calculus that we get to refer, it is how we apprehend the 
objects of enquiry in any detail beyond that given by intuitions).74 But, coverage is, as 
we have noted, not sufficient in itself.
One possible riposte to these remarks, with their insinuation of unfalsifiability, 
might be that, if such a caricature of theory development were the case, then surely
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there would never be any reason to revise any framework, nor initial 
hypotheses/analyses made within fr ameworks, and this is clearly not the case. It is to 
be admitted that our account is, indeed, a caricature, because considerably idealized. 
Also admittedly, there are, indeed, examples of revised and abandoned frameworks. 
However, again at a very general level, it is worth enquiring into the reasons for a 
framework being discarded.
One of the driving concerns within much of grammatical theoiy is to maintain 
the "purity" of the calculus and one of the primaiy motivations has been to keep the 
grammar as uncluttered and economical as possible. When the preservation of certain 
initial assumptions has led to an increasingly baroque superstructure the tendency has 
been to revise from the foundations upwards. For example, increasing numbers of 
transformations become unwieldy and the revision results in Government and Binding 
Theoiy in which there is a single transformation, move a, the operation of which is 
mediated and limited by a series of constraints. Mkiimalism appears to be going in a 
similar direction as does HPSG: a clean basic apparatus sprouts more and more 
features.
The general point is that "simplification achieved in one area of the grammar 
leads to complications in other areas."751' It is to be noted that it is not so much the raw 
data that are driving this revision. (It is not, to my knowledge, generally the case that 
fr ameworks get superseded on the basis of a proven inability to cover the data, there is 
always room for some manoeuvre, some added feature, or some hiving off onto 
performance or whatever. Some examples are provided below.) Rather, what drives 
the revision are theory-internal and methodological considerations of economy and 
elegance. If such criteria are taken to be alone pertinent to the task of selecting 
between grammars, in the sense of constituting an additional correspondence 
principle, then this is to assume that the real object of the real world under 
investigation is also designed with economy and elegance in mind. This is a species of 
"Galileanism", an assumption that things conform to some form of conceptual 
necessity: that the world is prefigured in some formal system, is some calculus writ 
large and that methodological criteria for selecting between formal systems qua formal 
systems are appropriate for selecting between theories in respect of their 
correspondence to the facts of the matter in the real-world object under investigation.
It seems that we are still in search of some contact with the facts of the matter. 
In noting this, one also notes that the condition on it being possible to fix on one 
grammar rather than another is that there are, indeed, determinate facts of the matter, 
the correspondence with which would count as getting it right. And for these facts of
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the matter, or the matter of the facts, we need some ontological status. The 
Chomskyan hypothesis is, and here we pick up on the third strand of Chomsky’s 
revolution, that the facts of the matter are psychological and are in respect of a 
mentally realized I-language: a set of "mentally represented cognitive structures".761* 
The psychological ontological status of the I-language provides a locus, something 
determinate and, according to Chomsky, some ultimately neurophysiological fact of 
the matter for a linguistic theoiy to be true of. It is this locus which supplies the 
potential content to the "principles" cited in Chomsky's recognition of the problem we 
have been discussing.
It is by way of the psychological claim that the prefiguring relation between a 
mathematical/logical apparatus and the object of study is, as it were, naturalized, it is 
how linguistics gets to be, according to Chomsky, one of the natural sciences. 
Linguistic objects, i.e. real objects of the real world, are prefigured (and so to be 
explained by) a formal system because, in effect, a mentally realized and represented 
formal system is hypothesized as being constructive, "involved in the aetiology", of 
linguistic objects. The calculus is the explanation.
One may not necessarily object to this psychological and causal claim as a 
hypothesis, but one is warranted in requiring that the hypothesis is testable and the 
psychologism given content. And this requires more than simply ascertaining the 
contents of a grammar and its economy of information, one also needs the hypothesis 
of a competence grammar (I-language) as a putatively causal explanation of the 
nature of the linguistic to be disconfiimable. It is not as if there must be a mentally 
realized competence grammar, as if this were the only logically possible (as opposed 
to only presently and apparently available) way to explain the nature of linguistic 
phenomena. This point is difficult to maintain sight of, because there is a distinct 
sense in which, indeed, there must be a competence grammar; there must be some 
way, probably several, of characterizing natural language strings in terms of some 
formalism, for surely everything has some/several accurate description(s). The crucial 
point is that such a means to an accurate description need not also directly supply the 
explanation: what is captured by the description, what one knows when one knows a 
language, is not itself the explanation, but is, rather, what is requir ed to be explained. 
To simply assume that it is would be to be guilty of the fallacy post hoc, ergo propter 
hoc. Of course, it is not the case that such a conflation of description and explanation 
is simply assumed, rather the explanation is by way of the additional and logically 
distinct claim that that body of knowledge is mentally represented. The question, 
though, concerns what additional evidence there might be for this ratcheting up of a
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characterization to a causal explanation; what evidence there is for a psychological 
ontological status for the linguistic, as defined in the theoiy as competence, and what 
evidence there is for the canying over the demarcations introduced by the conceptual 
apparatus we apply to in characterizing the linguistic onto the economy of the mind.
As we have discussed, and perhaps laboured, while we may have perfectly 
coherent and objective categorizations care of mathematical logic (just as we have a 
perfectly coherent and objective categoiy of fish), such need not provide the correct 
access to the general phenomenon, i.e. it need not answer to the putative real facts of 
the matter. Once we recognize this, and remind ourselves of where the conceptual 
apparatus was bought, that as a calculus it is initially neutral as to what it gets to be in 
a modelling relation with, then we also come to recognize that there is no a priori 
reason why mathematical logic should provide an appropriate language with which to 
explicate the nature of natural languages, nor why the modularization and the terms 
and properties that come with it should cany through to some causal and 
psychological explanation. It may, but it cannot be simply assumed.77
It is to be emphasized that in raising this point, we are not questioning the 
need for an account of phenomena that we apprehend efficiently and objectively in 
terms of the categories provided by a formal system. Indeed, precisely those perceived 
patterns and relations are to be explained. However, what is being raised is the 
possibility that phenomena need not be accounted for in terms of a theoiy that 
addresses the problem directly at the level of those patterns and relations as perceived, 
and as perceived through the representational medium of a formal system. It is 
possible that certain phenomena are, to some greater or lesser extent, epiphenomenal: 
incidental products of some set of causes, which causes make no dir ect reference to 
entities at an independent level of description provided by standard, formal models. 78
4.2 Modularization.
To recap a little: the realist claim is that the way the grammar carves the gross 
phenomenon corresponds to real joints in the phenomenon itself. What you get is, 
firstly, the positing of a discrete object of study and nomological domain: a 
competence grammar. Under a psychologist construal what you also get - one of the 
costs of the project - is a corresponding modularization of mind: a mentally realized 
"language faculty" which is independent of other and general cognitive abilities.
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A first demarcation is that between competence and performance which 
comes in by way of a disclaimer in regard to having anything to say "about how the 
speaker or hearer might proceed, in some practical or efficient way, to construct some 
derivation".79r This distinction is a direct corollary of the formal system metaphor: 
generative grammars licence a determinate set of strings and, for any string consisting 
of terms of the language, a grammar provides a decision as to the inclusion or 
exclusion of that string from the set. In other words, grammaticality, where it is 
defined by a standard formal system, is akin to the property of bivalence in logic: a 
proposition is either hue or it is false, with no middle term; a string of natural 
language terms either is or is not a member of the set of sentences of a language. If 
the object of study for linguistics is going to be similarly determinate, then one needs 
to idealize from the standard run of recognizably "degenerate" utterances which litter 
much linguistic behaviour. The upshot is that we cannot base a study on corpora of 
utterances and, furthermore, it is this ability to recognize degeneracy that reflects our 
linguistic knowledge. It is this, our competence, which is taken to be the proper object 
of study. Along with this rationale for the positing of competence as the proper object 
of study comes, as a corollary, a distinction between (abstract) sentence and (physical) 
utterance, and so, implicitly, a type-token relation between the two.80r
Parallel to a competence/performance distinction (defined over syntax) is the 
demarcation between semantics and pragmatics. In both cases the former term 
constitutes the privileged and notionally prior area of enquiiy. In semantics the 
privileged objects of enquiry are sentence meanings, defined in terms of fixed tiuth 
conditions that are independent of (and prior to) the individual use(s) of a sentence by 
a speaker, which latter subject is the province of pragmatics. Pragmatics is concerned 
with what speakers do with the originaiy, always and already, propositional content of 
sentences.81 It is this propositional content which is the primary interest; for not only, 
from the linguist's point of view, are sentence meanings prior - they are what is 
worked on by a pragmatic component - but, from the philosophers point of view, they 
are where is achieved the originaiy and transparent connection between language and 
world.82
In general, what is preserved by this approach, indeed, what it is premised 
upon, is "the linguistic relevance of the entire body of logical machineiy built up over 
two millenia."83r The gross object of study is parsed by the formal system metaphor 
and is grounded and given a locus in terms of a theoiy of a modularized mind.
One cannot object to some such modularizing strategy. The not inconsiderable 
pay off is that it makes the gross phenomenon tractable and gives us a certain access.
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And, in any case, how else might one proceed but on the basis of the conceptual 
material we have at hand? Moreover, Fodor suggests,84r in respect of cognitive 
abilities in general, that such modularization is the condition on there being the 
possibility of any explanatoiy study at all. He places this under the heading of a "First 
Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science". What this "law" amounts to is the 
view that without some such carving of joints the gross phenomenon would be simply 
too complex to be dealt with; we would end up, in the linguistic case, with a law of 
the nonexistence of linguistics (in the same way, on Fodor's view, we are precluded 
from a theoiy of the central processor), thus returning us to roughly the place from 
where Saussure and Chomsky left off.
Unfortunately, however, unless one is to confuse methodology with 
verification, one cannot cite as confinning evidence for a modular approach that it is 
the only way we can presently come up with by which to attempt an explanatoiy 
account and so it must be right. Even less can one have confidence, as if on some sort 
of a priori grounds, in any particular (e.g. this) carving of the joints made on the basis 
of the conceptual apparatus that is presently to hand.
More to the present point, however, while not objecting to the hypothesis qua 
hypothesis, the issue is one of what might be the discontinuing evidence that could be 
adduced in falsification of that hypothesis. What is crucial, if we are to accede to a 
theory's truth claims, is that the theoiy-intemal pressures that drive theoiy construction 
do not themselves supply a set of assumptions, such set as would constitute an 
unnegotiable dogmatism, that interpret the evidence so that that evidence is consonant 
with the theoiy and circularly confirms those veiy assumptions. We need evidence 
that is outside of the circle of theoiy construction. Otherwise the suspicion might be 
that all we are doing is characterizing the world in a manner that is consistent with 
certain prefiguring, modularizing and discourse-introducing concepts and then 
claiming the world to conform inherently to them, as if the world has to conform with 
our own interests: a case of conceptual necessity.85 This might be because it does so 
conform, i.e. we have got it right, on the other hand, it might be that if some account 
allows itself to unquestioningly rely on some categorization, then it is not too much of 
a stretch to imagine that the results are going to be skewed in that categorization's 
favour: if your only tool is a hammer, then the world is liable to look like it's filled 
with only two sorts of entity: nails and non-nails.
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4.3 Falsillabilitv.
In so far as a scientific statement speaks about reality, 
it must be falsifiable: and in so far as it is not 
falsifiable, it does not speak about reality.
(K. Popper, 1959).
You will find that there are many theories, This is 
always a bad sign.
(B. Silver, 1998).
While granting the practical need for a modular account, what we are insisting 
on is the requirement that the data are, in principle, able to disconfirm not only the 
hypothesized contents of the modules, but also the veiy demarcations that those 
modules propose. The hope, in respect of the content and so, implicitly, the 
boundaries of the modules, is that theoiy development in each will feed off theoiy 
development in the other in the manner of a sort of (dis)-confirming dialectic. So, for 
example, the postulation of some phenomenon as being due to pragmatic/performance 
factors - let’s say an otherwise explanatorily powerful analysis is frustrated by some 
problematic data - will be properly tested and potentially discontinued by a 
pragmatic/performance theoiy. However, this is only going to be realizable on 
condition that some firm, falsifiable content is given to the pragmatics/performance 
module and that it does not simply act as some sort of caipet under which one might 
sweep problematic data, otheiwise what one gets is not a disconfiiming, but instead, a 
self-confinning dialectic.
It is precisely just such a problem which an account in terms of a 
competence/performance distinction gives rise to. If we accept that linguistic 
performance involves, or is integrated with, Fodor’s "central processor” (and what 
constitutes central processing is resistant to theorizing: it is defined, on Fodor’s 
account, as being more or less anything and everything, i.e. just the sort of thing one 
cannot have a theoiy of; conversely there is no obvious limit to the stories that can be 
spun about the central processor), then, on the one hand, we get to tell consistent and 
plausible stories - phenomena that are problematic can always be parsed so that the 
problem can be marked down to performance considerations - but, on the other hand, 
in principle we get unfalsifiable stories by virtue of the principled lack of theoiy about 
the central processor.86
The problem of potential inability of some claim to admit of disconfirmation 
becomes the more acute when one considers that the data are, in practice, restricted to
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speakers’ intuitions. Such intuitions are, as we have noted, in need of some 
interpretation and one is brought to inquire into the manner in which they are 
interpreted. The answer, in short, is that they are interpreted in a manner that assumes 
the posited modularization as a given, "as a preconceived idea to which reality [is 
made] to correspond", and so gets to be self-confirmatory of it.s7r
4.4 Intuitions.
Like objects of study, data do not come as givens, ready labelled with 
indications of what they are data about, they have to be inteipreted as being relevant 
to whatever phenomenon is under investigation. If the object of study for linguistics is 
taken to be the mentally realized competence grammar, the I-language, then the data 
need to be either directly (preferably) or indirectly about that competence grammar. 
The first problem is to find some data. Chomsky’s move, and the standard working 
assumption, is, firstly, to take the status of native speaker to confer an entitlement to 
knowledge of a language,88 and, secondly, to take it that this knowledge is reflected in 
intuitive judgements. This, however, does not get one very far when what one wants 
are data about the hypothesized competence grammar, for who is to say what 
cognitive resources are applied to in the making of such judgements?
We ... do not know the psychological factors which 
determine the formation of such intuitions. It would be 
foolish to make linguistic virtue of psychological 
necessity by concluding that these factors are 
unimportant simply because they are unknown, but this 
is precisely what is done when linguistic intuitions are 
made the key to linguistic competence.89
In a similar vein, it can be, and has been, objected that intuitional judgements 
are, at best, a second-order linguistic phenomenon: they are "highly derived, artificial 
forms of linguistic behavior"901 that are, seemingly, only meta to what are pre- 
theoretically first-order linguistic phenomena, i.e. tokened strings; there is, after all, no 
obvious reason to exclude the possibility that "the behaviour of producing 
linguistically relevant intuitions may produce some properties which are sui generis 
and which appear in no other language behaviour."91 Chomsky's initial assumption
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was to brush such considerations aside and simply identify speaker-hearers' intuitive 
judgements with the hypothesized competence grammar:
the grammar is justified to the extent that it correctly 
describes its object, namely the linguistic intuition - the 
tacit competence - of the native speaker.921'
However, is it not the case that before we can have confidence in this 
identification "an adequate linguistics should explain [and, one might add, adduce 
evidence to show] why it is that the intuitions of a speaker/hearer constitute data 
relevant to the confirmation of grammars[?]"93 For, as Chomsky himself recognized, 
by itself "intuition is an extremely weak support. "94r
The explanation offered is that the I-language is involved in the aetiology of 
linguistic behaviour, which behaviour includes the making of judgements of 
acceptability: it is the same knowledge resource that is applied to in all aspects of 
linguistic performance. What we are encouraged to is:
The standard picture [which] views the theoiy of 
grammar as the theoiy of a context-independent 
resource - as, one might say, a clerk at a desk who is 
consulted from time to time on linguistic matters that 
come before the mind.95r
What is happening here is that the competence grammar is being posited in 
explanation of the ability to have acceptability judgements and it is just this very ability 
that is required if such data (the only practically available data, unless we return to the 
use of corpora) are to be directly relevant at all. It is the condition on being able to 
play psychological linguistic ball using intuitive judgements. It is also an instance of a 
certain circularity in theoiy construction; an instance of an assumption that is forced 
by the initial hypothesis in order to preserve the cogency of (and give content to) that 
initial hypothesis.96 So, we need to ask what is the justification for the practice of 
taking "informant judgements ... as 'direct evidence' as to the structure of the I- 
language", just what is the evidence (other than theory-internal requirements) that 
intuitions give access to, or are even vaguely related to, some body of internally 
represented linguistic knowledge?
It is to be emphasized that raising this issue is not just a case of nit-picking, but 
is fundamental to Chomsky's psychologism, because if there can be shown to be 
grounds for serious doubts that intuitions can be construed as causally related to an
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internalized competence grammar, if this construal of intuitive data can be shown to 
not make sense, then, while intuitions must be data about something or other 
(presumably, but not necessarily, directly linguistic97), they will not be interpretable as 
data about the putative object of study, the I-language, which is posited in explanation 
of our knowledge of language. Indeed, this would leave Chomsky's I-language 
hypothesis lacking any certifiable content, it would amount to no less than an 
"empirical apocalypse".98r
Returning to our question as regards the grounds that are adduced for the 
propriety of using intuitive judgements, Sells reports that "no justification for this 
practice has ever been offered.""1 This, however, is somewhat overstating the case, 
for there is a perfectly cogent justification on offer which, while it does not excise the 
circularity we obseived, does go some way towards making that circularity benign.
One removes the viciousness by pointing out, firstly, that this move of 
interpreting data to be pertinent to some posited construct is a standard manoeuvre in 
the sciences. In any case, how else might one proceed where one's starting point (and 
which point is what makes sense of the enterprise) is one of ignorance. To take one of 
Chomsky's examples, suppose one wanted to understand how it is that there are the 
phenomena of heat and light. The obvious direction to go is by pointing to the 
correlation of these phenomena with the presence of the sun. Of course, one then 
wants to explain how the sun generates this energy. One might posit thermo-nuclear 
reactions in the hidden interior of the sun and then, on that basis, take the light and 
heat experienced as data about those posited reactions. Such data can be taken as 
potentially discontinuing of any properties that may be postulated of those reactions. 
The objections raised by Levelt and Russell appear to be no more than arguing that 
one does not know how the phenomena are caused and so one cannot relate those 
phenomena to any putative cause, as if we are to be consigned, care of such scruples, 
to ineliminable ignorance. And after all - this is the second justification - what you end 
up with is an explanation where before we had none. Moreover, it is an explanation 
which justifies the assumption because it is the making of that assumption which 
allows one to make sense of the phenomena.
The point being made here is, essentially, a variation on Harman's theme of 
the inference to the best explanation:1001- one is justified in accepting a statement (i.e. 
believing it to be true) because it is the best available explanation - the one that makes 
the most sense of the data.
Unfortunately, at this point the seemingly clear water gets muddied somewhat. 
Firstly, as a point of interest to be noted in passing, such considerations, (indeed
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considerations that Chomsky explicitly encourages us to take on board1011 in 
persuading us of the appropriateness of a realist construal of the theoiy,) are entirely 
consonant with a theoiy of truth which, rather than being compatible with a scientific 
realism (i.e. a correspondence-to-facts-of-the-matter view of truth), are much more at 
home with an instrumentalism (and a coherence, making-best-sense-of-things, notion 
of truth).
Secondly, again to be mentioned in passing, but also to be put down on our 
agenda for future discussion, is that Hannan's principle is not unproblematic, but:
needs qualification, since sometimes it is unwise to 
ignore the antecedent improbability of a hypothesis 
which would explain the data better than others.1021'
We take up the question of the possible antecedent improbability of Chomsky's 
explanatoiy constructs and manoeuvres in chapter IV.
Thirdly, and more to our present point, the benignity of the circularity comes 
into question when it is recognized that, even if we accede in the assumption that the 
mentally represented grammar is the primary basis for the ability to make judgements 
of well-formedness, those judgements cannot be unaffected by other factors. The 
standard examples cited are cases of multiple centre-embeddings and garden paths, 
(both of which sentence types are judged unacceptable but which are grammatical,) 
and ungrammatical strings that are generally deemed acceptable.103 The standard 
explanation of this discrepancy between intuition and grammaticality makes use of the 
recognition that judgements are performance phenomena and as such are affected by 
"the intrusion of numerous other factors",1041' in other words, the intrusion of the 
central processor. The upshot is a weakening of Chomsky's (1965) identification of 
intuitions with tacit competence, instead we are encouraged to the view that taking 
intuitions:
as "direct evidence" as to the structure of the I-language 
... is only a tentative and inexact working hypothesis, 
and any skilled practitioner has at his or her disposal an 
armory of techniques to help compensate for the errors 
introduced.1051'
What this "aimoiy of techniques" is required to do is to be able to correctly 
filter out the intruding other factors, i.e. to parse and apportion causes to the data. 
However, to do this is it not necessary to specify, in advance, just what these other
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factors/causes are, and what their effects might be, independently of what they are 
required to be such as to preserve the theoiy? Without such specification (and I know 
of none - we are back here with the need for a worked out performance/pragmatic 
theoiy; a theory of the, for Fodor, non-theorizable central processor106) what seems to 
be in operation is a meta-theoretical implement that one might dub Occam's broom (it 
is found, unhygienically, in the same cupboard as the razor, perhaps): it allows one to 
sweep under the carpet any unpalatabilities and so keep simple what is to be 
explained. However, the notion of what is simple here is defined wholly in terms of 
the theoiy that one is positing. Ultimately what you get to sweep under the caipet are 
unpalatable data, and so what you get to preserve and make unfalsifiable is, firstly the 
analysis that is prefigured by one's notation and, secondly, the veiy modularization 
that has been introduced by way of the initial formal system metaphor: these other 
factors being precisely and negatively defined as those phenomena that cannot be 
handled in terms of the propeities and parameters of the formal systems that are 
posited.
Again a justification might ran along the lines of the explanatoiy success that 
is afforded, what we get is an account and an account which is, apparently, coherent. 
Of course, one does get to tell such a stoiy, but then with a reasonable amount of 
imagination regarding one's "armory of techniques" one could hardly fail to.
4.5 Theorv-internality and "closed circuit functioning".107
In general terms, the danger that we have been remarking on is that of theory 
construction (as regards both the task of extending the coverage of some framework 
and as regards the disconfiimation of analyses) engaging in a fallacious, hermeneutic 
circle, or, for aficionados of Winnie the Pooh, in a "Woozle hunt."108 It may be 
recalled that what Pooh failed to notice in his tracking down of the Woozle in the 
snow was that the evidence for Woozles - and evidence for their propeities - was what 
had been originally put there by his own paw-prints and then added to as he went 
round in circles looking for them. A further, related, cause for disquiet is the 
observation of the ease with which recalcitrant data are, on occasions, handled. The 
following provides some illustrative examples.
A framework achieves a certain coverage over some fragment. When one 
meets problematic or apparently disconfirming data one argues that the coverage 
already achieved licences one's continuing in the assumption of the constructs and
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analyses posited. One can get round the disconfirmatory obstacle by citing, in 
Chomsky’s phrase, "the intrusion of numerous other factors". In short, the 
maintenance of the theory, on the grounds of the generalizations that the framework 
affords, forces a saving assumption; making the assumption, not surprisingly, allows 
or interprets evidence to be confirmatory of the theoiy; the resulting explanatoiy 
success gets to be confirmatory of the theoiy and the assumption. When it is pointed 
out that there is little or no evidence for the assumptions that have been made, 
external to this circle, one cites the explanatoiy success achieved. Either that, or (a 
non-exclusive "or") one hives off problems onto some other field (standardly 
performance - a corollary of the formal system metaphor), or takes refuge in the 
idealization or "abstraction from mechanisms" that are claimed requisites of the 
enquiiy, or one characterizes the discrepancy between one's linguistic theoiy and what 
some theory-external perspective109 tells us, for example psycholinguistics or 
evolutionaiy biology, as either a problem for that external theory or "a mysteiy". The 
implicit claim here - that linguistic theoiy is confirmed beyond disconfiimation by 
these other perspectives (i.e. precisely such perspectives, such other points of view 
that, by taking us outside of the circle, might give confidence in the reality of the 
theoiy's constructs) - is made on the basis of no more than the explanatoiy success 
achieved in this theory-internal and circular way.
Much this set of problems and manoeuvres is in evidence in the standard 
pattern, replicated innumerably in the literature, for papers arguing for one's 
framework on the perfectly cogent basis of its ability to provide analyses of the data, 
to make conect predictions, in short to achieve coverage. Accordingly, one argues pro 
or con competing frameworks or analyses in the same manner. The schema of the 
argument goes somewhat as follows:
a) Here is construction type A and the relevant data regarding acceptability 
judgements.
b) Here is what Tom, Dick and Harry propose in lines with Tom's, Dick's and 
Hany's frameworks respectively.
c) But here is the puzzle for Tom, for Dick and an apparently disconfiiming 
clincher contra Harry.
d) Here is the general outline of My (variation of the) framework.
e) Look, if we do this, this and this (a feature here, an assumption there), then 
we get all the data out.
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f) (If it cannot be avoided.) True, there are one or two puzzles or problematic 
cases remaining.
However, there are a couple of strategies that can be applied at this point:
i) Dispute the data. Liberal use of "clearly" or some similar phrase is 
recommended to bolster your side of the discussion.110 Alternatively, be inventive with 
"?" and as in "??" and the permutations thereof.111
ii) Concoct some more or less plausible stoiy to account for the acceptability 
of what you want to be an ungrammatical string (or the unacceptability of a 
grammatical string) in terms of performance/pragmatic (any other you can think of) 
factors.112
This is, of course, not the end of the stoiy, for although My theory does a fine 
job as regards construction type A, we can justifiably defer our acceptance of My 
theory until this success is replicated across a sufficient range of construction types. In 
the meantime, the position, in practice, is that Tom's theoiy, in the case of 
construction type B, does a much tidier job than My theoiy, as does Dick’s in the case 
of C-type constructions. Furthermore, Harry's theoiy, although it has certain 
problems, beats all-comers in respect of construction type D. So we still have no good 
grounds upon which to prefer one account over another. One might be tempted to 
invoke some criterion regarding the extent of coverage that a theoiy acliieves, 
however, this is at least as likely to be a function of the state of development of a 
framework as it is to be a mark of the theoiy's ability to be regarded as hue.
What these obseivations infer is the open-ended nature of the task of deciding 
between grammars in terms of coverage. Tliis is the more acute when one considers 
the question of what is intended by the notion of coverage: suppose grammar X and 
grammar Y both, over some subset of the phenomenal range, a fragment of a 
language, make successful predictions, then we are left with the question of how a 
decision might be effected. One may point out that a decision must be deferred until 
both grammars can be compared in respect of their ability to make correct predictions 
across the whole phenomenal range, but in practice not only are there no grammars 
on offer that even come close to achieving this range, but also it is not clear whether 
this notion is itself practically definable and so usable given "the vastness of natural 
language": what has to be accounted for is open-ended. This is hardly surprising when 
one considers that a standard construal of what constitutes the object of study for
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linguistic theories is that it is a set of sentences, which set has indefinitely many 
members. The general point being that there can be no provisional, let alone final, 
decision made for or against any linguistic theoiy solely in respect of a theory's 
coverage. What these observations amount to is one more reason, to add to our 
observation of the insulated circularity of theoiy construction and discontinuation, to 
defer any realist construal of a generativist linguistic theoiy.
5.0 Realism and skeuomorphs.
To recap a little: our observation is of an initially metaphorical relation 
between some conceptual apparatus and the phenomenon it is intended to explicate. 
In this linguistic instance, the originaiy metaphor is the formal apparatus that institutes 
a domain of discourse. Our previous discussion, in paralleling the role of fornial 
calculi in linguistics with the role of mathematics in the sciences in general, has 
reminded us that formal models do not, by virtue of their modelling ability, thereby 
necessarily, by some form of Galilean conceptual necessity, articulate the inherent 
nature of the object modelled, nor do they necessarily demarcate the world in respect 
of the way the world is itself carved at joints. This observation warns of the need, on 
the one hand, for proper warrant before the metaphoricity can be excised and 
exchanged for a realism, and also warns of the need to beware of pre-conceived ideas 
and assumptions that are brought or smuggled in by way of the conceptual apparatus 
and, as it were, projected onto the object of study as apparent givens.
To excise the initial metaphoricity, criteria need to be adduced, the meeting of 
which would provide confidence that the identified object of study, (in so far as it is 
taken to correspond in its properties and parameters to the properties and parameters 
of the modelling calculus,) corresponds in virtue of itself and not in virtue of being 
projected by the assumption of the conceptual apparatus that figures it and which 
supplies our conceptual spectacles. In short, we need grounds for confidence that a 
postulated competence grammar and its constructs are not fictions, that the set of 
linguistic entities that are postulated exist as real, theoiy external objects (as Mata) 
rather than (to reprise Saussure) as no more than objects created by the point of view 
of the formal system metaphor, that is as no more than projections (ahstracta) of the 
terms of the formal systems employed in theoiy construction.113 We take up this issue 
in chapter II.
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The general suspicion that we have raised is that the intemality of theoiy 
development and verification we have discerned is undermining of any realist 
construal. What we get is a discourse and methodology that has many of the 
characteristics of what Popper terms "pseudo-science", a primary characteristic of 
which is resistance to any possible falsification.
Picking up on the latter of the above two issues, one of the features of 
linguistic theorizing is its top-down nature and the carrying down of constructs posited 
in analysis of some fragment as assumptions that, when the coverage of some 
framework is extended, direct further hypotheses of further constructs. A difficulty is 
that, on the one hand, there is, apparently, built-in methodological licence to explain 
away disconfiiirdng data when they interfere with some perceived explanatorily 
powerful generalization (itself a function of the particular economy of information of 
the formalism) that otherwise would be lost. On the other hand, evidence for these 
constiucts is not available external to the analysis which postulates and interprets 
them: such constiucts are unobservables and, by virtue of the restricted, range of data 
(acceptability judgements and little else), radically unobservable except by virtue of 
the spectacles provided by the notation system; what we end up with is a Woozle 
hunt. One can arguably "observe" sentences, but the theoretical apparatus that is 
recruited to the job of accounting for the judgements of acceptability of those 
sentences involves, according to framework, a series of sub-sentential theoretical 
constiucts, move a, greed, unification of features etc., which are elements of the 
calculi employed and which, when predicated as real of the object of study, are 
unobservables generated by the choice of calculus. It is in this respect that "notation 
systems [i.e. calculi] create analyses. "114r The misgiving is over whether those 
analyses, and the constiucts which enable them, can be discerned (i.e. made available 
for possible disconfirmation) independently of the framework which generates them, 
that is as real properties of natural language as opposed to real properties of whichever 
framework is the vehicle for representation.
What is discernible in this is the general pattern of a realist claim: that 
properties and parameters of some modelling apparatus are predicated of (or 
transposed onto) that with which it is in a modelling relation. It is this modelling 
relationship that is the hypothesis to be disconfinned. What has been further 
suggested in our discussion is that certain properties, which are brought in by way of 
the formal system metaphor, remain as base and unverified assumptions that, if the 
metaphoricity is warranted to be excised, are required to be the case of the object of 
study. These properties constitute, in terms of our commercial metaphor, the cost of
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the formal system metaphor. At this juncture we are concerned with merely noting 
what these properties are. In the following chapters we intend to further substantiate 
the suitability of a non-realist/instiumentahst construal of theories in Chomsky’s 
generativist paradigm and to show that the following unverified assumptions 
(transpositions, or corollaries of the transposition, of properties of standard formal 
systems onto putative objects of the real world) either cannot be the case or cannot be 
the case of an object of study that is taken to be a psychological object:
a) Intuitions construed as accessing information realized by a mentally 
represented body of declarative knowledge.
b) The modularization of the gross phenomenon along the axis of a 
competence/performance distinction.
c) A characteristic of generative grammars is that they generate a denumerably 
infinite set of strings, a subset of which strings are indefinitely long. Transposing this 
property onto the putative object of the real world that we are investigating requires 
that the set of sentences of a natural language, i.e. those generated by the I-language, 
is, correspondingly, denumerably infinite and, consequently, is "transcendent" of any 
particular set of events (i.e. linguistics is concerned not with linguistic tokens 
(corpora), but, as is the (usually implicit) consensus, with linguistic types). The set of 
sentences of a language is conceived of as, and assumed to be, given and fixed by the 
properties of the I-language.115
d) A corollary of this assumption, and a property of generative grammars qua 
mathematical systems, is the property of bivalence: for any random string composed 
of terms of a language, a generative grammar provides a decision as to the inclusion 
or exclusion of that string in the set of strings in the language; a string is either 
grammatical or ungrammatical, there is no middle term.116
These transpositions, where they are uncorroborated, may be placed under the 
heading of skeuomorph effects.117 The dictionary entry for skeuomorph has it as i) an 
object or feature copying the design of a similar artefact in another material; ii) an 
ornamental design resulting from the nature of the material used or the method of 
working it. Such observations, and the perspective from which they are made, are part 
and parcel of instrumentalism in the philosophy of science. This is the view that 
scientific theories are not capable of literal truth or falsity because the putative real and 
independent world is not available independently of the conceptual scheme which 
figures that world. Theories are to be taken as no more than fictions that are
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instrumental in providing predictions of events, but the terms and constructs that are 
involved in this predictive success are not to be taken as corresponding to real entities 
and so are not to be included in our ontology. Inability to assuage the misgivings of 
there being a skeuomoiph effect (that what is claimed to be the real world case is what 
is put there by illicitly quantifying over entities such as would interpret the terms and 
relations of some formal, theoiy-constitutive apparatus) would constitute an obstacle 
to construing such theories and their constructs as corresponding to the real linguistic 
facts of the matter.
The misgivings that we have aired are, surprisingly perhaps, echoed by 
Chomsky:
[The] conclusions reached might prove to be a kind of 
artifact, a result of our methods of investigation and 
theoiy construction, not properties of the real world 
that we are investigating.118
Such worries concern the instrumental role of any conceptual apparatus: the worry, to 
recap, is not that such apparatus is instrumental in proriding hypotheses about some 
object of study, but that such apparatus is instrumental in constructing an object of 
study and in providing its properties in lieu of some independently existing object of 
the real world which is the putative object of enquiry, and which object can not be 
discerned independently of the vehicle which expresses the theoretical claims. If these 
suspicions can be substantiated, then we will have shown that realism toward linguistic 
theories which share these certain traits will be misplaced. To investigate this 
possibility it is, firstly, worth enquiring, albeit somewhat summarily, whether a 
scientific realism is itself, in general, misplaced. If it is, then our raising of the issue of 
some skeuomoiph effect would be redundant and no more than stating the 
unavoidable.
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Footnotes.
* Hie spectacles metaphor is borrowed from Wittgenstein (1958, section 103).
2 S. Gould (1983, pg. 363), cited in G. Lakoff (1987, pgs. 119 -120).
 ^What this amounts to is an implicit predilection for a "God's truth" realist metaphysics. Arguably, 
such a realism is also implicit in much of our everyday discourse - Putnam terms it "a natural 
impulse" (1981, pg. 74). The view that there is no one final correct taxonomy is consonant with a 
"hocus-pocus" instrumentalism. More on this below.
4 One historian of science (D. Boorstin, 1983, pg. 290 andpg. 294) suggests that a prerequisite for the 
development of modem science was that common-sense apprehension of phenomena be 
acknowledged as defeasible: "Modem Western science takes its beginning from the denial of ... 
commonsense axioms". Even more forthright, in respect of the history of cosmology, is Hoskin 
(1997, pg. 32): it is "the heroic saga of the hard won rejection of the patently true in favour of the 
absurd". The examples cited, by both authors, being the obviousness of the earth's motionlessness 
and centrality vis-a-vis the sun, stars and planets.
 ^A. Einstein cited in J. Katz (1985, pg. 173).
 ^P. Churchland and T. Sejnowski (1989) in W. Lycan (1990, pg. 226).
2 The term "irreduction" is from B. Latour (1988). Sellars' phrase is from W. Sellars (1956).
^ B. Smith (1996, pgs. 77 - 78). Smith also supplies the "commercial metaphor" (somewhat amended). 
° F. de Saussure, (1916, pg. 24 - 25).
^  The latter quotation is from N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 217), the former from N. Chomsky, (1992, pg. 
102) cited by Burton-Roberts and Carr (forthcoming).
^  F. de Saussure (1974, 3).
12 Ib id  14.
^  N. Chomsky (1964, pg. 23).
14 N. Chomsky, (1964, pg. 51).
^  E. Post, (1936), this being furthered by Harris' and Chomsky's own developments in the fifties.
^  One may wonder, given the "muddle" of the linguistic, whether the centrality of this fact is really 
"phenomenologically obvious", a pre-theoretic given. In fact, it seems, it isn't: Chomsky has noted 
that, obvious or not, positing a generative grammar in explanation of creativity was misconceived (see 
Parret, 1974, pg, 28): "a confusion of competence and performance". What recursion gives is the 
means for creativity, it is not itself an explanation of creativity. The recognition of this has led to the 
shift to the present centrality, for an explanatory linguistic theoiy, of the facts of acquisition. The 
cynic might observe that what is the central fact seems to be suggested by what you look like having 
the means to explain.
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^  T. Moore and C. Carling (1982, pg. 62). They are, arguably, guilty of making rather more of the 
observation than they ought; they appeal- to take the hypothesis of a formal system as somehow 
reprehensible in itself. Plainly, it is not: one needs further argumentation to the purpose of showing 
that formal systems, as presently conceived, are simply not up to the task of modelling the facts 
(Lakoff takes up this further line of argumentation in indicating that standard formal systems cannot 
do justice to actual natural language categorization schemata (G. Lakoff, 1987).) One has to make use 
of some conceptual means in formulating theoiy. What would be reprehensible, and we argue is in 
fact reprehensible, would be to give way to the temptation to take the appropriateness of the formal 
system metaphor as some sort of given. However, Moore and Carling's contention is supported by an 
argument to the effect that linguistics is insufficiently clear about what constitutes linguistic objects. 
Such clarity, they argue, is a precondition for the appropriateness of deductively formulated 
theorizing (i.e. theory construction articulated by means of some (quasi) formal system). As will be 
noted, fairly well the same point will be made here except coming from the other direction: having 
posited certain linguistic constructs, linguistic theories are unable, practically, to adduce proper criteria 
of identity for those constiucts.
^  F, de Saussure (1916, pg. 23).
19 G. Lakoff (1987, pg. 228).
The quoted phrase is from Suppe (1977), it may be construed as hairing more or less the same 
content as Chomsky's (1980, pg. 11) observation of a "Galilean style" of theory construction in the 
natural sciences.
2  ^Compare Lakoffs account (G. Lakoff, 1987, pgs. 219 ffr).
99 For example, the set-theoretic relation of inclusion, "A is a subset of B", is the same as the logical 
relation of implication, "if A, then B".
23 J. Barrow (1993, pg, 111).
2^ See D. Hilbert, "On the Infinite" in P. Benaceiraf and FI. Putnam, (1983).
Cited in S. Dehaene, (1998, pg. 243).
26 L. Coutarat, cited in J. Barrow, (1993, pg. 114).
22 Compare Pollard and Sag’s account (1994, pg. 6 ff).
28 R. Boyd (1979, pg. 363). The physicist Richard Feynmann, in countering objections to the use of 
such metaphors, remarks:
People often complain of the unwarranted extension of the ideas 
of particles and paths etc, into the atomic realm ... there is notiiing
unwananted about the extension It is the only way to make
progress. (R. Feynmann, (1965, pg. 164).)
More generally, this role of metaphor, in the guise of "mapping across domains” (Carey and 
Spelke, 1994) or "representational redescription" (Kanniloff-Smith, 1992) or "transformation of
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conceptual spaces" (Boden, 1990) is argued to be the basis for human creativity: it is why we are so 
clever. For Gardner (1983) "wisdom" is just such an ability to build connections across domains, 
prime exemplars of which are our use of metaphor and what Fodor (1985, pg. 4) notices as our 
"passion for the analogical". (These are not entirely novel remarks: Aristotle's discussion of metaphor 
suggests that its use constitutes evidence of superior intellect.) It is the correlative holism and lack of 
encapsulation of the "central processor" that Fodor (1983) suggests is sufficient to defeat an attempt 
in its account. For a less defeatist view, and a considerable degree of fundamental consensus, see the 
above authors and Sperber (1994).
29 J. Cohen and I. Stewart (1994, pg. 23).
A typical example being Searle’s Chinese room argument (J. Searle, 1980),
The issue of quite what the phrases "facts of the matter" and "inherent to the object" intend will be 
taken up in chapter II.
32 See, for example, Can, (P. Cam, 1990) from whom the phrase is bonowed. Much the same can be 
discerned in Newmeyer's defence of the Chomskyan/generativist paradigm (F. Newmeyer, 1983). 
Such thinking is a variant on the theme of Harman's notion of the inference to the best explanation 
(G. Harman, 1965),
33 N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 109).
34 H. Putnam, (1989, pg. 214).
35 R. Robins, (1971, pg. 41), citedin C. Hutton, (1993,pg. 167).
36 Ibid.
77 This assumption is, of course, what underlies referential/denotative theories of meaning and, 
ultimately, the whole contraption of possible worlds in Montagovian semantics. In the case of the 
mathematical example, tire assumption founds a Platonist/realist view of mathematical objects.
According to Kay (1979) (cited in Lakoff, 1987, pgs. 121 - 125) this assumption is part and 
parcel of a folk theory of language meaning. (Derrida's notion of "logocentricism", "the traditional 
order of priorities of language, meaning and truth", points in a similar direction.) In brief, the folk 
theoiy is to die effect that words and thought fit the world, that:
there is a world independent of out* talk and ... our linguistic 
expressions can be more or less faithful to the non-linguistic facts 
they represent. (P. Kay, 1979,pg. 37)
The reader will, perhaps, recognize the phrase as a description of certain conclusions of the 
Minimalist program (e.g. N. Chomsky, 1995, pg. 385). Interestingly, Chomsky has also used the 
phrase as a description of what results from taking a Platonist view of the linguistic (1980, pg. 29 - 30). 
In that context the phrase is used as a stick with which to beat Platonists. We will use it below 
(chapter IV) as a stick with which to beat Minimalism.
39 H. Putnam, (1980, pg. 482).
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B. Smith, (1996, pgs. 80 - 81). It may be worth noting that Smith's book grew out of concerns with 
the nature of the objects and constructs of the discourse of the computational sciences.
One can provide a Kuhnian interpretation to these remarks: Kuhn's (1962) central point is 
that work within a scientific paradigm depends upon, but is not concerned with considering, its set of 
foundational assumptions. Smith's point, something of a counterpart to our prefatory quotation horn 
Heidegger, is a request that one be aware of those paradigmatic assumptions, which assumptions, in 
our terms, provide the initial epistemic access onto some area of enquiry.
See N. Chomsky (1980, pg. 11). The adjective was originally coined by Husserl.
42 Cited in S. Blackburn (1994, pg.152). Such a view is representative of a long tradition from Plato 
("God is a geometer") to, contemporarily, Roger Penrose (see below). The Pythagoreans held that "all 
firings that can be known have number; for it is impossible for a thing to be conceived or known 
without number." (Philolaus of Croton, reported in J. Barrow, (1993, pg. 252)).
43 r , Penrose (1995, pg. 415).
44 E. Wigner, (1960, pg. 527), He remarks that "the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the
natural sciences is something bordering on file mysterious and there is no rational explanation for it." 
AS Plato: Timaeus, (section 90). For a rehearsal of this position in a somewhat less quaint and more 
evolutionary idiom, see J. Barrow (1993): in short, maths is real of the world, it has really a 
mathematical substructure, and:
if our minds have derived a special mathematical facility from the 
real world, it is likely that they have done so as a result of an 
evolutionary process which has selected for those mental 
representations of the world because they most faithfully 
represent how the world truly is. (pg. 263.)
It is unlikely, however, that evolution, as it is understood on the Darwinian model, can be held 
responsible for our evolving concepts that provide such a transparent window on the world, not 
unless selectional advantage can only be achieved on the basis of having representations of the world 
that are hue. Truth from an evolutionary perspective is more likely to approximate to a pragmatist's 
conception: what are selected for are representations/theories that work and representations/theories 
that work may do so despite not being hue on a correspondence notion of truth, (see footnote 25, 
chapter V, pg. 211).
46 N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 9). Here "chance" is doing the same job for Chomsky as evolution does 
for Barrow (see footnote 45).
42 g. Lakoff (1987, pg. 262). It is not too much of an interpretative stretch to suggest parallels with 
Husserl's phenomenological project with its suspension of judgement and of ontological commitment 
(,epoche) to the objects that are posited as the referents of discourse conducted from the perspective 
of the "natural attitude" (E. Husserl, 1931, pg. 111). According to Bell (1991, pg.164,) and compare
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footnote 37, this "natural attitude" (compare Putnam's "natural impulse") involves "the belief that, on 
the whole, the world is very much as we perceive it and conceive it to be."
One may point to Kant's "Copemican Revolution" as the intellectual precursor of this change 
of perspective with its suspension of belief in the transparency of mind/language to "things-in- 
themselves" and a concomitant foregrounding of tire a priori categories by which we apprehend the 
world.
Putnam's "internal realism" (1981) may be considered as a latter-day Kantianism. It is a 
position that is more or less implicit in the stance that is being elaborated in our discussion. In very
brief, internal realism holds that there is an external world with all its objects, but that world is
epistemically accessed only by way of the conceptual apparatus which is available to us. There is, 
consequently, and contrary to a metaphysical realism, "no God's Eye point of view...; there are only 
various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and pmposes that their 
descriptions and theories subserve." (pg. 50) Contrary to an idealism, i.e. tire view that the world is no 
more than some fiction that is spun out the contents of our minds;
Intemalisin does not deny that there are experiential inputs to
knowledge [i.e. care of the impinging of the external world];
knowledge is not a story with no constraints except internal
coherence; but it does deny that there any inputs which are not 
themselves to some extent shaped by our c o n c e p ts .pg- 54).
4o
For a similar view in respect of "the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics", see S. Dehaene 
(1998, pgs 249 - 252).
^  E. Wigner (1991, pg. 540).
^  L. Wittgenstein, (1961, Proposition 2.161).
^  P. Hacker, (1986, pg. 60), cited in C. Hutton, (1993, pg 170).
Cited in B. Kosko (1994, pg. 3). A similar scepticism as to the precise fit between mathematics and 
the structures of the physical world is warranted, by the fact that even in the case of as well- 
understood a theory as Newton's account of gravity the mathematics is not up to predicting precisely 
the gravitational effects of more than two separate bodies (more precisely, there is no formula that 
solves/predicts the motion of two or more bodies exactly). This was proved by Poincare in 1889. To 
similar effect, Dehaene points out that, in general, "mathematical models rarely agree exactly with 
physical reality" (S. Dehaene, (1998, pg. 251)).
Tins latter is the conclusion of the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem. See S. Blackburn (1994, pg. 352).
A. Chur ch, (1932), cited in J. Barrow, (1993, pg. 16).
M. Kline, (1980, pg. 521). Barrow (1993, pgs. 8 - 20  and 154 - 156) remarks on the intellectual 
shock that the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries caused (for "the idea of axioms was for the first 
time divorced from physical reality,... they were no longer aspects of that physical reality.").
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56 This (weak) equivalence was proved by Bar-Hillel, Gai&nan and Shamir (1960). For a discussion, 
see L. T. F. Gamut (1991, vol. II, pgs. 95 ff.).
Other examples of such "extensional equivalents" in mathematics and other fields are not 
difficult to find. For example, in classical mechanics, there are two ways of using mathematics to 
determine the trajectories of particles moving under tire force of gravity, either one may use 
differential equations or a variational principle.
57 J. Barrow, (1988, pg. 557).
5% L. Wittgenstein, (1958, section 131). By "model" Wittgenstein is referring to "our clear and simple 
language-games ... set up as objects of comparison." I am taking such to be more or less equivalent to 
the metaphors alluded to above which institute discourse and theory.
It is interesting to compare these remarks with our previous quotation (pg. 30) from the 
Tractates. One might be tempted (a temptation to which I will succumb) to point to these quotations 
as paradigmatic of both the continuity in Wittgenstein’s concerns and of a central shift in Iris thought 
between the early and later work.
59 "Fregean" in respect of the idea that penueates Frege's project of uncovering the real foims of 
language, some prefiguring calculus, that underlies the apparent surface muddle, the "amas confus" of 
Saussure’s phrase. This is a project that goes back, through Leibniz amongst others, to at least the 
middle ages. It is generally accompanied by some notion of a universal language (see Robins (1967, 
pgs. 85 ff)).
66 This method of theory construction is distinct from that which prevailed in the years of American 
Structuralism. Rather than the structuralist bottom up series of inductive generalizations being made 
piecemeal from and through the systematization of the data, instead the method is primarily top 
down, the calculus being in the manner of a general hypothesis that is to be discontinued in relation 
to its ability to model natural language strings, and hence to predict their acceptability. See N. 
Chomsky (1975a). For an elegant summary see J. Katz (1996).
61 W. V. O. Quine (1976, pg. 40).
62 R. Hersh (1998, pg. 167).
63 R. Camap (1937, pg. xiii).
64 W. V. O. Quine, (1979).
65 R. Hersh, (1998, pg. 171).
66 j, Higginbotham (1987, pg. 126). An observation, consonant with this remark, is that "the search 
for a linguistic framework, as opposed to a substantive theory, that has just the right expressive power 
is ... misguided." (D. Johnson and L. Moss, 1994, pg. 539.)
67 Examples of this style of theoiy development can be found in any of the standard text books as 
the manner of exegesis of the theoiyfor example, Haegeman (L. Haegeman, 1991).
68 C. Hutton (1993, pg. 177).
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69 P. Sells, (1985, pg. 78).
70 S. Stich, (1985, pg. 133).
71 See W. V. O. Quine, (1972). The point is that where there is radical inability to select between 
theories then there is nothing of which those theories may be contentfully said to be true.
77 Two grammars would be notational variants if they referred to all and only the same entities and 
relations but did so using different symbols, for example simply substituted "S", "NP", "VP",.... with 
"S", "NFI", "qri".... This is not problematic. What is problematic is where two or more grammars, over 
the same fragment of a language, achieve identical coverage but where the equivalence is only in their 
specifying the same set of sentences, where, for example, the constituents they specify differ and so 
require different models. For example, compare a categorial grammar and GB both with the same 
coverage over some fragment. Are these notational variants? (We take up, in chapter IV, Chomsky's 
addressing of the question by way of his three posited criteria for adequacy.)
7^ N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 100).
7^ Providing air analysis involves positing a set of entities, i.e. the model (of syntactic objects) that 
interpret the terms of the formalism. Different analyses involve different models, corresponding to the 
different economies of information of various formalisms. But, whence these different models? For 
are they not supposed to be supplied by, in the sense of inherent in, the object of study? Are they not 
supposed to supply the content (meaning) of tire symbols independently of the symbols. To requote 
Putnam: "Models are not lost noumenal waifs looking for someone to name them; they are 
constructions within our theory itself, and they have names from birth." (1980, pg. 482). Models (i.e. 
for present purposes tire syntactic objects that interpret the terms of a calculus) are not things that are 
found in reality, but are what is put there.
Adam, goes the illustrative joke, after a hard day of naming things in Eden, goes home to 
Eve and his supper. As they are settling in to the hors-d'oeuvre a zebra walks past. "Oh, by the way, I 
decided to call that a 'zebra'". "What on Earth for?" asks Eve - she's a tittle tetchy - perhaps still 
bewildered by a not yet completely interpreted world. "Why do you think?" says Adam, "It just looks 
tike one."
It turns out, by the way, that according to cladistic criteria "there is no true biological 
category that consists of all and only zebras." (J. Gould (1983), reported in Lakoff, (1987, pg. 119)).
75 C. Hutton, (1993, pg. 174).
7  ^N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 100).
77 A rejoinder to these remarks might point to the abstraction of the enquiry from instantiating 
mechanisms. We take up the issue in detail in chapter IV.
7^ In illustration of the notion of an epiphenomenon, an example (Hotstadtefs) is that of a steam 
engine and its whistle. Imagine one wanted a general theory of the engine, one might address the 
problem by attempting some account that directly addresses the perceived behaviour of the whistle. It
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is certainly something to be explained but, in hindsight, one recognizes that an attempt at a theory of 
the whistle qua whistle would be a mistake. Rather, it is a piece of perceived behaviour that is not 
directly specified for, it is not something that the engine is designed explicitly to produce, instead, it is 
an incidental by-product of the overall system, something that falls out of the design, but is not 
directly referred to by the design. Thinking of this design as a set of rules, the whistle "is not built into 
the rules, but is a consequence of the rules" (D. Hofstadter, 1979, pg. 308 - 309), it is not something 
that needs to be addressed on its own account.
To take a linguistic example, Berwick and Weinberg's (1984) functional explanation of 
subjacency reconstrues the set of subjacency phenomena as falling out of the actions of the (modified 
Marcus) parser and as a consequence rather blurs, indeed makes problematic, the standard 
competence/performance distinction. (A more recent proposal, in a similar style, i.e. "a theory of 
performance acts as a filter on possible linguistic representations", is made by Ackema and Neeleman 
(ms, 1998). Their paper is in attempted account of the disparity between the incidence of leftward and 
lightward movement, while preserving the symmetry (contra Kayne (1994)) of X-bar theory.)
It will be noted from these examples that the notion of an epiphenomenon is related to the 
computational distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge: a distinction between what 
is explicitly referred to by some program and what is implicit. For example, a program may define 
and refer to some strings of symbols as "sentences" which are subsequently manipulated by certain 
operations. One might think of "sentences" as being "real" to the computer that runs the program. On 
the other hand, a different but functionally equivalent program, may have the same output but with 
no explicit reference to the same strings of symbols as "sentences". Such a program has no 
"knowledge" of any entities as "sentences". Rather, "sentences" are what the program does, they are 
epiphenomenal, "a global consequence of how the program works" (Hofstadter, 1979, pg. 363).
n . Chomsky, (1965, pg. 9).
^  See C. Hutton, (1990) andN. Burton-Roberts (1994).
^  ICempson (forthcoming, chapter 8) notes that despite tire increasing recognition of the centrality of 
tire phenomenon of underspecification of natural language content in recent years (a phenomenon 
which makes at least problematic tire appropriacy of the formal language metaphor - an issue which 
we take up in chapter VI), "linguists have maintained the concept of a formal system" and that:
Even in pragmatics ... the formal-language metaphor is sustained 
in so far as it is assumed that the grammar articulates some form 
of complete structure associated with a sentence string, subject to 
some form of semantic interpretation, with the remit of 
pragmatics being to explain how such information provides the 
basis for the very much richer modes of interpretation that are 
available in discourse.
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In making these remarks one comes across a point of connection between Anglo-Saxon and 
continental idioms - recall that we are, after all, engaged on an "Anglo-Saxon deconstmction" of the 
generativist paradigm. The relevant terms of continental art that give a perspective on the matters with 
which we have been concerned being Derrida's notions of "logocentricism" and of "supplementarity".
Derrida diagnoses logocentricism (compare footnote 37) as the mythos that underwrites the 
western philosophical project - as a thinking that attempts to get into a "pure, self-present 
contemplation of truth", it expresses a "desire to fix an origin for truth and knowledge", where truth is 
understood as the world as it is in itself In other, Anglo-Saxon, words, truth is constituted by the 
model that interprets language. Language is a sort of supplement, a window on the world that is both 
necessary - we need some means to view the world - and de trop - because it defers the self-presence 
of tlie world.
In this light, language use, the exceeding of these origins, the extended deferment of the self­
present, i.e. "pragmatics [, and here we have an Anglo-Saxon speaking,] is taken to be peripheral, and 
of secondary interest, since it is not concerned with having anything to do with objective reality" (G. 
Lakoff, 1987, pg. 171). Rather it is a detour- from that reality, a reality which is the province of 
semantics insofar as semantics deals with matters of truth and ontology.
A symptom of the philosophical distrust of the supplementarity of language use is found in 
attitudes to, for example, metaphor, "a figure whose workings could always be explained by reference 
to some other, more reliable, or epistemologically privileged kind of language" (C. Noiris, 1987, pg. 
203). "Metaphor ... is determined by philosophy as a provisional loss of meaning, ..., a certainly 
inevitable detour ... with its sights set on the circular reappropriation of literal, proper meaning." (J. 
Derrida, 1982, pg. 270.) (Compare our own use of the notion of a theory constitutive metaphor as a 
hypothesis that has to be authenticated by reappropriation to a literal, realist meaning.)
Derrida suggests that the logocentric/semantic project is undercut by a "double logic" of the 
supplement. To say that x is a supplement of A is to say both that x is external and internal, is to say 
both x c  A and x <x A. (Consider a volume that is a supplement to the OED. On the one hand one 
may regar d such as no more than an optional extr a: if one does not have the supplement one can still 
claim to have the complete OED. On tire other hand, there is a proper sense in which the OED is not 
complete without its supplements.)
If we apply this logic of the supplement to the peripheral/external status of 
pragmatics/performance one might not be surprised to find, as we will suggest in chapter VI, that 
what has been intended to be non-originaiy and peripheral has to be reassessed as integral and 
originarily constructive of the nature of natural language.
8^ S. Levinson, (1983, pg. 145).
84 J. A. Fodor (1983).
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85 A charge that seems to be extaordinarily pertinent when laid against "the modularity theoiy gone 
mad" of some evolutionary psychologists. See, for instance, Tooby and Cosmides (1992, pg. 113) 
who give an "incomplete" list of seventeen modules, including one for something called "effort 
allocation and recaiibration" and, as perhaps a challenge to our imaginations as to what might not be 
included, break off triumphantly with "and so on!" - exclamation mark, indeed.
8  ^These remarks are, arguably, not vitiated by Sperber and Wilson's (1986) theory of the central 
processor. Their theory is an attempt to outline the principles of the central processor's operations. It 
is regarded as an inferential machine, with a demonstrative logic that, designed on a least cognitive 
effort for most cognitive gain basis, makes sense of input in relation to manifest and accessible 
premises. The problem is one of what limits are set on the nature and number of accessible premises. 
If on any given occasion we cannot predict what premises an individual can make use of (for it seems 
to require some form of non-demonstrative process of hypothesis formation), then, while there is 
always some p ost hoc account that can be made that makes sense of some result/interpretation, what 
is lacking is some properly/v-edictive and so properly falsifiable account. (See W. Downes, 1984, pgs. 
280 ff (and personal communication)).
8^ The quotation is a reprise of Wittgenstein's remarks we cited earlier (1953, section 131).
88 Higginbotham reports that, at a conference in 1959, Chomsky's response, on being asked how it 
was that he knew that a certain string was not an English sentence, was to "argue": "What do you 
mean, how do I know? I am a native speaker of the English language." (J. Higginbotham, 
(forthcoming)).
89 W. Levelt, (1974, pg. 6), cited in G. Adriaens, (1986, pgs. 43 - 44). Dennett makes a similar point: 
"Whenever we say we solved some problem 'by intuition', all that really means is that we don't know 
how we solved it." (D. Dennett, 1995, pg. 441). Indeed, Wright observes that: '"Intuition' suggests a 
primitive, unarticulated apprehension, a form of knowledge too basic and immediate to admit of any 
further account.... [There is] no further stoiy to be told..." (C. Wright, 1989, pg. 240).
W. Levelt, (1974, pg. 5).
91 J. Bever, (1970, pg. 345). It has also been suggested (e.g. Bolinger, (I960)) that, given that 
judgements are meta, then one might expect the interference of normative and not necessarily very 
accurate notions of the sort one picks up by virtue of being educated (or indeed, by virtue of merely 
being a speaker of a language).
92 N. Chomsky, (1965, pg. 27).
92 j. a . Fodor (1985, pg. 152). The point is echoed by Higginbotham (forthcoming):
The fact that our reflective judgements are a good source of data 
about our languages is a fact that calls for explanation within an 
overall theoiy of the properties of human languages and our 
cognitive relation to them. ... We cannot take the general 
reliability of reflective judgements as a brute fact, orthogonal to
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the project of exposing the structure and expressive powers of 
language.
The issues these observations raise are a particular problem for Platonist views of the 
linguistic, for if the linguistic is a Platonic realm that is ontologically other vis-a-vis the mind, then one 
needs some account of a) how the mind gets into any sort of relation to it, and b) some good reason 
why any linguistic data, mediated by minds, should be trusted at all.
94 N. Chomsky, (1975, pg. 101).
95 j. Higginbotham, (1987, pg. 128).
95 Russell makes much the same point (J. Russell, 1987, pg. 228 - 229). As do Moore and Carling 
(1982, pg. 5): "[Chomsky] claimed that the theoretical model also explained the ability which in order 
to be valid it required."
9^ Not necessarily directly linguistic, where "linguistic" is defined as I-iinguistic, because it is possible 
that intuitions do not reflect knowledge of language, rather they may reflect (possibly false) opinion. If 
intuitions are meta to the linguistic, then they can also be mistaken.
98 The phrase is from Carroll et a l (1981).
99 In P. Sells et al., (1991, pg. 7).
100 G. Harman, (1965).
It is a theme that runs through Rides and Representations.
102 S. Blackburn (1994, pg. 131).
*03 Examples are the hoary old favourites: "The rat the cat the dog chased ate died" (multiple centre- 
embedding), Bever's "The horse raced past the bam fell" (garden path) and Smith and Wilson's "This 
is tire sort of book that, having once read it, you feel you want to give it to all your fiiends" 
(resumptive pronoun).
IO^n . Chomsky (1986, pg. 36).
105 Ibid.
106 Tire problem is addressed by Carroll et at. (1981). Their specific observation is of the 
unsystematicity of, and variation in, judgements. Their paper is a preliminary attempt to examine, and 
so ultimately specify, the "numerous other factors" of Chomsky's remark and hence explain the 
variation. They recognize, rightly, that the problem is not merely peripheral, but that the inability to 
explicate what is involved in the making of intuitional judgements is tantamount to an inability to 
justify the use of such data. Such an inability would amount to the "empirical apocalypse" for the 
generativist project to which we referred. (But let's not allow such scmples to get in the way of having 
stories to tell.)
1^7 The phrase is from Gross (M. Gross, 1979, pg. 966). An alternative and equivalent expression is 
"the closed level fallacy" (G. Adriaens, 1986, pg. 48). The points raised in the present discussion are 
by no means novel, indeed are rather boring in their recapitulation of old concerns. And they ar e also
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boring in the sense of being boorish: bringing standard methodology to question is rather like 
someone threatening to take the ball home or sitting on it so nobody gets to play. A standard way to 
handle bores is to ignore them and to hope they go away. But maybe, just maybe, though one hates 
to admit it, the reason the bore persists is because he has some perfectly legitimate concerns, and the 
reason why it is so much pleasanter and more convenient to ignore him is that he threatens to spoil 
everybody's fun. It might also be recalled from the reader's schooldays that a common justification for 
some, usually illicit, activity is just that it is fun so it must be alright (more or less an argument from 
heuristic fertility). It never seemed to work much then, did it?
^  Our literary allusion is borrowed from Aitchison (J. Aitchison, 1996, pg. 182). Such circularity, 
with a concomitant unfalsifiability of theory, is what Popper inveighs against and which he takes as a 
symptom of pseudo-science (K. Popper, 1959). An example of such a hermeneutic circle is provided 
by the Freudian notion of "suppression" or of being "in denial": "Were you abused as a child?" - 
"Yes" (you were) - "No" (you're in denial, i.e. you were.) Compare tins with the sort of story linguists 
concoct: is "Have you time for a drink?" grammatical? If it is not, as some analysis might predict (see 
footnote 112, below), then an unacceptability judgement is evidence for the analysis. If, however, 
such a judgement is not forthcoming, then just what plausible shuffle invoking performance factors is 
disallowed? Performance factors do fairly well the same job as suppression does for Freud: they 
constitute a carpet under which one may sweep unpalatable data. The instrument one uses being, 
what we termed, Occam's broom: it keeps things tidy and simple, where simplicity is defined in 
respect of the theory which you want to accommodate with the data.
109 By "theory-external perspective" I am not suggesting that there are such "God's eye" perspectives 
that are not theory relative and external to some theory, but rather that there are perspectives external 
to this theory and its discourse.
An example (and they are not difficult to find) is the case of the "pronouncedly deviant" "That 
Tom will win is likely but it's not clear which race" (Chung et al., 1996). I cannot help but find this 
pronouncedly all right. Maybe I am wrong, but what possible sense is there to "wrong" here? A 
problem with intuitions is that there is little to be gained from arguing about them. Being wrong is no 
other than being dishonest. I am not imputing dishonesty, but what might be raised is the question of 
what is to be done in the case where intuitions differ and not only between individual speakers but 
also in the case of the same speaker having different intuitions regarding the same string on different 
occasions.
The standard recourse, in Hie first case, is to invoke the notion of the idiolect. (What this 
means is that you get to idealize on the lines authorized by the grammar.) Clearly this will not serve in 
the latter case. What we are encouraged towards is some idealization and letting the grammar decide. 
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear to what extent this is distinct from giving licence for the proposer 
to interpret and dispose of data so as to fit the proposal: one idealizes in the direction of one's
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grammar on the grounds of answering to some methodological criterion of simplicity and economy 
(nor is this confined to only unclear cases - see footnote 112), but what this means is that one gets to 
sweep unpalatabilities under the carpet, but this is only allowable on condition that simplicity is taken 
to be some sort of metaphysical principle that informs reality (and it is not, see below, chapter IV, 3,3) 
- Occam's razor is transformed magically into a broom to do the sweeping - moreover, simplicity can 
be defined only theory-intemally so what happens is that it is one's theoiy that is not only the 
proposer as to how the world is but also the disposer. An egregious example of, in this case, letting 
the power of the grammar decide, is provided by Sells: "all the constructions that have been shown to 
require greater power than context-freeness are somewhat unusual, and apparently not run of the mill 
grammatical phenomena" (P. Sells, 1985, pg. 78) and so, the implication is that any untidiness 
(defined precisely in terms of context-freeness and the Chomsky hierarchy, i.e. the formal apparatus 
that is brought to the task) exhibited by natural languages need not be addressed: a case of fixing what 
one has to explain in relation to what one wants, or has to, explain it with.
On the other hand, in requiring that a string is taken to be deteiminately, irrespective of 
context, either in or out of the language, what is being assumed is that a principle of bivalence (a 
string is either grammatical or not grammatical) is relevant, that there is proper sense to the notion of a 
language being fixed always and already, independent of a context. In other words, that a language, as 
a set of sentences, is a real (in the metaphysical sense) object. This assumption is, as we suggested, 
brought in as part and parcel of the formal system metaphor. We aim to show, in chapter VI, that this 
is an unwarranted assumption.
^  An example - again a trawl through the literature will furnish innumerable similar cases - is 
provided by Saito (1985). Two Japanese strings are both unacceptable (so I am informed by a 
Japanese speaker) with, for that speaker, no difference in their intuitive level of unacceptability. One is 
tagged with "?" and put down to being a performance phenomenon and the other with on no 
evidential grounds whatsoever other than that of "letting the grammar decide", i.e. interpreting the 
data to fit the theoiy. The trouble with this strategy, to reiterate the point above, is that it is unclear 
what differentiates cases where it is perfectly proper (if it ever is) and cases where it is a means to 
getting the data to be the data that you want.
1 i  n
An example: if you want "Have you time for a drink?" to be ungrammatical (as opposed to the 
grammatical "Have you got time for a drink?" (you are led to this by your analysis), then you can 
wave your hands and claim that the acceptability of the former is on account of it being a case of 
fossilized language, rather in the manner of a conventional quotational use of an archaism, somewhat 
in the way that certain people are given to littering their speech with Shakespearianisms or, in certain 
settings, usually religious, "thee" and "thou" get invoked. The judgement, or rather the hand-waving, 
comes out of Pollock's analysis of auxiliary verbs (Y-P. Pollock, 1989). "Have you the time?" is 
ungrammatical because "have" as a main verb assigns a theta-role and the only verbs, in English, that
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raise over Neg/adverbs are non-theta assigning auxiliary verbs. Hence the need for an "explanation" 
for the acceptability of the string. It may, of course, be a correct explanation, but the worrying thing is 
the apparent lack of constraint on the types of factors that may be invoked in order to effect an 
explanation. In short, our ignorance of what goes on in performance is a licence for invention limited 
only by imagination and some rather vague notions of plausibility.
These terms (boirowed from Dennett (1987) and he in turn from Reichenbach), are roughly 
equivalent to representatum and representans respectively. Some more flesh will be provided below 
(chapter II, 4.0).
U4 C. Hutton (1993, pg. 177).
H-* This is a quite explicit foundational assumption of the generativist paradigm: Chomsky, in 
beginning the third chapter of Syntactic Structures, remarks: "Assuming the set of grammatical 
sentences of English to be given, we now ask what sort of device can produce this set." (N. Chomsky, 
(1957, pg. 18)). The device being, in more recent parlance, the I-language.
11  ^Bivalence is a standard accompaniment of metaphysical realism, i.e. the thesis that the facts of the 
matter are a determinate totality, fixed once and for all whether or not these facts come to be 
experienced, or, indeed, can be experienced. This is the sense of "transcendent" in fire above 
paragraph: what is the case is independent of its being recognized as the case. The facts of the matter 
are always and already. See, for example, H. Putnam, (1989, pg. 214) and A. Grayling (1990, pg. 233).
Recall our remark (paraphrasing Smith) that if some account allows itself to unquestioningly rely 
on some categorization, then it is not too much of a stretch to imagine that the results are going to be 
skewed in that categorization's favour. We might say skeuomorphed in that categorization's favour.
An alternative name is "brain puns" (J, Cohen and I. Stewart, 1994, pgs. 22 - 24). The idea is 
closely related to our previous discussion of the role of metaphor in scientific hypotheses and our 
observation of a Woozle hunt: what we see is what we put there; skeuomorphs are the trophies of 
Woozle hunts. (Also compare our quotation (pg. 26) from Smith.)
N. Chomsky (1991, pg. 50). We are a little guilty here of over-extending the reference of 
"conclusions", Chomsky has in mind the particular conclusions of the Minimalist program. However, 
we will be concerned with showing that these latter conclusions are, indeed, the result of taking to its 
limits the style of theory construction we have been concerned with identifying.
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CHAPTER II. 
Instrumentalism versus Realism.
How exquisitely the individual mind to the external 
world
Is fitted - and how exquisitely, too
The external world is fitted to the mind
And the Creation (by no lower name
Can it be called) which they with blended might
Accomplish.
(W. Wordsworth)
I  was myself the compass o f that sea:
I  was the world in which I  walked' and what I  saw 
Or heard or felt came not butfi'om myself;
(W. Stevens)
1.0 Introduction.
Our earlier discussion remarked on two species of approach to the use of a 
formal or conceptual system to model some phenomenon. The former, the Galilean, 
has it that such a system is able to model some given phenomenon because that which 
is being modelled inherently corresponds to the properties of the formal system, as if 
it were the instantiation by some other means of that logically prior formal system, a 
sort of writing in some other medium which translates entirely from the language of 
the formal system without residue. The Einsteinian observation, on the other hand 
(see pg. 30), makes recognizable a distinction that is available to be drawn: the formal 
system is a vehicle that allows one to talk about some object of study, to make correct 
predictions regarding that object, but that object in itself exceeds, i.e. is logically 
distinct from and autonomous of, the properties of the formal system qua formal 
system. The former construal is resolutely realist and Galilean regarding the properties 
of formal and conceptual systems: such give a transparent picture of an independently 
existing world, because that world is prefigured by some such system. The latter 
approach, in recognizing a proper distinction between representans and
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representatum, confers a degree of opacity on the vehicle which articulates theoiy. 
When this opacity is taken as ineliminable the result is an instrumentalist view of 
scientific enquiiy. This view has it that there is no literal truth or falsity possible to 
scientific theories: scientific knowledge is not of an independent world but is only the 
projection of mind-dependent and mind-projected concepts:
The study of a (putatively) "empirical" domain is not to 
be viewed as a "direct" study of the domain itself, but 
rather a study of our knowledge of it.11
This view is closely related to the Quinean observation of the theoiy 
dependence of any and all obseivational statements21 and the correlative criteria for 
success of any theoiy: it is not a case of a theoiy being successful by virtue of its 
correspondence to facts of the matter in the world, but rather a theoiy is successful 
when it is consistent with a web of beliefs viewed holistically. A corollary is the 
possible reusability of all beliefs, because those beliefs are not guaranteed by any real- 
world, mind-independent facts of the matter. The reusability is claimed to be relative 
to their coherence with all others in our conceptual scheme. In brief, what one gets is 
a relativism.
One step further leads one towards an out and out idealism: if the facts of the 
world are knowable not as facts of the world but only as projections of our conceptual 
scheme, then the world is indistinguishable from a fiction woven out of just that web 
of concepts: "To put the conclusion crudely, the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. "3r
2.0 Reasons for realism.
To avoid a philosophical morass, we will take the line, as more of an 
assumption, even pretence, rather than as an unassailable position, that, regardless of 
the philosophical plausibility of a thorough-going and ineliminable instrumentalism, 
scientific enquiiy more 01* less consistently assumes, in practice, a realist perspective 
and to revise that assumption would be at the cost of the prime motivating factor in 
scientific enquiiy: it is founded on an implicit metaphysical assumption that there are 
some mind-/concept-extemal and independent states of affairs which it is the task of 
science to elucidate. Furthermore, the development of the sciences is most accessibly 
understood in terms of the preference for one theoiy over another on the basis of a 
theoiy's answerability to the way the world in fact is. The fundamental problem with
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relativism is that it needs to account for the fact that, whenever enquiiy is serious, 
whatever field we are concerned with, it is not Liberty Hall:4 there are certain things 
that simply cannot cogently be said of some phenomenon. It is reasonable to suppose 
that what makes things impossible to be said is the way the world in fact is, and that it 
is the way the world in fact is that is, potentially, the ultimate arbiter of theoiy. To put 
this another way, if the sciences are, in fact, in the business of concocting stories to 
spin, if they are a species of fiction, then not only has science misunderstood itself 
(and we come to fail to understand what has been taken for its success), but also it 
rather loses its purpose, not to mention its constraints: there seems little motivation to 
"advance” science by merely exchanging one myth for not only some other, but any 
other: everyone might as well go home.
A riposte might be to remark on the motivation offered by the preferability of 
a set of beliefs that is internally coherent and it is the achievement of such coherence, 
as opposed to correspondence to states of affairs, which constitutes an '’advance". A 
coherence theory of truth is to take the place of a theoiy of truth as correspondence to 
external world facts. However, this is merely to exchange one metaphysical 
assumption for another: while realism makes an assumption of an external world to 
which theories are answerable, which assumption the philosophers show us is difficult 
to make good, the coherence Anew (e.g. Quine, (1953)), which we will take as 
symptomatic of positions that are sceptical of a scientific realism, has a similar 
difficulty.
The Quinean slogan has it that all beliefs are revisable. This raises something 
of a paradox because if we take it at face value, then the belief that "all beliefs are 
revisable" must also be reusable, so it cannot be true, the only revision available is 
"not all beliefs are revisable." One might tty to sidestep this, Wittgenstein-like, by 
claiming some meta-level perspective, some ladder which is to be thrown away after 
use. However, the point of the original slogan seems to depend on the possibility of 
something true (in the realist and not the pragmatist sense of the term) being able to 
be said of something, and this is to make a realist assumption. In this case, what 
constitutes the determinate and real something about which something true can be said 
is not some external world but a web of beliefs. The particular problem arises when 
one asks how we are to revise that web: what is it that makes one theoiy preferable to 
another? The answer is, as canvassed, a theory's coherence with the rest of the web of 
beliefs. But, in this case, there needs to be an unrevisable, prior and real criterion of 
coherence: "Being presupposed in the veiy concept of a system, [a principle of 
coherence is] at least absolutely a priori”5r Without such there are, literally, no
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coherent means, and so no coherent reason, to prefer one theoiy over another. In 
other words, a similar metaphysical and realist assumption to that made by realists is 
in place except in this case it is not an assumption of an external set of facts of the 
matter, rather it is of an extemal/meta-level principle relating beliefs to each other. It 
seems one cannot avoid some meta-(physical) assumption; either that the external 
world is that to which theories are answerable, or that there is some a priori notion of 
coherence, or, perhaps, both.
One is also drawn to wonder whence comes this metaphysical obligation to 
have a set of coherent beliefs: as the poet (Whitman) points out:
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes).
More prosaically, it appears to be the case that, for instance, many people have 
mutually inconsistent ways of understanding electricity - as fluid or as a bundle of 
particles - each manner of conceptualization being successful in respect of certain 
problems but not others where the rival conceptualization works (also compare wave- 
particle duality in quantum mechanics6). Why, and what use is there for a requirement 
to make these conceptualizations consistent, unless one has in mind the realist 
assumption that there is one and only one correct theory, or at least that there is 
potential content to the notion of best theory, where best is in respect of the fit 
between theory and how the world happens to be?
In the light of these remarks, we will assume that a scientific realism 
(construed as the thesis that the way the world is is what, to some crucial extent, 
interprets theory and is what theories are answerable to,) is a viable option, for it 
seems not to go away. We will also assume - an assumption that will be implicit in our 
methodology - that the standard notions of truth and falsity (i.e. a statement is true iff 
it corresponds to the facts of the matter) can be, in principle, properly, at least 
virtually, predicated of scientific theories.
The qualifications in this statement of what we are assuming viable are for the 
purpose of distancing our position from an unqualified realism. To recap, such a 
metaphysical, "God's Eye point of view" realism holds that facts of the matter are 
independent of minds and that "the world consists of some fixed totality of mind- 
independent objects"71', these objects having their properties inherently. What we have 
been insisting on, even if implicitly, is a species of realism along the lines of Putnam's 
"internal realism" and which takes note that:
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our way of understanding the world in terms of objects, 
properties and relations is an imposition of our 
conceptual schemes upon external reality; reality as we 
understand it [and as we can only understand if its the 
only access there is] is structured by our conceptual 
schemes.81'
From this perspective, facts of the matter, objects and then properties, are not 
so much always and already, inherent and waiting to be discovered, rather "'objects’ 
[and their properties] do not exist independently of conceptual schemes."9r This does 
not amount to an idealism, but it does amount to a recognition that our epistemic 
access is always and only by way of the concepts that are available to us. However, 
and here is the point, while constructs and properties are what get put there as initially 
skeuomorphs, a sort of virtual reality and "map of the territory", the present 
contention - and which provides content to the realism and what might excise the 
metaphoricity - is that the crucial arbiter of whether they can be properly put there is 
the world itself; whether it accepts them in the sense of conforming to, not behaving 
other than, this, as it were, virtual reality. As Bromberger puts it: "surveyors label and 
map the tenitoiy, ... but they don't create it"10r and, of course, what decides whether a 
map is more or less accurate is our trying to use it in respect of negotiating our way 
through the territory itself.
In the light of this, and to be bome in mind in our discussion, "facts of the 
matter" are to be reconstrued as the external world’s acceptance of conferred 
properties; theory development and the scientific enterprise are rather like trying out 
conceptual clothing on the world until there is a maximal fit; it is undertaken in the 
belief, or faith, possibly mistaken, that a perfect fit can be achieved. Taking this line 
we get to maintain the standard realist view that there is content to the need to choose 
between theories in respect of which is best "accepted" by the objects under study, 
which fits the most closely: it is the external world that remains the crucial arbiter of a 
theoiy’s correctness.
It is, however, one thing to argue for this position, it is another to take the 
same argument, even if it were conclusive, to found the assumption that a theory', in 
so far as it is confirmed by its predictions, might make such successful predictions 
only on the basis of its correspondence to (or, in the light of our remarks, best 
acceptance by) the way the world in fact is; that successful predictions are in 
themselves sufficient to warrant the constructs of a theory as (virtually) real.
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3.0 Reasons for an instrumentalist perspective.
There is a persistent temptation in respect of opposing and polarized 
philosophical positions, a temptation founded on, perhaps, a desire for tidiness, to see 
opposing poles as a case of either/or (in a strictly exclusive sense). A case in point is 
Carr's discussion of this issue.111' It seems that either one is to be a realist or an 
instrumentalist; what he appears to neglect is the possibility that certain theories 
warrant a realist, but others no more than an instrumentalist, construal. Can* 
apparently takes the instrumentalist/realist debate to be a case of an exclusive 
disjunction: in finding against instrumentalism, then any theories that make successful 
predictions are to be taken as, ipso facto, referring to real states of affairs, as if the 
only basis upon which a successful prediction could be made were one of the reality 
of the constructs that enable the truth of the prediction.
Can argues for a realist construal of linguistic theories on perfectly cogent and 
well-authorized grounds. However, what he argues for is the general cogency of 
realism in the philosophy of science, and hence the possibility of some more or less 
finished linguistic theoiy that does conespond to the real facts of the matter, facts 
which are guaranteed by the way the object happens to be. This is to be distinguished 
from an argument that shows that any given, actual linguistic theory is to be properly 
construed as corresponding to, or to be about, such facts: because there is, putatively, 
a discrete phenomenon to be explained does not entail that a theoiy that calls itself, in 
this case, linguistic, is, ipso facto, making reference to the real linguistic facts of the 
matter. What Carr requires for his argument to get started is some case to be made for 
our having confidence that the object of stud}' as postulated by current linguistic 
theories is properly identified, that our initial carving of the world has selected an 
object that is determinate and determinable and about which one may have a realist 
theoiy at all. Raising this returns us to the question of the originaiy choice of an object
of study, a choice, we have intimated, that was selected for by the availability of
certain formal systems.
Can’s confidence that a proper object has been identified, and that linguistic 
theories are disconfiimable in respect of that proper object of study, is based on the 
contention that:
there is no way of accounting for the success of our 
theories other than by adopting [a] realist position, the 
principal warrant for which is heuristic fertility.121'
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By this phrase he intends a theory’s ability to make successful predictions and to 
uncover previously unrecognized phenomena, (One might mention that one other 
entirely feasible way of accounting for this "success" is just the "closed circuit 
functioning" we identified - compare the "success" and heuristic fertility of Freudian 
psychology.) Leaving these remarks in parentheses, Carr points out that it is in respect 
of such an ability that one theoiy might be preferable to some other less good theoiy. 
Moreover, the fact that theories can be compared in this regard itself argues for a 
realism about scientific theories: what grounds the "heuristic fertility" of a better 
theoiy is that theoiy's closer approximation to the facts of the matter in the world: it is 
the world that is the test and theories stand or fall in relation to then ability to 
correspond to the way the world is.
Chomsky's position is not dissimilar to Can's, the discernible difference being, 
as Carr points out,13r Chomsky’s summaiy dismissal of instrumentalism as somehow 
obviously discredited, as a view that was "rapidly discarded". In his arguing that 
linguistics be treated in the same manner as the physical sciences there appears to be 
an assumption that realism is the universally accepted view,14 Chomsky argues15r that 
proposed linguistic theories should face the same criteria, neither more nor less 
stringent, as those which the theories of the other natural sciences face. Chomsky 
points out that it is "social practice" to confer on best theories the status of "true” and 
on their constructs the status of "real", much in the manner that we are happy to 
include the hypothesized particles of sub-atomic physics in our general ontology. In 
the same way, to the extent that a linguistic theoiy makes successful predictions, then, 
so the rhetorical question goes, what further criteria are to be met over and above 
predicting the data?
While it may well be social practice to confer truth on best theories, social 
practice is not, I understand, the arbiter of whether or not something is true, at least 
not unless we subscribe to some species of pragmatism.16 Where Chomsky's argument 
does have force is in respect of predictive success. Such success, goes the Chomskyan 
argument, warrants the propriety of the predicate "hue", and "hue" here is not to be 
distinguished from "psychologically real": a linguist’s grammar provides, by virtue of 
its postulated mental representation, a causal explanation of die nature of natural 
language, of its acquisition, of the means to linguistic creativity and of the similarities 
between natural languages.
It is at this point that Chomsky's and Carr's positions bifurcate. Then 
agreement is over the propriety of a realist construal of linguistic theories that achieve 
heuristic fertility, then disagreement is over the ontological status of linguistic objects:
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Chomsky takes a psychological stance, Carr views the linguistic as constituting an 
autonomous domain that cannot be reduced to the psychological. In terms of our 
initial schema, the disagreement is over the move from the second strand of 
Chomsky's revolution to the third, from realism to psychological realism.
While we will defer detailed discussion of these issues, it will, however, be 
useful, as a means to orientate ourselves, to baldly state what we hope to substantiate.
Autonomy of a domain involves the claim that that domain cannot be 
contentfully related to any other. Arguably, what sustains the willingness to concede 
the psychologism of Chomskyan linguistic theories is the (possibly mistaken) 
obviousness of the relation between the linguistic and the psychological (a lot hangs 
on what exactly constitutes "the psychological", but we will skip over the problem for 
the moment), for how else might one conceive of explaining why natural languages 
are as they are other than by citing the human mind/brain. If one wants an explanatory 
linguistics - an answer as to why as well as what, then, seemingly, one needs a 
psychological linguistics. A theoretical position that results in the inability to relate the 
linguistic to the psychological constitutes, on the basis of this obviousness and this 
explanatory need, grounds for questioning that theoretical position: the autonomy of 
the linguistic is tantamount to the anomaly of the linguistic, and the inability or refusal 
to explain the linguistic. If Chomsky's position cannot be adequately substantiated 
such that it achieves some identifiable psychological content, in other words if Carr 
(and Platonists such as Katz et a t ) are correct, then this leaves us having to negotiate 
an anomaly. One way to so negotiate the anomaly is to drop a realist perspective and 
exchange it for an instrumentalist position.
Can's and Chomsky's realist construal of theories depends on their arguments 
from heuristic fertility. Instrumentalism has it that there are always insufficient 
grounds for confidence that the world corresponds to the constructs of a scientific 
theory: it is not, until it becomes an idealism, a scepticism about the real world, but a 
scepticism of our knowledge of it. Our discussion (somewhat summarily) reinstituted 
the cogency of such a realism. The question is: when are we warranted in construing a 
theory's constructs as corresponding to the real state of things? It cannot be the case 
that the possibility of a realism thereby confers reality on the constructs of even "best 
theories" (unless we take Chomsky's Peircean suggestion and take social practice to be 
the arbiter). This is for the simple reason that best theories have an uncanny habit of 
becoming second best, passe good tries, in other words, not true. Presumably,
76
Instrumentalism versus Realism
defunct best theories achieved then "best" status by virtue of the heuristic fertility and 
predictive success that Chomsky and Carr advert to. But how are we to think of these 
partially truth-bearing, second-best theories? One answer is as instrumental fictions. 
The point is that bald, unqualified and unsupplemented heuristic fertility cannot be a 
sufficient mark that a theory answers to the real facts of the matter, as if predictive 
success could only be achieved on the basis of a theoiy's constructs corresponding to 
real entities of the real world.
Before adding some flesh to these remarks, it is worth pointing out why the 
possibility that the most appropriate construal of competence linguistic theories and 
their objects is as instrumental fictions might have a certain prima facie appeal. In 
short, the appeal is that it appears to make sense of some of the points that we have 
touched on.
One motivation for taking an instrumentalist perspective on theories in 
Chomsky's generativist tradition is that it avoids the ontological bifurcation that would 
be motivated if it were shown, as we intend, that the psychologism of the Chomskyan 
project is unachieved. If no psychological ontological status can be granted to 
linguistic objects, then, if one is to persist in a realism towards those objects, it is 
necessary to grant them some ontological status. The result of an autonomism would 
be to add one more different sort of thing to our ontological catalogue. Such might be 
the case, but, given the prejudices of a scientific materialism, and its fondness for 
Occam's razor and a clean-shaved chin, it is an unpalatable move. On the other hand, 
if a psychological linguistics is, given the basic prejudices of the cognitivist paradigm, 
what we want, and that is what we don’t have, then an instrumentalism offers a way to 
avoid those prejudices being embarrassed: one does not usefully quantify over 
fictional entities, and nor can one conclude from such entities to some non- 
psychological status for the linguistic.
Secondly, an instrumentalism offers a perspective on the problem we outlined 
earlier, that of the difficulty of adducing sufficient grounds to allow for decision 
between competing frameworks. As remarked, the present state of the field shows a 
degree of fracture, at least of pluralization, while, for the most part maintaining an 
agreed object of study: a competence grammar. Each framework continues as a going 
concern by virtue of precisely the "heuristic fertility" Carr adverts to. If such fertility 
were sufficient warrant for each framework/theory to be construed as corresponding 
to the real facts of the matter, i.e. to be constiued realistically, then linguistic reality 
becomes wonyingly pluralized. A question this raises is that, if we assume that at most
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one current framework is true, then how are we to account for the comparable 
heuristic fertility of those which are not true?
Returning to the insufficiency of Can's (and Chomsky's) argument from 
heuristic fertility for the grounding of a realist constraal of theoiy: the point we 
sketched regarding superseded "best theories" is an instance of a standard argument 
for instrumentalism that goes by the sonorous name of the pessimistic meta- 
induction.171' The argument is remarkably simple but powerful for all that: the history 
of science is littered with defunct, because falsified or superseded, best theories. On 
inductive principles we can surmise that present best theories will also turn out to be 
disconfirmed. On these grounds we would be unwise to confer truth on any current 
theories or reality on their constructs.
This argument, as well as encouraging a thoroughgoing instrumentalism, also 
raises something of a paradox. If, sanguinely, we take a Wliiggish view and think of 
science as a progression that, in the long run, gets ever closer to the truth, then the 
nearer one gets to the finished theory the more inductive grounds (because more 
superseded theories) there are from which to conclude the falsity of any current 
theoiy. Paradox aside, it would, however, as Papineau points out, "be too quick to 
conclude that [the argument] discredits realism completely."181 He remarks that:
the tendency to falsity is much more common in some 
areas of science than others, [there is] a differential 
success rate [which is] the result of the necessaiy 
evidence being more easily available in some areas of 
science than in others.191'
The moral he draws is that "we should be instrumentalist about that sub-class of 
theories which are not supported by adequate evidence."20 Arguably, we should be 
similarly inclined about those theories that furnish their evidence out of some "closed- 
circuit functioning", and also so inclined about those theories that cannot; in practice, 
adduce either evidence nor adequate criteria to substantiate their claims such as would 
allow for decision between competing accounts.
A useful illustration of an instance of a predictively successful, "heuristically 
fertile", best theoiy that cannot be construed realistically is the Ptolemaic theory of the 
solar system. Given all the data that were available to the ancients (i.e. naked eye 
observations) the Ptolemaic system was outstandingly successful: it, as it were,
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achieved coverage. Predictions of planetary motion were made on the basis of a geo­
centric model with the Earth (and human-kind) resolutely in the centre of tilings and 
the celestial bodies in steady progression around that centre. The idea of a static Earth 
is, of course, not only eminently preferable (out of species-egoism and in keeping with 
both scripture and a Christian world-view), but also eminently obvious: it is the sun 
and the moon and stars that move, one only has to look. Given all the available data, 
the available conceptual scheme and the success of the theoiy, there was simply no 
motivation to consider any alternative.21
Complications in the Ptolemaic geo-centric scheme were induced by the fact 
that the planets do not conform to movements that are consistent with simple circular 
orbits about the Earth. To get round this, (after all, why drop the basic assumption 
that allows one to explain so much, is this not what we do in linguistics?) it was 
necessaiy to have the planets moving in epicycles, i.e. minor orbits having as their foci 
the primary orbits around the Earth. (Imagine a large wheel with a smaller wheel 
having as its axis some point on the circumference of the larger.) Given this 
adjustment then you get all the data out. To be noted here is a variation on the theme 
of a skeuomorph: an unquestioned, perhaps a mediaevally self-evident, assumption is 
that celestial motions are to be explained (theories are to be posited) in terms of 
circular orbits. (The grounds being the perfection of this geometrical figure, the 
heavens being the creation of a, by definition, perfect divinity, and hence, the heavens 
themselves must be perfect. Ergo, celestial motion involves circles.22) Circles are, as a 
result of these considerations, the conceptual apparatus and explanatory construct to 
which one is constrained in positing theories: theorizing is "limited by the materials 
available".
What ultimately upset this marvellously successful theoiy - a theoiy that was 
rather more predictively accurate than Copernicus* original counter-hypothesis - were 
some extra and unfortunate data from telescopic observations (Galileo's) that showed 
that, amongst other things, Venus, like the Moon, has phases. Given these data and a 
willingness to commit heresy, the conclusion, or rather, the hypothesis, is that it is the 
Earth that moves. In hindsight it appears somewhat comical that a considerable debate 
of the period centred on the admissibility of telescopic data, indeed on the 
admissibility of any data other than naked eye observation, as if the data were 
somehow a priori. It is worth pointing out that Fodor charges Katz with just such a 
priorism in attempting to stipulate what linguistic data are.23r It is also worth 
mentioning in passing how this "comical" debate bears an uncanny resemblance to 
that regarding the pertinence of psycholinguistic evidence in the disconfirmation of
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linguistic theoiy.24 However, the point to be underlined here is that while the 
Ptolemaic theoiy is effectively discontinued, there remains the problematic status of 
the true predictions that were made on the basis of this false theoiy. Clearly, it cannot 
be the case that the theoiy's "heuristic fertility" is to be taken as warrant to construe 
the constructs of the theory (geo-centricism and planetary epicycles) as answering to 
the real facts of the matter. Rather, to the extent that the theoiy is truth-bearing, then 
these constructs of the theoiy are to be regarded as fictions that are no more than 
instrumental in providing predictive success: it is "as if ' the Ptolemaic model 
pertained.
4.0 Warrants for realism.
Other sciences are concerned with objects that are 
given in advance and which one can consider from 
different points o f view; in our field there is nothing 
similar. (Saussure)25
While we may agree that there is 110 present warrant to construe a Ptolemaic 
account realistically, we may ask what it is about the theoiy that has superseded it that 
encourages a realism. This returns us to the question of what Papineau might intend 
by "adequate evidence" such as would demarcate theoiies meriting a realist construal 
from those that merit an instrumentalist interpretation. In raising this we are also 
addressing the question of how our charge of "elosed-circuit functioning" in theoiy 
development might be negotiated; how one might be persuaded of the excision of a 
skeuomoiph effect and, correlatively, of the excision of the fictionahty/metaphoricity 
of the theoretical constructs posited: in brief, how to get out of the closed circuit.
In taking up this issue we are also setting ourselves an agenda and an 
orientation for our discussion of Chomsky's psychological realism. For now we will 
state rather baldly what we see as requirements and leave the details to emerge in our 
further treatment.
A pre-condition on a realist construal of some theoiy is that it state clearly 
what entities and relations it takes to be real; that is, there is a requirement that a 
theoiy specify what it postulates to exist as, in Chomsky's phrase, "real objects of the 
real world." In the case of deductively formulated theoiy, this is a requirement to be 
met by a suitably explicit interpreting function mapping from terms onto entities (and
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sets of entities) in a model. In meeting this requirement it is also desirable, and 
arguably a corollary, tbat these objects are provided with some statement of their* 
ontological status: we need to be told what it is we are supposed to be talking about 
and what sort of things they are.26
The general point is that only by providing such specifications are we likely to 
be able to adduce and apply adequate criteria of identity for the constructs of some 
theory. One can’t usefully apply any such criteria if we are not told what they are to be 
applied to. Furthermore, we need such criteria of identity if we are to take seriously 
the task of deciding between theories, i.e. grammars, and if we are to credit existence 
to any particular set of postulated constructs; the meeting of such criteria will be a 
condition on our acceding to then existence.
Once such preconditions are satisfied (in effect, no more than meeting the 
need to be clear in what is being claimed, i.e. stating which theory is being articulated 
through the vehicle of, in this case, some formal system), then, in order to have some 
confidence in the reality of the constructs postulated (e.g. the modularization of the 
gross phenomenon and the entities interpreting the terms and relations of the 
calculus), those constructs need to be able to be corroborated in such a way as to 
avoid the theory-intemality we have described.
To reiterate: confidence in the appropriacy of a realist construal is not 
warranted on the basis merely of some calculus' ability to achieve coverage. This on 
two counts: firstly, on the grounds that there is a need to choose between grammars 
that have equivalent coverage - at most one can be right; and, secondly, we saw that, 
in the case of the "heuristically fertile" Ptolemaic system, what enabled the predictive 
success was, precisely, fictional constructs, i.e. the geo-centric model with its 
correlative, saving-of-appearances, epicycles.27 What is needed is some additional 
correspondence principle beyond that of achieving coverage.28
The point of the demand for an escape from the theory-intemality we 
identified is that, in order for us to be warranted in conferring existence on any 
posited constructs, we need to have grounds for confidence that those constructs have 
not simply been put there as a function of (an impulse to a referential theory of 
meaning for the syntactic terms of) the calculus that provides us with some initial, 
theory-constitutive epistemic access: "notation systems create analyses", and different 
notations create different analyses and correlatively create different sets of entities that 
interpret the terms and relations of those analyses. At best, if there are facts of the 
matter, all but one of these sets must be fictional. Given that such fictionality is the
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case, then the point of asking for some non-theory-intemal, non-closed-circuit 
perspective, (some ’’other point of view”,) is that, presumably, fictional entities leave 
no traces and are indiscernible beyond constituting objects that are projected so as to 
interpret the terms of each calculus: for example, there is no hope of ever adducing 
evidence for the existence of planetary epicycles, outside of the limited perspective of 
a restricted and stipulated set of data, by observation by some inter-planetary probe, 
for example, precisely because they are fictional. Epicycles are only "observed" as 
theoretical constiucts when hypothesized as the case in order to account for a 
restricted range of data and when hypothesized on the basis of certain initial 
assumptions. These assumptions amount to expectations of what the world is (and 
ought to be) like: geo-centric and reflecting a creator who has a penchant for 
geometrically "perfect" figures. Indeed, they may be taken as paradigmatic of 
skeuomorphs, reflecting the imposition of some conceptual scheme and ordering and 
observing the world such that it conforms to, and is conflated with, that scheme.
A homely illustration is in order:29 A calculus or formal system is used to 
articulate or, let us say, picture some object or set of phenomena. Consider a painting 
(realist style) that claims to be an accurate, hence true, representation of, let's say, a 
landscape. One might point to the picture and ask someone what it is. There are two 
perfectly good answers: "It’s a landscape" or "It’s a picture (of a landscape)". The 
foimer reply takes the medium as transparent, which is to say does not distinguish, as 
the latter does, between the representans and the representation 3° moreover, it idly 
confers some existence on the landscape qua landscape, rather than conferring 
existence on the picture qua marks of paint on canvas as the vehicle of representation. 
Of course, in the ordinary course of things this is of no great import. However, if we 
are interested, the only way to ascertain, if asked, whether it is an accurate and non- 
fictional picture or not, is from the perspective of the latter reply. Crucially, and a 
point to be taken up below, answering this question also requires the availability of the 
actual landscape depicted; the object needs to be discerned independently of its 
representation by the picture; in other words, it needs to be discerned from a different 
point of view, thr ough other spectacles, otherwise there are no grounds for confidence 
that the object is any more than the creation of the artist's painterly technique. When 
this technique is supplemented by an observer's "natural impulse" to a metaphysical 
realism, then, in the "it's a landscape" answer to our question, what arises is an illicit 
ontological commitment to constructs that would interpret the terms/technique of the 
artist.
82
Instrumentalism versus Realism
To place these comments in relation to the role of the formal apparatus of 
linguistic theorizing, in brief, the requirement is that "the theory that accompanies the 
notation must tell us which aspects are intended to be empirically significant."31 This is 
to be stated through the interpreting function that defines the modelling relation 
between the forma! system and the object being modelled. Implicit in this remark is 
the recognition that certain aspects of the formal apparatus need not be interpreted as 
referring to any entities or properties of the object modelled. Such aspects remain 
resolutely properties of the vehicle of representation, having a purely instrumental 
role: what we get is a distinction between representans and representatum, between, 
as it were, the painterly technique and the representational task to which it is applied.
To illustrate, consider again our picture metaphor. Let us suppose that a 
painting is an accurate representation of a real landscape. Looking at the picture we 
can discern objects that correspond to objects in the real world. Thinking of the 
picture as a hypothesis of what the world is like we would take it that the artist intends 
us to quantify over the objects as depicted: there are, really, those two trees and the 
hedgerow and the gate. If we look closer we can discern the individual brushstrokes 
and the manner in which the paint has been smeared to create certain effects. At this 
level of discrimination we would not be tempted to the view that these elements of the 
painter's style are intended to correspond to real-world entities; these elements are 
purely instrumental to the depiction and it would be a mistake to quantify over them 
on the basis of the fact that they are the means to achieve an accurate account.
Less informally, and turning to the role of mathematical models in the 
sciences, Matthews supplies an illustration (from physics) of the distinction we are 
suggesting: "In the case of Buhner formulae for the spectral lines of hydrogen ... the 
integers of that formula initially received no physical interpretation."321. What underlies 
these remarks is the recognition that the purely instrumental/representing aspect of the 
calculus is to be differentiated from those elements which are interpreted to refer to 
the real linguistic objects to which the theoiy is existentially committed.
The distinction being made here rehearses points that have run through our 
discussion. In Matthews’ terminology the distinction is between "representational 
constructs" in contradistinction to "theoretical magnitudes."331' The former refer to 
aspects of the vehicle, the conceptual apparatus, which articulates theoiy and which 
aspects remain resolutely unquantified over in the world, whereas the latter refer to 
those aspects/terms of the vehicle that are taken to correspond to real world entities. 
The point is best made by way of Matthews' illustration (borrowed from Ryle341') of a 
theoiy of an individual's terrestrial location. One may specify such a location in terms
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of a mathematically articulated apparatus of latitude and longitude. The model 
pro\4ded allows one to pick out any location, e.g. that place where I am typing this, in 
Matthews' terms a particular "theoretical magnitude". It is, presumably, something one 
would be willing to quantify over as having a concept/mind-independent and concrete 
existence: it even fulfils Dr. Johnson's rather stringent criterion for existence by way 
of being something that one can kick. However, while one can kick this location, one 
cannot kick the point that is the intersection of a line of longitude with a line of 
latitude, for that is a different order of thing; an abstract, extensionless entity which 
subsists as a projection of the conceptual apparatus which articulates a theory of 
terrestrial location, and which has no existence independent of this conceptual 
apparatus - in short, it is a "representational construct". I suppose, one may, if one 
really wants to, or has to, get all platonic about these mathematical entities and grant 
them a mind-independent existence. But this does not entail that there are objects or 
phenomena in the non-platonic world that they ineluctably model, although there will 
always be fictional objects and phenomena which are the model of such mathematical 
structures.35 This latter point is the crux of my misgivings under the heading of a 
skeuomorph effect: given the nature of the data, there are insufficient means to 
determine whether or not the fictionality of these always and already objects, brought 
in as projections of the conceptual apparatus, can be excised.
This distinction between theoretical magnitudes and representational 
constructs corresponds to that posited by Ryle and Dennett36 (and, reportedly, 
Reichenbach37r) between abstracta (correlating with representational constructs) and 
Mata (theoretical magnitudes). In essence, recognition of the distinction adverts to the 
need to be aware of the role of the conceptual glasses of Wittgenstein's metaphor in 
positing theoretical constructs and the need to distinguish between what is 
appML&Xmlabstractum and what is quantified over as independently real and inherent 
to the object of sXxxdyfillatum. This translates into a requirement on a theoiy that it 
specify (and is able to (dis)-confiim) what terms and relations of the foimal theoretical 
apparatus are claimed to exist as, i.e. be interpreted by objects that are, theory- 
extemally real, and which exist (and can be (dis)-confnmed) independently of the 
formal apparatus that prefigures that reality.38
This requirement bears directly on the issue of the pluralization of grammatical 
frameworks in linguistics, which pluralization, to some, might look like gratuitous 
duplication and gratuitous because there does not appear any prospect of closure: one 
might reasonably ask what is the point/content and, what amounts to the same, what is 
the difference and what is the point/content of the difference between competing
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accounts. The problem is one of how such analyses, with their correlative constructs, 
get to be discontinued, and this itself refers us back to the problem of closed-circuit 
functioning which we identified. To put this another way, if two extensionally 
equivalent frameworks are taken to articulate different theories by virtue of making 
putatively distinct empirical claims (they quantify over different and non-logically 
equivalent sets of linguistic objects), then this has content just in case, firstly, that 
there is some clear specification of theoretical commitments, i.e. what is quantified 
over, and, secondly, that there are some potentially available and appropriate means to 
decide between those claims such that one may vitiate any charge of theoiy-intemal 
circularity in theoiy confirmation.39
In illustration, for now no more than a suggestive sketch, of how this latter 
might be achieved it will be useful to return to our picture metaphor: one might say 
that it provides us with a certain epistemic access onto the issue. If we conceive of our 
landscape as a theoiy about some aspect of the world, then what we need to give us 
confidence that what is depicted corresponds to some state of affairs having its 
properties independently of its depiction is some alternative access to that putative 
state of affairs; an access that is not dependent on the initial, theoiy-constitutive 
depiction. In brief, what we need are other means of access or, to conjoin Saussure's 
and Wittgenstein’s metaphors, some other points of view, some different spectacles. If 
the same things turn up irrespective of which spectacles we are wearing, then, it 
would seem, that what we get to see is not simply a function of any one and particular 
pair of spectacles, i.e. any one means to gain some epistemic access, rather we would 
seem to be justified in concluding that what is presented to us reflects some 
independent state of affairs in the real world. It is just such varied corroboration, by 
different means of obseivation and measurement, or by the commensurability of the 
constructs of different theoretical perspectives, that might constitute warrant for a 
realist construal of theoretical constructs.
For informal example, consider the notion of an electron: whether we are 
coming from the perspective of physics or of chemistry it turns out that neither field 
can do without just these posited entities. Or, to put this another way, the entities that 
get to be posited from the physicist's perspective turn out to be commensurable and 
able to be identified with the entities that are posited from the chemist's perspective. A 
similar mutual, but independent, corroboration is what underlies confidence in a 
heliocentric model of the solar system: Kepler’s more or less observationally accurate 
mathematical laws and the sun-centred model that interprets them fall out as a 
consequence of a theoiy of gravitation. In both cases, the two fields of enquiry act in
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a confirmatory dialectic, indeed, in just the way that is denied to grammatical theories 
by reason of the availability of some plausible shuffle that gets to have an appearance 
of being half-principled by way of pointing to the unspecified yet "numerous other 
factors" that might contaminate otherwise discontinuing data. What this supposedly 
licensed shuffle achieves is the unfalsifiability we noted and at the same time (and this 
because of) the maintenance of the closed-circuit functioning. On the other hand, 
what the availability and pertinence of data from other perspectives would pennit is 
the ability to step outside this veiy circularity. Furthermore, it is for this reason that 
the ontological status of theoretical constructs is of some immediate importance. To 
state the case baldly: if such constructs are claimed to be psychological (whatever that 
might mean exactly), then one could expect that the constructs of linguistic theories 
might be observable from the perspectives of theories in adjacent, psychological 
fields. On the other hand, the only seriously considered ontological alternative - some 
form of Platonism or autonomism - would appear to make, at best, problematic any 
such commensurability between linguistic theories and theories in other domains, 
leaving us, in this regard, empirically stranded. We take up these issues in the next 
chapter.
5.0 Summary.
At this point it will be useful to summarize the position we have reached and 
to indicate the dir ection we will be going. Centrally, we have argued for the possibility 
of an ultimately realist construal of scientific theories. In doing so we have pointed out 
that this is not {contra Carr ) equivalent to denying the viability or the preferability of 
an instrumentalist interpretation in respect of theories in certain fields of enquiry. The 
central point we raised in support of this view is that the ability of a theory to be truth- 
bearing, i.e. to enable correct predictions, need not be on the basis of the 
correspondence of the constructs hypothesized to the theory-external facts of the 
matter. Rather, we have suggested possible criteria to be met such as would provide 
warrant for a realist construal. While these particular criteria are negotiable40 (i.e. 
specification of ontological commitments and attainment of some vantage point that 
does not assume and is independent of the theory that posits and observes its own 
terms and constructs), what is not negotiable is the general requirement that some 
means be adduced for distinguishing between the claims of competing accounts, 
where those competing accounts claim to capture determinate facts of the matter. The
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meeting of such a requirement is a condition on the annulling of the suspicions we 
raised under the heading of skeuomorph effects: that rather than it being some 
putative facts that are being answered to, instead these 'facts' are confused with, and 
indistinguishable from, fictions that are projected so as to interpret the terms and 
relations that are brought in by way of the formal apparatus applied to in the task of 
theoiy construction.
It will be the purpose of the following chapter to show that Chomsky's 
psychological realism - the manner in which a determinate set of facts of the matter 
gets to be predicated of the linguistic - fails to achieve proper content and collapses 
into, at best, an autonomism/Platonism. This is itself, we will argue, an unpalatable 
position for it leaves unanswered the question of the relation between individuals and 
the languages of which they are speakers: we are denied a fully explanatoiy linguistics. 
Furthermore, if such a position can itself be shown to warrant no more than an 
instrumentalist construal (which would, as a by product, at least relieve us from the 
corresponding ontological commitments), then this would lead us to enquire what it is 
that obstructs a realism towards linguistic theories.
In substantiating the appropriateness of an instrumentalist construal, part of 
our task will be to show that the preconditions and warrants for a realism that we have 
sketched are systematically left unsatisfied. Our focus will then be on the criteria, 
some additional correspondence principles, that have been proposed, either explicitly 
(Chomsky's levels of adequacy) or implicitly in the practice of theoiy development, 
such as to allow for effective decisions between competing frameworks. The question 
raised will be whether such criteria reflect answerability of theories to the "properties 
of the real object of the real world that we are investigating", or whether they are 
theoiy-intemal criteria proper to the assessment of formal calculi qua calculi. The 
suspicion to be further substantiated, what we have referred to as a skeuomorph 
effect, is that the putatively real properties and constructs claimed to pertain to natural 
language are, rather, the results of a Fregean/Galilean attitude to the formal systems 
that are at the centre of theoiy construction. The properties of the formal system are 
transposed onto the object of study, indeed institute that object of study as an artefact 
which is mistaken for some object of the real world.
In brief, the central burden of our argument will be to make the case for the 
appropriateness of an instrumental construal of those linguistic theories that take on 
board the set of base assumptions and methodology that founds the Chomskyan 
paradigm.
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that while not untenable, "it is a theoretically unsatisfactory situation". (W. V. O. Quine, (1953, pg. 47) 
cited in J. Katz, (1986, pg. 172)).
22 A point to be noted about these epicycles was that they were enormously flexible: once one takes 
the notion on board, then one can endlessly fiddle to make one's model predictively successful, even 
to the extent of having the primary orbit turn out to be a square (J. Cohen and I. Stewart, 1994, pg. 
25). In terms of falsifiability epicycles are the mediaeval counterparts of Freudian suppression and the 
performance factors of the generative enterprise.
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Compare Russell's "distance principle", (J. Russell, 1987, pg. 228). The following may be taken as 
an attempt to outline the form that such a "distance principle" might take.
The analogy is borrowed from Hutton (C. Hutton, 1993, pg. 168). The same idea is used by 
Burton-Roberts (1994, pg. 192) to a somewhat different end. He does, however, rehearse the essence 
of the point in alluding to Magritte's painting of a pipe, beneath winch is the message "Ceci n'est pas 
une pipe." For, of course, what one looks at is not a pipe but a representation of a pipe.
30 A more or less parallel distinction is Richards' distinction, introduced as meta-apparatus to talk 
about metaphor, between vehicle and topic (or tenor) (I. Richards, 1936). More recently the 
distinction has been reinvigorated and elaborated by Black, (M. Black, 1962).
3  ^Z. Pylyshyn (1991, pg 239). A complaint made by Pylyshyn, Botha (1979, pg. 45) and Moore and 
Carling (1982, pg. 68) against Chomsky is of precisely the lack of a sufficiently explicit interpretative 
function.
32 R. Matthews, (1991, pg. 196).
33 Ibid.
34 G. Ryle, (1995, pg. 189). Ryle uses the equator for Iris example.
33 Our natural impulse to a referential theory of meaning again.
36 D. Dennett, (1987).
A similar distinction can be discerned in the idealistic atomism of Leibniz' Monadology. For 
Leibniz the only things that exist are the windowless monads, the stuff of the universe: "outside and 
between the individual existence of monads there is nonreality." All else, e.g. all relations, "cannot 
have real existence ... only mental existence." However, "the understanding that thinks relations is tire 
understanding of God. Relations [cf representational constructs] have their substantial reality taken 
away from them by being referred to an understanding, but because the understanding that carries 
them is the divine understanding, they ... receive back again a new reality." (G. Martin, 1955, pg. 1 ff, 
cited in R. Hersh, 1998, pg. 125.) This divine thinking is the grounds for the reality of mathematics: it 
is the understanding of God, His language in which he figures the world. So, if we believe in Leibniz' 
God and in this reality for a singular mathematics, then our present wonies are by the by: our calculus 
is merely re-presenting God's thought, which thought constitutes reality. Only, of course, we do not 
believe in Leibniz' God, and even if we did then we would still have to wonder about which calculus 
God thinks when he thinks language. Our observation of the Fregean tendency is just the observation 
of an atavistic reflex to such ways of thinking about formal calculi.
32 The report is made by Flanagan in T. Honderich (ed.), (1995, pg. 186).
In effect, the requirement is that we accept some formal apparatus as precisely "an object of 
comparison - as, so to speak, a measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must 
correspond"(Wittgenstein, (1958, section 131)), i.e. not as a transparent window onto tire world but 
as, initially at least, one more object added to the world, and suspend, or are parsimonious with, the
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"natural impulse" (Putnam) or "natural attitude" (Husserl) to take on ontological commitments to 
objects that would excise the apparatus’ status as an object of comparison. In Husserlian terms, this 
amounts to effecting a "transcendental reduction": to defer "the entire ontological commitment that 
belongs to the essence of the natural attitude, we place in brackets whatever it includes in respect to 
being" (E. Husserl, 1931, pg. 111). Warrant for a realism amounts to sufficient grounds to erase (some 
of) the brackets. Picking up on Pylyshyn's remarks (pg. 83, footnote 31), a realist claim requires that 
one distinguishes between what of the notation is to remain in brackets and what are to be the objects 
of ontological commitment.
The point, in sum, is that a calculus, no matter how predictively accurate, does not, by and in 
itself constitute an explanation.
39 At this point the reader might wish to resist the implicit comparison with the generativist paradigm 
by pointing out that on innumerable occasions Chomsky, for one, has emphasized that such 
perspectives are appropriate; the linguist is not constrained to data from speaker judgements. The 
common observation, however, (to be illustrated in chapter IV) is that in practice precisely this 
restriction holds.
if left unnegotiable and if further criteria are deemed unnecessary, then an upshot of the second 
criterion, in effect that a realism is warranted on the basis of inter-theoretic commensurability, would 
seem to have the effect of making reductionism a condition of a scientific realism.
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CHAPTER III.
ONTOLOGIES FOR THE LINGUISTIC I: 
Non-Psvehological Realism.
1*0 Introduction.
Construing a theory's constructs as real requires, at some time or other, taking 
some stance as regards the ontological type of postulated entities: if we have 
confidence in the reality of the things that we are talking about, then, presumably, we 
should be able to state what sort of things they are.1 In raising this point we are taking 
up the issues associated with the second and third identified strands of Chomsky's 
revolution: the move towards a realism and the attempt at an explanation of the 
linguistic in terms of the mind/brain. It is at this juncture that the Chomskyan 
paradigm (where it is defined as generativism) bifurcates, where Chomsky's 
psychologism (a psychologism that is reductionist2) parts company from those of an 
ontologically agnostic, or those of an autonomist or Platonist persuasion.
The central contention that we are to pursue in the following is that this 
realism can only be achieved, at doubtful best, by taking an autonomist ontological 
view of the linguistic: Chomsky’s psychologism collapses into an autonomism and so 
the third str and, the reductionist psychologism, with its correlative type of explanation, 
is unachieved. This "at best" is doubtful because, amongst other things, such an 
autonomism precludes one primary evidential warrant for a realism: that of the ability 
of the constructs of a theoiy to be confirmed in relation to other theoretical domains, 
i.e. for the constructs of a theoiy to be observable from some this-theory-extemal 
perspective and so excise any skeuomoiph effect. What results is an inability to deal 
with the embarrassment of extensional equivalent grammars, and they are an 
embarrassment for the autonomist, as the}' are for Chomsky, because they undermine 
confidence in the correspondence of the set of constructs and relations of any 
particular grammar to any calculus-external realities: the upshot is an apparent 
undermining of any realist claim.3 One may, suspending this doubt, if one wishes, 
term the theory interpreted in this autonomous light as "psychological" but only in the 
sense that the psychological is construed as constituting a level of description that is 
neutral to, and distinct from, any mind/brain internal states of affairs, i.e. as itself an 
autonomous, non-reducible domain. Such a construal aligns the Chomskyan
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Generativist enterprise with the functionalism that is the standard rationale of the 
cognitive sciences - competence theories correlating with the level one functions of 
Man’s hierarchy of levels of description.4r Re-applying our doubts, a line of enquiry 
which we will pursue is that of the preferability, at least in the linguistic case, of an 
instrumentalist construal of level one competence theories. This will be to exclude 
such theories from constituting any part of an account of the aetiology of linguistic 
behaviour: fictions do not have causal powers.
In drawing this somewhat negative conclusion we aim to identify its source in 
the originary positing of the proper object of study as linguistic competence. We will 
then (chapter VI) outline a positive proposal which will in effect reconfigure the 
object of study as a constructive procedure rather than as the outputs, the set of 
sentences, of that procedure. In effect our proposal will amount to a change in idiom: 
a language is not so much what one knows as what one does, a case of exchanging the 
ghost in the machine for the machine in the ghost.
2.0 The ontological options.
The ontological issue, in effect the question of the (non-)autonomy of the 
linguistic domain, is not a merely peripheral and somewhat esoteric concern best left 
to philosophers and then forgotten about, but is one which relates to the nature of the 
explanation that is attempted by linguistics - whether or not linguistics is to be 
understood, as Chomsky claims, as one of the natural sciences. The views that are 
taken on the issue are also, as we will outline, correlative with attitudes to the role of 
the formal apparatus.
Katz points out that, ignoring agnosticism (and don’t [see the need to] care - 
arguably the majority view), the range of ontological options is limited to nominalism, 
conceptualism (for our purposes this is interchangeable with "mentalism" or 
"psychologism") and Platonism.51'
To pick up firstly on what Katz ignores: an explicitly "agnostic" position - but 
at least they care - is taken by Pollard and Sag.61 They argue that, despite certain 
philosophical/ontological unclarities, language can be studied profitably without the 
need for such unclarities to be resolved in advance. Implicit, perhaps, in their 
argument, is the not unreasonable contention that one of the promises held out by an 
adequate linguistic theoiy is that it might well cast a certain retrospective light on such 
foundational issues.
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In support of their leaving of the ontological question in parentheses, Pollard 
and Sag cite the philosophically problematic status of the theoretical constructs of 
quantum mechanics. They take this as an example of a domain where both the need 
for the postulation of such constructs is well-motivated and the predictive success 
provided by their postulation constitutes good grounds for continuing in the theoiy, 
despite the philosophical puzzles these constructs give rise to (for example, wave- 
particle duality seems to bring into question the law of excluded middle).
It is worth pointing out that this argument, essentially an argument from 
heuristic fertility, is, both in the case of quantum mechanics and linguistics, entirely 
consonant with an instrumentalist/anti-realist construal. It is not, by itself, an argument 
as to why we ought to take a theoiy realistically, but an argument as to why we ought 
to continue in a theoiy on the basis of the productivity of the epistemic access that a 
theoiy affords: some talk, particularly if it is in some manner truth-bearing, is better
than none at all. It is interesting to note, however, that what gives rise to the various
non-realist interpretations of quantum mechanics is precisely the philosophical 
anomalies that accrue, the "unquestionable success" of the theoiy notwithstanding. 
Amongst the interpretative options that have been proposed are Einstein’s, that 
quantum mechanics "is at best an incomplete description of a better-behaved classical 
underlying reality", i.e. we haven't got it right yet, and Bohr and Heisenberg’s 
explicitly anti-realist Copenhagen interpretation in which:
there is no deep quantum reality, no world of electrons 
and photons. There is only description of the world in 
these terms: quantum mechanics affords us a formalism 
that we can use to predict events ..., but it is misguided 
or senseless to postulate a quantum reality answering to 
the description. Problems such as the wave-particle 
duality ... suggest that there is no reality behind our 
observation.7r
A similar rationale for a questioning of the realist credentials of (the objects 
of) linguistic theoiy underpins our present project: if similar conceptual problems and 
anomalies result from Chomsky's generative enterprise, then this would motivate, at 
the veiy least, the consideration of some non-realist perspective and, assuming the 
viability of an ultimately realist construal of some linguistic theoiy, a potential 
correlative revision of foundational assumptions.
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Agnosticism aside, the first enhy in Katz' catalogue (nominalism) is dismissed 
as a non-starter, because it restricts the linguist to the study of linguistic tokens, i.e. 
actual utterances, from which study it is not possible to do justice to the linguistic 
system which is always in excess of any set of actualized sentences. Katz' further 
entries are guilty of somewhat simplifying the situation, for there are positions which, 
while eschewing the conceptualist/psychologist option, also attempt to avoid a full­
blown Platonism, a case in point being Carr’s Popperian autonomism.8 Arguably, the 
issue boils down to what one does with abstract objects; how one negotiates the 
abstraction of sentence types, for it is the consensus that these types constitute the 
immediate objects of the linguist’s consideration,9 these being distinguished from 
utterances/tokens: it is only this latter that are unproblematically spatio-temporal and 
concrete. Conversely, a lot rides on what you get to call "psychological" and the 
extent to which the psychological gets to negotiate the abstraction of the linguistic.
Across the range of ontological opinions the view is that the linguistic, as to be 
defined by some suitable theoiy or set of theories, constitutes a nomological domain, 
the laws of which are sui generis. The disagreement, as sketched above, comes in 
over the type of things that linguistic entities are: the Chomskyan position is that they 
are psychological entities, having their properties by virtue of the informational 
structure of the innately specified principles and parameters of the I-language, which 
I-language is realized by "presumably neural mechanisms" thus holding out the 
promise, ultimately, of contentfully construing linguistics as a branch of biology;10 the 
Platonist/autonomist holds that the linguistic cannot be reduced, nor explained in 
relation to the psychological, nor to any other nomological domain; in short, the 
linguistic stands outside of a reductionist's hierarchy of nature (see next section): in 
respect of that hierarchy, the linguistic is anomalous thus making of linguistics a 
special science and not, pace Chomsky, one of the natural sciences.11
As is routinely acknowledged, science is engaged in attempting explanation. 
As we noted earlier, Aristotle suggested that the mark of proper understanding, the 
mark of an explanation, is to know not only what is the case but also why it is the 
case. The putative status of linguistics as a special science restricts linguistics to 
meeting only the former of these conditions, to what we might term a "constitutive 
explanation"12r: we are excluded from not only achieving, but even from attempting, 
an account of why the (natural) linguistic is as it is. To illustrate, and to relate our 
present concerns with those of the previous chapters (regarding the need and means to 
escape closed-circuit functioning), we need to make another short astronomical 
detour.
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3.0 Constitutive explanations, reductionist explanations and the continuity of the 
levels of nature.
To the ancients the planets were a discrete natural kind, a discrete object of 
study to be accounted for by a theoiy which differentiated their behaviour, their 
motion, from that of the background stars, indeed the etymology of the word suggests 
the observed distinction: planets are "wandering stars" which do not follow the same 
regular pattern of movement as do stars in general. The Keplerian account provides a 
very nearly entirely accurate, predictive theoiy of their motion in terms of 
mathematically formulated laws. The laws express the generalizations which allow for 
the confirming predictions. One can say, without doing violence to the language, that 
the Keplerian laws explain the motion of the planets, because the planets' motion 
across the heavens is predicted by and conforms to those laws: what constitutes 
planetary motion is the conforming to the laws as expressed by some mathematical 
formalism and any, as it were, "extensional equivalents" of that formalism.
What we have here is an answer to the question of what constitutes a 
particular domain; what are its entities and its laws. In having been provided with such 
an account, we may be led to ask for a further explanation of why the behaviour, in 
this case planetary behaviour, is as it is. In this instance we have an answer (Newton's) 
and the nature of that answer illustrates a form of explanation which we can term 
reductionist. The central point is that the laws that govern planetaiy motion are 
themselves explained in terms of a more basic and more inclusive set of laws: the 
planetaiy orbits and their approximately elliptical nature are the result of a set of 
interacting gravitational forces. What we have is a reduction of one set of laws 
(Kepler’s) and the correlative domain to another, more inclusive set (Newton’s) and 
domain. In general terms, and what is exemplified in our illustration is that "reductions 
are explanations of phenomena described by one theoiy in terms of the phenomena 
described by a more basic theoiy. "13r It is important to recognize what this does not 
mean. It does not mean that the less basic phenomena are explained away, nor that the 
theoiy at the less basic level is disproved or somehow discredited. Rather, what we get 
is an explanation for the less basic level in terms of the laws of a more inclusive level, 
and what we also get is, in effect, a mutually confirming dialectic between theoretical 
domains.
To add some flesh: the Keplerian laws do no more (nor no less) than 
characterize the motion of the planets. In (almost) accurately providing that 
characterization they leave unanswered the question of why the planets conform to
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those laws. (Kepler might demur here, but his answer, I suspect, would have been that 
of a mathematical mystagogue citing "God as geometer.") To achieve an answer it is 
necessaiy to invoke an ontological hypothesis as to what sort of things the planets are 
(i.e. massy bodies, as opposed to, for instance, deities or harmonics of the spheres 
made visible - these may be non-starters nowadays but they did have a certain 
currency), and a theoiy that is about massy bodies: a theoiy of gravitation. Having got 
this right (or more or less) on both counts we then achieve an explanation which is 
(sort of) causal: what (sort of) causes the elliptical motion of the planets around the 
sun - the reason why - is the interaction of the gravitational forces exerted by all of 
these massy bodies.14 Precisely the point of Chomsky's psychologism, articulated by 
way of a mental representation hypothesis, is that it is in attempt to provide an account 
which is (literally) causal (or part of a literally causal account) by virtue of holding out 
the promise of relating the abstraction of linguistic "laws" to the neurophysiological 
substrate, which substrate has (literally) causal powers and which gets to be quantified 
over as a physical world entity (note that Keplerian laws are not the sort of thing that, 
because they are abstract, either have causal powers or get to be quantified over as 
entities of the physical world). In brief, the Chomskyan strategy for achieving an 
explanation, and the manner in which linguistics gets to be one of the natural sciences, 
is, at some level of discrimination, to quantify over the abstracta of a calculus, the 
terms and relations that express the laws of the domain, such that they are taken to 
correspond to illata (the mental representations) which are involved in the aetiology 
of linguistic behaviour: "The statements of a grammar ... are statements about 
structures of the brain... These structures are specific things in the world".15
Picking up on the issues of the previous chapter, it is also worth noting how, in 
our illustrative case, (chosen as an exemplar of a theoiy with a best claim to a realist 
construal,) the separate hypotheses involved get to be mutually confirming: that the 
planets’ motion is predictable from a theoiy of gravitation confirms them as massy 
bodies, and their being massy bodies conforming to certain laws that are themselves 
predictable from a theoiy of gravitation gets to be confirmatoiy of that theoiy of 
gravitation. Of course, that need not be the end of the chain of "why" questions; one 
can quite reasonably re-apply the question and ask why gravitation is as it is and, 
having come up with an answer, ask again about that answer. Explanation must, 
however, have a stop: in the end, to the question "why?", the answer is the deeply 
mysterious, "because that's how it is", either that or, which amounts to the same, 
invoke the Deify. At root, what is disconcerting about non-reductionist, autonomous
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positions is that, in abruptly cutting this chain of questions, they appear impatient of 
God’s, or some equivalent’s, appearance.
The progress towards wider and more inclusive accounts may be figured as a 
hierarchy of lawful domains, the higher ones subsuming the lower and having as 
consequences those less inclusive laws. What emerges is a distinguishable "continuity 
of the levels of nature", the basis of the reductionist's credo, in which:
reality ... is a multiple hierarchy of levels of nature, 
each level marked by a nexus of nomic generalizations 
and supervenient on all those levels below it on the 
continuum.161'
For further example: the law that relates the parameter's of the macro­
phenomena of the pressure ("p"), volume ("V") and temperature ("T") of gases is 
expressible, that is characterizable, through the equation: p x V  = c x T  (where "c" is a 
constant). This law is itself to be explained through, i.e. can be derived from, the laws 
that capture the micro-phenomena of the behaviour of the individual molecules. These 
latter laws subsume and explain the former and relate the behaviour of gases to a 
wider range of phenomena: molecular behaviour in general. To r evert to our original 
example, a theory of gravitation ties planetary motion to all other phenomena that are 
provided with an explanation by that theory: planets, surprisingly, do what they do for 
the same reasons that apples do what they do when they detach themselves from the 
tree and they do this, even more surprisingly, for the same reasons that the tides rise 
and fall.
This tying together of apparently disparate phenomena, (i.e. phenomena that 
pre-theoretically might appear to be in discrete domains, needing distinct 
explanations,) under the cover of one theory is an instance of "consilience".17 The 
notion is related to the parsimony of Occam's Razor: when a theory ties phenomena 
together it achieves a singular explanation, and so obviates the need for several 
disparate but less encompassing accounts. The consilience a theory achieves is a mark 
of some underlying unity. However, a condition on a law or theory applying to a 
phenomenal range is the applicability of that law or theory to the types of entity, the 
natural-kinds, that constitute that phenomenal range. For instance, if an entity obeys 
the law of gravity, it must be of the same type, in some crucial respect, as all other 
entities to which the law applies. Conversely, failure to obey gravity would mark an
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entity as being of a type, or natural kind, that is distinct from those that do obey the 
laws of gravity.
The point of making these remarks is that it allows us to define what is to be 
meant by "reductionist psychologism". The "psychological" is definable as a 
nomological domain, a sort of logical/notional space, that is inhabited by that set of 
events and entities that conform to a certain set of laws. The linguistic is a subset of 
the psychological (or the biological) if and only if the set of events and entities that 
constitute the linguistic domain are also subject to some set of laws that apply to 
events and entities, other than the linguistic, which constitute the logical space of the 
psychological (or the biological). If there are no such covering laws, then the linguistic 
is an autonomous domain vis-a-vis the psychological. It may be noted that this 
formulation does not specify in advance what is and is not psychological, rather the 
psychological is revisable relative to the formulation of laws in theorizing in much the 
same way as the notion of matter has been revised and broadened relative to the 
postulation of successful theories.181'
More generally, one mark of the non-autonomy of a domain and its 
integration into a hierarchy will be, precisely, such achieved consilience across 
domains. Such consilience, in being strongly confirmatory, is, for the same reason, 
warrant for a realism in regard of the constructs of a theoiy under test. Moreover, and 
crucially, a condition on consilience is that the constructs of one theoiy are, as it were, 
observable from the perspective of the theoretical domain with which it is 
commensurable. The misgiving we raised about linguistic theories was that the data 
were interpreted theoiy-intemaUy. When a theoiy and its constructs are shown to be 
commensurable with those of other domains, this supplies a certain theory-extemality; 
we have, as it were, a different pair of spectacles and a warrant for realism. While the 
perspective is not theory-neutral, it is at least neutral of the theoiy one is attempting to 
adduce evidence for. It is precisely such theoiy-neutrality that would annul suspicions 
of a theory's posited entities being skeuomorphs induced by the conceptual apparatus 
that is applied to in the process of hypothesis formation.
These obseivations pertain to the question of what is to be taken as the 
relevant data for confirmation of linguistic theories. The moral to be drawn is that:
the data relevant to the confirmation of [a theoiy] T 
include the data predicted by the conjunction of T with 
any other theoiy that is independently well confirmed.
In particular, they are not exhausted by the entailments 
of T taken alone.19r
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In other words, if a set of constructs are real, then then observability will not depend 
on the epistemic access provided by the theory that posits them and which interprets 
the data. This is a point that is rehearsed severally in the literature:
If the [realist and mentalist] proposal is right, then 
linguistic behaviour and linguistic judgements do not 
exhaust the evidence on which linguistics should or can 
proceed. Other phenomena currently studied ... will 
also be pertinent. The study of natural languages 
becomes, in this respect at least, veiy different from the 
study of formal languages, and linguistics cannot simply 
confine itself to special versions of issues appropriate to 
such languages.20
More particularly, the claim that linguistics is a natural science, which claim is made 
on the basis of a putative commensurability with psychology, requires the relevance 
of, precisely, psychological theories and the brain sciences in general. In this regard, 
and a symptom of his reductionist psychologism, Chomsky remarks that:
In principle, discoveries about the brain should 
influence the theory of mind, and at the same time the 
abstract study of states of the language faculty should 
formulate properties to be explained by the theory of 
the brain and is likely to be indispensable in the search 
for mechanisms. To the extent that such connections 
can be established, the study of the mind - in particular, 
of I-language - will be assimilated to the mainstream of 
the natural sciences.211'
The assumption of the continuity of the levels of nature and a correlative 
ontological parsimony underlie, indeed constitute prejudices of, philosophical 
materialism. They are, however, prejudices which have a certain inductive warrant: 
precisely these prejudices are confirmed by the success of the scientific enterprise of 
the last half-millenium and the resulting cogency of the possibility, in physics at least, 
of some grand unified theoiy of just about everything. More particularly, they are, in 
respect of the linguistic, prejudices that take heart from the direction that the enquiry 
into the mind/brain is taking. It is now, apparently, consensual that mental phenomena
as seemingly quixotic as moods can be correlated to the presence or absence of neuro­
chemicals. In a similar vein, a major growth area appears to involve the correlation of 
behaviours with the presence or absence of specific genes. For example, in the case of
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William's Syndrome, specific cognitive deficits are correlated with a genetic, 
chromosomal disorder.22 More generally, it appears that we are beginning to achieve 
some understanding of the more detailed functioning of the brain, where that 
understanding recapitulates just such a reductionist's hierarchy of levels:
The auditoiy system is a fair example. There is 
evidence that the auditoiy cortex displays two- 
dimensional columnar organization: columns of
variously specialized cells arranged along one axis 
respond selectively to frequencies indicated by 
incoming impulses from the auditoiy nerve, while 
columns roughly orthogonal to these somehow 
coordinate input from one ear with input from the 
other. The particular sensitivities of the specialized cells 
is to be explained in turn by reference to ion transfer 
across cell membranes, and so on down. For its own 
part, the auditoiy cortex interacts with other higher- 
level agencies - the thalmus, the superior colliculus, and 
other cortical areas - which interactions are highly 
structured.231
Even more suggestive of the viability of explanations of linguistic functioning 
at the level of neurology and genetics are, as regards the former, studies of the 
correlation between various locations of brain lesions and particular linguistic deficits, 
and, in the latter regard, studies of family (i.e. genetically related) groups whose 
members evidence certain systematic language (e.g. morphological) impairment.24
In the light of this random sample of how an understanding of the mind/brain 
is being developed, and of how it is offering understanding of phenomena dependent 
on mind/brain functioning, an enquiry that results in the conclusion of the 
incommensurability of the objects of a linguistic theory with more basic or adjacent 
properties of the mind/brain is perplexing, even to the extent of being a reductio ad 
ahsurdum of realist claims made for such a linguistic theory. This because, in an 
autonomist's/Platonist's Mew, we have to say that whatever it is that the neuro-linguist 
is talking about has nothing to do with what the linguist proper is talking about: east is 
east and west is west and never the twain shall meet. We get a strange, if not 
downright bizarre, bifurcation between two domains and sets of objects where each 
domain/set seems to make sense only as related to the other (do we really want to say, 
along with Katz, that there are languages irrespective of there ever being speakers of
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those languages?), but then we are told that, by virtue of then different ontological 
status, the relation they are in is, on the one hand, not part of the explanation of the 
linguistic, and, on the other, this relation is, as we shall see, only explicated by 
recourse to an account that takes refuge in mysteries.
While such considerations supply a motive for continuing in Chomsky’s 
general, psychological and reductionist project, (for one thing, a psychological stoiy 
promises to relate and assimilate the two sides of this dichotomy,) these considerations 
do not by themselves provide psychological content to some linguistic theoiy nor 
confer, to use a much abused phrase, psychological reality on that theory's constructs. 
The conclusion, which it is the puipose of these chapters to draw, is that the 
Chomskyan paradigm has not only not itself achieved such psychological content, but 
also denies, by virtue of some of its initial foundational assumptions, the veiy 
possibility: given the initial set of assumptions and positing of an object of study, the 
autonomist/Platonist conclusion is unavoidable.25 However, this conclusion with its 
correlative and disconcerting (east is east, west is west) ontological bifurcation rests on 
a realist construal of linguistic theories and their constructs. As we pointed out, 
realism is not the only option. One primafacie motive for examining the possibility of 
an instrumentalist perspective is that it would absolve us from just this disconcerting 
bifurcation and correlative ontological commitments. However, as we have just noted 
in respect of Chomsky's psychologism, a motive, no matter how persuasive, is not 
itself sufficient to realize what is desirable. In the following we aim to provide 
precisely such grounds as argue for an instrumentalist interpretation of generativist 
theories.
4.0 Autonomism. Platonism and the (d is A continuity of the levels of nature.
4.1 Arguments for a non-psvchological ontology.
Central to the autonomist/Platonist position is the non-reducibility of linguistic 
theories to any other nomological domain. Consequently, other domains and then 
corresponding data are, and must be, irrelevant to discontinuation of linguistic 
theories. There are, at least, three ways one might come towards stating this claim: 
one could simply, as Fodor characterizes the Platonist position,26r stipulate one’s 
interests as being confined to the mathematical problem of fonnally specifying a 
grammar. If one restricts one's interest in this way, thereby restricting oneself to an
102
Non-Psychological Realism
exclusively constitutive account, one may also stipulate one’s data (in this case, 
speakers’ intuitions; a parallel would be naked-eye observations of the planets’ 
apparent motion). What one is then concerned with is the calculus qua calculus as an 
instrument for achieving coverage, i.e. to predict acceptability judgements. What one 
is not doing is attempting an account of why the phenomena are as they are, for 
example by relating the linguistic to properties of the minds/brains of speakers.
However, Fodor’s characterization of the Platonist/autonomist option as mere, 
unmotivated stipulation of the irrelevance of the psychological is not an entirely fair 
representation of that option. The taking of the Platonist stance is based on arguments 
of two basic types. On the one hand, arguments are adduced to the effect that, given 
the posited object of study (construed as the set of sentence types of a language), then 
this object's properties make it incompatible with a mentalist ontology: types are 
abstract and so not commensurable with a physical mind/brain; the second line of 
argument is to point to the incompatibility of the infinitude of linguistic objects with 
the finitude of the mind/brain.27 An alternative tack is taken by Carr.
Recall that Chomsky asserts that a condition on linguistics being ’’assimilated 
into the mainstream of the natural sciences", a condition on content being provided 
for the psychological claim, is that "connections can be established" between the 
psychological/neurological and the linguistic. Conversely, the inability to achieve such 
connections might be suggested as grounds to suspect the propriety of a reductionist 
psychological ontology for the constructs of linguistic theories. On the other hand, just 
tliis inability is predicted - a prediction Carr takes to be confirmed - by an 
autonomism/Platonism: the data are restricted, because of the putatively non-reducible 
sui generity of linguistic objects, to speaker-hearer judgements.28 Can” points out that 
no matter which ontological position one takes the data are, in practice, just so 
restricted; indeed:
In Chomsky's case, we find the rather odd situation in 
which he allows that other sorts of evidence are 
relevant to testing but never in practice uses, or 
recognizes, such evidence.291'
There is, in respect of the types of data applied to, no methodological distinction 
between linguists working from either ontological perspective, nor between these and 
those who take an agnostic position.30 There does, however, appear to be an 
"evidential distinction" between linguistic and psychological enquiry. Carr takes this
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"methodological divide" between the linguistic and the psychological to require an 
explanation.
The explanation (Can's) is that the two discourses reflect a real, ontological 
distinction in the nature of things: "the divide exists because the world is actually 
differentiated in this way."31r There is the psychological (in the guise of, for example, 
the psycholinguistic) and there is the linguistic, they are "distinct sorts of enterprise", 
and are so because their objects of enquiry are of different and incompatible 
ontological types. The former is concerned, because of its drawing of its primary data 
from experimentation, with spatio-temporal events; the latter, because it is concerned 
not with utterances but with sentence types, is not. (Types are to be regarded as 
abstract objects which, by definition, are neither spatial nor temporal.) Consequently, 
east is indeed east and west is indeed west:
Autonomous linguistics is thus methodologically distinct 
from natural sciences in that its general statements are 
not propositions about events, and are thus not laws in 
any [causal] sense ...,32r
The upshot is that linguistics, because of the nature of linguistic objects, is excluded 
from passing beyond a constitutive account. The perceived evidential distinction, itself 
based on a fundamental ontological distinction between the kinds of things that are the 
objects of investigation in linguistics on the one hand, and in the natural sciences on 
the other, is taken to be confirmatory of autonomism and disconfirmatory of 
Chomsky’s reductive psychologism. What we also get is the ontological 
anomalousness of the linguistic, at least it is anomalous from the perspective of the 
natural sciences; it becomes, rather, a special science. Can' contrives to portray this 
ontological anomalousness as a positive result, one that "avoids the pitfalls of 
reductionism", amongst which pitfalls is "an impoverished conception of ontological 
diversity, "33r
This "pitfall", however, is no more than a rhetorical dressing up of mutton as 
lamb, or rather, lamb dressed down as mutton: one could say, for the contrary 
position, and with much better foundation, that it avoids the pitfalls of anti- 
reductionism, amongst which pitfalls is a gratuitously extravagant conception of 
ontological diversity. We take the Quinean line here where less is distinctly more and 
the virtue is, all things being equal, in getting away with as parsimonious an ontology 
as possible.34 This aside, in taking a Popperian view on the ontological status of the 
linguistic (for more on this see below) we are able, Carr claims, to avoid "the excesses
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of Platonism" and, indeed, see the anomaly as not anomalous at all because the 
anomalousness only comes in by way of a mistaken prejudice for, and unwarranted 
assumption of, reductionism.
4.2 Problems with Platonism.
The unpalatabilities of a Platonism, whether it be in mathematics or linguistics, 
are, several. Firstly, no story at all is, nor can be, offered as to how platonic entities 
come to be - they are timeless, necessaiy, causeless and uncaused, one is reduced to 
stating that they simply subsist; there can be, seemingly by some act of stipulation, no 
answer to any question as to why they are as they are. Second on this agenda are the 
ontological excesses that Carr alludes to above. One consequence of Platonism in 
linguistics, and in general, is an immediate and unchecked proliferation of abstract 
entities. One of the disconcerting corollaries, in the linguistic case, is that not only do 
the sentence types of existing natural languages subsist, but also all the sentence types 
of languages (and so the languages) that are no longer in use, the sentence types of 
languages that are not yet in use, and the sentence types of languages (indefinitely 
many of them) that neither are, have been, nor will be in use. Such a situation is 
profligate in the extreme, to the extent of being downright squalid: it is, in Quine's 
words in respect of a similar position, "rank", "a slum" and "a breeding ground for 
disorderly elements."35 What is offensive is the lavish violation of Occam's Razor 
(which Quine picturesquely figures as shaving Plato's beard), not to mention the 
assault on common-sense. Furthermore, it would appear that Katz' position seems to 
have the unfortunate corollary of making the linguist's objects of study at best 
problematically distinguishable from objects with the "property" of non-existence.
As remarked, Katz is committed to quantifying over natural languages both 
actualized and unactualized. The fact of their actualization, through the agency of 
human minds/brains is merely contingent; it is irrelevant to their existence. But if the 
fact that the actualization of a language is merely contingent, then how does one get to 
demarcate a linguistically proper and linguistically non-contingent distinction between 
natural languages and the set of languages - imaginable and unimaginable - of which 
the natural are some subset? Take the contingencies of the human mind/brain away 
and the linguistic domain becomes considerably and (here’s the problem) 
indiscriminably richer. Presumably, this task of demarcation is one for some enquiry, 
only it is not a properly linguistic enquiry for it would need to apply to linguistically
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contingent facts, i.e. regarding, presumably, the human mind/brain. But, this seems to 
draw a map of the linguistic domain which, other than some small, contingently 
actualized subset, is empty (but in reality non-empty), and its non-emptiness indicated 
by the legend tt)ere be bragons, i.e. languages both imaginable and unimaginable. 
The trouble with dragons is that they are indistinguishable from entities that are non­
existent. If actualization is contingent, then we need to cast around for some other 
touchstone of existence. Take actualization and minds/brains away as touchstones of 
existence, then what is the difference between our objects of study as things that exist 
and objects of study that do not exist? I think that we need to be told.
The third, and similarly unpalatable, corollaiy of a Platonism is the perennial 
problem of how non-spatio-temporal, abstract objects get to be in some relation (i.e. a 
knowledge relation) with spatio-temporal minds/brains: platonic objects are:
beautiful (at least to some), imperishable, 
multitudinous, intricately connected. They toil not, 
neither do they spin. Nor, and this is the mb, do they 
interact with us in any way. So how are we supposed to 
have epistemological access to them? To answer, 'by 
intuition', is hardly satisfactoiy. We need some account 
of how we have knowledge of these beasties.36r
Katz gets himself into knots on this topic.37 In effect he recapitulates a 
Chomskyan innateness hypothesis that looks far less plausible than the original: our 
intuitions about abstract objects are taken to be internally constructed representations 
which representations may (or may not38) correspond to the mind-extemal abstract 
objects which they intend. This representational faculty is innate. But given that these 
objects have no causal powers (by virtue of not being spatio-temporal), then how 
come we have this faculty of internally constructing representations of them? There 
can be, seemingly, no evolutionaiy story (except, perhaps, extreme and serendipitous 
mutational accident), nor any causal story: it must be simply a mystery.
Similar difficulties arise in respect of the need for an account of the facts of 
language change. Presumably, the process is, in some way, caused, but Platonic 
entities are not the sort of things that get caused, nor are they causal. On the other 
hand, minds/brains are, again presumably, just the sort of things that enter into causal 
relationships. Consequently, it would seem likely that to account for many of the 
phenomena associated with natural language it will be necessary to invoke properties 
of the mind/brain. Even if it should turn out that there is some proper content to the
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notion of the linguistic as ontologically distinct of the mind/brain, and this shown to 
constitute a proper province of the grammarian, it will still leave not only room, but 
the need for the "psychogrammarian" to attempt to understand how we come to be 
language using beings. And this is, in Fodor’s words, where the interest and "the 
action is[:] all at the other [i.e. conceptualist's] end of town."39r
Viewed from this angle, what Chomsky’s programme amounts to is the placing 
of a bet that, once one has exhausted the study of language from the psychological 
perspective, then there will be no further linguistic phenomena to be accounted for: 
the psychogrammarian will subsume the grammarian and, correlatively, (and this is 
why it is so appealing,) there is no ontological bifurcation with its attendant problems. 
Given these problems, why not stick with an innateness hypothesis, some faculty 
which constructs representations, and take that faculty and those representations40 as 
the proper objects of study, indeed the only objects of study, and do away with these 
highly problematic abstract entities that are, if they exist at all, both themselves 
inexplicable and obstructive of an explanation of the human language faculty? This is, 
very crudely, the line that is taken, and for broadly similar reasons, by 
constructivism/intuitionism in mathematics.41 However, and also cmdely, one reason 
why constiuctivism/intuitionism is, I take it, a minority interest in mathematics is that it 
seems the abstraction and correlative autonomy of mathematical objects will just not 
go away, in much the same way as, conversely, and on the grounds cited above, the 
reduction of the linguistic, defined more or less on Chomskyan lines, to the 
psychological, as we will see, remains unachieved.
4.3 Autonomism and Popper’s Mworld three".
The Popperian perspective, Carr insists, allows us a realist discourse about 
linguistic objects, taken as autonomous and abstract, without involving us in the same 
problems as make a linguistic Platonism so unpalatable. For one thing, by positing a 
non-contingent relation between language and mind, mediated by a notion of 
emergence, we get to negotiate the ontological extravagances of Platonism that we 
adverted to above. However, it is not clear to what extent Carr’s Popperian position 
can be distinguished from the brute claim that there is a domain of mind-external, 
autonomous, objective knowledge, together with the assertion that this domain 
interacts (we are not told how) with psychological states of individuals, as if you can
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get the requisite interaction by fiat, or by some spurious necessity, because it is the 
only way to make sense of the position.
Oddly, however, and a second42 reason to suspect that Chomsky’s 
psychologism might not be contentfully distinguishable from an autonomism is that, in 
certain respects, the picture that emerges is not dissimilar to one which is, 
interpretably, Chomsky’s: in his case mind-internal tacit knowledge, i.e. the I- 
language, (captured at some suitable level of abstraction above the actual instantiating 
mechanism) interacts with conscious psychological states of individuals and it is this 
knowledge which is putatively involved in the aetiology of the behaviour. For 
example, it is supposedly what is accessed when we make some judgement of 
acceptability. But just how this interaction happens we are not told; it is left as a 
problem for the brain sciences. (We may note that, at bottom, the issue is a rehearsal 
of philosophy’s mind-body problem, that of just how one is to accommodate (or 
relate) the abstraction of the mental within (or to) properties of physical entities. In 
broad terms, this conceptual and ontological bifurcation/dualism is what the mental 
representation hypothesis is supposed to negotiate.)
This problem is not confined to linguistics, but is replicated in cognitivism in 
general. Fodor observes that a characteristic of cognitivism is its reliance on "neo- 
Cartesian" explanations that appeal to some body of mentally realized declarative 
knowledge in account of the nature of behaviour. Such explanations Fodor takes to be 
"enthymemic", i.e. one premise is left implicit. The ’’premise’’ being the nature of the 
mechanisms that take an individual from the body of declarative knowledge to the 
realized behaviour; i.e., in linguistic parlance, the performance (in Popper’s terms, 
interactive) mechanisms which:
do for Chomsky some of what the pineal gland was 
supposed to do for Descartes: they are invoked to 
answer the question "How does the structure of 
behaviour come to mirror the prepositional structures 
that one cognizes?’’431-
The primary difference between Carr's Popperian position and Chomsky’s is the 
ontological status of the body of knowledge: in the Popperian case it is mind-extemal, 
in the Chomskyan case it is mind-intemal. As in the Popperian case, it is the shadowy 
and unexplicated nature of this interaction that will be a cause for concern and which 
makes the object of the Chomskyan study resistant {pace Chomsky's protestations) to 
integration into the natural sciences.
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Central to the Popperian scheme is a division of the world into three 
ontological domains: worlds one (the physical), two ("subjective experiences", the 
psychological) and three (objective knowledge, the objects of those experiences).44 It 
is amongst this latter that Can' encourages us to place linguistic objects, which objects 
are, contra Chomsky, not elements of individual psychology, but are public and 
speaker-external. Although we are not here concerned with the propriety of this 
ontological catalogue, we are concerned with how successful it is in addressing the 
unpalatabilities of a Platonism: the irreducible otherness of the ontological category of 
abstr act objects, and, secondly, the relation between those objects and individuals.
On the former count, the solution is to see each of the latter two worlds as 
constituting ontological categories that are emergent from the ontological category that 
precedes them in the series. Rather than be committed to a mysterious pre-existing 
collection of subsistent platonic entities, these entities and their properties are 
emergent45 out of some creative evolutionary process:
I suggest that the universe, or its evolution, is creative, 
and that the evolution of sentient animals with 
conscious experience has brought about something
new  With the emergence of man, the creativity of
the universe has, I think, become obvious. For man has 
created a new objective world of the products of the 
human mind.46r
Furthermore, these emergent (types of) entities and their* properties are irreducible to, 
that is cannot be predicted from, the properties of the evolutionary prior domains:
In a universe in which there once existed (according to 
our present theories) no elements other than, say, 
hydrogen and helium, no theorist who knew the laws 
then operative and exemplified in the universe could 
have predicted all the properties of the heavier elements 
not yet emerged, or that they would emerge; or all the 
properties of even the simplest compound molecules 
such as water.47r
The problem with this latter claim is that it is not at all obvious that it is true, and even 
less obvious how it could be shown to be true (or false). It appears to invoke as much 
mystery as Platonism, but in this case the mystery is over how these new properties 
emerge in a kind of "evolutionary saltation"48r The relation between higher and lower-
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level appears to be one of some sort of inexplicit, because unexplained, dependence or 
"supervenience". To say that some type of entity or some set of properties is 
supervenient on some other type of entity or set of properties is to say that there could 
not be any differences in the former without there also being differences at the latter 
substratal level. However, the same entities or set of properties might result out of a 
substr ate with different properties. The trouble is that what we get out of the notion of 
supervenience is a label that does justice to an observation of what is to be explained, 
but the label can not do service as an explanation. As Blackburn remarks:
One promise the notion [of supervenience] holds out is 
that by its means we can understand the relation of ... 
different layers of description without attempting a 
reduction of the one area to another. [But] the value of 
this promise depends on how well we understand the 
supervenience relation itself. If it is a dangling, 
inexplicable, metaphysical fact ..., then supervenience 
inherits rather than solves the problems of 
understanding the various areas.491'
Furthermore, there are many cases, such as in our illustration of the gas laws 
(pg. 98), where more basic level laws can be shown to be predictive of the laws that 
pertain at some higher level. The quite general observation, cutting across domains, 
particularly those domains in which progress has been made, is that "autonomy 
assumptions have not proven viable".501' Indeed, it is arguable that a condition on the 
reusability, and so development of theories, is the ability for one theoretic domain to 
be revised in the light of theories in adjacent domains. The history of science furnishes 
many examples of such co-evolution with which goes a correlative revision and 
reconfiguration of the categorizations and conceptual schemata that give access onto 
phenomena.51 A corollary of an assumption of a domain's autonomy is precisely a 
resistance to such a reconfiguration. The upshot is a species of "conceptual necessity" 
(recall, this is Chomsky's phrase, predicated of Minimalism's competence/ 
computational system) whereby the terms and categorization with which we approach 
a phenomenon take on a degree of unrevisability, and an unrevisability which is 
reinforced by the concomitant insulation of theories from data from other theoretical 
domains.
What Popper requires, if we are to believe him, is some way to show, rather 
than baldly assert, that, for some principled reason, the apparent autonomy of a 
domain is ineliminable by any future scientific development. This appears to be the
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burden on all anti-reductionist positions. Given the above obseived, quite general non­
viability of autonomy assumptions, it would seem that autonomy of a domain is the 
exception rather than the rule: it is a surprising, one might even say, anomalous result. 
Furthermore, whereas the evidence for the non-autonomy of a domain is just the 
mutually confirming dialectic between theoretical perspectives we outlined, the 
evidence for autonomy is just the lack of precisely such confirmatory evidence of a 
theoiy’s constructs from any external theoretical perspective.
The upshot is that any theoretical position (e.g. autonomous linguistics) that 
claims the irreducibility of its domain to any other, or any non-autonomous position 
that fails to realize evidence for that non-autonomy (e.g., we shall argue, Chomskyan 
linguistic theory), looks like simply the failure to get it right. This either, guiltlessly, 
because there is no suitably developed (or, on the autonomist stoiy, no possible) 
theoretical domain to which "connections might be established", or because the theory 
is misconceived, or both. At veiy least there need to be strong grounds adduced for 
why a theoiy is not so failing such as to encourage to the former of these options. The 
strongest grounds that Can* provides, and perhaps could provide given the nature of 
an autonomy claim, is the heuristic fertility of competence orientated linguistic 
theories, but, as we have argued, that in itself is insufficient.
The crux of our observation was that, while heuristic fertility would arise out 
of the constructs of a theoiy answering to real entities, it would also result where 
phenomena are caught up in a species of hermeneutic circle (a skeuomorph effect) 
whereby the phenomena are interpreted in the terms of the conceptual apparatus 
applied to the task and, mistaking the means of access and representation for the thing 
represented, "we predicate of the thing what lies in our method of representing it."52r 
What results is an apparent licence for taking there to be a relation of correspondence 
between the terms and constructs (the abstracta) of the prefiguring calculus and real, 
theory-external entities (illata). If this skeuomorph effect is indeed the case, two firm 
and confirmed predictions that fall out, and suspiciously so, are, firstly, precisely the 
autonomy of the domain and, secondly, its abstract ontological status. These because, 
to take the latter first, such entities (abstracta masquerading as illata) will have the 
same abstract ontological status as the prefiguring calculus and, secondly, they will 
also be highly resistant to confirmation from (or reduction to) other theoretical 
domains for the simple reason that they do not exist anywhere but as projections of 
the calculus. Furthermore, the putative autonomy of a domain effectively deprives the 
theoiy of one source of warrant for the reality of its object of study and its constructs, 
and deprives the theoiy of one means of excising a skeuomorph effect: autonomy of a
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domain precludes theories about that domain from discontinuation by evidence from 
any other domain, this insulation being packaged as ineliminable. The suspicion is that 
this ineliminability is no more than a case of it not occuning to us to take off the 
glasses, of Wittgenstein’s observation, through which we see whatever we look at.
Leaving these remarks to one side, once you have a domain or ’’world" or 
"realm” of objective knowledge it seems you can get to, indeed, have to, claim the 
interaction between it and the other worlds as a brute fact:
Popper wants to say that our intellectual products may 
have an effect on, and be affected by, the physical 
world via psychological states. Thus, our theories may 
influence our physical environment in any manipulation 
of the physical world we cany out.53r
The trouble is that this brute fact of interaction seems to be no more elucidating, nor 
elucidated, than Platonism’s reliance on intuition:54 the Platonist is reduced to saying 
that we simply "see", for example, mathematical relations, the autonomist that we 
simply interact with, for example, linguistic objects. The point is admitted, coyly, by 
Can' in the guise of a research program: "exactly how interaction ... takes place is 
something that needs to be investigated. "55r In short, until some explication of this 
interaction is provided we are left with the linguistic as an ontological dangler, unable 
to be integrated into an account of linguistic behaviour, as, indeed, anomalous in the 
same way and for the same reasons as Platonism is. The only "advantage" is that the 
otherness of the second and third worlds is mediated by some wholly mysterious 
evolutionaiy saltation (in parallel to a wholly mysterious form of interaction) that, by 
virtue of the mysteiy, explains nothing. Furthermore, is there not a suspicion that an 
account, such as would eliminate these mysteries (a possibility that can not be 
precluded), would also, perhaps, even probably, disconfirm the ontology and, 
perhaps, reconfigure the categorization articulated by theoiy, and so come to show 
that what is wrong about an autonomous realism is not so much the autonomy but the 
realism, for once you drop the realism you get the autonomy for free: fictions are not 
likely to be observable except from the perspective of the theoiy that projects and 
posits them.
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4.4 Evolution: the indiscernabilitv of psychologism and autonomism.
As we noted in respect of the relation between competence grammars and 
behaviours, the recourse to mysteries is the price paid for the maintenance of a realism 
towards competence grammars on either side of the ontological controversy. This gets 
replicated in respect of the issue of the evolution of the human language faculty. To 
negotiate similar problems Chomsky's predilection for a reductionist psychologism 
needs recourse to much the same unclarities resulting in a "mysticism dressed up in a 
biological metaphor"561' or, alternatively, the posing of the problems as problems for 
the biologist. Chomsky's general strategy is to identify the problem (i.e. that which 
gives rise to the incommensurability of linguistic theories with putativefy 
adjacent/lower level domains) in our understanding of those domains: its just a matter 
of getting our biology/evolutionary/brain theories right and all will be well (then 
incommensurability with competence theories being the evidence for their failings, 
and that means all of them57).
According to Pinker, the consensus is that "a uniquely human language 
instinct seems to be incompatible with the modem Darwinian theoiy of evolution. "58r 
The way Chomsky comes to negotiate the incompatibility is fairly well in line with 
Popper: he goes the way of "emergence", thereby inheriting exactly the same 
problems, but the reductionism (and hence the non-autonomy of the linguistic) gets 
preserved and smuggled in by some hand-waving in the direction of unknown
physical principles. All that it has going for it is that it papers over our ignorance in a
manner in tune with the prejudices of a reductive materialism while simultaneously 
insulating competence theories, in a cloud of unknowing, from the criticism that the 
fact of their incompatibility with evolutionary theoiy lays them open to:
[an innate language faculty] poses a problem for the 
biologist, since, if true, it is an example of true 
"emergence" - the appearance of a qualitativefy 
different phenomenon at a specific stage of complexity 
of organization.
It may be that at some remote period a mutation took 
place that gave rise to the property of discrete infinity, 
perhaps for reasons that have to do with the biology of 
cells, to be explained in terms of properties of physical 
mechanisms, now unknown.... Quite possibly other 
aspects of its evolutionaiy development again reflect the
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operation of physical laws applying to a brain of a 
certain degree of complexity.,..
The answers may well lie not so much in the 
theoiy of natural selection as in molecular biology.59
Notice that in the latter quotation the suggestion is that the human language 
faculty by-passes, by way of an evolutionary saltation, a Darwinian account; what we 
get, by way of a "chance mutation" is the human language faculty as some sort of 
"hopeful monster".60r The standard evolutionaiy stoiy has it that complex systems 
come about through the gradual accumulation of random mutations that get selected 
for on the basis of the advantages that accrue to the organism. Certainly, it is not easy 
to see how the property of discrete infinity might come about gradually, nor how it 
might confer any selectional advantage, particularly as this seems to require that not 
only unactualized possible sentences give a selectional advantage, but also impossible 
unactualized sentences. I suppose it is a logical possibility that some other, non- 
evolutionary account might turn out true, but surely it is a long shot and seems to 
require a view of the language faculty as, in Dennett's phrase, an (again the word) 
"inexplicable gift". It is a long shot because a language faculty is as good a candidate 
as you are going to get for something that does confer a selectional advantage. 
Consequently, it is a prime candidate for explication in terms of Darwinian gradual 
development, rather than as something which falls out as a non-selected-for happy by­
product of an enlarged brain - serendipity indeed.61r
The "enthymemic" account of the instantiation of the competence grammar 
gets to be dealt with in the same way:
perhaps principles now unknown enter into the 
functioning of the human or animal minds, in which 
case the notion of "physical body" must be extended, as 
has often happened in the past, to incorporate entities 
and principles of hitherto unrecognized character.621'
What is being floated here is the notion that some promissoiy brain science will be 
able to elucidate the nature of the missing premise of the enthymeme. It is the brain 
sciences that need to reconfigure their concepts. What is not floated is the recognition 
that this can cut both ways and that when this has happened in the past it has often 
only been achieved by way of reconfiguration, and occasionally wholesale revision, of 
the constructs and categorization of the assimilated theoretical domain (think what 
happened to phlogiston).
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A problem with pre-specified promissory sciences is that they do not always 
turn up, either, as is our observation, as you want them or, sometimes, at all. In both 
cases this is to undermine claims to realism for the theoiy that fails to be assimilated. 
In the former case, because the theoiy has simply turned out wrong; in the latter case, 
because it remains dangling and anomalous in respect of the hierarchy into which, 
given reductionist prejudices, it is supposed to be assimilated; the theoiy, 
consequently, remaining under-confirmed.
At this juncture, an ingenious move that gets you to paper over any anomalies 
is to invoke the notion of "epistemic boundedness": "It may be that the operative 
principles are not only unknown but even humanly unknowable because of limitations 
on our own intellectual capacities."63 What we are encouraged to is the view that our 
questions and curiosities are to be categorized as either "problems" (within our 
capacities and soluble) or "mysteries" (outside our capacities and so insoluble). What 
this buys you is a plausible rationale for a restriction on the range of data that can be 
adduced to the task of falsifying a theoiy: where heuristic fertility and predictive 
success fail to be supplemented by data from other theoretical domains, where there is 
a failure to achieve a certain theory-extemality, one can take cover behind this 
convenient and repeatedly usable cloud of unknowing. The trouble is that there is 
something deeply unsatisfactoiy about a position where the maintenance of a realist 
construal, whether it be horn the perspective of a reductionist psychology or of an 
autonomism, not only trades on, but itself generates, mysteries and/or the need for the 
promissoiy. Moreover, what these mysteries achieve is an insulation of a theoiy from 
other theoretical domains, the result being something that looks veiy like an 
autonomism but, we are assured, only looks this way because we can not explain why 
it isn't. The converse problem for a theoiy construed as autonomous is that nor can 
we explain why it is so.
There appear to be two directions in which things could go. The first 
possibility is that Chomsky's and Can's realism will turn out to be, in general terms, 
well-founded, hi this case, the difficulties we have been discussing will be addressed 
by some future enquiry such as will feasibly provide an answer to the ontological 
question, but without requiring any other substantial revision of the postulated object 
of study. In this regard, Chomsky's bet is that the apparent resistance of the linguistic 
to an assimilation into a reductionist hierarchy is eliminable; Can's bet is that it is 
ineliminable. The second possibility is that a realism is misplaced and that the reason 
for the difficulties that we have been canvassing is the irreality of the objects of study
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of competence theories. Despite the predictive success of competence theories, they 
answer only to fictions. Prime reasons for suspecting, and for investigating the 
possibility of, such fictionality are the variations on the theme of empirical 
strandedness that accompany the theoiy and which compound the theoiy-intemality 
we earlier identified: one reason why the constructs of linguistic theoiy are so difficult 
of observation from other theoretical perspectives might feasibly be that they are 
fictions. On the other hand, it is just this str andedness which Can- adduces as evidence 
for an autonomous ontological status for the linguistic. This move is, however, just as 
readily interpretable as not so much a solution as a means to justify the inability to 
provide a solution by dignifying that inability with an ontological title (compare: this 
drug causes sleep because of its dormative properties; the linguistic resists integration 
into the natural sciences because it is autonomous). In this light, one may wonder 
whether it might not be worth questioning the reality of that which is so resistant, for, 
after all, fictions would present similar problems.
To summarize Can's autonomist position: the linguistic object of study, the 
one posited by Chomsky’s generativist program, is affirmed (on the grounds of 
heuristic fertility) but provided with a different, non-mentalist, ontological 
interpretation. This interpretation is argued for on the basis of the observation that it 
makes sense of the actual practice of linguists, (which practice gets to be normative,) 
in then attempt to explicate this object of study; it makes sense of the ’’evidential 
distinction” between psychology and linguistics and the correlative inability of 
psychology to provide (dis)-confirmatoiy data. In brief, it makes sense of the 
observation that there is, arguably, no confirmed psychological content to Chomskyan 
linguistic theory except for the content provided by the assertion that competence 
grammars are psychological: a case of throwing a word at something often enough 
that in the end it sticks and, arguably sticks because it gets smuggled in on the back of 
the heuristic fertility and on the back of a prejudice that makes the psychological basis 
of the linguistic unnecessary of argumentation, that is, as some sort of obviousness.
Once one recognizes that it is not an obviousness and that the psychologism 
does not come for free, as if it necessarily came with the linguistic territory, then 
Carr's contentions may be viewed as constituting a challenge to the reductionist 
psychologist claims of the Chomskyan project; in particular, a requirement that the 
reductionist psychologism is provided with proper and identifiable content, such that 
the putative psychological status of a competence grammar is not similarly an 
ontological dangler by reason of being no more than an unsubstantiated addendum.
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Our aim in the following is to add some further substance to our discussion so 
as to show that the Chomskyan project fails in this respect and indeed collapses into 
an autonomism. In brief, we will argue that Can's and Katz' diagnosis is largely 
correct. The trouble is I hate their suggested cure because it inherits the problems we 
have just been canvassing of being unable to explicate how the linguistic gets into any 
relation with language users, and, consequently, leaves the linguistic more or less 
inexplicable (except by evolutionary saltation or some equally mysterious and 
promissoiy notion of supervenience). Furtheimore, it leaves it inexplicable by virtue 
of having to invoke an ontology for linguistic objects that from the perspective of 
Lycan's hierarchy of nature is anomalous.
One cannot, however, simply discount the possibility that this ontological 
anomaly might be the case, or that the anomaly is no more than a case of unequal 
levels of development in the relevant domains. One must accept one's (reductionist) 
prejudices as being precisely that, i.e. prejudices, even if they may have some degree 
of argued for warrant. Consequently, our aim will be, firstly, to attempt to further 
substantiate Carr's observation of the contentlessness of the reductionist psychologism 
of Chomskyan theory (or, to define an appropriate sense for "psychological”) and, 
secondly, to argue that the resulting theoiy warrants no more than an instrumentalist 
construal.
To make our case, it is firstly necessary to more clearly define the corollaries 
of an autonomous realist linguistics in respect of what objects it takes to be real, i.e. to 
be quantified over, this in relation to the formal systems that are applied to in theoiy 
construction and which articulate the theoretical claims. In brief, we aim to show that 
the theoretical magnitudes of an autonomist theoiy (what is taken to be real of the 
independently existing object of study) cannot be differentiated from the 
representational constructs, the abstracta, of the calculus that articulates the theory. 
The result is that the autonomist is unable to make a choice between extensionally 
equivalent grammars in respect of any principles other than the purely methodological 
and theory-internal. The psychologist claim is that psychological facts of the matter 
provide such other principles and so truth-content to a choice between grammars. It is 
on condition that this claim is substantiated that a psychologism can be contentfully 
distinguished from an autonomism. We aim to show that it cannot be so distinguished 
and so, to that extent, Can's autonomist contentions get to be substantiated. As we 
have suggested, this is not an altogether happy result for it leaves us, firstly, without 
the realization of the third strand of the Chomskyan project, i.e. an explanation of the 
linguistic, and, secondly, the reliance on purely methodological and theory-internal
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considerations in respect of the choice between grammars leaves us without the 
realization of a contentful realism, for all we have is a "heuristic hocus-pocus".64'
5.0 Autonomism^ and Platonism's existential commitments.
A primary distinction between a realist and an instrumentalist construal of a 
theory are the differing degrees of existential commitment that are involved. In the 
case of the former, there is an explicit commitment to the theoretical constructs of a 
theoiy: they are taken as real and existent entities rather than productive and predictive 
fictions. To revert to a previous illustration: once one takes the Ptolemaic model as no 
more than an instrumental device for generating accurate predictions of planetary 
motion, then one drops the existential commitment to certain elements of the model 
that afford those successful predictions: while one remains committed to the existence 
of the planetary bodies, one no longer expects, for instance, that planetaiy epicycles 
are to be discovered in nature outside of the conceptual scheme which allows one talk 
of the behaviour of the planetaiy bodies. In this case, these epicycles articulated by the 
conceptual scheme are to be reconstrued as "fictions in an action-predicting calculus", 
i.e. as abstracta - "calculation-bound entities or logical constructs" whose existence is 
only internal to the conceptual apparatus that provides the model,65r these being in 
contradistinction to entities that are posited as real and existent external to the 
conceptual apparatus, i.e. illata. Conversely, the realist construal of the theory would 
require just this theoiy-extemal commitment to these epicycles.
In the case of deductively formulated theoiy, where the theory articulated by a 
calculus is to be taken realistically, it is, as we have argued, a requirement, firstly, that 
the terms and properties of the calculus correspond, at some level of discrimination, to 
real elements and properties of the object modelled, and, if the theory is to be testable, 
that it is specified what that level of discrimination is: this amounts to a requirement 
that one distinguishes between what of the calculus one takes to be abstractum (or 
"representational construct") and what illaium (or "theoretical magnitude"). In brief, 
the requirement is that "the theoiy that accompanies the notation must tell us which 
aspects are intended to be empirically significant",661' that is to say, what the theoiy is 
existentially committed to and, if these claims are to be given warrant, that the 
postulated constructs are able to be credited with an existence independent of the 
formal apparatus that is the manner of then postulation.
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It is, perhaps, a little perplexing and counter-intuitive to discover that one of 
the corollaries of autonomism/Platonism is that the only things it both need be and can 
be cogently committed to are the members of the set of sentence types (or, if we 
accept Postal’s and Langendoen's argument (see footnote 27), members of a mega­
collection of sentence types). Beyond successfully generating all the members of that 
set (or explicitly characterizing the members of the mega-collection) there are no 
further facts of the matter as regards, for example, the internal structure of sentences; 
there are no tmth-issues involved in respect of any decision between two extensionally 
equivalent grammars.67 To see how this comes about we need to rehearse a little 
intellectual histoiy.68r
For Bloomfield a language is constituted by "the totality of utterances that can 
be made in a speech community",69r the result was a reliance on corpora of collected 
utterances and a view of grammars as taxonomic characterizations of those corpora. 
Chomsky showed that such a procedure was inadequate to the need to capture the full 
distributional structure of a language, i.e. to allow for a characterization of those 
sentences that are in the language but are outside of any particular corpus.70r In other 
words, one has to do justice not only to the actualized sentences of a language, but 
also to the unactualized possible sentences. Once one recognizes this need then one 
must, so the argument goes, also be committed to one’s linguistic theory quantifying 
over abstract entities for the simple reason that unactualized possibilities cannot be 
construed as other than abstract: "unrealized entities have to be construed as 
universals".71r The upshot is that linguistic theories are concerned with such 
universals, standardly understood as sentence types. By implication, the relation 
between these objects and the products of linguistic behaviour is that of a relation 
between a type and its tokening.
Amongst the properties of types, by definition abstract entities, are their lack 
of spatio-temporal qualities, they have neither duration nor occurrence and, as a 
corollary, cannot be properly said to have parts: they are discrete and indivisible and 
so with no internal structure. For this reason "it is hopeless to try to assemble them 
into classes",721- and hopeless in respect of, for example, then internal structural 
properties, for the simple reason that they do not have any. The consequence is that 
any two grammars that achieve the same coverage, and so are extensionally 
equivalent, differ only in respect of their notational variation, then differing economies 
of information, but these differences do not constitute tiuth-issues. The extent of the 
existential commitment of a linguistic theoiy is restricted to just the set of sentences of 
a language; the manner of generating those sentences, which manner reflects the
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properties of the calculus that is applied to the task, has a purely instrumental status. 
The result is that there is nothing to choose, in respect of truth, between a grammar 
that simply attempts to list the members of the set of sentences and one which 
generates the same set through some, or any, set of rules. Fodor makes the same 
observation:
strictly speaking, the Platonist [/autonomist] has no use 
for distinguishing among grammars in respect of truth 
at all, so long as they make the same predictions about 
the speaker/hearer's intuitions.73*
A further corollary is that there is no sense to the notion of a sentence qua 
type having constituent parts: abstract objects are simply not the sort of things that 
have parts. For example, "The cat bit the rat", when considered as a type, cannot be 
properly said to contain the VP "bit the rat", nor constitutively contain any of the 
individual lexical items as parts. Certainly, each lexical item can be said to exist, as can 
the constituents, but they do not exist in the sentence qua type, qua abstract object, 
but only independently as distinct types. On the one hand, one might observe that this 
leads to there being rather a lot of such entities, none of which has any mereological 
relation with any other, i.e. no relation of being a constitutive part of any other whole. 
On the other hand, and extremely bizarrely, we get a set of linguistic objects, 
sentences and constituents {the linguistic objects - they are, after all, the objects of 
study), that lack most of the mereological properties that linguists are interested in and 
consistently talk about. What results is consensus about what we are studying 
(sentence types) and then, in this light, an absurd counter-consensus to talk about 
something else: the internal structure of sentences, which internal structure is precisely 
what sentence types do not have. The only things that have such internal parts are 
sentences considered as structured sets of tokens, but did we not just agree that 
tokens, i.e. corpora of utterances, cannot do service as our proper objects of study?74*- 
This leads to an uncomfortable quandary. On the one hand, if one insists in 
construing the linguistic domain as constituted by a set of sentence types, then this is 
to undermine any realism towards the terms and constructs of linguistic discourse 
where that discourse imagines itself to address the internal structure of sentences, for 
such internal structure vis-a-vis sentence types can be no more than a fictional 
projection of structure. I suppose one can take this direction if one really wants to, 
only it is har'd to see why anyone would want to. For one thing, linguistic enquiry 
would have virtually nothing to say about the everyday phenomenology of the
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linguistic, the actual products of linguistic behaviour which, being spatio-temporal, do 
have internal parts. This would leave it open for a different linguistics to be instituted, 
one that does address this area of study. On the other hand, and in the light of this, 
one might ask:
why should linguists bother with types (...) at all, when 
all the linguistic properties with which they are most 
crucially concerned are elsewhere - always and only in 
utterances (the supposed tokens)?75
The implication is that it is the aforementioned and promissory "different linguistics" 
that is the proper, prior, and, let's face it, interesting area of enquiry and that linguistic 
realities are restricted to just these physical, actual and actualized tokens. If this is the 
case (despite the previously canvassed inadequacies of this approach), then, as 
Burton-Roberts observes, linguists' discourse, in quantifying over types (i.e. abstract 
entities that are non-occumng and non-physical), fails to refer to the real, calculus- 
external linguistic entities (physically occurring utterances); the referents of the 
linguist's discourse are no more than "calculation-bound" abstracta'.
if the linguistic is abstract (not physical), it is so only in 
the sense of being derived by abstraction 
(generalisation, idealisation, classification) over the 'real 
linguistic data', namely physical utterance phenomena;
... what is abstract in linguistics is not of-language, but 
merely of-and-for-the-linguist [of-and-for-the-calculus], 
having a (merely) theoretical [instrumental] utility for 
the linguist in his efforts to come to grips with the real 
object of his enquiry, .,.76
In sum, the fact that the linguistic is in excess of any set of actualized 
sentences, (hence, requiring of a linguistics that it be concerned with abstract objects,) 
is at odds with a second fact: that structural properties cannot be cogently predicated 
of these abstract objects. If we address the latter fact by reverting to tokens, we do not 
get the requisite generality and the abstraction of the constructs of our discourse is 
"merely of-and-for-the-linguist"; if we address the former fact, then the truth-issue is 
no more (and, of course, no less) than one of devising a grammar that correctly 
generates the members of the set of sentences, but there are no truth-issues beyond 
this, in respect of, in Chomsky’s phrase, "the principles used", i.e. the particular 
economy of information of which a grammar makes use. The particular economy of
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information is also "merely of-and-for-the-linguist", i.e. it has a purely instrumental 
role.
What these remarks suggest is, firstly, that there is something wrong 
somewhere, and seemingly the something wrong has to do with the identification of 
the object of study as a set of sentence types, and, secondly, the question as to 
whether these somewhat unpalatable conclusions can be avoided, preferably without 
the need for wholesale, foundational revision.
Chomsky’s proffered solution (which we will elaborate more fully below in 
chapter VI) is to reconfigure the object of study: rather than the linguist’s concern 
being directly with the set of sentences in a language (i.e. the E-language, a set of 
abstract types - for it is the taking of this as the primary object of study which, in 
seemingly precluding a reductionist psychologism, underpins autonomist/Platonist 
approaches;) instead, what the linguist is to address is the nature of the I-language, the 
mind-/bram-intemally realized set of rules (or principles and parameters). It is this set 
of rules, with their informational content - ultimately neurological structures - to 
which the linguist's grammar is required to correspond. These rules are, putatively, the 
linguistic realities, they are what a linguistic theory is to be true of, they are the facts 
of the matter and facts that are involved in the aetiology of linguistic behaviours, 
amongst which behaviours are speaker intuitions. It is this which makes sense (in 
respect of truth) of any choice between extensionally equivalent grammars; the 
putative mental representations and their economy of information constitute the 
"principles" which provide the content to any decision between grammars, they are 
what our theories are in attempt to get in correspondence with, that is, to be true of.77 
What we also get for free is a rationale for the taking of intuitions as data, a rationale 
which is a requirement - we need to know why the data are appropriate and (more or 
less) veridical data - and which rationale a Platonism precludes, needing resort to the 
mysteries of "intuition" to paper over the discrepancy. In this way the realist construal 
of a grammar is dependent on the mind/brain reality of these informational structures; 
it is these which are "psychologically real" and not the set of sentences, for such sets, 
Chomsky tells us, "are not in the mind/brain".781'
Such is the proposal which distinguishes the Chomskyan generativist 
enterprise from autonomist/Platonist construals. It is, however, one thing to propose, 
another to dispose. We take up, in chapter VI, the issue of whether Chomsky’s I- 
language diagnosis is sufficient cure. That aside, if we are to be convinced, then we 
need grounds for belief by being provided with properly achieved content to the I-
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language. The Chomskyan view, in contending that there are truth-issues - mind/ 
brain-intemal tmth-issues - involved in respect of a choice between extensionally 
equivalent grammars, needs to be able to provide some proper, truth-relevant criteria 
for allowing a decision between such grammars. If such cannot be provided, then the 
psychological realism of the Chomskyan position fails to substantiate the content of 
’'psychological" and becomes indistinguishable from a Platonism/autonomism. But 
then, as we are attempting to suggest, what is wrong about a Platonism/autonomism is 
its claim to be answering to any facts of the matter that exist external to the conceptual 
apparatus which articulates theoiy. It is not so much or only the autonomy that we are 
objecting to, but the realism.
For the Platonist/autonomist the data are restricted to intuitions because the 
Platonisf/autonomist position insists on, because the coherence of the position 
requires, (in explicit contradiction of the Chomskyan new (see, for example, N. 
Chomsky, 1986, pg. 39)) the irrelevance of any other data. This seems to raise a pair 
of problems. Firstly, to reprise our previous remarks, we might want to be told a 
stoiy, preferably one that does not take refuge in mysteries, as to what grounds there 
are for taking intuitions as the data; for if the linguistic is not to be granted a 
psychological locus then we forfeit Chomsky's rationale for accepting intuitions as 
relevant, i.e. they are relevant because they reflect a speaker's tacit competence and 
reflect it because that competence has a role in the aetiology of the intuition. The 
point is emphasized by Fodor (his italics): "an adequate linguistics should explain why 
it is that the intuitions o f speaker/hearers constitute data relevant to the confirmation 
o f grammars."1*
As we noted, Katz makes an attempt at an account but, while it gets him what 
he needs, the relevance of intuitions, this is achieved at the cost of credibility. 
Likewise, Carr has to wave vaguely at the "fact" of "interaction" and hope that we do 
not ask for an explanation.
The second problem, and one that infects Chomsky's position, (again an issue 
taken up in chapter VI) is that of having to explain how it is that our intuitions are 
fallible. The anomaly is that, in the case of certain sentences, (e.g. multiple centre- 
embeddings, which are grammatical but unacceptable,) we seem to have to flout the 
law of excluded middle by having to claim that what we know, our tacit competence, 
(which is identified with our ability to have intuitions; it is the knowledge resource we 
are supposed to access,) we simultaneously do not know (so our intuitions, where they 
go wrong, are not identified with our tacit competence). In Can's words, Chomsky's
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problem is that of "how it can be that our cognitive resources allow for such structures 
and cannot cope with them at the same time."80 Carr takes this as grist to the 
autonomist's mill: the fact that such sentences are licensed, but exceed our cognitive 
abilities is "more easily interpretable" if one makes "a distinction between linguistic 
facts and cognitive psychological facts." The problem, though, is that if one makes 
this distinction, it is hard to see why intuitions should be taken as trustworthy data at 
all, and if they are not trustworthy (as they may not be, given the consensus that they 
are on occasions fallible, and in which case, how do we know when they are 
trustworthy?), then just what are the constraints on the licensing of sentence types by 
theories? Once one removes the psychological locus for the linguistic, then while one 
gets to justify actual practice in which data other than intuitions are effectively 
irrelevant, unfortunately, one also undermines the rationale for taking intuitions as 
relevant data in the first place, and, along with this, it seems one is absolved from 
having to answer to mere actuality.' it's positively Liberty Hall.
Can 's observation is only grist to his mill if we know that such (unacceptable 
but grammatical) sentences are proper objects of the linguist's concern, that is as 
licensed sentences of a language, as real linguistic objects. (Where "linguist" is 
someone who is interested in natural, as opposed to artificial, languages.) But, how do 
we know this, just what is the authority for such sentences being members of the set 
of sentences in a natural language? Just what queer facts are these that we know but 
which are "not cognitive"? There are no possible data, neither as actualized tokens, 
nor, when the linguist artificially constructs such sentences, are there any speaker 
judgements of their- acceptability. The only authority is the calculus/grammar (a non- 
cognitive object? What sort of minds do linguists have?) which generates them along 
with the rest of the infinite set. But, in this case, how ar e these unactualized and 
unactualizable objects, to which the calculus is supposed to be in a modelling relation, 
(that relation is, after all, what linguistic enquiry is in the business of testing,) to be 
distinguished as real members of the set of sentences of a natural language as opposed 
to real members of the set of sentences of an artificial language? They are simply 
unidentifiable except as objects that are required to exist so as to interpret the 
structures generated by the calculus, having no discernible existence except as 
"abstracta - calculation-bound entities or logical constructs". But this is not to test the 
modelling/generative ability of some calculus, but it is simply to assume it. (And it is 
also to assume, as if on some grounds of conceptual necessity, that there is "no 
important theoretical difference between natural languages and the artificial languages 
of logicians."81) And in assuming it, and quantifying over the set of objects that
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interprets the generated structures, i.e. which supplies its model vis-a-vis syntactic 
objects (this is how we get to say a language consists of an always and already given 
set of sentence types), it is not just a case of our conceptual spectacles tending to 
structure how, and what, we see in the world, but they also invent it.82
Furthermore, this problem does not just infect the relation between the types 
generated by the calculus and their impossible tokenings, but, given the 
incommensurability of the properties of types and any actual utterances, then we get a 
peculiar bifurcation such that the actual linguistic, i.e. tokens, the products of linguistic 
behaviour, what would appear to have some claim to constitute a pre-theoretical given 
and first order phenomenology of the linguistic, remain distinct of, and unable to be 
assimilated with, what is being taken as the proper object of study: east is east and 
west is west and never the twain - the linguistic and actuality - shall meet. To reprise 
Carr's comments above, it would seem that this situation is "more easily interpretable" 
if one makes a distinction between the linguist's object of study with its "facts", to 
which linguists alone have privileged access, and the actual, real world linguistic facts. 
Only do not the former look like, for how can we distinguish them from, phantasms?
The result is that an autonomous/Platonist linguistics begins to look 
indistinguishable from the study of formal calculi simpliciier, with the object of study 
(an always and already set of sentences, putatively linguistic reality) looking 
suspiciously like (because indistinguishable from) an artefact constructed out of the 
formal properties of die mathematical/logical apparatus that has, as we noted, beyond 
the role of generating the right set of sentences, a purely instrumental role. But it is 
not just the economy of information of a grammar, that carries no truth claim, the 
calculus-external, actual-world fictionality also extends to members of this set of types 
that are in the extension of the grammar but are not actualizable or recognizable as 
acceptable sentences. With this losing of contact, the object of study begins to look 
like a skeuomorph, nothing corresponds to it except the abstract generative capacity of 
the formal calculus, which calculus, of course, has one ineliminable modelling 
relation: it ineliminably models itself (see footnote 82). Our concern will be with 
assessing the extent to which Chomsky's psychologism succeeds in negotiating these 
problems and so distinguishing its object of study from the phantasmic.
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6.0 Choosing a grammar.
Leaving the above issues to one side, although Platonism/autonomism results 
in the situation where extensionally equivalent grammars cannot be decided between 
on empirical grounds (beyond the apparently negotiable criterion of answering to 
speaker intuitions), this does not vitiate the desirability of choosing between competing 
formulations of the grammar in respect of other criteria. The relevant criteria here are 
those of simplicity, economy and elegance, the standard set of considerations that are 
applied to in construction of scientific theories.
But just what is at stake in invoking these criteria in respect of a special 
science, as opposed to a natural science? The answer would appear to be quite proper 
practical considerations regarding ease of use and applicability, these being particularly 
relevant in respect of possible computational applications. Alternatively, but 
amounting to the same, one might prefer one formulation over another simply on 
aesthetic grounds: one formulation is able to capture useful generalizations in a neat 
and systematic way whereas another does not. Crucially, these considerations refer to 
the calculi employed in theoiy construction as vehicles of representation for that 
theoiy and they are criteria relevant to the assessment of those calculi in respect of 
their comparative efficiency as vehicles of representation, not in respect of the 
empirical claims of the theoiy that is articulated through some calculus. Recall, our 
concern is with examining the comparative merits of extensionally equivalent 
frameworks that all express the same theoiy, that is all predict the same set of 
sentences and which sentences are the sum of the existential commitment of these 
frameworks.
The situation is akin to a choice between different ways in which we might 
represent the natural numbers in mathematics or how we choose to represent first 
order logics. To take the former to illustrate: two notations may both express the same 
theoiy, i.e. have the same model, and so quantify over the same entities, in this case 
the set of natural numbers. This set may be represented by either arabic or roman 
numerals with no different tiuth claims being involved in respect of either: they are 
extensionally equivalent and have the same existential commitments, i.e. make 
reference to (or, in model-theoretic teims, are interpreted by) exactly the same set of 
entities. However, we standardly use the former for the reason that the arabic 
numerals admit of much easier implementation in the algorithmic procedures that we 
use to perform the mathematical functions (e.g. tiy multiplying CCLXXIH by CXLIV 
without transposing into arabic numerals). The notion of ease of use is, however,
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relative to the applications one has in mind: arabic numerals are not used in 
computational contexts, rather the binary system, again because of its ease of 
implementation, this time in respect of the basic properties of computational 
hardware. Certain indirect truth-issues do, however, arise out of the choice of 
notation. For example, the development of mathematics in Europe was greatly 
facilitated by the introduction of the arabic numerals. This is not because they are any 
more true, but because they are easier of manipulation; indeed, it is the properties of 
the notation that make available the algorithms that we use in, for example, 
multiplication and division.83r Choice of notation has a heuristic value. There are 
parallels in linguistics. Tree-diagrams and bracketing notation are taken to be 
equivalent. It is arguable, however, that it is the use of the former that makes available 
such notions as government and c-command - relations which are simply not salient, 
even if implicit, in bracketing notation.84r
These observations are not confined to the special sciences. Reverting to 
astronomy again, Pylyshyn points out that:
Apart from issues of parsimony and generality, we do 
not argue about which of two equally predictive 
formulations of classical mechanics provides the correct 
explanation of planetary motion .... The question 
simply does not arise in mechanics because no 
ontological claims are made about the notation in which 
the equations ar e cast.85r
There are two points to be underlined here, one for future reference and the other in 
respect of the content of Chomsky's notion of I-language. Firstly, a theoiy's truth does 
not correlate, necessarily, with some measure of simplicity, as if, given two equally 
predictively successful theories/grammars, then the simpler one is, ipso facto, more 
likely to be true. Certainly, all thing being equal, it is to be preferred as a hypothesis 
on grounds relevant to the methodology of theoiy construction, but on methodological 
grounds alone. (A hypothesis, even the most methodologically sound hypothesis, 
cannot be taken to correspond to what is the case. If we could rely on our 
methodology of theory construction, science would be a purely armchair enterprise.) 
It is a brute fact that, in certain cases, and in some fields more than others - notably 
and veiy relevantly biology - it is the messier theoiy that is the more accurate.86 The 
moral of the stoiy is that preference for a theoiy on the grounds of considerations of
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simplicity - which considerations are precisely theory-internal considerations - can not 
double as preference for a theoiy on the grounds of empirical truth; the fact of a 
theory's internal simplicity is not itself warrant for a realist construal of that theoiy.
Secondly, Pylyshyris remarks provide a commentary on Chomsky's positing of 
the I-language as the object of study, and on how this thesis relates to the two general 
observations we have made regarding a Platonist/autonomist perspective; firstly, the 
purely instrumental status of the economy of information of a grammar and, secondly, 
the inability to maintain contact between actual linguistic objects and events and the 
abstract objects that interpret the set of strings generated by a calculus.
Although this will be finessed, essentially what the I-language perspective 
requires so as to achieve content is existential commitment to entities and relations that 
correspond as the referents of the notation of a grammar such that there is, putatively, 
a substantive argument over extensionally equivalent formulations.87 The terms and 
relations of a calculus are not simply instrumental means to a characterization of the 
phenomena, not simply representational constructs {ahstracta\ but theoretical 
magnitudes (ittata): the linguist's grammar corresponds to some psychological 
structure that represents the same informational economy as that grammar. It is the 
internally represented grammar that constitutes the object of study, and it is the 
properties of that mentally represented grammar that constitute the facts of the matter, 
i.e. what one is to be realist about, this as opposed to sets of sentences, hi making this 
move one is addressing what is, perhaps, the primary inadequacy of a Platonist/ 
autonomist linguistics, that is the failure to address the question of the relation 
between linguistic objects and their instantiation in linguistic behaviour through those 
linguistic objects being in some relation with individual speaker/hearers of natural 
languages. In short, one needs some account from the perspective of individual 
psychology, this because it at least makes sense of the use of intuitions as the primary 
source of data, and this needs to be made sense of to justify anyone in taking the 
enquiry, with its methodology, half seriously.
On the other hand, we want, if not need, this perspective because the question 
of how individuals come to be related to the linguistic does not go away simply by 
ignoring it. It is equivalent to the question as to why natural language is as it is; it is the 
attempt to answer this question that makes the enquiry more than a taxonomy and is, 
arguably, what makes the field interesting. Fodor makes fairly well the same point:
Suppose that we grant the Platonist proprietary use of 
the term 'linguistics'. So, by stipulation, linguistics is 
part of mathematics. But then, just down the road there
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must be another science just like linguistics except that 
it does care about empirical truth because it cares about 
how the mind works.88*'
Going down the road and taking a perspective from individual psychology constitutes 
Chomsky’s wager; that should such a psychological linguistics be achieved, then that 
would exhaust what is to be explained in respect of the linguistic;
Knowing eveiything about the mind/brain, a Platonist 
would argue, we still have no basis for determining the 
tiuths of arithmetic or set theoiy, but there is not the
slightest reason to suppose that there are tiuths of
language that would still escape our grasp.89r
The wager is, in short, that "language has no objective existence apart from its mental 
representation. "90r It is this hypothesis which offers to solve the anomalous and 
ineliminable sui generity that is argued for by the Platonists on the basis of the nature
of the object of study postulated by Chomsky's generativist enterprise. If it can be
shown that this anomalousness cannot be excised and the psychological claim not 
achieve proper content, then, perhaps, despite its own problems, we must take the 
Platonist/autonomist option. But that would leave, down the road, the same 
promissory science Fodor alludes to, for which foundations have to be set, or, 
alternatively an option on reassessing the status and propriety of the object of study 
that is hypothesized by the Chomskyan project.
These remarks set an agenda: whether it is possible to distinguish between 
Chomsky's psychologism and an autonomism on the basis of achieved content for the 
psychological claim.
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Footnotes.
1 This is not to require that such a statement is a precondition of theory development. Compare 
Quine's remarks (chapter 2, footnote 26).
2 We use the teim "reductionist" here in respect of Chomsky's claim that linguistics is a sub-branch of 
psychology and ultimately of biology (N. Chomsky, 1986). The same position appears to be taken in 
more recent writings where the human language faculty is described as a "biological system" (N. 
Chomsky, 1995). This reductionism is not of the eliminative sort (i.e. an eliminativist would claim that 
title constructs of some discourse are ineal, evenifpredictively accurate, and are to be wholly replaced 
by the constructs of some other more basic level discourse). Rather, I take it that Chomsky holds the 
view that some completed neuro-science will be commensurable with the constructs of linguistic 
theory (in a manner similar to which the gas laws fall out from a more basic level molecular theory, 
(see below, pg. 98)).
 ^In a similar way, what undermined confidence in the Galilean prejudice that the world is maths writ 
large was, in the case of mathematics, the discovery/invention of non-Euclidean geometries and, in 
logic, of higher-valued logics. (See our discussion in chapter I, 2.1 and J. Barrow, (1993, pgs. 8 - 20)). 
4 D. Marr (1982).
5 J. Katz (1981, pg. 180).
 ^C. Pollard and I. Sag, (1994, pg. 14). Similar agnosticism is expressed by Gazdar et al. (1983, pg. 5).
7 S. Blackburn, (1994, pg. 84).
 ^P. Cair (1990). Can's species of autonomism is founded on a Popperian (1972) view of "objective 
knowledge" which is argued to be "inter-subjective" and not dependent on, and so autonomous of, 
individual psychologies. For more on this, see below.
 ^An example of the consensus view is given by Pollard and Sag: "one tiling that [language] certainly 
does not consist of is individual linguistic events or utterance tokens, ... Instead, what is known in 
common, ..., is the system of linguistic types," (C. Pollard and I. Sag, 1994, pg. 14). See also 
Bromberger, (1989). Indeed, it is difficult to find any dissenting voices, see, however, Sampson, (G. 
Sampson, 1976). For an account of some of the uncomfortable corollaries of taking the relation 
between linguistic objects and the products of linguistic behaviour as a type/token relation, see 
Burton-Roberts, (1994, pgs. 186- 189). Indeed, just such uncomfortable corollaries, we will argue, ar e 
the linguistic counterpart of quantum mechanics' wave-particle duality.
Hie type/token distinction was first given an explicit formulation by Peirce:
There will ordinarily be about twenty "the"s on a page, and of 
course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word 
"word", however, there is but one "the" in the English language;
... it is impossible that this word should fie visibly on a page or be 
heard in any voice. (C. S. Peirce, 1958, pg 423)
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"A word in this flatter] sense is not a physical object, not a dribble of ink or an incision in granite, but 
an abstract object. ... Words in the first sense have come to be called tokens\ words in the second 
sense are called types." (W. V. O. Quine, 1987, pg 217.)
For a survey of type-token thinking in linguistics, see C. Hutton (1990).
^  Note that taking the objects of study of linguistics to be sui generis, as is the consensus, is not to 
claim, in the same motion, that the linguistic is irreducible and so ontologically autonomous. Rather, 
what one is claiming is that there is a discrete, nomological domain which is characterizable in terms 
of laws that are peculiar to that domain. These laws themselves may be consequences of more general 
laws. This is the case when the former domain is reducible to the latter. For more on this, see below.
* * We will take "special science" (Fodofs phrase) to refer to any area of discourse that resists 
reduction to any other discourse, not necessarily on the basis of an ontological distinction.
12 The phrase is borrowed from Carr (P. Carr, 1990, pg. 35).
p. S. Churchland andT. Sejnowsla, (1990, pg. 229).
^  It might be properly objected that this is stretching the notion of causality somewhat, however, the 
point is to distinguish and refer to two senses of "explanation", it is not intended as an account of the 
nature of causation.
^  N. Chomsky, (1986, pg. 23). Perhaps we have come, out of familiarity, to forget to notice the 
boldness - in Hie best Popperian tradition - of this hypothesis. It is, after all, analogous to proposing 
that the planets have a body of internally represented propositional knowledge to which they in some 
sense refer, and which is (literally) causally implicated in their behaviour. A hypothesis, I imagine, that 
would not find (and would never have found) many takers. But then, planets are not the sorts of thing 
we would credit with minds nor knowledge and, in the human linguistic case, it is this knowledge 
which is what is accounted for by a grammar. However, what our illustration demonstrates is that a 
specification, through a grammar, of what one knows when one knows a language, in effect a 
specification of the laws of the domain, is not by itself a causal explanation, but is, rather, what is 
required to be explained.
^  W. Lycan, (1990, pg. 78).
17 The term originates in the work of the nineteenth century philosopher W. Whewell (1840). The 
man seemingly had a talent for coining neologisms being also responsible for the term "scientist".
^  Compare S. Bromberger (1989).
19 J. A. Fodor, (1985, pg. 157).
S. Bromberger, (1989, pg. 85). Bromberger's argument is, in fact, from a slightly different direction: 
his suggestion is that we need a psychological locus for the linguistic such as to provide something for 
linguistic laws to be detenninately true of, otherwise (this is my interpretative spin) there is nothing to 
distinguish the laws being about anything other than fictions.
2* N. Chomsky, (1986, pg, 39).
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22 The case of Williams Syndrome is particularly relevant. The characteristics of the condition include 
both clearly physical and cognitive elements. Physically, sufferers share an "elfin-like" facial 
physiognomy and a susceptibility to certain forms of heart condition; cognitively the condition is 
marked by a low IQ, with particular problems in spatial and quantitative reasoning. However, 
sufferers are reported to have above average social skills and a coiresponding linguistic facility.
2^ W. Lycan, (1990, pg. 79).
24 See M. Gopnik (1994) and M. Gopnik and M. Crago (1991). The conclusion the latter draw is that 
"it is not unreasonable to entertain an interim hypothesis that a single dominant gene controls for 
those mechanisms that result in a child's ability to construct the paradigms that constitute 
morphology." (pg. 47). For an overview of research in these areas, see Pinker (1994, chapter 10).
2^ This is not a novel position. See, for example, P. Carr (1990, Chapters 1 and 2). The same 
conclusion is reached on different grounds to Carr's by Katz (J. Katz, 1981 and 1996) and 
Langendoen and Postal (D. Langendoen and P. Postal, 1984).
26 J. A. Fodor, (1985).
22 The former of these reflects a central area of tension in Chomsky's thinking, that of how to 
maintain a relation, primarily a causal/explanatory one, between the "determinate neural structures" 
that instantiate the I-language and the abstraction of the sentence types that the I-language generates.
An instance of the latter argument is Langendoen's and Postal's (D. Langendoen and P. 
Postal, 1984). It is akin to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem (compare Yourgrau (1989)) and is used 
by them in much the same manner as Penrose (1991) applies the latter to "prove" the inadequacy of 
the notion of the mind as a computer, i.e. in both the linguistic and the mathematical case there are 
sentences/statements that are beyond the capacities of generative grammars/computers. Furthermore, 
in much the same way that Godel's theorem grounds his Platonism, it also grounds theirs.
In very brief, their point is that the collection of sentences of a natural language, in view of 
the facts of co-ordination, is not given by any number, finite or transfinite. Natural languages, hence, 
exceed the capabilities of any generative grammar. Correlatively, most sentences of a natural language 
cannot be psychological entities, they exceed the capacity of a finite brain. Although Chomsky 
maintains that sets of sentences are not the direct objects of study (1986, pg. 34) (rather it is the I- 
language, a finite set of principles and parameters - possibly this reformulation is in response to their 
argument), the relation between the I-language and the sentences of a language becomes problematic 
because there simply can be no psychological relation between that I-language and most of the 
sentences of a language, i.e. those sentences, the vast majority, that are too big to have a mental 
representation.
For other arguments to the same effect, i.e. the nature of linguistic objects is incompatible 
with their having a psychological ontological status, see Katz and Postal (1991). These issues will be 
taken up again below (in chapter VI).
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28 One might wonder how a speaker hearer gets into some appropriate relation with these linguistic 
objects such as to have intuitions at all, let alone intuitions that are to be trusted, but we will gloss over 
the issue for the moment.
29 P. Carr (1990, pg. 54).
3  ^Arguably, this is why there is a comparative lack of interest in the ontological question: nothing 
practical hangs on it so one might as well ignore it. This should not be a source of comfort: the 
downside is that all that this suggests is that, quite literally, linguists do not properly know what they 
are talking about.
31 P. Carr (1990, pg. 36).
32 Ibid. pg. 35.
33 Ibid. pg. 45.
34 W. V. O. Quine, 1960.
The point, of course, is that there is no a priori metaphysical, as opposed to methodological, 
virtue in either richness or economy; the point is to get it right and that means having as many things 
in one's ontological catalogue as there are types of thing in die world, neither more nor less. This 
observation may be taken as a corrective to a common shibboleth-like invocation of Occam's Razor as 
some soit of metaphysical principle of maximal economy. This would be true only if there were 
grounds for believing the world to be designed on maximally economic lines. This could be the case, 
but it could only be shown to be so a posteriori. On the other hand, to suppose that it is the case is a 
species of Galileanism, the world being the creation of some perfect mathematician valuing elegance 
and economy above all else. A proper use of Occam's Razor is in respect of practicality and 
methodology in theoiy construction. Given some phenomenon to be explained, one constructs a 
theoiy that has as few explanatory constructs as are required to do the explanatory job, so avoiding 
redundancy, making fewer guesses and so making the theory easier to test. Then one tests it and it is 
the testing of the hypothesis, not its conforming to a methodology of hypothesis formation and 
theory development, that is the arbiter.
3^ W. V. O. Quine, from "On What There Is", in W. V. O. Quine (1961). Quine’s target is Meinong's 
universe of subsistent entities.
3^ P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (1983), cited in J. Barrow (1992, pg. 272).
32 J. Katz (1981, pgs. 201 ff). Katz' position here, and the problem he is in attempt to address, has 
more than a passing resemblance to Burton-Roberts' (1994) "representational conjecture". This 
resemblance, despite the tatter's avowed "cognitivism", is perhaps not too surprising as they are both 
trying to negotiate the same problem: that of how to preserve a realism vis-a-vis the standardly 
accepted object of study and get it to be related to actualizations of the linguistic in behaviours. We 
address Buiton-Robert's hypothesis in Chapter VI.
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3® The "may not" clause is to cater for the cases where our acceptability judgements are mistaken. It 
rather leaves the question begging as to how the linguist can know that they are mistaken.
j. a . Fodor, (1985, pg. 160).
40 "Representations" in a slightly Pickwickian sense in that they do not represent anything external 
to the representations; they represent themselves, as it were. Imagine a piece of non-figurative abstract 
art and the appropriate sense of "representation" that is pertinent to it.
4* Chomsky has himself suggested the similarity: "One could perhaps take the intuitionist view of 
mathematics as being not unlike the linguistic view of grammar." (1982, pg. 16). Where this analogy 
fails (between the Chomskyan conception of the linguistic and the intuitionisf s conception of the 
mathematical) is in the intuitionisfs emphasis on the construction process, its existence in time and its 
algorithms, the mathematical correlate of linguistic performance. We return to these issues in chapter 
VI.
49 The first being the practical restrictions on data mentioned previously; i.e. generativism's empirical 
strandedness.
43 J. A. Fodor (1983, pg. 9).
44 See K. Popper and J. Eccles, (1977, pgs. 16 ff. and 36 - 50). There are more than passing similarities 
with Frege's "three realms1' (G. Frege, 1967). Frege's classification is itself a symptom of his Platonism 
in respect of numbers, sets and propositions. It is interesting to note how the Fregean scheme works 
out in respect of the linguistic: amongst physical things are counted written or uttered sentences (i.e, 
tokens); in the second realm we have the mental "ideas" that accompany (process?) the tokens, and 
the third realm's denizens include the propositions (and, presumably, the syntactic structures) 
expressed or, perhaps more accurately, revealed: they are after all entities that exist always and 
already, independently of physical and mental events.
It is also interesting to note a curious parallel between the Fregean and Popperian trinities 
and that of mainstream cognitivism with its (after Marr (1982)) three levels of cognitive description: 
level one, the function computed (cf world/realm three), two, the algorithm, (the psychological 
construed as intermediary process) and three, the hardware (the physical).
Hersh (1998, pg. 220) reports that notions of autonomy of "levels of reality" and "emergent 
evolution" ar e not new and he points, as does Blitz (1992), to R. Sellars' Critical Realism (1916) as a 
precursor.
45 p p r0pei-ty 0f  a complex system is said to be 'emergent' just in case, although it arises out of the 
properties and relations characterizing its simpler constituents, it is neither predictable from, nor 
reducible to, these lower-level characteristics." (in T. Honderich (ed.), 1995, pg. 224). A putative and, I 
understand, not uncontroversial example is the transparency of water which, it is claimed, is not 
predictable from the properties of, and the laws relevant to, the hydrogen and oxygen atoms of which 
it is composed.
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^  IC Popper and J. Eccles (1977, pg. 16). Cited in Can-, (1991, pg. 40).
^  Ibid. pg. 16.
48 The phrase is Churchland's (P. M. Churchland, 1990, pg. 219).
49 S. Blackburn, (1994, pg. 368).
50 W. Bechtel, (1990, pg. 266).
Cl
As examples of categories that have undergone such reconfiguration and revision, Churchland and 
Sejnowski cite impetus, caloric, gene, neuron and electricity amongst others. (1990, pg. 229).
L. Wittgenstein, (1958, section 104).
^  P. Carr (1991, pg. 40).
Recall Dennetfs observation that citing "intuition'' is tittle other than admitting that we do not 
know what is going on.
^  P. Carr, opus cited, pg. 44.
^  The phrase is Pinkefs (1994, pg. 317). Compare with Ryle's phrase (he had in mind the innateness 
hypothesis, but the general point is the same) "clouds of biological glory."
^  See, for example, N. Chomsky, (1972, pg. 70 and 1995, pg. 386). I suspect that biologists, 
evolutionary theorists and brain scientists might object to this assumption as to who is getting it 
wrong and quite reasonably make the same charge only going in the contrary direction. One suspects 
that the argument is not readily decidable one way or the other (one can argue the toss all day) as 
regards the claims of the brain sciences, but it seems at least a bit rich to suggest that Darwinian 
evolutionary theory (which surely must rate as about as explanatorily successful as theories get) is 
flawed or irrelevant - ie. some other explanation is needed (see, Chomsky, 1972, pg. 98) - because it 
appears unable to give an account of how a competence grammar might have evolved.
^8 s. Pinker, (1994, pg. 333).
59 The former quotation is from N. Chomsky, (1972, pg. 70), the latter N. Chomsky, (1988, pg. 170 
and pg. 167), cited in D. Dennett, (1995, pg. 389) and S. Pinker (1994, pg. 355). It might be noted that 
much the same considerations in respect of the qualitatively different phenomenon of mind lead a 
recent Nobel prize-winning neurologist to propose that what has been going on is "supernatural 
spiritual creation" (J. Eccles, (Popper's co-author) 1989, pg. 287). It is not immediately obvious where 
the two approaches differ in respect of any hard explanatory content, all we have are different 
packagings for our ignorance.
For a discussion and rebuttal of Chomsky's agnosticism toward Darwinian evolutionary 
theory in respect of the human language faculty, see Dennett, (1995, pgs. 384 - 393) and Pinker, 
(1994, pgs. 354-364).
^  The phrase is Dennetfs (1995, pg. 391).
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^  For an argument for the relevance of a Darwinian account, see Pinker and Bloom, (1990). The by­
product idea is canvassed by Gould as "the evolutionary reading for Chomsky's theoiy" (S. Gould, 
1990, pg. 14).
67 N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 6).
63 Ibid.
It is amusing to note that a similar line was taken by the Pope with whom Galileo came into 
conflict. We are encouraged to take, on faith, the Church's teaching because "God could - and indeed 
may - have brought about the observed effects 'in many ways unthinkable to our minds'" (M. Hoskin, 
1997, pg. 133).
64 C. Hutton (1993, pg. 175).
67 The phrases are Dennett's (1981, pg. 13).
66 Z. Pylyshyn, (1991, pg. 239).
67 Chomsky (1986, pgs. 20 ff), in positing his distinction between E-languages and I-languages, 
makes a similar point, and takes this point as indicating the inability of an E-language approach to 
explicate any notion of internal structure.
68 For an elegant and concise summation of these issues, see S. Bromberger (1989, pgs. 58 - 62).
69 L. Bloomfield, (1928) cited in N. Chomsky, (1986).
70 N. Chomsky, (1975).
71 W. V. O. Quine (1960, pg. 34), cited in J. Katz, (1996).
77 Ibid., pg. 34.
73 J. A. Fodor, (1985, pg 159). Also compare Chomsky (1986, pg. 20).
74 This observation is owing to Burton-Roberts, (1994, pg. 188). See also A. Kasher (1972, pg. 331) 
who notes "tire difficulty for those who would like to maintain that sentences are series of smaller 
elements." One might come to think that a type-token distinction is more trouble than it is worth.
77 N. Burton-Roberts, ibid. It is to be noted that Burton-Roberts does not advocate such an 
elimination of type talk.
76 ib id , (pg. 189). Again this position is not one that Burton-Roberts is party to, rather it is a position 
that his paper attempts to counteract.
77 Recall Chomsky's contention (1980, pg. 11) that "substantial coverage ... is not a particularly 
significant result; ... [because it] is not very informative as to the correctness of the principles 
employed".
78 N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 34).
79 J. A. Fodor, (1985, pg. 152).
80 P. Carr, (1990, pg. 43). The standard answer is, of course, by way of the competence/performance 
distinction. As we illustrated previously (chapter I, section 4), perhaps this might be better termed a 
distinction between competence and a bottomless rag-bag of ad hoc manoeuvres.
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^  R. Montague (1970), cited in Gamut (1991, pg. 214). "On this point," Montague remarks, he 
"agree[s] with Chomsky and his associates." It is worth reminding ourselves that there is, to my 
knowledge at least, no a priori reason why this should be the case (except on the basis of some 
Galilean assumption).
^  This quantifying over abstract objects, i.e. the syntactic structures that are generated by a grammar, 
is a reflex of the "natural impulse" to a referential/denotative theoiy of meaning: in this case it is the 
strings/theorems of a calculus that are interpreted by a model, supposedly some aspect of the real 
world, as syntactic objects. We need such a model with its objects, apparently, if a grammar is not to 
be just the paper-written symbols of a formalist's nominalism.
Putting things this way gives us a purchase on the notion of notational variation: two 
grammars are notational variants where the same model, a set of syntactic objects, interprets both. 
They are not notational variants just in case that they require different models. The picture gets 
complicated somewhat if we take on board Putnam’s (1980, 1981 and 1989) argument (pm tat is 
mutandis) contra a model-theoretic semantics for natural language (and hence contra an autonomy 
of syntax from semantics thesis). This argument is to the purpose of showing, with a result 
reminiscent of Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis, that for any one formal system there are an 
indefinite number of models that can act as the interpretation of that system. Hie cogency of a realism 
depends on the model (what our notation is about) being existent independently of theoiy and also it 
being possible to answer the question, "which one?". Hie problem for a realism is that the question 
does not appear answerable. Moreover, Putnam reminds us that while some model is supposed to 
supply the meaning of the axioms (for our present purposes, supply the syntactic objects that are the 
syntactic "meaning" i.e. referents of the strings of the calculus,) that meaning is not something that 
comes with the model itself: models are simply sets of structured entities and, as such, meaningless. 
What this suggests is that they have to have their meaning imposed upon them. But then, do they 
exist independently, ie. really, of the calculus of which they are the model?: "Models are not lost 
noumenal waifs looking for someone to name them; they are constructions within our theory itself, 
and they have names from birth." (H. Putnam, 1980, pg. 482). In this respect our conceptual 
spectacles tend to structure not only how, and what, we see in the world, but they also invent it.
^  For an account, see Hogben, (1989, pgs. 243 fif).
^  This observation is made by Hutton, (C. Hutton, 1993, pg. 174).
^  Z. Pylyshyn, (1991, pg. 234).
o r
An example in the natural sciences is the theory of relativity in comparison with the Newtonian 
account in respect of the problem of two particles moving under the influence of an arbitrary central 
force. "The elegance and generality of the classical solution ... is a delight. Relativity, though 
undoubtedly the more accurate theory, has nothing comparable to offer." (M. McCausland, 1997).
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Nature's refusal to conform to canons of simplicity is particularly prevalent in biology: 
Wolpert remarks, in review of Brenner (1998), that "often in the history of molecular biology neither 
the simplest nor the most elegant theory turned out to be right."
Recall that if there are no tmth-issues involved in the choice between two extensionally equivalent 
grammars, then for those grammars, their differences, their distinct internal economies of 
information, or if you like, their intensional aspects, have only an instrumental status; for example, 
there is no choice, except in terms of some criterion of economy or elegance, to be made between any 
two grammars which achieve equivalent coverage of some fragment, e.g. let's say between a GB and a 
HPSG account.
88 J. A. Fodor, (1985, pg 159).
89 N. Chomsky, (1986, pg. 33).
N. Chomsky, (1972, pg. 169).
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CHAPTER IV.
ONTOLOGIES FOR THE LINGUISTIC II:
PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM.
1.0 Introduction.
An explicit mentalism constitutes the third strand of Chomsky’s revolution (the 
first and second, it will be recalled, being the mathematization of linguistics and the 
taking on of a scientific realism). In coming to focus on this mentalist strand, a strand 
we are to argue is unachieved, it is useful to keep in mind the basis of Chomsky's 
psychological claim, i.e. how psychological reality gets to be claimed for a linguist's 
grammar. The answer, in short, at least Chomsky's answer, is to assert that not only 
does a grammar characterize, on certain axes, the products of linguistic behaviour, but 
that a grammar is itself mentally represented, and it is in virtue of having a mentally 
represented grammar (an "MRG"), (as well as the relevant processing mechanisms), 
that we possess a language ability. The MRG is putatively involved in the aetiology of 
linguistic behaviour. It is, for example, the resource which is applied to in making 
judgements of acceptability, and it is, in standard parsing accounts, the knowledge 
resource to which the parser has access in the processing of strings. Moreover, in 
order to account for the facts of acquisition, language variation (within parameters 
that define a similarity) and linguistic creativity, the only apparently available option is 
to invoke some innate property of the mind/brain: a universal grammar that, given 
primary linguistic data, will output a grammar of the speaker-hearer of a language. 
The grammar does not just characterize, providing merely a constitutive account, but 
it also gives a sort-of-causal/reductionist explanation by virtue of relating properties of 
the linguistic to the psychological substrate, and this by way of the central theoretical 
construct, the MRG. In brief, the grammar-, the characterization of the laws of the 
domain, is identified as (part of) the literally causal and reductionist explanation. The 
mental representation hypothesis is what supplies the psychological realism - it is how 
the linguist's grammar gets to be predicated as corresponding to an internal structure 
of the mind/brain.
These remarks rehearse the distinction we drew earlier between reductive and 
constitutive explanations. In the latter case, the terms and relations of the 
mathematical apparatus which articulates the explanation, as in Kepler's theory, are
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not themselves required to be quantified over.1 What are to be quantified over are all 
and only the linguistic objects, the set of sentences, picked out by a grammar. As long 
as the right set of such objects is picked out, then the apparatus that achieves this is in 
the same position as Kepler's laws of planetary motion: the particular economy of 
information of the notation is not significant; there may be neater formulations, but no 
truth issues hang on the choice of formulation as long as those formulations get it 
right, as it were, extensionally. In the case of an explanation that is reductionist/causal, 
where a MRG is postulated, then the economy of information of the calculus is 
significant, at least at some specified level of discrimination; it is something that is 
supposed to be in correspondence with "some determinate complex of neural 
mechanisms".2r This complex constitutes the facts of the matter beyond the problem 
of getting an extensionally accurate grammar, i.e. a grammar that simply achieves an 
efficient characterization: it is a matter of getting it right, where getting it right means 
formulating a grammar that corresponds to the mentally realized I-language, and so 
reflecting the economy of information of that I-language.3 Interpreting the theoiy in 
this way, (there are, as we shall see, other readings), the data and their interpretation, 
i.e. the methodology and criteria adduced, need to be up to the task of fixing the 
content of the I-language to allow for a decision between competing claims for that 
content. Chomsky's contention in respect of E-language (Platonist/autonomist) 
approaches is that this 'getting it right' (i.e. going beyond a characterization of the set 
of sentences of a language) only makes sense in terms of a psychological instantiation 
of the linguistic: an explanation that addresses the question "why" as well as "what" is 
only to be achieved through a linguistics conducted from the perspective of 
"individual psychology."
The question we are to pursue is that of whether a competence grammar can 
be so upgraded from a characterizing vehicle (in answer to the question "what?") to 
being the central causal explanatory construct (in answer to the question "why?"); a 
mark of such success being whether there is any discernible difference in substantiated 
content between a linguistics conducted from an E-language perspective and one 
conducted from an I-language perspective. To anticipate our conclusion, and to 
indicate the direction we are to go in the following, our answer is that there is not. To 
put the point succinctly: the "abstraction" and "idealization" that Chomsky claims a 
requirement for enquiry effectively blurs the putative determinacy of the putative facts 
of the matter, the upshot being an account that is indistinguishable in substantiated 
content from an autonomist's/Platonist's constitutive and non-explanatory account.
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1.1 Lines of enquiry: data and criteria of identity for theoretical constructs.
The distinction between causal/reductionist and constitutive types of 
explanation parallels the two ontological interpretations of the linguistic that we have 
canvassed: mentalism and autonomisin/Platonism. One symptom of the difference 
between these positions is the opposing views taken on the question of the 
commensurability of the linguistic with the psychological. The ontological controversy 
correlates with the question of the nature of the scientific enquiry and type of 
explanation that is proper to linguistics. This difference is reflected not merely in 
respect of the ontological status of the object of enquiry, but also in the range of 
predictions that follow from the vehicle, the formal calculus, which expresses the 
theoretical claims; and conversely, in the range of data that are pertinent to the fixing 
of the content of a mentally realized competence grammar: for a linguistics 
undertaken from a psychological perspective there is no room for a restriction on the 
data to only speaker/hearer's intuitions. An upshot of the Chomskyan position is that 
there is a prediction of the relevance of data other than intuitions. The promise here is 
that such data may relate the linguistic to other domains: there is a prediction of the 
commensurability of the linguistic with the psychological.
The extent to which this prediction is borne out will be a mark of the extent to 
which a psychological realist construal of a linguistic theoiy is warranted and also the 
extent to which an I-language approach is contentfully distinguishable from an E- 
language approach. One of the marks of this availability of data will be that it will 
allow for decision between competing claims for the content of the MRG. 
Alternatively, one might require that other and appropriate criteria are adduced for 
decision between such claims, which criteria are appropriate in the sense of providing 
warrant for a psychological realism as regards the theoiy and its constructs.
The above remarks indicate one line of enquiry to be followed regarding the 
content, the economy of information, of proposed grammars. In brief, they take up 
the question of the realism of linguistic objects at a level more fine-grained than that 
of the set of sentences generated by a grammar, it is the question of how a decision is 
to be made between extensional equivalents. That there are appropriate means is a 
requirement for a psychological linguistics that posits a MRG, which MRG is a 
determinate structure and about which there are, putatively, determinate facts of the 
matter in respect of its economy of information. If there are determinate facts of the 
matter, then this latter claim can only be shown to be substantiated if these facts are, 
in principle, determinable. Ability to provide warranted content for a MRG is a
141
Psychological Realism
condition on substantiating the MRG hypothesis. The point is Quinean: if there is a 
determinate entity, then there are, or should be available, criteria of identity for that 
entity.
A second line of enquiry, not entirely separable from the former, and an issue 
which constitutes an unusual bone of consensus amongst philosophers of mind is the 
one raised by taking a grammar, a characterization of linguistic phenomena, as a 
causal explanation:4 not only do acceptable strings of a language conform to the 
grammar, but the reason why they conform to the grammar is because the grammar is 
mentally represented and that MRG "provides the basis for actual use of language by 
a speaker-hearer."5r The essence of the philosophers' misgivings is that it is one thing 
to devise a gr ammar that accurately characterizes the sentences of a language, it is 
another to show that that grammar is causally related to the various forms of linguistic 
behaviour:
The claim that the agent is acting on rules involves 
more than simply the claim that the rules describe his 
behavior and predict future behavior. Additional 
evidence is required to show that they are rules the 
agent is actually following, and not mere hypotheses or 
generalizations that correctly describe his behavior; 
there must be some independent reason for supposing 
that the rules are functioning causally.61'
To neglect such independent reasons would be to illicitly offer a constitutive account 
as a causal/reductionist account.
An egregious and revealing example of how this distinction is conflated is 
provided by Berwick's remarks regarding the nature of the explanation provided by a 
level one/competence theory of the visual system (Ullman's "rigidity assumption"7r):
Suppose we take [the rigidity assumption] as the "best 
explanation" we have of how people compute the 
structure of an object viewing successive snapshots of it 
in motion. Then we can ask whether the Rigidity 
Principle is "used". Evidently, the answer is yes, even 
though we have no idea what its realization might be.
Note that 110 one supposes that the Rigidity Principle is 
literally inscribed in the brain. Presumably, there is 
some physical basis for the Rigidity Principle itself, 
where the Rigidity Principle is not literally expressed.
But this does not detract from the Rigidity Principle
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idealization, which successfully explains the operation 
of the visual system. The visual system apparently acts 
as if it used the Rigidity Principle.8r
The confusion here is over whether the principle is an account of "how people 
compute ... structure” or whether it is an account of what is computed. In sliding over 
and conflating the substantive distinction, the upshot is a case of taking an account of 
what is computed (which it properly is) and trying to smuggle it through as a causal 
account of how it is computed. A first bone of contention is that there is nothing at all 
"evident" about the Rigidity Principle being used (if we are taking "used" in some 
reasonably strict sense). Simply because behaviour conforms to the principle does not 
confer causal properties on it. (If the claim is that it is used, then is this not a claim 
that the principle is involved in the aetiology of the behaviour, and hence corresponds 
to some causal, mind/brain internal facts?) It is only "evident" if we are taking "used" 
in some unreasonably loose sense, a sense in which we might be willing to say, for 
example, that projectiles "use" the laws of classical mechanics. The second problem is 
that there is a world of difference between something being "evidently used", with a 
concomitant commitment to corresponding causal mind/brain internal structures, and 
it being the case that it is "as if it [is] used"; things that are claimed to be only "as if' 
are no more than fictions and fictions do not correspond to any real and causal 
entities. So we are left posing the question of what is the manner of the relation 
between the individual subject and the level one competence theoiy; just what type of 
explanation does a competence theory provide? Is it fictionally causal or realty causal, 
and, if the latter, can we distinguish this claim from the former? Is it the case that it 
offers a characterization of behaviour in the way a Keplerian account of planetary 
motion sets out the laws which the planets obey, or does it also, at least in part, 
account for why the behaviour conforms to the "laws", and do this by a commitment 
to the internal representation of those "laws"?
It will be recalled that Kepler's account of planetaiy motion makes use of a 
mathematical vehicle, some set of formulae, which correctly characterizes that motion, 
stating its laws. The Newtonian explanation for that motion, a statement of why those 
laws are as they are, is provided by a further account of the nature of the stuff of 
which the planets are made. One may, as a fagon de parler, take an intentional stance 
and say, as one does, that the planets obey Keplers' laws. However, these laws, qua 
some mathematical formalism, do not exist in nature, they are, if you like, mind stuff 
about nature; in nature you will find only the behaviour that conforms to those laws, 
you will not find, perhaps as some sort of inscription, the laws themselves.9
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(Notice how it is precisely as some, despite Berwick’s remarks, not veiy 
metaphorical inscription, as mentally represented grammars, that linguistic laws get, 
on a common interpretation of the Chomskyan scheme, to be themselves real, that is 
as corresponding to determinate neuro-physical structures with intentional content. 
The linguist's calculus, construed as an initially content-neutral, formal and 
instrumental means to model the phenomena and to articulate linguistic laws, has the 
status of representans, a representational construct, an ahstractum. By way of the 
mental representation hypothesis it is reconstrued as representatum, a theoretical 
magnitude, an ittaium. What we get is a literal expression of the Galilean assumption 
of the world as calculus writ large, and a correlative conflation of the conceptual 
apparatus that institutes discourse with the object to be figured by that discourse. The 
calculus is no longer in a modelling relation, as in the Keplerian case, rather a calculus 
is itself the object of study.)
Only fancifully, and by collapsing the distinction between the statement of the 
laws and the explanation of why those laws are as they are, might one say that the 
laws of gravity are referred to by massy bodies. These laws do not, however, provide 
the causal basis for actual movement by planetary bodies as a kind of knowledge 
resource or in the way a program is causally implicated in the behaviour of a 
computer. In the case of linguistics, what is needed are reasons and evidence to show 
that "attributing knowledge of a grammar is more plausible than attributing knowledge 
of the laws of physics to a projectile whose behaviour they predict. "10r It is, of course, 
more plausible for the reason that language users are, standardly, the sorts of things 
that have minds, and minds are the sorts of things that possess knowledge. (The 
sceptic might equally say that it is more plausible by virtue of the fact that our 
ignorance about minds is such that there is very little that can be ruled out as 
obviously implausible.)
Plausibility, however, is one thing, good evidence is another and it is such that 
is needed to ground the claim that there are MRGs corresponding to real structures of 
the mind/brain. Furthermore, the plausibility becomes less marked when we consider 
the operations of a well-understood artefact such as an electronic calculator. It 
performs mathematical functions analogous to the linguistic function of mapping from 
an input signal to a structured linguistic representation. However, it is not the case that 
the calculator "knows" any mathematics in any usefully precise sense. There is no 
representation of mathematical knowledge, the mathematical functions it performs are 
what it does, not of what it has an internal representation.11 In short, it is not an 
obviousness that to explain a cognitive ability one needs to posit an internal
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representation, it is, however, how one gets to quantify over, i.e. to be mind/brain- 
intemally psychologically realist about, the terms and relations of one's calculus. Of
course, one may make such a hypothesis, but it is something for which proper
evidence is required. We will argue that the strongest evidence that is adduced is that 
the mental representation hypothesis provides an apparently best explanation (in 
Harman's sense12r), but a best explanation that warrants no more than an "as if '13 and 
so instrumentalist construal.
Chomsky's explanatory strategy is in keeping with the cognitivist paradigm in 
the brain sciences in general (or, perhaps, this is best the other way round: the 
Chomskyan manoeuvre is, historically, the model for cognitivism14r):
A typical strategy in cognitive science has been to try to 
discover complex patterns such as those found in 
perception or language and then to postulate 
combinations of mental representations that will explain 
the pattern in the appropriate way. ... Epistemically, the
existence of the patterns is taken as evidence for the
existence of the representations. Causally, the existence 
of the representations is supposed to explain the 
existence of the patterns.15r
The positing of mental representations is the means by which to go beyond positivism 
(and Platonism/autonomism for that matter16) and so beyond a positivist linguistics, a 
linguistics that Chomsky has remarked would be no more than a science of meter 
readings:
We as post-behaviourists know that explanations of 
behavior must advert to internal processes and we 
know of no other way of characterizing those processes 
except in terms of mentally represented rules.171'
Much the same is expressed by Fodor: "Take the notion of mental representation 
away from linguistic meta-theory and you get positivism by subtraction. "18r In brief, 
the psychological claim is made on the back of a notion of mental representation and 
if this notion can be shown to be either lacking in cogency, or individual claims to be 
lacking in identifiable content, then the psychological status of the linguistic is 
unachieved. However, it is at least questionable whether the sine qua non for a 
psychological linguistics is this notion of mental representation, as if it were the only 
possible way the linguistic could be predicated of the mind/brain. (The only way we
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can presently think of need not be the bound of possibilities, perhaps we need to be 
cleverer.)
The philosophers have provided arguments to the effect that indeed the notion 
of mental representation lacks the requisite cogency. Two arguments are those of 
Quine and of Searle.19r
2*0 Sceptical Representations.
2.1 Quine and mental representation.
Quine's argument focuses on the problematic scientific credentials of entities 
that are to be individuated in terms of their putative intensional properties, i.e. the set 
of rules (or parameters and constraints) that have propositional content, which content 
equates with one's putative knowledge of language. The problem is induced by the 
invocation of intensional properties such that the task for the linguist is to discover the 
correct set of rules, the mark of the correctness being that they correspond to the 
intensional properties of postulated mentally represented rules. This requirement, 
Quine argues, constitutes "an added burden" on the "grammarian" and, moreover, an 
added burden that cannot be earned through.201' The argument is, in essence, a re­
working for syntax of his argument for the radical indeterminacy of translation.211'
Quine's point is that the hypothesis of a MRG has content if and only if it is 
possible to distinguish between competing proposals for the contents of the postulated 
MRG. This appears to require that these theoretical constructs are to be individuated 
in respect of then intensional properties. According to Quine such individuation is 
simply not possible (for the same reasons and in like manner that we cannot tell what 
the native "has in mind" when he says "gavagai"; maybe he means "rabbit" maybe he 
means "temporal stage of rabbit" or "undetached rabbit part" or any some such). 
Consequently, precisely because of the inability to choose between hypotheses in 
respect of their intensions, their economy of information, MRGs are not allowable 
scientific constructs, they are "entia non grata". On the grounds of "no entity without 
identity" we are encouraged to conclude that a MRG is no entity at all. And so, it 
would seem, with the disappearance of MRGs also disappears the possibility of a 
mentalist linguistics, at least to the extent that a mentalist linguistics cannot do without 
(cannot, to coin a phrase, get real without) predicating the mental representation of its
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vehicle for articulating theory, i.e. by way of a notion of mentally represented rules 
individuated in respect of their intensional properties.
This argument is not, however, as has been pointed out severally,22r conclusive 
when it is taken as supplying a priori grounds for the inadmissibility of MRGs. In 
effect it is trying to stipulate in advance of science what will and will not be a viable 
scientific entity, it tries to exclude mentally represented grammars from inclusion in 
any future science rather like the apocryphal argument based on the best and soundest 
of first principles that showed, conclusively, that there can be seven and only seven 
planets in the solar system a little while before the discovery of the eighth.23r Indeed, 
in a more recent work Quine offers an implicit retraction of the strength of his original 
position: instead of entities, which are individuated by their intensional properties, 
being, on a priori grounds, indeterminate, rather the indeterminacy generating 
strictures are simply "traits of the science of our day [which] might well change as 
science advances".24
The central point that is rehearsed in the literature contra Quine's argument is 
that what that argument refers to is no more than common-or-garden 
underdeterminacy of a theory by the data. Nor is it the case that positing a MRG 
makes this underdeterminacy necessarily any more virulent than is standard in the 
natural sciences:
For there can certainly be empirical evidence in favour 
of attributing to a speaker one underlying causal 
structure rather than another; ... [this because] as 
Chomsky often stresses ... there is no a priori limit to 
the kinds of evidence that might be relevant.251'
However, Quine's retraction and these observations do not vitiate Quine's 
point entirely. It is here that doubts about the cogency of the mental representation 
hypothesis merge with the issues raised above in respect of adducing the content of 
grammars such that there are appropriate means available to allow for a decision 
between competing grammars. We might also notice that we are also rehearsing Carr's 
reasons for disallowing a psychological ontological status for the linguistic and our 
own remarks about the lack of theory-external "observability" of theoretical 
constructs.
In principle, we ar e assured, there are all manner of types of evidence that 
might be relevant (standardly the list includes evidence from neurophysiology, 
acquisition, pathology and psycholinguistics), the problem is that, in practice, none of
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these evidential types appear to get used in disconfirmation of grammars (we will be 
concerned with further substantiating this claim below). But if this is the case, and the 
MRG hypothesis is stranded from disconfirmation by these ’'relevant" data, then the 
evidential base is indistinguishable from that of Platonism/autonomism: the 
psychologism of the Chomskyan enterprise would be little more than an empty 
addendum leaving the relation of the linguistic to the psychological fairly well "a 
dangling, inexplicable, metaphysical fact" in much the same way as Can’s negotiation 
of the ’’fact" of interaction between the individual and the linguistic. This goes through 
unless an assumption is made that there must be a mentally represented competence 
grammar that is the psychological, mind/brain-intemal reason why the natural 
linguistic is as it is.
While there is a sense in which there is indeed likely to be some predictively 
accurate grammar that achieves coverage (surely everything has an accurate 
description), the achievement of this is distinct from showing that any such grammar 
or some extensional equivalent has, in fact, a causal and explanatory role. In other 
words, one cannot conflate achieving coverage with achieving a psychological 
explanation of the linguistic, one still has to show the causal role of the competence 
grammar, which is, as we noted, just what the philosophers point out. If it is the case 
that the fixing of the content of the postulated MRG is stranded from the types of 
evidence alluded to (which evidence would be a mark of the commensurability of the 
linguistic with putatively related domains and potential evidence of the causal role of 
the MRG), then it is necessary that whatever other criteria are adduced are sufficient 
and proper to the task; we will need "clarification of [these] criteria."261
This is where we return to Quine’s argument but divest it of its a priorism: 
while there is nothing scientifically illicit about hypothesizing a MRG, if it is the case 
that there are insufficient means for fixing the content of a MRG (for only what is real 
is determinate and only what is real can have a causal role), then there appear to be 
several options. One, Chomsky’s, is to preserve the hypothesis, license the abstraction 
of the discourse as being above any instantiating mechanisms and at the same time 
invoke some promissory brain-science to paper over the gap. Alternatively, one might 
go the direction, which is Carr's, of suggesting that there is no such available means 
because the nature of the linguistic is not to be explicated in psychological tenns: the 
linguistic is not a psychological and mind-internal reality.
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2.2 Searle and mental representation.
Searle's objections (directed at cognitivism in general) focus on the putatively 
ineliininably unconscious nature of knowledge of a grammar by individuals, what he 
refers to as the "unconscious intentionally" of linguistic rules. There are certain 
similarities with Quine's argument: Quine considers intensionally individuated entities 
to be slippery theoretic constructs, Searle unconscious intentional states. However, 
while Quine argues from considerations of criteria of identity for meanings, Searle 
argues, primarily, from a conceptual analysis of (un)consciousness by way of the 
notion of intentionality. The conclusion reached is that:
The notion of an unconscious mental state implies 
accessibility to consciousness. We have no notion of 
the unconscious except as that which is potentially 
conscious.27r
He argues that the mark of an intentional state is that it has a certain "aspectual shape" 
(by which he means, more or less, a certain intension: a state may be about some 
object but it is always about that object "from a certain point of view" ). This aspectual 
shape is only determinate from the perspective of the conscious agent and not from 
any third-person perspective. Moreover, (and this is where he goes the same direction 
as Quine, and where he can be challenged on the same grounds as Quine, i.e. 
stipulating in advance what is possible to science), "110 amount of neurophysiological 
facts under neurophysiological description constitute aspectual facts."281' However, 
"the ontology of unconscious mental states, at the time they are unconscious, consists 
entirely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena."291' The upshot is 
that states which are putatively always inaccessible to consciousness, e.g. the rules of a 
MRG, never have any aspectual shape, there is always and only a neurophysiological 
description possible, hence no description nor explanation in terms of the linguist's 
rules where those rules, i.e. intentional states, are posited to be causal of behaviour. 
The only sense to be made of unconscious intentional states is where those states are 
possible conscious states. If we want a cause of certain behaviour, then the strategy of 
invoking intensionally individuated and tacit mental representations is not a cogent 
option.
Notice that Searle's position does not take us back to a Platonism/autonomism 
for the linguistic, rather, on the one hand, it takes us toward viewing "explanations" in 
terms of MRGs as fictions and so, to the extent that such explanations are truth-
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bearing by virtue of their making correct predictions, the constructs invoked requir e 
an instrumentalist, "as if ' construal. On the other hand, it leads toward asking for a 
neurophysiological (and so an eliminative reductionist) explanation of the linguistic 
and one which excises all realist talk about mentally represented rules.30
One might, or might not, be impressed by Searle's argument as constituting an 
a priori dismissal of mental representations of tacit knowledge. A reason why one 
might not, even if one can find no obvious flaws, is, as in the Quinean case, that such 
argumentation depends, if it is to be irrefutable, on the unrevisability of the concepts 
whose analysis provides the premises that take one to the conclusion. As already 
remarked, one aspect of the scientific enterprise is that it "may reconfigure our current 
assumptions"31*’ and our current concepts. The point, indeed a Quinean point, is that:
Philosophers don't get to tell you what counts as [a] 
permissible scientific construct, ... What determines 
which constructs are permissible ... is: how the world 
turns out to be. We will find out whether we can make 
sense of'mental representation’ as we go along?1
Taking this on board, the line to be taken will be to examine the extent to 
which the mental representation hypothesis, by achieving corroborated content, 
achieves an explanation and so makes sense of the concept. We might, however, also 
take Searle's argument (as well as Quine's) as making a prediction that this will be 
unachieved. It will be unachieved, i.e. we will be unwarranted in construing the 
grammar as mind/brain-intemally real, if the content of the postulated MRG cannot 
be fixed, or if we cannot adduce evidence for the causal role of a MRG in linguistic 
behaviour. On both counts such failur e would bring to question the reality of a MRG. 
(Notice that this is distinct from bringing to question the notion of mental 
representation in general: the point is not so much that there is no mental 
representation as that some particular system is not mentally represented.)
3.0 To what is a grammar to correspond?
Central to Chomsky's claim that a linguist's grammar is psychologically real is 
the assertion that a grammar is "correct insofar as it corresponds to the internally 
represented grammar."3317 In this way the task is to explicate the nature of the mind- 
intemally represented linguistic knowledge, the 1-language, which constitutes what one
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knows when one knows a language. A problem here, and what amounts to bringing to 
question the mind-intemality of the psychological claim, is that there is a studied, and 
purportedly principled, vagueness about exactly what is required by getting one's 
grammar to "correspond":
Exactly what is meant by the notion "corresponds" in 
the case of the abstract study of a physical system is a 
complex question, not unique to this enterprise.
The statements of a grammar are ... about structures of
the brain formulated at a certain level of abstraction 
from mechanisms.34r
("Mechanisms" here referring, presumably, to the neural structures that instantiate the 
linguistic information.) This vagueness, brought in by way of the "abstraction" of the 
enterprise, (and which, for George, gives rise to "confusion"351) has led to claims that 
Chomsky's position is "ontologically indeterminate", on the grounds that this 
abstraction constitutes a contact breaking move hum any contentful notion of the 
psychological, where this is construed as concerned with mind-internal states.361- What 
the invocation of "abstraction" arguably and suspiciously achieves is the ability to 
maintain the hypothesis of a grammar as mind-internal and causal while, at the same 
time, the "abstraction" of the description distances the thesis from any evidence (and 
justifies the lack of evidence) as to the mind-internal, causal role of the grammar.
There are two related ways in which one can figure this issue. Firstly, in terms 
of an ambiguity in the notion of "knowledge". In asking that a linguistic theory 
correspond to knowledge of language are we asking for an account of what is known 
by a speaker of a language, (i.e. the object of knowledge considered independently of
any knowing subject,) or to the knowing, by the individual, of that knowledge?
Knowledge is one of the propositional attitudes. To know x is to be in a psychological 
state that relates an individual to x. One might be tempted to take it that this is 
sufficient to ground the psychological (mind-intemal) ontological status of x, where, 
for instance, some linguistic knowledge is the value of this variable. However, while 
the knowing is psychological, the object of knowledge need not have a psychological 
locus, as is standardly the interpretation of mathematical objects, or, indeed, of real 
world objects in general. The incompatibility of properties of the object of knowledge 
(e.g. its infinitude in both the case of mathematics and linguistics) with its being 
accorded a psychological ontology is one of the weapons in Katz' armory as to why
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the two sides of the ambiguity cannot be conflated, and as to why the linguistic qua 
object of knowledge, the proper concern of the linguist, is distinct of the 
psychogrammar which is the contingent, psychological basis for the relation between 
an individual and that object.37
Alternatively, one might understand the vagueness in terms of a distinction 
between the rules of a grammar being implicitly or explicitly represented; in this case 
the vagueness infects the notion of representation:
[Chomsky’s] writings have not acknowledged the 
distinction between the rules in a system being 
explicitly encoded, and a system merely implicitly 
conforming to rules - i.e. behaving as if it were 
following rules even though the behavior may arise 
from unspecified causes.381-
The same point, is made by Stabler in terms of the rules being "encoded" in the 
manner in which a computer program directs the running of a computer and, on the 
other hand, being "hard-wired”, somewhat in the manner that a calculator performs 
mathematical functions without any explicit representation of the mathematical 
"rules”.39r
The issue brings to light a certain tension in Chomsky’s position, a tension that 
parallels the move from linguistics construed as a characterizing enterprise to 
linguistics taken as providing a psychologically (mind-intemally) real account; it is a 
question regarding the reality of the constmcts of the theoiy, of the correspondence of 
the terms and relations of a calculus to some real and mind/brain-internal entities.
It is possible, in Chomsky's writings, to find passages, some of which appear
to support one reading and some the alternative. For example, that Chomsky is
positing the explicit representation of rules is the most accessible interpretation of the 
following assertions:
The grammar is mentally represented and used [like a 
computer program is used?] in the exercise of linguistic 
abilities such as understanding speech and making 
grammaticality judgements.401
[A grammar is a device that] assigns to each expression 
a structure, which we may take to be a set of
representations, one on each linguistic level, where a
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linguistic level is a particular system of mental 
representation.4^
On the other hand (my italics):
A generative grammar attempts to characterize in the 
most neutral possible terms the knowledge of the 
language that provides the basis for actual use of 
language by a speaker-hearer 42r
The grammar, in whatever form its principles are 
represented in the mind or brain, simply characterizes 
the properties of sentences, much as the principles of 
arithmetic determine the properties of numbers,431-
The tension here marks a substantive issue concerning the nature of the 
explanation attempted and, correlatively, the existential commitment of a theory.
When representation is taken in an implicit sense, the economy of information 
of a grammar has the same instrumental status as predictively equivalent but 
notationally and "intensionally" distinct formulations of the laws of mechanics: as long 
as they make the same correct predictions there is no further truth-issue at stake. 
Similarly, in the case of a calculator, there may be different ways to express the 
functions computed, but there are no truth-issues involved in respect of these different 
formulations (compare with our remarks on choosing between grammars from the 
Platonist/autonomist perspective). Nor, however, in the case of the calculator, does 
the stating of the function supply any more than a characterization of the output of the 
machine: the characterization, the specification of the function computed, cannot, by 
itself, be taken as an explanation of the output: the cause remains unspecified.
Certainly, one might propose an explicit representational hypothesis, i.e. that 
the functions computed by a calculator are internally represented as a body of 
propositional/declarative knowledge, but, as it turns out, while this would be 
predictively successful, it would also be the wrong explanation. At least, it is the 
wrong explanation unless we are using "representation" in a sense so loose as to be 
more or less vacuous, and vacuous because it could not engender any useful
predictions as to the internal workings of the calculator. It is only in a somewhat "as
if ’, metaphorical ("abstract7"neutrar) sense that a calculator represents mathematical 
knowledge (in the same way that it is only "as if' a projectile consults the relevant
laws when it knows how to describe a parabola). If this is the sense intended by
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Chomsky, then Searle’s objections to the representational hypothesis are misplaced, 
because an "as if ' view of the intentionality of the system of rules does not constitute 
a commitment to represented tacit/unconscious knowledge.
However, this implicit sense of representation is inconsistent with other aspects 
of Chomsky's position. Chomsky’s claim that:
Substantial coverage of data is not a particularly 
significant result; it can be attained in many ways and 
the result is not very informative as to the correctness 
of the principles employed.4^
only make sense if there are facts of the matter at stake (i.e. certain truth-issues 
regarding what is mentally represented,) in respect of the choice between extensionally 
equivalent grammars. The same remark applies vis-a-vis the position that Chomsky 
takes in the debate contra Quine's doubts over the scientific credentials of theoretic 
constructs that are to be individuated in terms of their- intensional properties. 
Furthermore, the implicit construal of representation appears inconsistent with 
Chomsky's emphasis on providing criteria of adequacy in order to allow for decision 
between extensionally equivalent grammars; again this only makes sense if the claim is 
that there are determinate, representational facts of the matter that it is the task of a 
linguistic theory to explicate.
Somewhat bizarrely, ("bizarrely" because he takes it as "a positive note”,) 
Stabler remarks that the implicit/explicit issue is rather academic and by the by:
Even if the representational hypothesis were removed 
from current theories, very little of the substantial and 
interesting work that has been done in linguistics and 
psychology is going to topple as a result.45r
On a negative note, exactly the same coin, just the other side, this suggests that the 
representational hypothesis is, for both linguistics and psychology, empirically 
vacuous; something of an idle cog that gets you to claim linguistics to be one of the 
natural sciences, but which otherwise does not have any identifiable content. 
Furthermore, for the same reasons, the upshot would be that there would be no 
evident, contentful distinction between a psychologjstic and a Platonist/autonomous 
linguistics, because it is the representational hypothesis that gets you the psychological 
(mind-intemal) content: recall Fodor’s observation that to "take the notion of mental 
representation away from linguistic meta-theory [is to] get positivism by
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subtraction".46 In avoidance of this, the question for Chomsky is one of how much 
mileage one can get out of, and refuge one can take in, the notion of "abstraction 
from mechanisms" such as to allow the maintenance of the causal, explanatory and 
psychological claim without being able to provide any content for it.
To provisionally sum up: Chomsky's psychological realism, to be made good, 
requir es that the linguist’s grammar' corresponds to some psychological, mind-intemal 
state of affairs; to some psychological structure that represents, at some level of 
discrimination, the same informational content as that grammar. In short, the truth of 
the grammar-as-sort-of-causal-explanation hypothesis (as opposed to the grammar- 
taken as a constitutive, characterizing account) depends on the reality of mental 
representations. For this to be testable, (we are, of course, as scientists, committed not 
only to the attempt but to the possibility of discontinuation of our theories; this is why 
this is science and not pseudo-science) we need, firstly, some specification, sometime, 
of our- ontological commitments, in other words, a specification of how the terms and 
relations of a grammar map onto the internalized representation (i.e. what is 
theoretical magnitude, what representational construct), and, secondly, that competing 
claims can be decided between in respect of available data and/or appropriate criteria, 
and without engaging in the theory-internal hermeneutic circle which we described. If 
there really is a MRG, then there will be a set of determinate and determinable facts 
of the matter. That is why there are supposed to be truth-issues involved in respect of 
extensionally equivalent grammars. If, however, there are no such things as MRGs 
such as constitute the facts of the matter, then also disappear the supposed and 
correlative truth-issues. Nor, of course, does what is not the case provide data to allow 
for decision between competing theories. Decision between competing extensionally 
equivalent grammars (that are truth-bearing by way of making correct predictions over 
the external behaviours) would require, as we will see it is reduced to, resort to the 
type of theory-internal, methodological and non-truth-relevant considerations that are 
appropriate to the choice between different notations.
At first blush, it would seem there should be no need for such resort: given 
that MRGs are putatively psychological, the promise is of the realization of the 
repeatedly canvassed relevance of the brain sciences to the discontinuation of 
linguistic theories: "facts about the brain [could] select among theories ... that might 
be empirically indistinguishable in other terms. "47r The relevance of such facts being a 
mark of the commensurability of the linguistic with the psychological and a means to 
achieve a certain theoiy-extemality. Furthermore, one might be tempted to the view,
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given the putatively causal role of the grammar, that it more or less directly feeds into 
the operations of the performance mechanisms, i.e. the information of the grammar is 
more or less isomorphic with that of the parser. If such were the case, then 
psycholinguistic experiments would be appropriate to the task of (dis)-confirming the 
relation of correspondence between linguists' grammars and the MRG.
3.1 Choosing between grammars I: the (ir-f relevance of psycholinguistics.
The suggestion of the relevance of psycholinguistic data to the confirmation of 
grammars was made (first, to my knowledge,) by Miller and Chomsky:
The psychological plausibility of a transformational 
model of the language user would be strengthened, of 
course, if it could be shown that our performance on 
tasks requiring an appreciation of the structure of 
transformed sentences is some function of the nature, 
number, and complexity of the gr ammatical operations 
involved.481'
The result of this suggestion was the Derivational Theory of Complexity 
(DTC). In brief, the idea was that processing time should correlate with the number of 
transformations involved in the derivation of a sentence; passive interrogatives, for 
instance, being predicted to require greater processing time than the corresponding 
active affirmatives. Unfortunately, despite some initially promising findings, the theory 
got buried.49r
What was also buried was the direct relevance of psycholinguistic research in 
respect of the confirmation of linguists' grammars. The conclusion reached was that:
The human sentence processing mechanism does not 
make dir ect use of the rules of the mental grammar 
studied by linguists .... [Consequently,] we can leam 
nothing about the format of the mental gr ammar by 
studying language processing.50r
Rather than the evidence being taken as disconfirmatory of a transformational 
grammar, instead the evidence was taken as disconfirmatory of the null hypothesis 
(i.e. of the isomorphic relation between grammar and parser). It also gave rise to an 
explicit disclaimer from Chomsky:
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There is not the slightest justification for any such 
assumption [of an isomorphism between grammar and 
parser, and hence of the grammar as a performance 
model]. Such an assumption seems not only without 
justification but entirely counter to whatever vague 
notions one may have about the processes that underlie 
production.5 lr
This makes a lot of psycholinguists very unhappy (for it makes them rather peripheral 
to the main action) and some quite openly disbelieving: the complaint is that if, as 
claimed, "a reasonable model of language use will incorporate, as a basic component, 
the generative grammar that expresses the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of the 
language",521' then the competence grammar is used in performance. And, if it is used, 
then the study of performance cannot but be directly relevant to the task of adducing 
evidence. Consequently, on this reasoning, (which is Bresnan's and Kaplan’s:) "to the 
extent that there is evidence against the DTC, this can be taken as evidence against the 
psychological reality of transformational grammars."531' To assert the contrary is, 
according to Steinberg, to be guilty of "a psychological self-contradiction."541' In brief, 
the mark of the psychological reality of a grammar is just its observability in 
performance, its being accessible to psycholinguistic disconfirmation. This is a view 
that persists and gets rehearsed, to greater or lesser degrees, in the literature (e.g. 
Kintsch, (1974), Bresnan, Halle and Miller, (1978), Steinberg, (1993), and, a 
philosopher, Soames (1985)). Alternatively, to preserve the claimed relevance of 
psycholinguistic research to grammar- disconfirmation, it is necessary to insist that it is 
"plausible to reinstitute the methodological assumption that the mental grammar 
directly guides the parser’s behavior."551'
In the former case, (Steinberg's (et aVs) militant psycholinguists) the claim 
boils down to the assertion that if a linguistic hypothesis is not amenable to 
psycholinguistic research, then the hypothesis is not psychological. (And, of course, 
all is as it should be if the linguistic is autonomous of the mind, if linguistic objects 
are, for example, platonic objects.) This has, I suppose, a degree of prima facie 
reasonableness: a putatively psychological linguistics that is irrelevant to
psycholinguistics appears, at best, anomalous; for surely, if any brain sciences are to 
be relevant, psycholinguistics is the prime candidate.
However, such considerations should not immediately convince one of the 
irreducibility of competence theories to psychology, rather, the interpretation is 
plausibly that these considerations merely defer the achievement of psycholinguistic
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content. The reason being that this militancy need amount to little more than "the rage 
of Caliban at not seeing himself in the minor." It is a case of attempting to claim 
proprietary rights over what counts as psychological, as if the psychological status of a 
theory were dependent on it being a theory that is testable by the (let's face it) rather 
hit and miss techniques of cunent psycholinguistic experimentation.56 This militancy 
would only make sense if psycholinguistics were something approaching an achieved 
enquiry. Moreover, given that psycholinguistics, as presently conducted, is centrally 
concerned with processing, the implicit claim is that the psychological domain is 
defined as concerned exclusively with processes; a case of, in George's phrase, 
"process fetishism": if its not a process, its not psychological.57 The upshot is a species 
of positivism where the psychological domain is defined as being restricted to those 
phenomena that are accessible to cunent techniques ofverification and observation.58
The second problem with demands that psycholinguistics have a privileged 
role in the disconfirmation of competence theories is that it depends on the 
assumption of the null hypothesis, i.e. of their being some fairly direct relation 
(approaching isomorphism) between the competence grammar and the parser, that 
"the parser and the grammar are well-matched."59r Unfortunately, while there is:
a measure of informal agreement about what would be 
a more direct, or a less direct, way of putting a given
grammar to work ... [at the same time] there is no
precisely defined notion of a "direct" processing 
implementation of a given grammar.601
The difficulties that result from this imprecision are exacerbated by the fact that, even 
if there were a clear notion of direct use of a grammar by a parser, this would be of 
little use: Berwick points out®lr that should a parser be in a logically direct relation 
with the grammar this need not translate into psycholinguistic evidence (given cunent 
techniques) being relevant to disconfirming the competence theoiy, because the
temporal performance sequence need not correspond to the logical sequence of
operations in a derivation.
The disconfirmatoiy status of psycholinguistics vis-a-vis competence theories 
becomes yet more tenuous when we consider that the null hypothesis is itself 
somewhat lacking in motivation (other than that its the only way to obtain the 
disconfirmatory status of cunent psycholinguistics), for "there is no inherent reason 
why the parsing process must conespond directly to the form of the grammar."62 
Indeed, there are several, clearly defined, possible non-isomorphic relations between
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grammars and then parsers, none of which can be immediately excluded as 
psychologically implausible (see, for a catalogue, Abney (1988) and van de Koot 
(1990)).
The unavoidable and principled conclusion is that competence theories are 
distanced or deferred from disconfirmation by current psycholinguistics. However, 
despite these well-motivated grounds for putting some distance between linguistic 
theories and psycholinguistic confirmation, this is no particular reason to be sanguine 
about linguistic theories' psychologism. This is because the net result is that the 
discourse domain of competence theories is insulated from, and so unfalsifiable by, 
data from the very domains that are predicted to be and should be relevant. 
Reasoning, no matter how cogent, to the conclusion of the unfalsifiability of 
theoretical (and ontological) claims in respect of some evidential domain is at best a 
pyrrhic victory: not so much a solution but a problem. The problem is that, 
apparently, the only data that are, in practice, pertinent to the development, the fixing 
of content and the testing of competence theories are speakers' judgements of 
acceptability. But, as Chomsky notes:
It seems absurd to restrict linguistics to the study of 
introspective judgements [for such would be to] reduce 
the field to problem solving .... That is, perhaps, the 
natural definition if you abandon any [psychological] 
realist conception of the field.63r
The question that arises, is how it is possible, in the face of this empirical 
strandedness from psychology, to maintain the psychological ontological status of the 
linguistic? One answer is to point to the comparative lack of development of the 
appropriate brain sciences, and so, by implication, to invoke some promissory 
neuroscience. An alternative is to invoke a psychology that is not defined in terms of 
an exclusive concern with mental processes, one which is justificatory of the level of 
abstraction above mechanism that is deemed appropriate.
While it is perfectly cogent to point to the differing levels of development of 
linguistics and the brain sciences as grounds for their’ present incommensurability, one 
may be less happy about the slant given; it is one which seems designed to maintain 
the aforementioned insulation of competence theories from disconfirmation. 
Competence theories, it appears, set the task for the neurosciences but not vice versa: 
"results obtained at this [competence] level provide a guide for the study of 
mechanisms" :64r
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It is the task of psycholinguistics to develop processing 
theoiy along lines that will be comparable to linguistics.
When such theories become available, then and only 
then can serious connections be made between 
psychology and linguistics - only at this level of 
abstraction will any significant convergences be 
discovered.65r
Note that the onus is not on linguistics to specify the relation between competence and 
the instantiating mechanisms (''mechanisms” being ambiguous between the 
representing "neural structures" and the performance device), rather the onus is on 
some future psycholinguistics or psychology to show how the competence theory qua 
MRG gets realized.
But what sense of ''psychological" is this for which a promissoiy psychology is 
obliged, on the basis of some sort of necessity, to make good the mental 
representation hypothesis? One or the other (or, as it turns out, both) of two options 
can be taken: on the one hand, one can exchange a deferred and promissoiy 
psychology for a never-never psychology; on the other, one can invoke a sense of the 
psychological to parallel the canvassed abstractness of the correspondence between 
the linguist's grammar and the putatively mental object that it describes, one which is 
abstracted above causal and instantiating structures.
The advantage of the former strategy is that it allows one to deal with the 
discomfort of having to maintain a realism over the constructs of a theoiy that are 
unavailable to any disconfirmation by the supposedly relevant adjacent domains. It is a 
manner in which to negotiate unfalsifiability (by evidence from these domains) with 
impunity. The way to making this sound respectable is to invoke, as we discussed 
earlier, some notion of "epistemic boundedness" (or "cognitive closure”), i.e. there 
may be some phenomena that we are intellectually and cognitively unequipped to 
account for, some phenomena are simply beyond our capacities to understand and 
explicate. A prime candidate being the instantiation of a grammar by neuro- 
physiological structures. In effect, it is a way to explain away the anomaly of a 
psychological linguistics that is incommensurable with the rest of psychology and the 
brain sciences: the anomalousness, by virtue of being reasoned, is not really 
anomalousness after all. Taking this line gets Chomsky to cite, a little surprisingly, 
perhaps, Wittgenstein (that noted mentalist) with approval:
It is ... perfectly possible that certain psychological 
phenomena cannot be investigated [neuro-]
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physiologically because nothing [neuro-] physiological 
corresponds to them.66
The problem with this line is that there is something more than a little disquieting 
about a theoretical position that depends in part, for the maintenance of a realist claim, 
on invoking this idea of epistemic boundedness where it is used to justify an inability 
to adduce potentially disconfirming data. It is also the case that much the same lack of 
correspondence would result if it were simply the case that there were no such 
psychological entity as a competence grammar (which is, I suspect, a little closer to 
what Wittgenstein's views on the matter would have been).
The second strategy is to justify the practical unavailability of data other than 
speaker judgements on the grounds of the abstraction of the level of discourse "above 
mechanisms" that is deemed appropriate. And it is appropriate because our present 
ignorance of the nature of the mind/brain precludes the theorist from usefully 
proposing any more concrete hypotheses regarding the relation between competence 
grammars and performance, on the one hand, and competence grammars and their 
manner of realization on the other. In other words, the relations between competence 
and instantiating neural structures, and between competence and performance are left 
as blanks (compare Fodor's observation of "enthymemic explanation" in cognitive 
science).
The misgiving over the taking of this line is that it is not immediately obvious 
how this abstraction over the putative causal, instantiating mechanisms is to be 
contentfully distinguished from no more (and, of course, no less) than an abstract 
characterization of the patterns evidenced in behaviour. The abstraction appears to 
constitute a contact breaking move from other, supposedly relevant, domains of 
discourse, making the theory's constructs both "ontologically indeterminate" and 
insulated from data in adjacent fields.67 Indeed, is there not something altogether 
rather suspicious about a move that allows just such insulation. Even more 
suspiciously and to our point, such insulation is precisely the mark of a domain that is 
ineliminably autonomous and ontologically discrete. What we get, again, is the 
"dangling, inexplicable, metaphysical fact" of the relation between the linguistic and 
the psychological, exactly recapitulating Can's autonomist account (or lack of 
account) of the "fact" of interaction between the individual and the linguistic. If we 
want some firm content to this fact, and content to the psychological ontological claim 
for the constructs of the linguist's theoiy, then this abstraction appears to constitute an 
institutionalized obstacle, blurring any film criteria of identity for a theory's constructs.
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In sum, given Chomsky's claim that there is a relation of correspondence 
between the linguist's competence theoiy and the postulated internally represented 
grammar, then there is a requirement on a theoiy to address the question of this 
relation. And this because we need to know not only if there is a competence 
grammar (i.e. an accurate characterization of linguistic knowledge), but whether a 
competence grammar, a body of propositional knowledge that is mentally represented 
is indeed properly in causal (as opposed to constitutive) explanation of the nature of 
natural languages. The way towards this is through some firming up of the abstraction 
of the discourse by specifying how, at least at the level of the economy of 
information, the competence grammar, the knowledge of language, is realized. In 
other words, what is to be addressed is the question of "the realization relation" 
between the grammar and an individual psychology.681- For if the theoiy, the claim, is 
being pitched at the level of individual psychology, then only:
so long as the claim itself is well-defined and has truth 
conditions for its being true [at this level], [does] it 
remain a perfectly sound scientific proposition.691-
If there are determinate mind/brain internal facts of the matter concerning a MRG, 
and if a theoiy that postulates an MRG is to be testable as a thesis of the mind- 
internal, constructive basis of the nature of natural language, then such a theoiy's level 
of discourse has to be pitched at a level appropriate to what is being claimed. 
Peacocke's "Informational Criterion"701- is an attempt to elucidate what that level is 
such that a theoiy meeting the criterion would be contentfully a theoiy with a claim to 
psychological reality.
3.2 Feacocke, Marr. cognitivism and level 1.5.
Peacocke's position is interpretably a rehearsal, only rather more subtle and 
coined in cognitivist terms, of Bresnan's previously canvassed solution to the problem 
of choosing between extensionally equivalent grammars (i.e. the assumption of an 
isomorphic relation between grammar and parser). It might also be thought of as 
rather in the manner of a supplement, or alternative, to Chomsky's criteria of 
adequacy.71r
One way of presenting the problem that Peacocke addresses is in terms of the 
observation (the Quinean observation) that competence theories can be characterized
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in too many ways, this is what constitutes the difficulty for substantiating the claim to 
there being any relation of correspondence between a linguist's grammar and a 
determinate MRG, it is what constitutes the difficulty of a psychological realist 
construal of the terms of a linguist’s grammar: there are insufficient criteria of identity 
and without such we are disallowed from the postulation of a corresponding entity.
Before we consider Peacocke's proposal it will be useful to sketch out the 
relation between the Chomskyan and cognitivist paradigms.
The Chomskyan distinction between competence and performance, the former 
constituting a discrete and primary object of study, provides the model for Man's 
characterization of the "Natural Computational Framework". Marr identifies three 
levels of description relevant to theories of cognitive function: the first level, level one, 
specifies the function computed (correlating to a competence theory), level two 
identifies the algorithm which performs the computation (a parser), and level three the 
hardware realization (the neurophysiological structures).72 The presiding insight is that 
the mind may be understood in much the same way that we understand the 
functioning of a computer: cognition in general is seen as an instance of running a 
program that is instantiated in the mind/brain. Linguistic competence is then a matter 
of possessing the relevant program; what we have when we know a language is a 
computational system (quite explicitly so in the Minimalist program). The placing of 
linguistics within the more general cognitivist paradigm is endorsed by Chomsky for 
the two enterprises share:
the belief that certain aspects of the mind/brain can be 
usefully construed on the model of computational 
systems of rules that form and modify representations, 
and that are put to use in interpretation and action.73r
Parallel to the case in Chomskyan linguistics, the consensus is that the general 
task of providing an account of cognitive function is best pursued by taking the issue 
of the level one function as prior and distinct from a specification of the processing 
mechanisms. Marx remarks that: "Finding algorithms by which Chomsky's theoiy may 
be implemented is a completely different endeavour from formulating the theory 
itself."741* The rationale for this competence-first strategy being that it is only when we 
have a clear idea of what the cognitive function is that we will be able to usefully 
attempt an account of how it is computed. It is in the manner of a heuristic:
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The level of abstraction [,the level of the function 
computed,] is appropriate insofar as the results obtained 
at this level provide a guide for the study of 
mechanisms, much as study of chemical properties 
provides a guide for inquiiy into atomic theoiy.75
Significantly, the Man* hierarchy does not require that level one theories are 
mentally represented in any explicit sense, nor is the coherence of this hierarchy of 
description affected by this neutrality on the representational issue. However, what is 
affected by this neutrality is the nature of the explanation provided by a level one 
theoiy: the question is just what is a level one theoiy Hue of by virtue of its 
correspondence to (and predictive success in relation to,) the facts of the obseived 
behaviour? Need a predictively accurate level one theoiy be any other than an abstract 
characterization over the obseived behaviour for which there are no truth-issues 
involved in respect of extensionally equivalent formulations? If it need not, then it also 
need not be true in virtue of corresponding to a mentally represented cognitive 
resource that is "put to use in interpretation and action", but hue in virtue of being 
simply a characterization of the obseived patterns of external behaviour, the cause of 
which is, presumably, the (unknown) nature of the internal states of the mind/brain, 
but about which states nothing has been specified. This would amount to an 
explanation akin to a Keplerian account of planetary motion; it would constitute a 
statement of the laws that die behaviour obeys, but without furnishing any reasons as 
to why (nor how) the behaviour conforms to such a characterization. Such an account 
would be psychological in a mind-extemal/object-of-a-propositional-attitude sense, i.e. 
it is about the products of behaviour which, presumably, have some mind/brain 
internal cause, but, it does not invoke the sense of "psychological" where what is 
referred to are internal states of the mind/brain.
These are the issues that Peacocke addresses. His "Informational Criterion" 
reflects the contention that for a level one theory to be contentfully proposed as part 
of a mind/brain-internal, causal account, such that it can be distinguished from a 
characterization of the products of linguistic behaviour, it needs to firm up the truth- 
conditions as regards what would warrant the construal of a theoiy as causally 
involved in linguistic behaviour. These truth-conditions reflect the need to show a 
relation between a level one theory and mind/brain internal states. Coirelatively, the 
issue is one of whether the question of the realization relation, the relation between 
the different levels of description, needs to be addressed before claims to
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psychological realism (in the mind/brain-intemal sense) for a level one description are 
appropriate, for, as van de Koot, observes:
At least some relation between the three levels must 
obviously obtain if claims about the (psychological) 
reality of competence theories are to have any 
content.761'
Peacoclce argues, in line with our remarks above, that a level one theoiy 
"obliterate^] [is abstracted away from?] distinctions that correspond to 
psychologically real differences."771' There are psychological facts of the matter that 
are not captured at the level of the function computed and these facts are, Peacocke 
contends, crucial to the contentfulness of the claim to a theoiy’s psychological reality. 
The particular facts that Peacocke focuses on are those regarding the realization 
relation for competence theories, in particular the relation between the competence 
theoiy and the performance mechanisms, in other words, facts concerning "the 
information drawn upon by the relevant mechanisms or algorithms in [the] subject "78r 
These facts, the ones to be addressed, are neither specified by the level one function 
computed, nor are they specifying of any particular algorithm (although they specify 
an "an equivalence class of algorithms, namely, all those drawing on the same body of 
information"79r). This level of description is dubbed level 1.5 in terms of Man ’s 
scheme, and it is this level of description that is deemed appropriate: "the claim of 
psychological reality for a rule of grammar is a claim at level 1.5."80r
What this buys is "a form of causal explanation": the reason why linguistic 
behaviour exhibits the structures that it does is because the relevant mechanisms draw 
on this particular economy of information, it is this information that is used and the 
sense of "used" here is no "as if' sense. Peacocke’s proposal is an attempt to set the 
conditions on excising the "as if ’ from the explanation. What is being specified is the 
manner of the relation between the object of knowledge and the subject who 
evidences linguistic behaviour. In effect, what Peacocke is addressing is the problem, 
observed by Fodor, of "Neo-Cartesian", enthymemic explanations in cognitivism 
where precisely this relation is left unspecified; one waves one’s hands in the general 
direction of the performance mechanisms which "do for Chomsky some of what the 
pineal gland was supposed to do for Descartes".8lr
What is not clear in Peacocke's discussion is whether the Informational 
Criterion is to be taken as the sufficient and necessary condition on the psychological 
reality of a grammar. Is this the only relevant criterion? Furthermore, although it
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might be desirable, and in the long run a requirement, that a theoiy specifies its 
realization relation, is it necessary or, indeed, is it a mistake to try to provide such a 
criterion prior to empirical enquiiy?
In respect of the former of these questions, if the criterion is canvassed as 
being the single necessary condition on the psychological reality of a theoiy, then, as 
George points out, this merely reflects the previously remarked on illicit identification 
of psychology with mental processes; a case of "appropriating] the term 'psychology' 
for the study of a restricted subset of mental life," and assuming that "algorithmic 
processing [is] a touchstone for psychological existence. "82r But then, taking George's 
point on board, although we can blithely and reasonably get to call the level one 
description of cognitive function "psychological", what we get to call a study is really 
not the point. The point is the issue of the constructive role of the mind/brain in 
relation to cognitive function, and it is just this issue that a level one description does 
not directly address, even though it is, arguably, a necessaiy preliminary. It is even 
more the point when we recall Chomsky's bet that it is mind/brain internal states 
which are hypothesized as constructive of the nature of natural language: once we 
have a complete understanding of the brain sciences then "there is not the slightest 
reason to suppose that there are truths of language that would still escape our 
grasp. "83r
Even though George's observations are cogent they do not solve the problem, 
for the relation between the competence theoiy and the internal state of the 
mind/brain vis-a-vis processing mechanisms remains unspecified and without clear 
truth-conditions. As such the competence theoiy remains both explanatorily and 
ontologically dangling. The former because it is not shown to do any causal work, and 
the latter because without substantiating the relation between the competence theoiy 
and the performance mechanisms, for which it is standardly considered to be some 
sort of informational resource, it remains also unsubstantiated whether there is, in fact, 
any mind-intemal structure that corresponds to a competence grammar. The 
competence grammar is incommensurable with and insulated from other discourse 
domains. Tliis is, of course, the evidence that Can- adduces for his view that the 
linguistic is ontologically autonomous. In turning to the second of our questions (is it a 
mistake to tiy to provide criteria prior to empirical enquiiy?) and the manner of its 
negotiation, this upshot, this empirical strandedness, does not get excised, rather it is 
defused.
Interpretably, Peacocke's criterion, in requiring of a competence theory that it 
specifies how the information, at level one, feeds into the processing mechanisms,
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parallels Pylyshyn's requirement that: "the theoiy that accompanies the notation must 
tell us which aspects are intended to be empirically significant. "84r To put this into the 
terms of our previous discussion, the requirement is to specify what elements of the 
notation are to be taken as corresponding to real and, in principle, theory-extemally 
observable linguistic entities; what are the theoretical magnitudes, the posited illata, 
and what the representational constructs, the abstracta. Pylyshyn's complaint is that 
such a specification is not offered. In brief, Chomsky fails to address the question of 
the realization relation of a competence theoiy.
However, this is not simply negligence or an oversight, rather it is in 
recognition of the fact that any hypothesis as to the manner of the relation between an 
individual and a competence theoiy would be otiose given the present state of 
development of the brain sciences. It is this lack of development that justifies the 
"certain level of abstraction from mechanisms". We are encouraged to view linguistic 
enquiiy as not dissimilar to that of nineteenth century chemists into the properties of 
the combinability of different elements where it would have been unreasonable to 
demand of them that they also supply the sub-atomic theoiy that explicates the 
relation between the chemical property of valence and its instantiation in a chemical 
element.851’
Peacocke disputes the analogy.86r (He misses a trick, however, in not pointing 
out that the theories that the nineteenth century chemists came up with did not have to 
be hue, but only got to be confirmed, in mutually confirming retrospect, by sub­
atomic theoiy. Chomsky’s analogy is somewhat tendentious, change it and you get a 
rather different picture: why not consider the view of linguistic enquiiy as not 
dissimilar to that of eighteenth centuiy scientists into combustion and then think what 
happened to phlogiston? One does not get a warranted realism for the constructs of 
one’s theoretical domain by fiat, but only by some suitable corroboration.) The 
Informational Criterion, Peacocke insists, is not a requirement on linguists that they 
supply a neurological theoiy, rather it is a requirement on linguists that they specify 
just what economy of information is drawn on by the processing mechanisms, or, in 
more or less Pylyshyn's teims, a requirement that linguists specify what in the notation 
is algorithmically significant. Even though we have been led to dispute the insistence 
on algorithmic processes as the mark of the psychological, they are a mark of the 
psychological, (i.e. members of the set of psychological phenomena: if the 
psychological constitutes a nomological domain, algorithmic cognitive processes fall 
within that domain), and the general point remains: the brain sciences, even if they are 
only promissoiy, need to be told, some time, just what it is that they might be in the
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business of discontinuing vis-a-vis algorithmic processing. The misgiving is that an 
inability to state (or a deferral of the statement of) what amounts to the truth- 
conditions for a theoiy (the criteria of identity for the theoiy's constructs) is 
compatible with there not being anything in fact to which the theory corresponds vis- 
a-vis a mind/brain internal structure. The problem with this deferral, on the grounds 
given, is that it makes the (dis)-confhmation of the theoiy depend on a promissoiy 
psychology/neuroscience. And the problem with such a science is that it is 
indistinguishable from a fictional one. Conversely, if confirmation of the psychological 
reality of competence theories qua psychological entities requires a 
promissoiy/fictional science, then does this not also confer a no more than fictional 
status on mentally represented competence theories?
3.3 Choosing between grammars II: realism a la Dr. Pangloss.
The observation of the insulation of competence theories from 
psycholinguistic disconfirmation provokes, because it can not remove, the suspicion 
that their putative mind internal, causal role may be no more than "as if', no more 
than an instrumental, psychological fiction; fictions, of course, being somewhat 
resistant to empirical confirmation. However, this fictionality need not infect the 
notion of a competence grammar per se. Either one can maintain the psychological 
claim by providing further psychologically appropriate criteria or one needs a 
different, non-mentalist ontological interpretation; one can maintain a realism, just 
drop the psychologism.87 This is, I take it, more or less Carr's position, and which 
position he takes for fairly well the same reasons as discussed here. His autonomism is 
existentially committed to linguistic objects which are taken to be abstract, mind- 
extemal and mind-independent. In sum, what we have is an E-language approach.
As remarked previously, where an E-language perspective is taken, where the 
object of study is a set of sentences:
the linguist is free to select the grammar one way or 
another as long as it correctly identifies the E-language.
Apart from this consideration, questions of truth and 
falsity do not arise.88r
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By implication, from the I-language perspective there are truth-issues involved in 
respect of a decision between extensionally equivalent grammars. This constitutes a 
substantive distinction between the two conceptions of the linguistic, a distinction that 
affects the role of the formal systems that articulate linguistic theories. For the E- 
linguist, the calculus need only be interpreted in respect of the objects it picks out, i.e. 
the set of sentences that are generated (assuming a generative grammar). The 
differences between grammars that generate the same set of sentences are of no 
account in respect of truth. A grammar can be regarded as a more or less efficient 
instrument employed to the purpose of generating all and only the sentences of a 
language. The theorist's existential commitment need extend no further than 
quantifying over this set of sentences. This is in contradistinction to the I-linguist for 
whom there are determinate facts of the matter in respect of a grammar's economy of 
information.
As was remarked in chapter m, in the case of E-language approaches, while 
questions of truth and falsity do not enter into the choice between extensionally 
equivalent grammars, this does not remove the desirability of effecting a choice 
between competing, extensionally equivalent grammars. However, in this case the 
relevant criteria are concerned with issues of practicality, simplicity and economy. 
Whereas the truth concerns of an E-language perspective do not extend beyond 
attaining coverage, the I-linguist is concerned with "the correctness of the principles 
employed" and is so because, putatively, there are mind-intemal facts of the matter to 
which the linguist's grammar is to correspond. Ostensibly, a methodology that would 
be appropriate to an E-language perspective needs to be supplemented by further 
criteria such as are relevant to the task of ascertaining the economy of information that 
is mind-intemally represented, i.e. relevant to the empirical task of fixing the content 
of the mental representation. To this end Chomsky has proposed a series of 
increasingly stringent levels of adequacy. Grammars are required to meet the most 
stringent of these levels in order to warrant the appellation "psychologically real".
The minimal requirement is that a grammar be "obseivationally adequate".891" 
An observationally adequate grammar decides (and/or predicts) for any putative 
sentence its inclusion in, or exclusion from, the set of sentences constituting the 
language. A grammar meets this criterion of adequacy just in case all and only the 
members of the set of sentences of a language can be predicted/decided to be 
members of that set. Alternatively, one may think of an obseivationally adequate 
grammar as a function which enumerates the members of the set of sentences of a 
language. As we have obseived, observational adequacy is sufficient to a linguistic
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theoiy that (to conflate the Chomsky 1964 with that of 1986) takes E-language as its 
object of study. In fulfilling this project there need be no psychological (in the mind- 
internal sense of the term) interpretation of the grammar.
A psychological interpretation, on the other hand, requires that grammars are 
"descriptively adequate", that is that tire grammar provides structural descriptions of 
strings that account for the intuitions that speaker-hearers of a language have about 
those strings. The example Chomsky gives is of ambiguous strings.901" The distinction 
he is making is between a grammar that simply characterizes a string as well-formed, 
with no regard to any internal structure, and a grammar that gives a structural 
description of the string (in the case of ambiguity, structural descriptions) which 
structural description accounts for and corresponds to the available intuitions a subject 
may have about that string, in this case the two (or more) available readings.
As remarked already, if one grammar meets this criterion, then there will be an 
indefinitely large set of other extensionally equivalent grammars that also meet it. To 
allow for discrimination between members of that set Chomsky proposes a further 
level of adequacy, which he dubs that of explanatory adequacy.911' A grammar is 
explanatorily adequate when it allows a reasoned choice of one descriptively adequate 
grammar over another "on the basis of an empirical hypothesis concerning the innate 
predisposition of the child to develop a certain kind of theoiy to deal with the 
evidence presented to him"92r (my italics). The claim here is that given the paucity of 
primary linguistic data and the rapidity with which language is acquired, then this is to 
be explained by a rich, innate, grammatical endowment which constitutes a template 
for the grammar that is to be acquired. This template ("Universal Grammar" or "UG") 
constrains the hypotheses of the child (viewed as a type of unconscious linguist) in the 
face of the data that he/she receives as input. In respect of the child, the initial state of 
the UG constrains the type of hypotheses possible. In respect of the linguist, 
competing hypotheses are decided between on the basis of an "evaluation metric" 
which selects for the simplest hypothesis; "simplest" being defined in relation to the 
economy of information of the initial state of the template. The UG provides the 
principles and the child, on the basis of the data available, chooses between the 
possible settings of the parameters of these principles: given the data, given the 
principles, the grammar selected for is the simplest. This process is, mutatis mutandis, 
essentially what the linguist recapitulates in attempting to discover the mentally 
represented grammar.
The model that is set up is that of a maximal relation between the UG and the 
final state of the system such that the UG is sufficiently restrictive so as to allow for
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the similarities between natural languages while it is also sufficiently permissive as to 
allow for the differences. The UG is also required to be sufficiently richly specified so 
as to explain the speed of first language acquisition: more or less explicitly, the 
standard line is that this process is so rapid that the bridging of the gap between UG 
and the final state will require the minimum amount of work: UG contains the 
principles, it is simply the switch settings which need to be set. In short, there is a 
maximally economic relation between UG and the grammars of natural languages.
The crux of the observation to be made here is that it is not obvious to what, if 
any, extent these levels of adequacy are distinct in content from the application of 
purely methodological, non-empirical criteria of simplicity and economy, i.e. precisely 
the same criteria that the E-linguist has recourse to, but which, in the E-language case 
are invoked for no more than pragmatic, non-truth-relevant, instrumental reasons. 
Hutton observes the same: ’’Lacking external criteria for verification, Chomsky opted 
for simplicity as the criterion of explanatory adequacy.”931' This is problematic. 
Simplicity is a perfectly proper methodological criterion: it allows one to constrain 
hypotheses and, all things being equal, one prefers the more parsimonious theory 
because it makes the fewer commitments and so fewer guesses; it is easier to test. But, 
then one tests it in respect of how the world, external to the theory and its method of 
construction, in fact turns out to be: the ability to construct a maximally economic 
theory is not itself the test of the theory's truth. Simplicity is, quite simply, not a truth­
relevant criterion, not unless one assumes that the world, or the bit of the world one is 
interested in, is designed on maximally simple lines or, as is equivalent, that the Deity's 
method of world construction and His conceptual apparatus parallels one’s own 
method of theory construction and the conceptualization in which it is figured - a 
distinctly Galilean assumption, hr brief, to identify:
simplicity as a marker for truth ... makes sense only if 
one believes that nature is simple, and will appear so 
through the filter of theory and language.94r
Yet, it is precisely as a marker for truth, as a criterion for a realism, that the set of 
levels of adequacy is canvassed.
These criteria are intended for the purpose of winnowing down the number of 
extensionally equivalent gr ammars such that the grammar selected has the best claims 
to correspond to the economy of information of the postulated MRG (i.e. correspond
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to, that is, to be true of the putatively mind/brain-internal facts of the matter). Lacking 
the external criteria that would test the answerability of hypotheses to how the 
mind/brain turns out to be, this procedure only makes sense if purely methodological 
and theory-internal considerations can be taken to be sufficient to the making of a 
truth claim. Such considerations are sufficient only on the assumption that the 
mind/brain, an evolved and contingent structure (contingent for, presumably, it could 
have turned out otherwise, e.g. more or less complex), nevertheless evidences not just 
some certain simplicity in design, but a simplicity that is capturable in, and 
commensurable with, the language, the conceptual apparatus, that is used for 
expression of theoiy.
As Chomsky reminds us simplicity is relative to particular theories, it is not an 
absolute. The assumption that theory-internal and methodological considerations may 
serve as directly truth-relevant leads to the transposition of those considerations and 
the correlative projection of the terms of the conceptual apparatus (Wittgenstein's 
"spectacles") that articulates theoiy, and in respect of which apparatus simplicity is 
defined, onto the world as, in the former case, real principles and, in the latter case, 
real objects. But the warrant for their reality is only as good as the warrant for the 
making of the assumption and, as Katz points out, there is no reason to exclude the 
possibility that "the human mind is so constructed that its representations of 
grammatical knowledge use more theoretical apparatus than is necessary".95 If this is 
so, then parsimony cannot, on the mentalist construal of the linguistic, be a relevant 
criterion to decide between theories in respect of their correspondence to any 
psychological facts of the matter.
The outcome is a study that becomes "not a 'direct' study of the domain itself, 
but rather a study of [the conceptual apparatus that articulates] our knowledge of 
it."961 Moreover, what one might predict to be the upshot of the making of this 
assumption, (which, insofar as it is unwarranted, results in no more than "a heuristic 
hocus-pocus"971') is, in fact, what one gets: a theoiy, Minimalism, which, when 
construed in a realist light, predicates of the mind/brain a language faculty that 
evidences a certain "perfection" in design and which conforms to "virtual conceptual 
necessity".981- This is just what one would expect where a theory's construction, 
lacking theoiy-extemal criteria, applies to theory-internal considerations and is run off 
the conceptualization that is applied to the task of figuring the phenomenon.
Oddly enough, it is just the lack of interest in external validation (duplicated, in 
the Chomskyan case, by lack of availability of such criteria), with a correlative lack of 
interest in the way the world, as opposed to our concepts, happens to be that is the
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stick which Chomsky uses to beat the Platonists. Even more oddly, even the phrase is 
the same:
attempts to capture those properties of language that 
are logically or conceptually necessary [is no more 
than] an enquiiy into the concept 'language'.
[Furthermore, this enquiry is] unlikely to prove more 
interesting than an enquiiy into the concept 'vision' or 
'locomotion'.99r
While it is the case that this is not what the Chomskyan psychologistic project 
was in attempt of, that the result is a theoiy that posits conceptual necessity might 
suggest that, in substance, there is nothing to distinguish the mentalist and the 
Platonist/autonomist perspectives, which is to say that the psychological facts of the 
matter that answer to Minimalism's perfections are indistinguishable from fictions. In 
brief, there are grounds to suspect that a theoiy that concludes in conceptual necessity 
is unlikely to prove more than a skeuomorph, or, as Chomsky has it:
a kind of artefact, a result of our methods of 
investigation and theoiy construction, not properties of 
the real object of the real world that we are 
investigating.100r
These non-empirical considerations aside, what we also get from a theoiy that 
predicates "perfection" of an evolved, biological system is "a problem, possibly even a 
mysteiy", for one is led to ask "why language should be so different from other 
biological systems."1011' Chomsky takes linguistics to be, ultimately, a branch of 
biology. Consequently, Minimalism is, supposedly, making a substantive biological 
claim. The difficulty is that, although at last finding some theory-external 
considerations in respect of a domain that is claimed to be relevant, what those 
considerations tend towards is the refutation of a theoiy that predicates "perfection" of 
a biological system, for, as Chomsky himself remarks, evolved, biological systems are 
typically not like this at all.
However, perhaps this perfection is indeed the case, perhaps Minimalism's 
conclusions constitute a problem for biology and not for linguistics. For, after all, 
what we are in account of are similarly theory-(#w« calcuius)-extemal considerations, 
i.e. the facts of language acquisition. Amongst these facts, and what we are 
encouraged to be impressed by, is the speed of first language acquisition. It is this fact 
that suggests the need for a maximally economic relation between UG and the final
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state grammar and so the taking of simplicity as a truth-relevant, as opposed to merely 
a methodological, criterion.
Chomsky more or less recapitulates this point in remarking that the Minimalist 
Program is the culmination of an attempt to resolve the tension between the task of 
achieving a descriptively adequate grammar' and that of attaining explanatory 
adequacy:
[The] central objective [of the research program] was 
to abstract general principles from the complex rule 
systems devised for particular languages. ... Steps in 
this direction reduce the range of language-specific 
constraints, thus contributing to explanatory adequacy.
They also tend to yield simpler and more natural 
theories, laying the groundwork for an eventual 
minimalist approach.1021
And what makes truth-relevant sense of this "abstraction of general principles" is the 
fact of the speed of first language acquisition. A fact that is wheeled out as a standard 
platitude in innumerable textbooks. To remind ourselves: within a period of 
approximately three years an infant moves from virtually zero ability, in production at 
least, to more or less a complete command of the structural diversity of the language 
and, barting pathological cases, this ease of acquisition is universal, seemingly being 
uncorrelated with any other possibly relevant factors such as IQ. So, the argument 
goes, this ability must requir e a phenomenal speed and efficiency on behalf of the 
language faculty.
But, what precisely do we mean by "speed" here, and "speed" relative to what 
and to what that is relevant? In raising the rhetorical question it is difficult to think of 
even a rhetorical reply. If we grant that talking of speed is not entirely vacuous, then 
we need to ask whether this speed is maximal, as fast as it possibly could be. The 
trouble is that it is not clear at all what we could mean by maximal speed, and nor 
what possible circumstances, if we make the claim, could falsify it. Indeed, it is much 
easier to concoct arguments to the effect that language acquisition is not as fast as it 
could be in some possible world. For instance, it is well-known that children over­
generalize their- "hypotheses" and stubbornly persist in them despite plenty of 
discontinuing evidence that, it seems, it takes them time to assimilate. One could 
reasonably say that this is disconfirmatory of the claim that acquisition is maximally 
fast. The rejoinder might be that, given the mechanisms that are involved, which 
mechanisms are as fast as they are, then acquisition is as fast as it could be. But this is
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just saying that acquisition is as fast, and as slow, as, in fact, it is, no more and no less. 
To persist with the claim that acquisition is maximally fast appears to require a 
distinctly Panglossian frame of mind: acquisition is maximally fast because this is the 
fastest (and simplest) of all possible worlds. And this is the route that is taken: one 
opts for simplicity as a quasi-metaphysical principle', simplicity as a marker for truth. 
There is, however, simply no warrant for this. Of course, there is the need for such a 
principle in lieu of external criteria, for otherwise one’s psychological realist claims for 
one's theoiy would be embarrassed by the complete inability to distinguish between 
competing, extensionally equivalent grammars. This brings us back to the Quinean 
stricture: for theoretical constructs that one cannot truth-relevantly tell the difference 
between, one cannot contentfully claim there to be any (I-language) facts of the 
matter to which the constructs answer. What we also appear to get is corroboration of 
die interpretation of Quine's (and Searle's) arguments as non-a priori and predictive 
of the failure to achieve such content.
Once one takes the "fact” of the speed of acquisition away, it appears that 
there are no other facts to which the perfection of the linguistic system answers. 
Indeed, we are left with only the counter-facts provided by evolutionary biology: 
predicating perfection of an evolved system, as we canvassed earlier, constitutes a 
virtual reductio ad absurdum of the biological credentials of the theory that makes the 
claim. Quite simply, evolved systems are, for the most part, rather messy and are so 
by virtue of being evolved. They do not evidence the work of a creator with a design 
award in mind, nor do they provide examples of maximal design efficiency. 
Physiological, and presumably psychological, structures and faculties are arrived at, 
we are told, through a blind process of chance mutations, for the most part false 
starts, which get selected for on the basis of the advantages they provide for the 
organism. The whole business is not conducted on the basis of an end in view, 
consequently the successful organisms that populate the world cany with them a 
record of the false starts and changes in direction. That is why we have redundant and 
non-optimal body parts, tonsils and appendices and the like. This is also presumably 
why, according to Wolpert, that "often in the history of biology neither the simplest 
nor the most elegant theoiy [has] turned out to be right.”1031' Moreover, simple 
systems are economical systems with coirespondingly minimum waste, redundant 
effort and superfluity. The trouble with such systems is that they crash at the slightest 
provocation; damage to one element and the whole becomes unusable. This does not 
seem to be the case with evolved systems for the simple reason that such fragility 
would leave the organism open to the possibility that the slightest damage would result
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in the loss of the relevant function. In this respect, a certain redundancy in design is a 
distinct advantage for the organism, allowing it to function even when partially 
damaged. This appears to be the case with the human language faculty: severe lesions 
are rarely so severe as to result in the total collapse of the system. Furthermore, the 
common recovery of full, or nearly full, functioning indicates that the mind/brain is 
capable of a considerable degree of plasticity through re-dedication of brain areas 
from one function to another.1041-
In this light, it seems that Chomsky was indeed correct to point out that 
Minimalism’s conclusions constitute a problem, the problem is that it appears to refute 
itself as a theory of a psychological and biological system. At this point there are, 
logically, two options: something is wrong somewhere and it is either in the biological 
sciences or in linguistics. Chomsky opts for the former.
One str ategy Chomsky takes, as we have previously noted (chapter ID, 4.4), is 
to cast doubt on the relevance of evolutionary accounts in respect of the human 
language faculty and so strand, by stipulation (and self-serving necessity), linguistic 
theory from such (dis)-confirming evidence:
It is perfectly safe to attribute this development [of 
mind-intemal, innate knowledge of language] to 
"natural selection", so long as we realize that there is no 
substance to this assertion, that it amounts to nothing 
more than a belief that there is some naturalistic 
explanation for these phenomena.105r
An alternative tack is to play the ball resolutely into the biologists side of the 
court and suggest that there must be something wrong with biology such that it has 
lamentably failed to uncover certain underlying principles that organize biological 
systems and if the biologists would only get cleverer all would be well.106 Either that 
or invoke "epistemic boundedness" and put the issue in the box marked "mysteries” - 
that’s what you put in, what you get out is irrefutability.
One might wonder what warrants Chomsky in his confidence that the 
problems raised are, indeed, problems for the other sciences. The answer, it seems, is 
the productivity in the explanations afforded, what we have referred to as "heuristic 
fertility’’. The trouble with this is that the maintenance of a realism towards the 
linguist's conclusions infects the enterprise with considerable heuristic ^fertility: it 
does not so much explain as mystify. For, do we not need some account as to why the 
linguistic faculty should be so uniquely and anomalously special as to be outside of an
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evolutionary explanation? And is it not at least of questionable rationality to maintain a 
position that depends on either the incorrectness of theories in other domains (which 
theories have some firm foundation and their own explanatory success), and/or on 
some unique anomaly?
In general terms, what is going on here is that, as we have had cause to 
emphasize, Chomsky's reductionist psychologist project claims the relevance of 
evidence from adjacent domains of study. This is what makes the reductionist 
psychologism cogent. When such evidence is disconfirmatory, where it is available at 
all, then, on the grounds of the explanatory success of the linguistic theoiy, one gets to 
insist the problem lies in the apparently disconfirmatory evidence, or in the fields 
which, if they would only get themselves properly developed, would furnish proper, 
corroborating evidence; as if a criterion of their success were their having to confirm 
linguistic theoiy, and as if it is this latter which must (on the basis of some, have we 
not agreed, illegitimate notion of conceptual necessity?) be right. What results is the 
present failure to give any content to one's reductionist psychological claims and, 
correlatively, something that looks remarkably like unfalsifiability from the perspective 
of these supposedly evidentially relevant domains.
The problem that the criterion of explanatory adequacy was designed to 
address was that of winnowing down the number of extensionally equivalent 
grammars and winnowing them down in respect of empirical truth. What might have 
warranted simplicity as a truth-relevant criterion was the "speed" of acquisition. Once 
this "fact" is undermined, then also undermined is the truth-relevance of choosing 
between grammars in respect of their comparative simplicity. The upshot is that all 
grammars that are extensional equivalents of the most constrained theoty are equally 
heuristically fertile. There are grounds to select between them, but the only available 
grounds are considerations that are relevant to the assessment of grammars qua 
systems of notation, i.e. as instruments that are more or less efficient, or elegant, or 
admit of greater ease of use. Exchanging one grammar for an extensional equivalent 
raises no truth issues. But, where there are no truth issues, then neither are there facts 
of the matter. At least, what is lacking are proper and available criteria of identity for 
the postulated MRG, and, to mix philosophers (like one mixes metaphors), whereof 
we cannot adduce criteria of identity, thereof we cannot credit existence.
This outcome is somewhat paradoxical: Chomsky's psychological realism "led 
to the choice of system-internal (or notation-internal) measures as criteria for 
distinguishing [between hypotheses]. [Psychological] realism led in effect to a
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heuristic hocus-pocus. "107r The paradox derives from the tensions that result from the 
inability to show the correspondence with some mind internal state of affairs on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the insistence that such a mind internal state of affairs is 
causally explanatorily powerful. The inability to show any very direct correspondence 
between the particular economy of information of the most constrained grammar and 
that putatively instantiated in a MRG results in an inability to validate the mind- 
internal, psychological and so causal explanatory status of a competence grammar. 
Without such validation, a competence grammar has no substantiated psychological 
locus, it is, at optimistic best, temporarily autonomous of the psychological.
The paradox dissolves once one drops the psychologism with its correlative 
commitments to a MRG and construal of the object of study as I-language. What we 
then get is a position broadly in line with Caffs autonomism (and/or Katz' Platonism). 
The inability to adduce any facts of the matter in respect of any differences between 
extensionally equivalent grammars only undermines the psychological reality of the 
grammar, not the reality of the set of sentences a grammar it is in account of. What 
we also get is a constitutive explanation, which is to say, what we do not get, and are 
seemingly precluded from, is an explanation of the relation between the linguistic and 
individual speakers.
What is so unappealing about an autonomism/Platonism is just this anomalous 
inability to furnish an explanation, this together with the justification for this inability 
only through recourse to further mysteries. Such considerations provide a motive to 
avoid going this direction. Perhaps we can still breathe some life into Chomsky’s 
reductionist psychologism.
4.0 Inference to the best explanation.
The way towards maintaining a psychological ontology for the linguistic, and 
the way that, interpretably, Chomsky encourages us to take, is indicated by pointing to 
the explanatory power of the mental representation hypothesis as separable (justified 
by the necessaiy "abstraction" of the enquiry) from any particular content; it is the 
best and only explanation on offer and, invoking Harman’s notion of the inference to 
the best explanation, this fact constitutes grounds for its acceptance:
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Suppose that our most successful mode of explanation 
and description attributes to Jones an initial and attained 
state including rules ... and explains Jones' behavior in 
these terms; that is, the rules form a central part of the 
best account of his use and understanding of language 
and are directly and crucially invoked in explaining it in 
the best theoiy vve can devise. ... I cannot see that 
anything is involved in attributing causal efficacy to 
rules beyond the claim that these rules are constituent 
elements of the states postulated in an explanatory 
theoiy of behavior and enter into our best account of 
his behavior.1081
Furthermore, (Chomsky's interpolation):
As Demopoulos and Matthews observe, "the apparent 
theoretical indispensability of appeals to grammatically 
characterized internal states in the explanation of 
linguistic behavior is surely the best sort of reason for 
attributing to these states [and, we may add, to their 
relevant constituent elements] a causal role in the 
production of behavior. "109r
In sum, the explanation cannot do without mental representations and the provision 
of an explanation is itself the confirmatory evidence. What comes out of this is that 
the interpretation of the enterprise subtly shifts: the MRG hypothesis becomes 
evidentially distinct and separable from the task of adducing the content of the 
competence grammar. Indeed, it needs to be so because the claimed for necessaiy 
abstraction of the linguist's discourse constitutes a breaking of contact from the 
putative actualities of the economy of information of a mentally instantiated grammar.
This seems to be the way to make sense of Chomsky's suggestion that, in the 
case of extensionally equivalent formulations, the problem is to be resolved by 
"find[ing] a more abstract principle ... incorporating just the relevant features shared 
[by equivalent grammars] without the extra structure that differentiates [them]."110r 
Given our previous remarks to the effect that there are no grounds to suppose the 
mind/brain is designed on the lines of maximal economy, then there are no 
truth/mind-internal-relevant reasons to prefer this "more abstract" formulation. There 
are no reasons to suppose that there is anything wrong (not true) about either of the 
original formulations, only that the more abstract is more efficient in capturing 
significant generalizations.
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What results from this reappraisal of the enterprise is that the linguist’s 
grammar is, in effect, in account of what is known when we know a language, the 
object of knowledge, as opposed to an account of the internally realized economy of 
information which is, at the level of information, how it is known. This translates into 
the idiom of cognitivism as an account of the level one function computed. It is a case 
of substituting the word '’functional” for the word "mental” and making an act of faith 
that some future enquiry will reassimilate the two terms.. Provisionally, and only 
provisionally, this constitutes a shift from "psychological” in a contentful mind/brain 
internal sense to "psychological" in a weaker, object-of-a-propositional-attitude sense, 
where the mind/brain is not shown to be directly constructive of the nature of the 
phenomenon, rather this relation, and so the psychological ontological status of the 
linguistic, is more of an act of faith, a faith based on the observation that what the 
MRG hypothesis provides is an explanation by way of a naturalizing and 
psychological ontological locus, and what we need is an explanation. This is, of 
course, simply autonomism, or perhaps an ontological indeterminacy, supplemented 
by the promissory, i.e. an autonomism by another name (and one which, perhaps, 
smells the sweeter to standard prejudices).
The psychological, non-autonomous ontological status for the linguistic is 
maintained, and the slide to an autonomism halted, by adverting to, on the one hand, 
some future validation by the brain sciences and, on the other and in the meantime, to 
the explanatory success of the mental representation hypothesis. It is the explanatory 
power of this thesis in offering an account of acquisition, language variation within 
distinct parameters and, in general, a response to the question as to why the natural 
linguistic is as it is which constitutes the grounds for the status of the MRG hypothesis 
as best theory. It is just this ability to explain that constitutes the warrant, a la Hannan, 
for accepting the explanation.
However, the further move that Chomsky encourages us make is to accept the 
tiuth of the explanation, to take up a realism towards MRGs, this being the "social 
practice" in respect of best theories; in short, to equate acceptance with belief (the 
philosophers remind us that to believe x is to take x to be true). This is, however, to 
neglect a distinction:1111' there need be no strict correlation between the set of 
propositions one may happen to accept and the set of propositions one holds as true. 
For example, when buying a lottery ticket it is rational to accept that the ticket will not 
win, but one does not thereby also hold the beliej that it will not win. If one did, it 
would be wholly irrational to buy lottery tickets. Similarly, one might accept and 
rationally so, on the basis of its accuracy and simplicity, the explanation that a coin
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which falls heads 550 times out of a 1000 is biased to give a probability of heads of 
0-55. However, one might question the truth of this explanation, without impugning 
its explanatoiy success, by considering the antecedent probability of such a bias. 
(Notice that what these remarks hint towards and are consistent with, is an 
instrumentalist, as opposed to a realist, view of an accepted theoiy.)
Our discussion has considered the theory-constructive role of the antecedent 
conceptual apparatus that is the vehicle for hypotheses in the generative paradigm. In 
doing so we have identified certain tensions, which we dubbed skeuomoiph effects, 
that aiise out of a realist construal of the constructs modelled by the formal systems 
that articulate theoiy. This was not to deny the heuristic fertility of the generative 
paradigm - and so is not to deny the grounds for acceptance of that paradigm - but it 
is to raise the question of the antecedent probability of, and so grounds for belief in, 
the truth/reality of that explanation and, by a certain transitivity, the reality of the 
postulated object of study, the I-language. In short, the suggestion being investigated 
is that the explanation provided is no more (and no less) than an instrumental fiction. 
Our concern in the following chapter is to address the question of the explanatoiy and 
ontological status of level one functions and whether they can be accorded any more 
than an "as if' psychological status, indeed, any more than a feigned and "as if ’ 
existence.
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abstract entities.
7 N. Chomsky, (1986, pg. 39).
^ The need to reflect that economy of information is behind Chomsky's positing of levels of adequacy 
(N. Chomsky, (1964, section 2 and 1965, pgs. 30 - 38)).
^ Examples are T. Nagel (1969), R. Schwartz (1969), W. V. O. Quine (1972), J. Fodor (1983), J, Searle 
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section 81).
 ^N. Chomsky (1965, pg. 9).
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possible that the same program could be used to calculate the batting averages of a baseball team or 
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J. Searle, opus cited, pg 241.
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l^W. Demopoulos andR. Matthews, (1983, pg. 406). Cited in G. Adriaens, (1986, pg. 60).
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CHAPTER V.
Cognitmsm and Functionalism.
1.0 Introduction.
The Chomskyan paradigm is, as we noted, in accord with mainstream 
cognitmsm. In broad terms, this is the view that behaviour is to be explained in terms 
of mind/brain internal states (contra Behaviourism) and that the nature of these states 
needs recourse (contra Dualism) to neither ontological categories nor explanations that 
are at odds with an entirely scientifically respectable materialism (for are we not all 
good materialists now?1). The individual is to be usefully construed as an information 
processing system. This latter idea gets articulated and clarified by the mind-as- 
computer metaphor: individuals make use of mental representations in much the same 
way as computers make use of programs. Cognition becomes a matter of the rule- 
governed manipulation of representations. Correspondingly, the task for the cognitive 
scientist is one of determining the psychologically real programs that the mind/brain 
runs.
Placing the Chomskyan scheme within the more general cognitivist paradigm 
in turn aligns the Chomskyan scheme with the functionalism that provides cognitivism 
with its philosophical rationale. The essence of this position is reflected in Maris 
hierarchy: the privileged level of explanation of cognitive functioning is that of the 
level one function computed. It is this function, in contradistinction to any algorithm 
or hardware, which is to be identified as the primary explanatoiy and psychological 
construct.
Our aim in the following is to argue that, while the Chomskyan enterprise is 
indeed in line with mainstream cognitmsm (and so takes on to itself the credence 
which is, apparently, widely afforded to the cognitivist paradigm), however, an appeal 
to the authority of the cognitive enterprise does no more than result in a conclusion 
which, on the one hand, from the perspective of the mental representational 
hypothesis, encourages an instrumentalism, and, on the other hand, from the 
perspective of a functionalist rationale, recapitulates Carr's contention that the 
linguistic, defined as a level one theoiy, is to be properly construed as an ontologically 
autonomous domain. The options are then either to rest (not veiy) content with that 
conclusion - for after all, somewhere down the road there must be some study that
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contentfully relates the linguistic to the individual subject in terms of individual 
psychology; a study which will possibly reconfigure our ontology and conceptual 
commitments - or, alternatively, one might bring to question the reality of the object 
of study that a level one theory addresses.
2.0 Cognitivism and Folk Psychology.
Implicit in the cognitivist enterprise is a realism toward the intentional content 
of level one theories. If cognitivism is to be in the business of providing real 
explanations of cognitive behaviour, then its central theoretical constructs, level one 
theories, have to correspond to the explanatoiy facts of the matter. The explanation 
provided by level one theories standardly applies to a claim that the causality of 
cognitive functioning is, in part, run off the intentional content of posited rules. The 
trick is to negotiate the intentional content of level one theories within the parameters 
of a prevailing materialism. The solution is the mental representation hypothesis in 
which the two sides, of what is essentially Descartes' dualism, are mediated: the 
intentionality of the posited rules and representations (intentionality being a (perhaps 
the) mark, of the mental2) is assimilated to a thorough-going materialism by means of 
the (neuro)-physical structures that are doing the representing. While the specific, 
presumably neurological, mechanisms that instantiate the representations are presently 
unknown, the problematic relation between the abstraction of the intentional content 
and the physicality of the structures doing the representing does not call to be 
negotiated by recourse to the postulation of some shadowy and mysterious immaterial 
mind-stuff. Mind-stuff, it is the contention (compare Chomsky), is no more than 
some fancy, as yet unknown, arrangement of ordinary matter.
2.1 Taking an intentional stance, taking a knowledge stance.
The pattern for cognitfiism's explanations (i.e. by way of theoretical constructs 
packing intentional content) is the "theoiy" which we routinely use in explanation of 
one another's behaviour by ascribing beliefs, desires and hopes (i.e. propositional 
attitudes that are individuated by their intentional content) to other individuals. This 
"theoiy" being variously described as a "theoiy of mind", "the theoiy-theoiy", 
"intuitive psychology", or, the one we will stick with, "folk psychology" (FP).3i
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Routinely we causally explain why Tom left in a hurry, or why Dick worked 
hard, by ascribing, to Tom, the belief that he would otheiwise miss an appointment 
and, to Dick, the desire to get promotion. This "theoiy”, in much the same way as 
cognitivist theories, posits and quantifies over intentional constructs (in this case, 
beliefs and desires etc.) that are taken to be involved in the aetiology of behaviour. 
The basic explanatoiy strategy of theories in the cognitive paradigm is by way of 
"extending the framework of FP to get an encompassing account of cognition in 
general. "4r The way towards this is by extending the set of intentional constructs 
beyond those of beliefs, hopes etc., of which we may be conscious, to include 
unconscious, mentally represented rules. This strategy is replicated (or, arguably, was 
introduced) by Chomsky: in explanation of natural language the Chomskyan paradigm 
ascribes, not beliefs, but knowledge to individuals; tacit knowledge that is instantiated 
by a body of intentional constructs, the I-language's set of rules or principles and 
parameters. FP takes up an intentional stance and quantifies over psychologically real 
and causal propositional attitudes; Chomskyan linguistics takes up, what we might call, 
a knowledge stance and quantifies over mentally represented rules that are involved in 
the aetiology of linguistic behaviour.
FP's positing of beliefs and desires etc. as theoretical constructs in explanation 
of the behaviour of individuals constitutes a predictively accurate and remarkably 
successful "theoiy". The scare quotes because it is not a theoiy that has been arrived 
at through the normal route of conjecture and development. Rather, the consensus is 
that such a theoiy is part of our innate cognitive endowment as human beings.5 
However, it is one thing to propose that we are innately designed to spontaneously 
come up with such a theoiy and to point out that it works, it is another thing to 
propose that the theoiy is also true, works because it is true, and true because it 
corresponds to the psychological causal facts of the matter, i.e. there really are such 
things as beliefs and hopes that really are involved in the causation of behaviour.6
The former observation - that taking an intentional or knowledge stance 
works, because it is predictively successful - is separable from the latter claim, which 
claim is as to why taking that stance works. This is not to cast doubt on the objectivity 
of the patterns in behaviour which a theoiy correctly characterizes, but it is to 
distinguish this characterizing explanation from a causal account. What FP does is to 
take the terms/concepts by which we apprehend and successfully predict behaviour 
and preserve them in the causal account of that behaviour; what the Chomskyan 
model does is to take the calculus by which we gain epistemic access onto the 
linguistic, and by means of which we - as linguists - articulate theoiy, and also
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preserve it in a mind-internal causal account. This is supposed to duplicate the innate 
theoiy through which we as acquirers/speakers gain knowledge of language:7 it is what 
constitutes the language faculty.
The basic idea is not novel and goes back to the discussion of universals by the 
Greeks and, later, the scholastics:8 in brief, to recognize some particular (e.g. a 
sentence token) as an instance of an x (a sentence type), one needs to always and 
already have the concept, i.e. universal, of an x (care of the generative capacity of the 
grammar). Another exemplar of this basic idea is Fodor’s Language of Thought - to 
acquire a language one must already have a language - itself more or less a rehearsal 
of the view of St. Augustine as criticized by Wittgenstein at the opening of 
Philosophical Investigations.
What results, in general, are causal theories that mimic a certain conceptual 
necessity run off the conceptual apparatus that figures our apprehension of the 
behaviours. That the strategy works, e.g. in the linguistic case, by attributing 
knowledge of language to individuals, coincides with the account of how the 
mechanism works: there is an internally represented body of declarative linguistic 
knowledge, the cause is an abbreviated version of the effect. To reprise Searle:
Epistemically, the existence of the patterns is taken as 
evidence for the existence of the representations.
Causally, the existence of the representations is 
supposed to explain the existence of the patterns.91'
It is by no means impossible that such an account is correct, however, it is not an 
obviousness, nor is it obvious on the basis of the predictive success of the theoiy vis- 
a-vis speaker judgements, which is, in Chomsky’s case at least, the argument of choice 
(and necessity, given the lack of anything else) to rebut scepticism. On the one hand, 
this explanatoiy strategy depends on the extent to which the hypothesis of mental 
representations inaccessible to consciousness can be made to hold water (as we 
discussed above (chapter IV, 2.2) Searle argues such constructs to be illegitimate), on 
the other hand:
Those who think that it is obvious ... are confusing two 
different empirical claims. The first is that intentional 
[/knowledge] stance description yields an objective, real 
pattern in the world .... The second is that this real 
pattern is produced by another real pattern roughly 
isomorphic to it .... Doubting the existence of the
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second real pattern is not doubting the existence of the 
first.101*
Dennett suggests, as regards FP, that there are good, even if not overwhelming, 
reasons for believing in this second pattern. There are, however, also good reasons to 
doubt its existence. His position constitutes a third argument, to go with Quine's and 
Searle's in our previous chapter, that articulates a scepticism towards mental 
representations.
2.2 Dennett’s instrumentalism.
As Dennett is at pains to point out, our FP constructs and explanations are not 
confined to our understanding of persons; indeed, taking up an "intentional stance"llr 
is endemic in our explanation of the behaviour of animate things in general (listen to 
the commentary on any natural history film), and frequently stretches to inanimate 
objects: a thermostat, for instance, turns up the heating because, we might say, it 
"believes" or "notices" the temperature is below sixty degrees. It is an intentional 
system by virtue of exhibiting an "aboutness" in regard to its environment. As regards 
a thermostat, or many machines, there is a good explanation as to why the intentional 
stance is successful: it has been designed by another intentional system so that it can 
be comprehended by individuals taking an intentional stance towards it; its intentional 
"mind" has been designed into it; it, as it were, borrows its "mind" from its designer.
Of course, we are not tempted to the view that a thermostat itself really has 
internal states of belief or represented rules which are causal of its behaviour, rather it 
has internal, electrical, states, that allow it to monitor (note how hard it is to avoid 
intentional talk) its environment and to act in response to it. In this regard our taking 
up an intentional stance is purely metaphorical, i.e. our "theoiy" with its intentional 
terms is acknowledged to be purely instrumental; a sort of short hand allowing us to 
avoid a complicated story of what is actually going on at the level of the electronics of 
the system. We feel no need to argue from the predictive success that taking an 
intentional stance affords to the causal reality, in the system itself, of the terms that we 
use. In other words, in respect of thermostats we can, if we have the patience and the 
knowledge, completely excise intentional terms from an explanation of their behaviour 
exchanging that level of description for one in terms of its electronics. This does not 
affect the predictive and objective success of our shorthand account: there are
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objective patterns of behaviour that are captured by the characterization couched in 
intentional terms, but what we do not get is a causal account of the system in itself. 
Rather what we have is the system described in terms of our own interests, in terms of 
a certain conceptual apparatus, and preserving the terms of that FP apparatus in a 
metaphorical/instrumentalist account of the behaviour.
In the case of artefacts, the function computed is designed into the artefact, 
and it is from the perspective of the designer that some system can be appraised as 
either a better or worse instantiation of a level one function. The function, mediated 
through some engineering design, prefigures the artefact, it is sort-of-causally involved 
in the design of the artefact; it is the concept with which the engineer works. The 
reason why there are, for instance, mousetraps, is because someone thought of the 
concept (do we really want to get all Platonic and say that someone "discovered" it?) 
and designed an artefact with that concept/function in mind. Consequently, we 
understand the behaviour of the artefact in terms of the function. Mediated by way of 
the designer, the function is causal of the forms and patterns of the behaviour of the 
artefact when the behaviour of the artefact is considered in the light of that function. 
However, that the artefact’s behaviour is an instance of the computation of that 
function is not something intrinsic to the artefact, rather it is something that is 
recognized only under interpretation. For example, that a mousetrap is instantiating 
the function of executing mice as opposed to wedging open a door is a case of 
someone having some function in mind.12r
Searle remarks that "the aim of natural science [recall, for Chomsky, 
linguistics is a natural science] is to discover and characterize features that are intrinsic 
to the natural world".131’ If the level one functions of cognitive science are such 
intrinsic features (i.e. they correspond to real entities that are independent and waiting 
to be discovered, as opposed to being attributions out of the conceptual scheme of the 
attributer, e.g. the linguist), then what needs to be excised from an account of non­
artefacts such as minds/brains is the third-person externality of the designing and 
interpreting mind which attributes the function, the "idea of the machine". The hick is 
to put the designing and interpreting, always and already idea in the mind of the 
individual whose behaviour is to be explained.
To take linguistics, Chomskyan style, as paradigmatic of cognitivist 
explanations, what replaces, by way of doing the job of, the external designer is the 
system of intentional rules which prefigure and "design" the patterns of the 
behaviours. In this way the "explanation" offered is not dissimilar to pre-Darwinian
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creationist accounts of natural phenomena : to explain why something happens to be as 
it is one invokes the prefiguring and designing mind of the Deity; the phenomena of 
the world are simply material instantiations of His prefiguring mind.14 Dennett 
supplies us with an example. The wasp species Sphex is an instance of a lower 
organism that evidences "intelligent" behaviour. Before laying its eggs, the female of 
the species builds a burrow, stings a cricket to paralyse it, drags the cricket into the 
burrow, lays her eggs next to it (it will be her progeny’s larder), closes the burrow and 
flies away.15r On a creationist's stoiy:
The behavior of the wasp is explained ... by postulating 
the existence of an intelligent mind, a god ... who 
thought about and designed the behavior of the wasp, 
based on his knowledge of the environment of the 
insect, and who subsequently created the behaviour he 
designed, who gave it material shape in the wasp.16r
In the case of human intelligent behaviours, the cognitivist paradigm makes the move 
of transferring wholesale such "knowledge" into the mind/brain of the individual by 
way of a set of mentally represented rules, the competence grammar, which designs 
and is involved in the "creation" of the behaviours. On the creationist model, the 
intelligence of the wasp is offered as evidence for the existence of a mindful creator, 
likewise, on the cognitivist model, the existence of the intelligent behaviour is taken as 
evidence for the designing and prefiguring "knowledge" by way of a representation of 
the function that is computed in the behaviour. (Compare our previous quotations 
from Searle and Dennett above, (pg. 192)).
But what is also happening in this style of explanation is that the coneepfiial 
terms under which the behaviour is apprehended and understood are preserved in the 
cause, (as in the creationist's account) and are preserved in the manner of abbreviated 
or condensed always and already versions, as the prefiguring idea of the patterns of 
the behaviours. What is being achieved here is that the identification of level one 
functions, as a proper level of description of mind/brain internal states, is no more 
than a case of projecting the terms of the conceptual apparatus with which we 
theoretically apprehend and interpret forms of overt and particular behaviour back 
onto the mind, in the form of mental representations, and so preserving the terms of 
the conceptual apparatus that provides us with epistemic access to the phenomenon in 
a causal account: a form of putatively empirical enquiiy driven by a species of 
conceptual necessity. What we get is something which is akin to what we dubbed a
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skeuomorph effect: a case of taking the terms, (in effect, a particular set of 
universals,) under which a phenomenon is represented/apprehended and transposing 
them into the phenomenon and construing them as intrinsic to that phenomenon at the 
phenomenon's causal level. The strategy to "explain" the observed structures and 
patterns of human cognitive behaviours is to posit those structures and patterns to be 
always and already more or less explicit in the cause as something that begins to look 
rather like a sort of conceptual homunculus. It is a case of explaining the universals 
that are instanced in particular behaviours, at least as those particulars are 
apprehended by, for example, linguists, by positing the set of universals, i.e. grammars 
as, (again some old-fashioned vocabulary) their first cause in the mind of, in the 
linguistic case, the speaker of a language.
In certain respects, the current scientific state of a 
general theoiy of representation is analogous to the 
science of embiyology in the nineteenth century. The 
development of highly structured, complex, fully 
formed organisms from eggs and sperm is a profoundly 
amazing thing. Faced with this mysteiy, some scientists 
concluded that the only way to explain the emergence 
of a fully structured organism at birth was to join the 
ancients in assuming that the structure was already 
there. Hence the homuncular theoiy of reproduction, 
which claimed that a miniature but complete human 
already exists in the sperm ....
We now know that there is structure in the 
sperm (and the egg) - not in the form of a miniature, 
fully structured organism, but mainly in the form of 
DNA - a molecule that looks not at all like a fully 
formed human. Thus, the structure of the cause does 
not resemble the structure of the effect.17
However, the rejoinder is to point to the explanatoiy success of cognitivism's 
strategy of postulating level one functions as mentally represented rules, i.e. in taking a 
knowledge stance, and of the parallel strategy in FP of postulating beliefs and desires 
ct at, in taking an intentional stance. The point is simply that in both cases the 
strategy works and such mental representations appear indispensable to an 
explanation. The question is why it works. Either such representations are really used 
(i.e. they are involved in the aetiology of the behaviour) or it is no more than "as if' 
they are used (compare our quotation from Beiwick, (pg. 142)).
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The non-causally explanatory option is canvassed by Dennett. Dennett’s 
position is open to a degree of interpretation.18 However, for our purposes the crux is 
that in viewing some system as intentional (or as a knowledge system), one attributes 
to that system a range of beliefs (or knowledge states). But, (compare our thermostat) 
any single description from either an intentional/knowledge stance is compatible with 
indefinitely many system-internal states of affairs (there are many different ways to 
design and implement a thermostat): what is criterial is the external behaviour. But 
what this suggests is that:
the beliefs and other intentions of an intentional system 
[or knowledge states] need not be represented 'within' 
the system in any way for us to get a purchase on 
predicting its behavior by ascribing such intentions [or 
knowledge states] to it.19r
Rather, these postulated states, taken as constituting part of a causal account of the 
behaviour, warrant, as we have been suggesting, no more than an instrumentalist 
construal. Indeed, Dennett suggests that they require to be interpreted as "idealized 
fictions in an action-predicting, action explaining calculus."201 Such states exist not as 
illata, as entities that exist independently in the world, but are "abstracta - calculation 
bound entities or logical constructs"211' projected from the conceptual apparatus by 
which we represent the world. In this Dennett is close to Searle's contention that "the 
so-called 'functional level' is not a separate level at all, but simply one of the causal 
levels described in terms o f our interests". The I-language does not correspond to an 
illation, but is a fictional entity projected from the conceptual apparatus that is our 
means to represent, and this representans is mistakenly posited as representatum: a 
case of a skeuomoiph effect. It might also be noted that the fictionality of the 
grammar qua internal system is entirely consonant with the empirical strandedness of 
psychologistic linguistic theories: fictions do not leave traces of themselves.
On the other hand, there is, Dennett insists,221 something perfectly objective 
about the descriptions of the behaviours that are available by taking an 
intentional/knowledge stance and which descriptions can only be captured in this way. 
But whatever this something perfectly objective is, such as it constitutes certain facts 
of the matter, they need not be system-internal, intrinsic facts, rather only facts as 
appear under attribution. Moreover, there are an indefinite number of such sets of 
facts given that for any level one function, e.g. a grammar, there are an indefinite 
number of extensional equivalents of that function/grammar. Insofar as they are
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predictively successful, grammars can not be licensed to be taken as true of some 
mind/brain internal states, but to be true of the external patterns of linguistic 
behaviours. But, if this is the case, then we have to drop a psychologist ontology, 
correlatively also drop any truth-issues in respect of a choice between grammars that 
achieve coverage, and we appear to be in a position that recapitulates a Popperian 
third world ontology (or a Platonism), for whatever it is that are the conditions of 
identity for patterns of behaviour as being instances of a natural language cannot be 
system-internal/psychological.
While such instrumentalist contentions vis-a-vis a causal explanation might 
seem entirely reasonable in respect of artefacts like thermostats, we are, perhaps, less 
taken by the prospect in regard to our own behaviour, for does it not rather offend 
our dignity, not to mention our understanding of ourselves? Moreover, it is at least 
arguable that in a certain sense the apprehension of the behaviour of others in FP 
terms is, indeed, ineliminable. If, as the currently fashionable stoiy goes, and however 
it is to be explained, we are so constructed so as to develop a folic psychological 
theoiy which predisposes us to cast the behaviour of other individuals in its terms, 
then it is conceivable that this form of apprehension is in the manner of an 
indefeasible reflex. Insofar as our conscious apprehension of other persons involves 
FP terms, then these terms might well be ineliminable: maybe we cannot help but 
think of people's behaviour in the FP fr amework. If there really is an innate theoiy of 
mind, then it is part of what constitutes our very rationality to understand individuals' 
behaviour in terms of FP’s constructs. To this extent, as Putnam argues, FP would 
not, in a certain sense, be corrigible at all.23r If it turned out that a true account of 
behaviour eliminated, at all levels of description, the constructs of FP, then, feasibly, 
we would still, as a reflex, apprehend and understand behaviour in terms of beliefs 
and desires. Similarly, for instance, the sound of a flute is always the sound of a flute 
and not what the physicists tell us it really is, i.e. a sinusoidal wave train. However, 
we simply do not naturally apprehend the sound of a flute in the physicist's terms. In 
healing the flute as a flute, but knowing some physics, we are in a position akin to 
looking at an optical illusion, knowing it to be so, but still, and simultaneously, the 
illusion persists.24
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2.3 Corollaries.
The conclusion these remarks tend toward is that FP is not a necessarily true 
theoiy of the aetiology of behaviour (not unless we are tempted to the view that 
evolution, which is presumably responsible for FP, is geared towards selecting for 
organisms that apprehend the world as it really is, as opposed to selecting for 
organisms whose apprehension of the world confers an advantage on the organism25). 
We seem to have to confer no more than an instrumental status on the intentional 
constructs of FP and this suggests that they are viable candidates for elimination from 
a correct account. The point of our addressing this question is that if the FP strategy 
of attributing such constructs to persons can be brought into question, then, given the 
parallels between taking an intentional stance and taking the knowledge stance, this 
will also bring the supposed ineliminabihty of the MRG hypothesis into question. It is 
to be noticed that one of the factors that argues for resistance to elimination of the 
former, i.e. the availability to consciousness of our FP intentional constructs, is, by 
definition, not available in support of the hypothesis of tacit/unconscious intentional 
constructs. In other words, while one might resist the elimination of FP constructs by 
appeal to the fact that such terms are those which populate our conscious awareness 
and are which we think with, how much less unappealing and less counter-intuitive is 
the elimination of constructs/terms of which we are unconscious.26
Our general question now gets couched in terms of the prospects for 
elimination of FP (and so, on the parallel we are drawing, of MRGs). For a precis of 
the various positions on the question I can do no better than quote Churchland:
The identity theorist optimistically expects that [FP] will 
be smoothly reduced by completed neuroscience, and 
its ontology preserved by dint of transtheoretic 
identities. The dualist expects that it will prove 
irreducible to completed neuroscience, by dint of being 
a nonredundant description of an autonomous, 
nonphysical domain of natural phenomena. The 
functionalist also expects that it will prove irreducible, 
but 011 the quite different grounds that the internal 
economy characterized by [FP] is not, in the last 
analysis, a law-govemed economy of natural states, but 
an abstract organization of functional states, an 
organization instantiable in a variety of quite different 
material substrates. It is therefore irreducible to the 
principles peculiar to any of them.
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Finally, the eliminative materialist is also 
pessimistic about the prospects for reduction, but his 
reason is that [FP] is a radically inadequate account of 
our internal activities, too confused and too defective to 
win survival through intertheoretic reduction. On his 
view it will simply be displaced by a better theory of 
those activities.271'
The crux of the position that we are arguing for is that, firstly, as we have 
demonstrated, despite Chomsky opining in the direction of some form of promissory 
identity between the constructs of a postulated I-language and "structures of the 
brain", with a correlative reduction of the linguistic to biology, this position lacks any 
substantive evidence from neurophysiology, nor, indeed, from any purportedly 
relevant adjacent domain. The unsubstantiated nature of his position and its 
inexplicitness is negotiated by the invocation of the "level of abstraction [of the 
investigation] from mechanisms" and the "complex question" as regards "what is 
meant by the notion of 'corresponds' in the case of [this] abstract study".281' The 
upshot of this level of abstraction with its correlative empirical insulation is, in effect, 
a realism and a materialism that is negotiated by way of the enthymemes of an implicit 
functionalism.
3.0 Functionalism.
3.1 Origins.
Functionalism developed in response to problems that are attendant on 
mind/brain identity theories.29r The nub of the matter is that if one identifies mental 
types, such as pain, with types of neurophysiological state (type-type identity), such as 
having certain specified brain fibres filing, the result is a counter-intuitive inability to 
predicate of some organism that it is in pain unless it also has just the same type of 
brain fibres firing. The consequence is a type of species chauvinism where an 
organism is precluded from, to continue in our example, being in pain unless it shares 
the same neurophysiology as humans. The solution is to propose that what is crucial is 
not what type of neurophysiological machinery is involved (imagine, in the human 
case, that some future medical advance allows pieces of damaged brain to be replaced 
with bits of hi-tech cir cuit board), rather, what is important, what is the criterion of
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identity, is what that piece is doing in respect of the cognitive functioning of the 
organism as a whole. Types of mental state get to be identified with an abstract 
functional role, not with bits of neural wetware. This position does not require the 
relinquishing of a thorough-going materialism: individual instances (’’tokens") of pain 
may indeed be identified with particular neurophysiological events in an individual, 
(upon which neurophysiological facts they are supervenient,) but pain as an abstract 
type of mental state cannot be so identified.
The result is the mobilization (compare Man) of distinct levels of desciiption:
but [the functionalist] applies them all to the same 
fundamental reality. A physical state-token in 
someone's brain at a particular time has a 
neurophysiologicai description, but may also have a 
functional description .... And so there is after all a 
sense in which "the mental" is distinct from "the 
physical": though there are no nonphysical substances 
or stuffs, and every mental token is itself entirely 
physical, mental characterization is not physical 
characterization, and the property of being a pain is not 
simply the property of being such-and-such a neural 
filing.301'
Moreover, the abstract types of mental states, correlating with level one 
functions, are ineliminable, by reduction, from any causal account of cognitive 
functioning, because, given the multiple physical instantiability, any description at the 
level of the neurophysical would not be able to capture what is common to 
instances/tokens of mental types. In short, "a functional characterization of our 
internal states is here to stay."31r And also here to stay is the level of abstraction that 
Chomsky cites as a methodological and provisional requirement, only it is not 
provisional because not eliminable.
3.2 Multiple instantiability.
A consequence of the claim as to the ineliminability of a functional 
characterization is the strandedness of level one theories from (dis-)confirmation by 
neurological evidence. If the same function may be realized in a variety of physical 
systems, where that variety includes systems, many of which are constituted of 
substances to which different physical laws apply, then findings about the physical
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system qua physical system do not constitute any sort of evidence as to the 
correctness or identification of any level one theory: there can be no reduction of the 
level one theoiy in respect of any laws that apply at the physical level. In a similar 
regard, Fodor points out,32r invoking the standard mind-as-computer metaphor, that it 
is quite possible for two computers to be in precisely the same physical/electronic state 
but each computing a different function; one, for instance, calculating the gross 
national product of Monaco, the other the batting averages of the New York Yankees. 
In other words, one cannot tell from inspecting the hardware, nor the algorithm, just 
what is going on at the level (level one) of what is being computed. Conversely:
It seems possible for two individuals to be in the same 
mental state even though they're in different 
computational states. Two computers can multiply 35 
and 44 [or the GNP of Monaco] in very different ways.
By analogy, two sentient beings might possess some of 
the same psychological [for our purposes, linguistic] 
properties even though their psychologies involve veiy 
different programs [i.e. grammars]. The computational 
model of the mind thereby suggests, surprisingly, that 
mental [/linguistic] states are not to be identified with 
computational states [/a specification of an I- 
language].33r
And, of course, neither are they to be identified with neurological/biological/physical 
states. The question arises as to precisely what they are to be identified with; what, 
precisely, (of what ontological status) are mental states/level one functions if the 
specification of the internal state of a machine/individual, even to the level of the 
economy of information of any putative internal representations of some program, is 
redundant in their identification? It seems there are no tmth-issues in respect of a 
choice between extensional equivalents, it seems there is no cogency, because no 
identifiable content, to the notion of an I-language (compare Quine). Correlatively, we 
seem to need an E-language approach and an ontological status which is 
indistinguishable from either CaiTs/Popper’s autonomism or a Platonism a la Katz, 
and this because the identity of any level one function is ineliminably distinct (and its 
properties underivable) from any internal states of a machine/organism. What this 
appears to suggest is that a linguistics that posits a level one function as its central 
explanatory construct is orthogonal to, or at least distinct from, a linguistics conducted 
from the perspective of "individual psycholog}''". I suppose one can get to call the
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former construct "psychological", but it is psychological in a wholly object-of-a- 
propositional-attitude sense. Katz makes the same point.
He asks us to imagine an English speaking Martian who, presumably, has a 
different neurology and who also employs a different but extensionally equivalent 
program to the one supposedly internally represented by human English language 
speakers. Neither internal fact has any relevance to the external, mind/brain 
independent fact that he/she/it is still speaking English. The existence of English is 
independent (ontologically) of any particular mode of its instantiation. The upshot is 
that the identification of I-language with Marr's and functionalism's level one results in 
anomaly for an explicitly reductionist psychological linguistics by way of undermining 
the possibility of a reduction to the properties of the instantiating hardware. But also, 
it appears to undermine any psychologist (human-mind internal) ontological claim and 
correlatively the cogency of an I-language, i.e. a determinate set of mind-intemal 
representations, as the proper object of study. In short, it appears not the case, contra 
Chomsky, that "language has no objective existence apart from its mental 
representation,"341' for, indeed, it does have such an objective existence. Katz puts the 
point succinctly:
We cannot abstract away from [mental or neural 
structures] without abstracting away from the 
psychological medium in which competencies are 
realised .... Such abstraction would collapse 
conceptualism [i.e. mentalism] into Platonism [or, at 
least an autonomism].35r
The point is not, of course, restricted to linguistic matters: level one functions in 
general appear- to require to be granted a status as being autonomous of any physical 
and representational state of affairs.
One corollary of multiple instantiability is that it undermines any rationale for 
choosing between extensionally equivalent level one theories in respect of any 
mind/brain internal facts of the matter, that is, in respect of any facts of the matter as 
regards the manner of instantiation of the level one function, because any such facts 
are beside the point: east is indeed east and west is indeed west, the level one function 
is always and already, and is so independently of the internal states of any individual 
minds/brains/computers, indeed, to take this independence to its Platonic conclusion, 
seemingly independently of the existence of any such entities. It seems, in fact, that 
what we are led towards concluding is that level one functions look remarkably like
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reasons for having to propose an ontological category along the lines of Popper's 
world three or Katz' Platonism.
A further corollary is that the putatively ineliminable level of description of a 
level one function, in being raised above any particular instantiation, appears to 
remove a functional characterization from empirical criticism, leaving the level one 
theory empirically stranded. What results is "a faintly stipulative character," one might 
say, a certain conceptual necessity: it is "as if the onus were on the empirical systems 
to instantiate faithfully the organization that [level one functions] specify".36 The sense 
is that of the specified function prefiguring what must be the case in the physical 
system. What we get is the function as a sort of picture, symbol or idea of an ideal 
machine, of, in Wittgenstein's phrase, "the machine-as-symbol" which, as it were, 
contains the movements of any actual machine in a manner far more determinately 
than any imperfect actualization and which idea is, indeed, independent of any 
actualization.371' The impression of the incorrigibility of the specified function by any 
merely empirical facts is, Churchland observes,
enhanced by the standard examples used to illustrate 
the claims of functionalism - mousetraps, valve-lifters, 
arithmetical calculators, computers, robots and the like.
These are artifacts, constructed to fill a preconceived 
bill. In such cases, a failure of fit between the physical 
system and the relevant functional characterization 
impugns only the former and not the latter.381
An alternative way to express the point, and one which is more clearly of linguistic 
relevance, is to remark on the putatively principled discrepancy we remarked upon 
between competence, the level one characterization, and the performance of any 
particular system. The fact of the performance mechanisms in some way falling short 
or diverging from what is licensed by the competence system does not bring into 
question the correctness of the specification of the competence system because that 
system is autonomous of, and unfalsifiable by, any evidence regarding algorithmic 
processing. It seems the function is known in advance of, and irrespective of, any 
empirical evidence.39r
The conclusion that these considerations from the multiple instantiability of 
level one functions tends towards is, again, that of their’ autonomous, abstract 
ontological status;40 if they are not to be identified with any particular state of a
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physical system, and not corrigible in respect of any particular system, then they seem 
to have some soil of existence, or subsistence, that is neither spatial nor temporal, they 
appear:
not [to be] phenomena located in space-time and we 
lack any evidence at all for their existence. Nevertheless 
they have to exist [spatio-temporarily], because they are 
part of the [causal explanatory] paradigm of Cognitive 
science.411'
And, if they have no such spatio-temporality, and they are to be credited with 
existence, then either they are the sorts of things that inhabit Popper’s world thr ee or, 
to taste, Platonic entities.
It is at this point that the functionalist's drift to autonomism, along with its 
unpalatability to materialist sentiments, is attempted to be arrested by the invocation of 
the notion of supervenience or of a promissory neuro-science - the enthymemes of 
Fodor's remarks. It is not the case, so the story goes, that level one functions exist in 
the ether, they only exist because they are instantiated in physical systems and depend 
on such physical systems for their existence: no physical system, no level one 
function. This is not, however, to impugn the truth and ineliminability of 
generalizations made at the level of level one functions.
This seems to be Fodor's position. As regards the question of the ontological 
status of the mental, he holds it "very likely" that, without espousing a reduction of 
mental types to physical types, "mental events have true descriptions in the vocabulary 
of an ideally completed physiology. "42r What we get, by way of this act of faith, is a 
discharging of the need for abstract ontological categories; we have the advantage of 
maintaining a materialism without being committed to a thorough-going reductionism: 
significant and true generalizations can be made without reference to the physical 
properties of the instantiating system. But, this is just the promissory again, and what 
we also have is a present inability "to distinguish in practice between ... [Fodor's] de 
facto anti-reductionism and ... a radically anti-reductionist" autonomism,43' An 
autonomism might be embarrassing to our materialist prejudices, but an autonomism 
is what we get. The only other option appears to be to question the (nature of the) 
existence of the always and already level one function.
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4.0 Eliminating level one.
These remarks are intended to have been taken as casting doubt on the 
legitimacy of cognitivism's and Chomskyan linguistics’ explanatory strategy in taking a 
knowledge stance; a case of raising the antecedent improbabilities of an explanation of 
behaviour in terms of the mental representation of level one functions. Raising those 
improbabilities is to undermine acceptance of theories based 011 their explanatory 
success - some inference to the best explanation: they might explain, provide a stoiy, 
but the constructs through which the stoiy is achieved are problematic. It might be 
noted, however, that none of the above considerations are sufficient to exclude the 
possibility that indeed there are internal states that correspond to the construct’s of 
FP’s intentional stance or the constructs of Chomsky's parallel knowledge stance. 
Furthermore, it is arguable (compare Stabler’s remarks above, (pg. 154)) that such 
doubts as have been raised leave the practice of linguistics in the Chomskyan 
paradigm unaltered, for whether or not we take the causal explanation realistically we 
still have an agreed and perfectly objective object of study: the level one function. 
However, if it can be further substantiated that this object of study is indeed 
incompatible with any, even a promissory, mind-intemal psychology (we take this up 
in the next chapter) and so leaving us not only with a deferred explanation but the 
impossibility of an explanation from the perspective of "individual psychology", then 
we might be encour aged to reassess the status/reality of level one functions.
Just such a reassessment is suggested by Searle where he takes up the 
challenge of showing how such theoretical constructs as systems of mentally 
represented level one functions might be excised from explanation.
Searle's worries about the explanatory strategy of cognitivism amount to the 
observation that, firstly, where we properly understand certain systems the postulation 
of a functional level explanation is no part of their explanation, and, secondly, that 
where we do have computational simulations of systems those systems do not 
themselves make causal use of a represented level one function.
For example, a word processing program in a computer is causal of the 
simulation of the output of a good, old-fashioned mechanical typewriter. Certainly, 
this program is causally explanatory of the workings of the computer, but it is not in 
the least bit involved in the understanding of how a typewriter works:
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As simulations go, the word processing program 
simulates a typewriter better than any AI program I 
know of simulates the brain. But no sane person thinks:
"At long last we understand how typewriters work, they 
are implementations of word processing programs."441'
To this it might be objected that what is crucial to the working of a typewriter, what in 
fact provides the program, is the mind/brain of its operator.
However, consider what happens when sitting in a moving car and focussing 
on the road ahead. Were a video camera to be set up to film as you travelled along, 
the resulting images would be shaky and jerky. This is not replicated in your own 
visual experience; instead you enjoy a more or less stable and smooth view of the 
road. One might explain this phenomenon in terms of a mentally represented level one 
function amounting to an unconscious and always and already rule to move the 
eyeballs in your head in such a way as to maintain focus on some intended object and 
so compensate for the involuntary head movements induced by the bumpy road 
surface. Such a rule would explain complex, flexible, goal-directed behaviour 
involving information processing: the rule takes in information (from head 
movements) as input and gives as output the desired behaviour. It seems we have a 
canonical cognitivist explanation in response to just the sort of problem which 
cognitivism was set up to handle. Moreover, we have a predictively accurate 
explanation once the function (or any extensional equivalent) is correctly specified. 
The trouble is that what actually happens is rather different:
What actually happens is that fluid movements in the 
semicircular canals of the inner ear trigger a sequence 
of neuron firings that enter the brain over the eighth 
cranial nerve. These signals follow two parallel 
pathways, one of which can "learn" and one of which 
cannot. The pathways are in the brain stem and 
cerebellum and they transform the initial input signals 
to provide motor output "commands", via 
motomeurons that connect to the eye muscles and 
cause eyeball movements. The whole system contains 
feedback mechanisms for error correction. It is called 
the vestibular ocular reflex (VOR). The actual 
hardware mechanism of the VOR [involves a system of 
mentally represented rules] no more than [does] the 
movement of [a] plant's leaves due to the secretion of 
auxin. The appearance that there is an unconscious rule
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being followed ... is an optical illusion. All the 
intentional ascriptions are as-ij.45
The question this explanation raises (and, for our present purposes it is not 
crucial that it is a neurological explanation) is that of how one is to consider the status 
of the still predictively accurate specification of the level one function that 
characterizes the VOR. Certainly, we come to see it similarly to the way we recognize 
intentional ascriptions to thermostats, as metaphorical/instrumental merely, but what, 
ontologically, is that level one function? It would appear to be no more than an 
abstract characterization of a set of overt behaviours: an idea of the machine, but the 
proper explanation is to be found not in understanding the idea but in understanding 
the machine itself. It is the machine which is prior and not some always and already 
level one abstract object: insofar as an enquiiy posits such level one abstractions they 
are abstractions only in the sense of being derived by generalization, idealization or 
classification over the real data, namely the behaviours of the (neuro)-physical 
machine; what is abstract in the enquiiy is not of the object of enquiiy, but merely of- 
and-for-the-scientist, having a merely instrumental utility in the scientist's efforts to 
come to grips with the real object of study.461’
In effect, at least interpretably, Searie's position amounts to (as we will see in 
the next chapter where we take up the issues raised here) a Wittgensteinian 
exhortation to look at the machine itself as opposed to the function that is the idea of 
the machine. To put this in old-fashioned terminology, and to return us to our 
comments at the opening of this chapter, what is being canvassed amounts to a 
distrust of universals (in the guise of mentally represented rules of which the 
intentional content is tacit) as causal explanations for behaviour, where those 
universals are postulated as a means to preserve, in some putative cause, a realist 
constmal of the terms/conceptualization by which a theoiy attains epistemic access 
onto a phenomenon.
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Footnotes.
* The answer to the question is, of course, no. The attempt to negotiate the abstraction of the mental 
within a materialism is, however, what underpins the functionalist enterprise.
 ^This observation goes back, famously, to Brentano (F. Brentano, 1874) and retains a considerable 
currency, although the present consensus is that the mental is not adequately defined in this way (for 
example, pains are mental if anything is, and pains do not appear to have any directedness or 
"aboutness").
 ^For an overview see A. Whiten, (ed.), (1991).
^ P. Churchland and T. Sejnowski, (1990, pg. 232).
 ^ The argument for this view very accurately recapitulates, mutatis mutandis, Chomsky's for an 
innate language faculty:
By the time children reach the age of three years old they attribute 
mental states to other people when attempting to explain their 
actions. In particular-, they understand that other people have 
beliefs and desires and that these play a causal role in behaviour.
... The basic concepts of belief and desire that children use, 
whatever their cultural background, could not be constructed 
horn the evidence available to them during the earliest stages of 
their development. Consequently these concepts appear to derive 
from an innate psychological structure - a content-rich mental 
module which creates mandatory interpretations of human 
behaviour in mentalistic terms. (S. Mithen, (1996, pg. 51)).
Other candidates for innate "theories" or modules are, along with language, an intuitive 
biology and an intuitive physics. Somewhat more profligate proposals (what Fodor calls "modularity 
gone mad" - see chapter 1, footnote 83) have also been suggested (see Sperber (1994), Tooby and 
Cosmides (1992) and Barkow et at. (1992)).
^ If you consider the raising of doubt here as a case of scepticism taken to absurd lengths, consider 
the following report of neurological experimental findings and try to reconcile it with a FP account 
which would, presumably, have the conscious, mental decision as having a causal role:
if somebody is asked to move a finger voluntarily, and to say 
when he firs t decides to make the motion, then waves of brain 
activity in the relevant motor area start up a second or two before 
he says that his conscious mind "makes the decision." (Cohen 
and Stewart, (1994, pg. 176).)
^ Recall Chomsky's remarks as to the "systematic ambiguity" of the tenn "grammar": "to refer, first, 
to the native speaker's internally represented 'theory of his language1 and, second, to the linguist's 
theory of this" (1965, pg. 25).
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 ^The standard options on universals include: a) Platonism, they exist ante rem (compare Katz); b) 
die Aristotelian view that universals are in re, and not independent of particulars (compare Fodor's 
view below); c) nominalism, the view of certain of the scholastics, diat universals are no more than 
flatus vocis and eliminable (compare the Churchlands, and Searle).
Russell (1979, pg. 430) remarks, writing in the forties, that "modem discussions of the 
problem of universals have not got much further [than those of the scholastics]" and arguably this is 
still the case.
9 J. Searle, (1992, pg. 241).
^  D. Dennett, (1990, pg. 164).
 ^^  The phrase is Dennett's, (1987 and passim).
*2 See R. Cummins, (1989) and J. Searle, (1992, pgs. 205 - 212).
13 Ibid. pg. 212.
Again there are interesting parallels with die scholastics' treatment of universals. For instance, 
Abelard, Occam and Aquinas, while all of distinctiy nominalist tendencies, felt the need to suggest 
that universals are ante rem, only in die sense that they are concepts in the mind of God, and titis has 
to be the case so as to explain creation: such ideas "had to be in the mind of God before he could 
create" (B. Russell, 1979, pg. 464).
1  ^D. Dennett, (1978). Cited in W. Meyer Viol (ms).
1  ^W. Meyer Viol (ms).
12 p. Churchland and T. Sejnowski, (1990, pg. 234). Compare with the notion of epiphenomena 
(chapter I, footnote 78.).
1^  D. Dennett, (1978, 1981 and 1990). The interpretive issue is one of the extent to which his "mild 
realism" constitutes, or does not, a thorough-going instrumentalism in respect of FP constructs. For 
conflicting reports see, for example, die entry in T. Hondeiich (1995) and T. Horgan and J. Woodward 
(1985). Stich's (1981) paper, in noting that Dennett has "a disconcerting penchant for working both 
sides of die street'1 investigates tiiem both.
19 D. Denned, (1978, pg. 277).
20 Ibid, (pg. 30).
21 D. Denned, (1981, pg. 13).
22 D, Denned, (1990, pg. 158 - 159).
23 H. Putnam, (1964, pgs. 681ff.) Also see N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 7).
OA This observation is akin to Husserl’s identification of a Lebenswell Clife-world1) (E. Husserl, 1970): 
"die inter-subjective world of our natural, pre-tiieoretical experience and activity ... [which] essentially 
persists even after die development of the tiieoretical 'spirit1. Even die physicist drinks of die sun as 
rising and setting, and as marking die phases of his practical life" (from die entry on Husserl in T. 
Hondeiich, 1995, pg. 384).
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Arguably, a similar distinction between the scientific 'theoretical attitude’ - exemplified for 
Husserl by Galileo - and that of pre-theoretical, everyday experience may be discerned in the later 
Wittgenstein's anti-scientism (see Chihara and Fodor, 1967).
33 If we concede that evolution selects for innate theories, then, given our understanding of the nature 
of evolution, best theories, i.e. the ones selected for, axe likely to conform to something much closer 
to a pragmatist’s notion of truth, rather than some sort of correspondence theory. While it might be 
advantageous for an organism to get it right, more appropriate, on some evolutionary story, will be a 
theory's success in action in respect of the interests of the organism and this may, or may not, involve 
getting it right, in the sense of corresponding to how things really are. For example, imagine there 
were some evolutionary advantage involved in being able to predict the motion of the planets and 
there were to evolve an innate theory. There would be no reason for evolution to favour a heliocentric 
(and correct) theory over a geocentric/Ptolemaic (and wrong) one as long as they both do the same 
job in respect of whatever the advantage is that is accrued by having such an innate theory. In short, 
just because a theory, eg. FP, is a product of evolution does not confer on it the status of a true 
theory.
26 This point approximately rehearses Seaile’s distinction between "intrinsic'' and "as if’ intentionalrty 
and his argument for the "Connection Principle" (see chapter IV, 2.2). This, it will be recalled, is to the 
effect that the only cogent sense that can be made of intentional constructs is if they are candidates 
for being contents of consciousness; where states are not candidates for being contents of 
consciousness, the intentionality is no more than "as if', no more than metaphor, and for which the 
proper description is neurophysiological. (Searle, 1992).
22 p. Churchland, (1990, pgs. 209 - 210)
28 The former quotation is from Chomsky, (1986, pg. 23) and the latter Chomsky, (1980, pg. 220).
26 The seminal papers are H. Putnam (1960 and 1967) and J. A. Fodor (1968). It is worth noting that 
Putnam has repudiated the position he was instrumental in founding.
30 W. Lycan, (1990, pg. 8).
3* P. Churchland, (1990, pg. 213).
32 J. A. Fodor, (1980).
33 E. Sober, (1990, pgs. 98 - 99).
34 N. Chomsky, (1972, pg. 169).
35 J. Katz, (1981, pg. 91).
36 P. Churchland, (1990, pg. 213). Compare Chomsky's emphasis (e.g. 1986, pg. 39 and our remarks 
above, (pg. 157)) on the directionality between the linguistic and adjacent domains being from the 
former to the latter: it is linguistics that constitutes a problem for the brain sciences rattier than the 
other way about.
33 L. Wittgenstein, (1958, sections 193 - 194).
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p. Churchland, ibid.
39 See for example, N. Chomsky, (1991, pg. 19).
4° It might be noted that the issue of multiple instantiability is related to the issue of the need, if 
constructs of a grammar are to be taken as real, for there to be means to effect a decision between 
extensionally equivalent grammars. To rehearse a Quinean view, it appears that the only facts of the 
matter are in the external behaviours.
W. Meyer Viol, (ms).
42 j. A. Fodor, (1975, pg. 9).
43 P. Can, (1990, pg. 91).
44 J. Seaile, (1992, pg. 218).
A C
Ibid, (pg. 236). This may also count as another lesson to the purpose of illustrating that "heuristic 
fertility" is not sufficient warrant for a realism.
49 This sentence is an adulteration ofremarks by Burton-Roberts, (1994, pg. 189). Compare pg. 121.
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CHAPTER VI.
Ghosts. Machines and a Linguistic Constructivism.
Words move, music moves 
Only in time...
Or say that the end precedes the beginning,
And the end and the beginning were always there 
Before the beginning and after the end.
And all is always now.
(T. S. Eliot, Burnt Norton.)
We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon o f 
language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. 
[Only it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety o f 
ways]. (L. Wittgenstein11'.)
In itself language is ... ait activity. (W. von Humboldt.21')
An utterance ... is a structure in time, ... in which the wholes and 
parts are events. ... Time's arrow applies to human behaviour as it 
does to the rest o f the universe. (C. Hockett.31')
1.0 Introduction.
What emerges from our discussion of Scarle's and Dennett’s perspectives on 
cognitivism is a view of level one functions as corresponding to a statement of the 
laws of cognitive behaviours akin to a constitutive Keplerian statement of the laws of 
planetary motion. Such laws are not to be quantified over as causally explanatory 
constructs, but are abstract constructs that are no more (and no less) than a conceptual 
and objective instrument by which to predict and understand possible realized 
behaviours.
On the Chomskyan account, the laws are to be quantified over, they are 
supposed to correspond to determinate neural structures and are posited as part of the 
causal explanation of linguistic behaviours. However, those behaviours are not 
themselves the primary linguistic realities and objects of study: rather the object of 
study is the I-language, the set of rules and parameters, which constitutes the always
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and already of the linguistic; it is, as a level one function, logically distinct from, prior 
to and in excess of any performance: it is, as it were, the ghost in the machine and 
which ghost is the understanding (in both senses of the ambiguity) of the machine.
Platonism/autonomism, on the other hand, directly quantifies over the set of 
always and already abstract sentence types that constitute a language, again an object 
that is transcendent of actuality and performance: the primary commitment is not, or 
cannot be to a particular formulation of the laws/grammar, but to the mind- 
independent objects that those laws are in answer to thr ough their generative capacity.
Our puipose in the preceding chapter was to question the antecedent 
probability of the MRG hypothesis as a causal explanation. To the extent that we have 
raised the improbability of this explanatory move, then this is the extent to which a 
realism regarding the object of study of linguistic theoiy needs recourse to a 
Platonism/autonomism and, correspondingly, to the positing of the primary - as 
opposed to derivative - object of study as the set of sentences of a language. What we 
have suggested is that Chomsky's generativist paradigm, in its realism, fails to provide 
content to its psychologism and collapses ontologically into, because it is empirically 
indistinguishable from, a Platonism/autonomism: a ghost without a machine. The 
generativist object of study is orthogonal to, is resistant to incorporation into, a 
perspective from individual psychology. It requires, and is routinely conceptualized as 
an always and already Platonic object.
However, what we have also suggested is that such an ontology is not a 
solution, but is rather the problem and a problem which is sufficient motive to bring 
us to question the reality of the object of study instituted by the generativist paradigm. 
This is because, once the psychological locus is removed, then we neither have an 
explanation of the human language faculty - neither how it came to be (there can be, 
as indeed there is not, an evolutionaiy account), nor an account that can avoid taking 
refuge in mysteries as to how the individual gets into any relation (causal or epistemic) 
with linguistic objects. It is precisely an answer to this latter question which it is the 
ostensible puipose of Chomsky's psychologism to provide and which, we have 
argued, has failed to be achieved: the object of study, the competence grammar of the 
generativist paradigm has failed to be, and resists being, assimilated into a psychology; 
there is simply no ascertainable psychological content for an I-language.
Our central conclusion is that from the perspective of psychology a 
competence grammar, qua causal explanatoiy construct, cannot be afforded, because 
there is no evidence for, any more than an instrumentalist constmal. The puipose of 
the present chapter is to, firstly, show that not only is there no such evidence, but that
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the positing of a psychological ontology for a competence grammar induces tensions 
that approach incoherence (an incoherence that is tidied up and disguised by liberal 
application of Occam's broom). Secondly, and running in tandem, we will argue for 
the irreality and instrumentality of the postulated object of study, i.e. the object, the 
ghost, which remains once one has undermined the psychological locus of the I- 
language: an always and already set of sentences. What generativism has answered to 
is a second order idea of the linguistic, an idea to which there is nothing that answers 
in reality. It is an idea that takes the place of the actual and which, where the actual 
does not answer to it, then this is not to impugn the idea but is to impugn the actual as 
an aberration from this transcendent reality. There is, at least, the promise of a certain 
consonance in this diagnosis: it is likely that you need a causal/explanatory fiction to 
answer to a fiction. Finally, we will take the observation of the radically context- 
dependent natur e of linguistic objects to argue for the need for a linguistics that is 
concerned with the linguistic as, at root, a constructive procedure: the linguistic is to 
be found always and only in such psychological constructions and events; what we are 
to be concerned with is ex-(or)-cising the ghost, Wittgenstein's "phantasm". A 
language is not so much something we know, something in which (we have the 
illusion that) "the end precedes the beginning", rather it is something that we do: it is, 
as von Humboldt observed, firstly and foremost an activity and as such it is required 
to be understood.
2.0 Antimonies of Chomsky's Psychologism.
2.1 Sets, types and tokens.
Chomsky's generativist enterprise was originally instituted and remains on the 
foundations laid by an assumption, precisely the assumption (the metaphysical realist's 
assumption) of the always and already of the linguistic (recall that this creed involves 
there being "a totality [that is] fixed once and for all"):
Assuming the set of grammatical sentences of English 
to be given, we now ask what sort of device can 
produce this set.4
As we have previously noted, this set is standardly and (as we have also noted) 
problematically understood as a set of types related - here is the problem - to the
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products of actual linguistic behaviour in terms of the Peircean relation between type 
and token. However, the privileged member of the polarity is resolutely the abstract 
type (and it must be abstract by virtue of being real independently of any instantiation; 
it is already "given"):
one thing that [language] certainly does not consist of is 
individual linguistic events or utterance tokens, ...
Instead, what is known in common, ..., is the system of 
linguistic types.5r
The problem is that this type/token manner of thinking results in certain 
anomalies:6 firstly, the attempt to privilege the type over the token is questionable 
because each side of the polarity is defined by its mirror term; you cannot make sense 
of the notion of some concrete event being a token of something without having it 
being the token of a type, (i.e. the something which individuates it as a token of that 
something,) and you cannot individuate types (i.e. specify which one you are talking 
about) unless you token it. Moreover, once you introduce type-token thinking, the 
point of which is to elucidate the relation between the events of linguistic performance 
and the "given" set of linguistic expressions, one is caught in the bind of certain 
"internal perplexities”.71'
To recap, types, being abstract and timeless, do not occur and do not have 
parts, so certain ineliminable properties of sentence tokens, (e.g. being temporal and 
having parts, parts which seem to be linguistic entities with linguistic properties, e.g. 
constituents,) cannot be predicated of the privileged and ontologically prior sentence 
type of which the token is the instance and where it is the type that is supposed to be 
explicating the nature of linguistic phenomena. But then we seem to have to reverse 
the priority, because it is the tokens and only the tokens that have certain of the 
properties that linguists are standardly interested in. We do not get to understand 
tokens by reference to their types. However, it is just this system of abstract types that 
is supposed to be given and is supposed to be the object of the linguist’s enquiiy 
offering us an understanding of the nature of individual instances. But if certain and 
criterial linguistic properties are only to be predicated of actual tokens, then this 
undermines precisely the initial realist assumption with its ineliminable abstraction for 
linguistic entities and which abstraction is articulated in terms of a set of types. The 
upshot is that we would seem to have to take, as we have suggested but coming from 
a different direction, an instrumentalist Mew of the linguist’s abstractions/types: it 
would seem that "what is abstract in linguistics is not of-language, but merely of-and-
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for-the-linguist, having a (merely) theoretical utility".8r Moreover, even supposing this 
can be patched up so as to maintain the proper predication of linguistic properties vis- 
a-vis the abstract members of the set of sentences, something is still awiy, for 
precisely what we do not have is an account of how the posited object of study is 
related to the first order phenomenology of the linguistic, i.e. the products of linguistic 
behaviours: what we get is the "properly" linguistic being abstract east, and the actual 
behaviour being concrete west and the two seemingly fail to meet.9
The upshot, as has been severally obseived (see the quotations below), is a 
species of solipsism: the object of study, the set of a-temporal abstract types, which is 
at the centre of the generativist enterprise, cannot be contentfully related to any 
behaviour. This is not just a matter of an empirical failure to provide any content for 
the MRG hypothesis - as has been our concern in previous chapters - but is precluded 
by the logic of the conceptualization that institutes the generativist’s discourse about 
the linguistic: between the actual/concrete and the abstract there are no common 
denominators; the former into the latter, the latter into the former simply will not go; 
as Burton-Roberts remarks, the generativisfs object of study, by virtue of its 
abstraction, offers "no E-scape". Other commentators offer similar observations:
Modem linguistics has failed to give a coherent account 
of [the] process of realization, .... Ironically, the belief 
that speech is made up of instanced forms precludes 
our giving a coherent account of the central notion, that 
of the instance itself. If we take the abstract view of 
linguistic knowledge, we have no way of linking the 
abstract to the concrete.101-
Chomsky has constructed a formal model, a
’mathematical' grammar which generates linguistic 
expressions or ’sentences'. But what is the relation of 
these linguistic expressions or ’sentences’ to our
eveiyday [linguistic activity]?1 lr
This question has real point, for without such a relation it is not clear that the selected 
object of study would be any more than an artefact of theoiy, or of some thinking, 
and an artefact that answers to nothing in reality; in other words, a fiction. This is 
because the resulting theoiy would not be explanatory of, because would have no 
contact with, any apparent and verifiable set of phenomena that we come across in the 
world; it would be, in short, (and this is where we return to the notion of a
skeuomoiph) a calculus that models no more than that which any calculus
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ineliminably models, namely, itself. Furthermore, it would be incorrigible by any 
properties of any concrete actuality (recall our remarks regarding unfalsifiability, 
empirical strandedness and the incorrigibility of level one functions): if what we are 
concerned with is a system of types, with the properties that are proper to them, then 
many properties that pertain to tokens need not be relevant to the falsification of any 
theoiy of the types.
What is being remarked on in these observations is that the abstraction of the 
designated object of study (this itself resulting from the perceived need to go beyond 
corpora to include non-actualized possibilities) gives rise to the apparent need to 
conceive of the object of study as a set of sentence types. This involves the 
Chomskyan project in certain conceptual tensions. On one side of the coin, we 
apparently lose contact with the everyday phenomenology of the linguistic, that is with 
any actualizations/realizations (i.e. precisely what psycholinguists complain about); on 
the other side (same coin), there is the explanatory need to supply the linguistic with a 
psychological and so concrete locus while negotiating the abstraction of the object of 
study. It appears, however, that the designated object of study, the set of always and 
already sentences of a language, provides an ineliminable obstacle to a psychological 
(and so explanatory) ontology for the linguistic: the abstraction of the postulated 
object of study simply cannot be coherently negotiated in this way.
2.2 Infinitude and the linguistic.
Katz (1996) observes that the psychologism of Chomsky’s project is an 
attempt to negotiate and naturalize the apparently inalienable abstractness of the 
generativist’s object of study in terms of a concrete/cognitive/neurological ontological 
locus.12 He also observes that this attempt is flawed: such a conceptualization, he 
argues, does not and cannot "allow for sufficient abstractness to provide a satisfactoiy 
interpretation of grammars."13 The essence of Katz' point (see also footnote 27, 
chapter m  and Carr, (1990, pgs. 42 - 43)) is quite simple: the infinitude of the 
linguistic is incompatible with the finitude of the psychological (for remarks on the 
bold faced - indeed, positively brazen - "knows" see the footnote).
Since Chomsky is taking a generative grammar to be 
about something mental/neural, and since an English 
grammar is about the denumerable infinity of English 
sentences, ..., it follows that those sentences must also
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be something mental/neural. Hence, there has to be a 
denumerable infinity of mental/neural objects. But 
given the fmiteness and discontinuity of matter, 
there can’t be an infinity of mental/neural objects.
The moral is simple. Infinity and abstractness 
go hand in hand. No concrete [e.g. mental/neural] 
interpretation of grammars can satisfactorily represent 
the infinity of sentences of a natural language. ...
Consequently, the only way to obtain the unactualized 
possibilities required to do justice to what the field of 
linguistics knouts about the sentences of a natural 
language is to non-reductively take that scientific 
knowledge to be about types. But, since types are 
abstract objects, taking theories in linguistics to be 
about types is linguistic realism [i.e. platonism].14
Chomsky’s manoeuvre, the E-language/I-language distinction, is to disclaim 
commitment to the extensional psychological reality of a set of sentences: "sets are not 
in the mind"15r Rather the commitment is to a finite set of rules and parameters, a set 
which is perfectly compatible with the finitude of the mind/brain. As Katz remarks:
The hope is that, being committed to only ... a finite 
system of sentence-generating operations which 
characterizes a potential infinity of sentences, linguistic 
conceptualism will be consistent with the finiteness and 
discontinuity of matter.16r
Ostensibly, again as Katz remarks, and has Chomsky has also suggested,171' this move 
places the generativist project in line with Brouwer’s intuitionist/constmctivist project 
for mathematics. The trouble is that, if this is the only way to preserve the 
psychologism of generativism (Katz suggests it is) and if the Brouwerian option is 
what we want, then what we want is a linguistics that is committed to the notion of the 
infinitude of the linguistic as no more than potential, as opposed to the Platonist 
commitment to an actual infinity. This is the point of defining the set of sentences 
intensionally as opposed to extensionally. However, this is precisely what we do not 
get: the actual practice and the thinking of linguists in the generativist tradition is 
pervaded by the assumption of a metaphysical realist (Platonist) and actual, always 
and already construal of the set of theorems (i.e. sentences of a language) that are 
generated by some finite set of axioms. Indeed, Katz suggests that this cannot be 
avoided: if one wants to insist on a potential infinity, and generativism does, then:
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to say that such operations 'can' generate an infinite 
class of sentences, the explanation [of what this means] 
has to use ’sentence’ in the type sense or has to use the 
notion of non-actual possibilia ... .18r
But this is to understand the non-actual as actually, even if abstractly, always and 
already, which is precisely what the manoeuvre was supposed to obviate.
The inappropriateness of characterizing the Chomskyan scheme as parallel 
with constructivism in mathematics emerges from the observation that there is no 
obvious room in a linguistic version of constructivism for a distinction between 
competence and performance. Precisely what a constructivism insists on, if we 
preserve Chomsky’s terminology, is "a blurring’’,191' indeed, a conflation of the two 
poles of the competence/performance distinction. The whole point of constructivism, 
hence the name, is to excise commitment to objects unless they are actually 
constructable: it is their construction which is their- own verification, it is how they 
come into existence. What exists is not some prior reality to which an event is in 
correspondence, rather there is only the construction, the mental event.20 There is, 
from this perspective, literally no sense to the notion of a mathematical/linguistic 
object that has some always and already, even if abstract, existence independently of 
its actual construction:
Where the realist says that every potential infinity 
presupposes an actual infinity, the constructivist replies 
that every potential infinity presupposes an operation 
and entails that there is no objective reality. What is 
true [or existent] is so only in virtue of our ability [a 
practical/perfbrmance-type ability] to apply the 
operation to a successful outcome, not in virtue of any 
correspondence with any such reality. ...
[Where, on the one hand, the constructivist 
does,] the realist does not take the notion of 
construction seriously, as imposing any real 
constraint.211'
Indeed, nor does the generativist linguist, for such constraints as are concomitant with 
a constructivist perspective are in conflict with the "full generality - the notion of 'any 
sentence’ - on which the [generativist] linguist relies. "22r Here, of course, "any 
sentence" means any one of the set generated by the competence grammar. From a 
constructivist perspective, the focus is not on a level one/competence theory, rather
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the constraints mentioned above, constraints which are intrinsic and properly 
constitutive, are those of a level two/performance theoiy;
The entire significance for the mathematician of 
rendering more precise the concept of algorithm 
emerges ... in connection with the problem of a 
constructive foundation for mathematics.23r
A corollary is that constructivism entails that there is no sense to the notion of a 
sentence being in a language where that sentence is not only unactualized but also, 
because perhaps it is simply too long or defeats the parsing mechanism, 
unactualizable. The inclusion of such sentences in a language is, however, precisely 
the position to which Chomsky's level one/competence theoiy and standard practice 
are committed: taking such considerations as length to be proper to the object of study 
would be to confuse acceptability with grammaticality.24
As further grist to the mill and contention that a constructivism is incompatible 
with Chomsky's position (and illustrative of Katz' contention) are some more recent 
remarks by Chomsky. It is not a constructivism, with its concomitant anti-realism, but 
only a realism with its commitment to an actual, pre-existing, albeit abstract, infinity 
that makes sense of Chomsky's comment that:
With only a slight ah of paradox, we may say that 
languages, as such, are not usable. If some expressions 
are not parsable, as is often the case, they are simply 
not used, and the language is no worse for that.251
It would seem one can only predicate (un)-usability of something which is in some 
sense already, of something which one is prepared to quantify over irrespective of 
whether it can be constructed/actualized. In short, Chomsky's (and generativism's) 
thinking is shot through with a metaphysical realist conception of the linguistic 
domain, with the linguistic as a set of always and already abstract types. In this 
respect, the E-language/I-language distinction is little more than cosmetic: while it 
might apparently offer to ground a constructivist view of the linguistic, it is a promise 
that is not met precisely because it does not integrate the actualizing constructive 
procedure into the object of study. Furthermore and crucially, the price of not 
meeting this promise is, if we accept Katz' contentions, a failure to preserve a 
psychological ontology for the natural linguistic, for what we are referring to, the set 
of sentences in the language unconstrained by performance factors, simply has to be
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construed as constituted of abstract objects, many members of which exceed the limits 
of a psychologist ontology. The conclusion that falls out from these remarks is that 
there is no ontological hope for the generativist object of study except by way of a 
Platonism/ autonomism.
The internal tensions that arise from an attempt to construe this object of study 
as psychological come out further if we inspect a little more closely Chomsky's "slight 
air of paradox". On the one hand, the generativist cannot cogently (although does) 
think of the members of the generated set as existing independently of their 
construction, i.e. extensionally, not if he wishes to think of them as having a 
psychological ontological status (they are too many and too many too long). 
Consequently, he has to (even if he habitually does not) think of the generative set as 
merely potential, as specified in intension. But then, what sense is there to "potential" 
where many members in the extension of the term (i.e. many members of the set 
generated) are, as a matter of psychological fact, not potential at all, but are, in this 
actual world, unusable, i.e. impossible because they cannot be actualized? But, this 
seems to commit the linguist to saying that certain sentences of a language are, like all 
the others, potential but, unlike others, not potentially potential ("see how high the 
seas of language run"). This puzzle attempts to be accommodated by "cannot" being 
taken to be linguistically contingent, a matter of performance, as, in Bertrand Russell's 
phrase, remarking on "merely a medical impossibility". But, is not this "medical 
impossibility" no other than a psychological impossibility. What emerges from this 
attempt to maintain a psychologism is a distinction, and, in the event, a seemingly 
unreconcilable tension and breaking of contact between two sets of facts: between, on 
the one hand, the linguistic (supposedly psychological) and, on the other hand and 
rather peculiarly, also the psychological.
This might strike one as odd. It is an oddness that, to be negotiated, instigates, 
as we shall see, the recourse to the familiar numerous set of intruding other factors to 
"explain" the apparent bifurcation. However, this itself has a consequence, parallel to 
the one we have remarked on and equally questionable: one set of cognitive facts - 
knowledge of I-language, by which knowledge we are supposed to be able to 
recognize licensed sentences as licensed sentences - parts company from and is 
privileged over (in the jargon, is potentially verification-transcendent of26) another set 
of cognitive facts - the facts about which set of sentences we do, in actual fact, 
recognize and which we can, in fact, actualize. (We take this up in detail below).
However, might one not ask just which psychologically real language it is that 
is not usable, that is not psychologically realizable? Is it the case that the language we
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"must speak [,] the language of eveiyday ... is somehow too coarse and material"27r to 
answer to the real linguistic facts, those linguistic facts that generativism is in answer 
to and seems to somehow know antecedently, which are always and already, in excess 
of and elsewhere than linguistic events? What other language is this which is always 
and elsewhere, which we know but which is unusable? For the unusability of a 
language (and its exceeding, as it must do, our intuitive recognition) is entirely 
consistent with, is indistinguishable from, that language not being the case in respect 
of any psychologically realized or realizable human language. A solution (Katz* and 
Carr's) to these apparent antimonies is to maintain the realism but drop the 
psychologism on the grounds that this is the only way to coherently accommodate the 
properties of the standardly accepted object of study, which object makes sense of the 
working practice of linguists.
However, is it not at least possible that what generativism is answering to, in 
answering to the non-actual, is no more than an idea and a fiction of the linguistic, the 
"non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm" of Wittgenstein's phrase? This is not to 
question the objectivity of this unusable language, it is surely an objective one, but 
objective only in the way that a formal, mathematical system (i.e. a generative 
grammar) and its set of strings are real; that is as abstracta. It is, however, to question 
the reality of the relation of correspondence between those abstract entities and some 
physical or psychological illata that are actually existent. Such suspicions would at 
least cast some resolving light on the paradox that Chomsky notes. There is, after all, 
not even the slightest air of paradox in saying that a language that is a fiction and an 
artefact - a skeuomorph - is not usable.
2.3 Infinitude as skeuomorph.
We predicate o f the thing what lies in the method o f 
representing it. Impressed by the possibility o f 
comparison, we think we are perceiving a state o f 
affairs o f the highest generality.
(L. Wittgenstein281')
Central to the misgivings raised in the above is the putative infinitude of 
natural language. It is this which induces the air of paradox. Infinitude is not a 
property that admits of empirical confirmation. One might ask how it gets to be so 
confidently predicated as a property of natural language (compare our quotation from
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Katz, pg. 219 and the corresponding footnote). As it turns out, it is so predicated only 
by a sleight of hand which involves circularly assuming properties of what is supposed 
to be disconfirmable, i.e. the formal model, the theory-constitutive metaphor that 
provides epistemic access, that, in Saussure's phrase, "creates the object".
Smith and Wilson provide an example of the standard reasoning. On the basis 
of the acceptability of multiple light embeddings (e.g. "I said that you knew that you 
felt...") they argue that (my italics):
As there is no linguistic limit to the number of times S 
can be reintroduced ... it is impossible to construct the 
longest' sentence in English, and hence the number of 
sentences generated is infinite.29
This also prorides the rationale for the inclusion of multiple centres within the 
language: the grammar has to account for acceptable sentences such as:
1) The rat the cat ate died.
The case of multiple right embeddings argues for unlimited recursion, consequently, 
multiple centres cannot be excluded from the set of grammatical strings, despite the 
fact that nobody (except perhaps linguists) has judgements of acceptability for 
sentences of any greater recursive complexity. This amounts to the claim that such 
sentences are verification transcendent. The same reasoning is applied to the case of 
strings that are judged acceptable but which can not be included within the set of 
sentences in a language. Smith and Wilson cite in illustration (here slightly amended):
2) That is the sort of book that, once you have read, 
you really feel you want to give it to all your friends.
This is to be excluded from the set of grammatical sentences on the basis that:
Xf we incorporated the principles used to form [it] into 
English grammar, they would immediately give rise to 
the clear ungrammatically of:
This is a book which I gave it to my friend.
In other words, whatever it is that makes [the former] 
sound natural, it is not, and cannot be, a linguistic 
rule.30
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However, what is questionable in the above quotations is the use of 
"linguistic'’, for the reason that the linguistic (and what "cannot be" the linguistic case) 
is being assumed and defined as corresponding to the parameters and properties (in 
the first case, unlimited recursion) of the formal apparatus, the formal system which it 
is supposed to be the business of enquiry to test as regards its fitness as a model of the 
linguistic. Moreover, it seems that one is released from empirical constraint, for what 
is the theoiy-extemal evidence (external to the assumption of a generative model) that 
multiple centre-embeddings (or indefinitely long sentences) are to be accounted for as 
being included within the set of sentences of a language except for the fact that they 
have to be there as a reflex of the realist interpretation of the formal system that is 
applied to in the task of furnishing an explanation? This move, to be justified, appears 
to require the Galilean assumption of the literality of the formal system metaphor, that 
some formal system prefigures the properties of linguistic objects and that the 
properties of the formal system inhere in that object. In other words (Wittgenstein’s), 
such formal models constitute "a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond" 
(compare "must" with the force of Smith's and Wilson's "cannot" - both are seemingly 
of sufficient force to override any mere actuality).
A rejoinder might rehearse the reasoning that we can be confident in asserting 
the grammaticality of impossible to be actualized sentences (e.g. multiple centre- 
embeddings) by deducing that they must "go on in the same way" as perfectly 
acceptable sentences, i.e. sentences of which we have perfectly adequate evidence and 
in answer to which the property of recursion was posited in the first place. The fact of 
recursion in the attested cases suggests a general rule, the attested cases are as if "a 
visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity. "31r However, when we think in this 
way, what we are doing is, figuratively, putting on the glasses as provided by some 
second-order thinking about the linguistic; we are taking up some meta-perspective as 
provided by the conceptual apparatus which we bring to theorizing and we are 
thinking through that - on those rails - to the not yet actual, to what must be the case, 
i.e. what is predicted ij the formal system is true, i.e. is the intrinsic condition, of the 
linguistic. What excises the conditional is the Galilean assumption that natural 
language is a formal system. What we have is, from the I-language perspective, the 
linguistic-as-foimal-system and, from the E-language perspective, the linguistic as the 
objects, i.e. sentences, that interpret that formal system. These objects, however, are 
never to be come across in this actual world, they are abstract types, nor, however, are 
their tokens to be encountered, because they are not-actualizable, but this latter 
empirical fact cannot, nor, indeed, need any such fact, impugn the transcendent
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logical fact. It would seem that linguistics is not an empirical science, but is, by fiat of 
the originaiy theory-constitutive metaphor, a formal science simpliciter.
One might still be tempted to cling to the empirical legitimacy of Smith and 
Wilson's "must". However, the force of this "must" not only carries one out of any 
empirical realm toward the making of assertions that are verification transcendent (i.e. 
unable to be bome out by any data), but also one is earned toward the making of 
assertions that are frequently contradicted by the empirical evidence: speakers simply 
do not have judgements of acceptability of, for example, multiple centre-embedded 
strings. It is at this point that evidence is supplemented and interpreted by the 
"intrusion of numerous other factors". As we have discussed, it is by no means clear 
what the evidence for such other factors is other than the theory-internal tensions that 
require them to be the case so as to preserve, and make unfalsifiable, the realist 
reading of the theoiy, i.e. the literal constraal of the formal system metaphor. In short, 
what we get is indeed the formal system as a "preconceived idea to which reality must 
correspond", some "superlative fact" which when not bome out by any evidence, i.e. 
speaker judgements, is sufficient (care of the intrusion of numerous other factors) to 
override and confute that evidence. However, this is not so much theory-saving as 
theory-confounding, for what emerges again is the difficult to make coherent 
bifurcation of supposedly psychological facts: the I-linguistic on the one hand, and, on 
the other, intuitive judgements. What is odd is that the latter are supposed to be 
informed by the former, for this is the veiy rationale for taking such judgements as 
relevant at all, as being data about that I-language. What results from this bifurcation, 
as we detail in the next section, is the undermining of this rationale and with it an 
undermining of both the mind-intemal ontology for the I-linguistic and also of the 
ability to provide an explanatory linguistics on the basis of a competence grammar.
2.4 Intuitions revisited: bivalence as skenomorph.
The "preconceived idea", the formal system metaphor with the metaphoricity 
illicitly excised, as we have suggested previously, constitutes the axis of the 
idealization and abstraction that is deemed a methodological requirement for linguistic 
enquiry. It is what modularizes the gross phenomenon. What results is a skeuomorph: 
the object of study is made to answer to (and the data are tidied up on the axis of 
idealization so as to answer to) the properties (infinitude and bivalence) brought in by 
way of the conceptual apparatus that institutes the discourse and "creates the object of
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study". Where those properties are not bome out by any evidence, we get the citation 
of "the intrusion of numerous other factors" to account for this empirical shortfall. 
But all this amounts to is a wielding of Occam's broom justified on the grounds of 
simplifying the theoiy. However, this simplification (recall simplicity is definable only 
in theoiy-intemal terms) is no more than a case of assuming that which is supposed to 
be open to falsification and thereby making it unfalsifiable. What also results, and 
which is the focus of our concerns in the following, is an xmdermining of the rationale 
for positing the I-language in causal explanation of the ability to have intuitions, as 
that which provides the causal basis of our linguistic ability. In short, what is brought 
to question is the status of the I-language as explanatory of the speaker's linguistic 
ability.
In brief, the point is that if it is claimed that there are grammatical sentences 
that are not recognizable, by a speaker's intuitive judgement, as acceptable (or 
ungrammatical sentences that are judged acceptable, or, indeed, sentences that 
apparently violate the principle of bivalence, i.e. are on some occasions deemed the 
one and on other occasions the other), then, and this is the difficulty in the position, it 
seems that one has to maintain that there are certain sentences that are licensed by the 
I-language, as a putative psychological fact, and so are what is known, but which the 
I-language which we putatively access in making such judgements, does not 
recognize. It seems we have both to know a sentence to be in the language (care of 
the I-language that licenses the sentence) and, at the same time, to not know that a 
sentence is in the language (care of our intuitions, themselves putatively care of the I- 
language that licenses the same sentence).32
The "other factors" are what are posited to get round this anomaly, or, to be 
more precise, get in the way of access to the I-language. However, this does not solve 
the problem because, the strong whiff of unfalsifiability apart, what is then brought 
into question is the very cogency of taking intuitive data to be evidence for the content 
of the I-language at all: if, in certain cases, it is allowed that there is a discrepancy 
between what is judged acceptable and what is licensed by the grammar, then, in these 
cases, that which is the basis for the judgement, the information that is accessed, 
cannot be the I-language. So, in these cases the judgements are data about, and are 
data that are informed by, the "other [i.e. performance] factors". To explain the ability 
to have these intuitions one cannot postulate the I-language, something else must be 
the informational cause of the judgement. But then, the I-language was posited in the 
first place to explain, amongst other linguistic behaviours, the ability to have intuitive 
judgements. This is what makes sense of taking such judgements as data. Now we
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have to say that we can, indeed must, have such judgements on some other basis. But, 
does one need to postulate the I-language, defined as a context-independent 
autonomous body of declarative knowledge, as being the basis for any intuitive 
judgement, and, by parity, as being causally implicated in any linguistic behaviour, as 
being, in any contentful sense, psychologically real? Might it not be the case that it is 
precisely the numerous other performance factors that are properly, to some crucial 
measure, constitutive of speakers' linguistic ability? Moreover, if linguistic behaviour 
vis-a-vis intuitions of acceptability need have no recourse to a body of autonomous 
linguistic knowledge qua I-language, one might ask just what is the I-language 
hypothesis explaining, other than linguistic facts that are not actual, i.e. not 
recognizable as, linguistic facts. Just what verification transcendent language is this 
that we are talking about (and not speaking) and just what work is it doing other than 
allowing the theorist to get psychologically real about his grammar?
To unpack these remarks: the rationale behind using intuitive judgements as 
data (recall, Fodor reminds us that we need some stoiy to relate the data to that which 
they are data about) is that they are taken to be informed by the I-language and, 
hence, provide the linguist with evidence of what strings of a language are members 
of the set of sentences generated by the grammar; ostensibly they make the theory qua 
grammar falsifiable. If the I-language is what we know when we know a language, 
and the I-language is the knowledge resource that is accessed when we have intuitions, 
then it is predicted, all things being equal, that speakers should be able to recognize as 
acceptable all and only the sentences generated by the grammar, for this is what 
makes sense of the practice of using intuitive judgements as potentially 
disconfirmatory of theoretical claims. This is how linguistics gets to be a fully paid up 
member of a Popperian natural-scientific club.
However, an unqualified interpretation of acceptability judgements as being 
directly disconfirmatory of the content of the I-language has to be modified because, 
simply, many strings that on a generativist model have to be taken to be licensed by 
the grammar are not recognized as acceptable sentences of a language by speakers of 
the language. Examples are sentences that are, in general, recursively complex, as in:
3) The man who has knowledge of the fact that the
Prime Minister knows of the whereabouts of the leader
of the opposition's secretary’s files is under arrest.331
Other systematically problematic sentence types are certain garden path sentences that 
on some occasions, i.e. in certain contexts, are, and on other occasions are not, judged
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acceptable.34 If such judgements were allowed to be taken at face value (i.e. as data 
directly about the I-language), then this would bring to question the principle of 
bivalence which is supposed to be applicable to natural language strings: they either 
are, or are not grammatical and are so antecedently to their tokening. (Bivalence is a 
direct corollaiy of a metaphysical realism, it comes out of the assertion that there are, 
antecedent to any actuality, a defined set of determinate states of aifairs, in the 
linguistic case, a given set of sentences; any string either is or is not a member of that 
set, there is no middle term.)
Relatedly, one might also mention the frequently attested cases of native- 
speaker informants who, individually, have an unhappy habit of giving conflicting 
judgements on different occasions about identical sentences - one might think that 
they do not know (in the theoretically approved sense of "know") their own language. 
It is just as well we can rely on linguists' "annoiy of techniques" to sort out what their 
judgements should really be. Of course, it might be pointed out that the need for this 
complexity (or, to give a certain rhetorical spin to the same phenomenon, this licence 
for any ad hoc undignified shuffle) can be traced back to, and so bring to question, 
both Chomsky's initial realist assumption of a language as a determinate, already given 
set of sentences and also the correlative canting of the gross phenomenon by a 
distinction between competence and performance.
A consideration that is put forward to argue for the maintenance of this 
carving of the gross phenomenon is that we need to maintain the standard distinction 
between competence and performance (and so maintain a realism in respect of the 
competence grammar as a mentally represented autonomous system) because it 
answers to certain observed facts. This is the line of (standard) argumentation taken 
by Higginbotham.35 He argues that there is need to posit the competence grammar as 
a sort of "clerk", "a context-independent cognitive resource" who is consulted from 
time to time on matters linguistic, in order to account for the fact that, in certain cases, 
for example garden-paths, speakers are able to reflect on initially unprocessable strings 
and come to the conclusion that they are in fact acceptable sentences of the language 
as licensed by the grammar. The picture we are encouraged to have is one of the 
intruding, performance factors being suppressed and so allowing some direct access to 
what our linguistic clerk has to tell us.
This is not, perhaps, an impossibility (I am being charitable), it is, however, 
both unlikely on the one hand (because difficult to make coherent,) and, on the other,
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wholly insufficient reason to ground the conclusion that we need an autonomous and 
encapsulated body of linguistic knowledge to account for this ability.
To take this latter point first: in the case of multiple centre-embeddings it is 
standardly argued that the difficulty of such constructions is to be placed at the door 
of the perceptual strategies that the parsing process implements. Higginbotham's 
suggestion, which is in line with Chomsky's comments,36 is that, given some time to 
reflect, a subject can suppress these factor's. But, even where a subject does accede to 
such a sentence's acceptability, there is no very good reason to privilege the 
supposition that this is because a body of autonomous linguistic knowledge is being 
made use o f In any case, it cannot be applied to because its information is putatively 
tacit. The general point is that, given time to reflect, then, while this may enable 
"extrinsic constraints" such as memory limitations to be suppressed, precisely by the 
same measure, this means, because we can not apply to our tacit knowledge, that the 
extra time allows other, i.e. extrinsic, cognitive abilities to come to the rescue. These 
extrinsic factors are putatively irrelevant to a string's grammatical status. They are, 
however, seemingly crucial to the verification of its status and to a string's being 
constructed as a psychological object for contemplation by our clerk. What emerges, 
if we insist on this view, is the position where psychology bifurcates into two sets of 
facts, however, one of these sets of facts, the linguistic, are transcendent of those facts 
which are crucial to their verification. Not only is this somewhat unsatisfactory, 
looking like a Platonism under the guise of an ersatz psychologism, but it also turns 
out to be very difficult to make coherent.
In illustration of the role of extrinsic factors, as we noted above, one might 
persuade a speaker (or a speaker might persuade herself) that, given the acceptability 
of a sentence with one centre-embedded clause, and given unlimited recursion in the 
case of right-embeddings, then a sentence with two (or unlimited) centre-embedded 
clauses must also be grammatical. But what gets us to this conclusion is a non- 
linguistic-specific ability for deductive reasoning. It is not, and cannot be, evidence of 
the nature of a speaker's linguistic competence, but of a speaker's ability to think 
logically about the string taking the unrestricted recursion of a grammar as a premise. 
It cannot be evidence for the reality of an internalized competence grammar because 
this premise cannot itself be derived from inspection of one's tacit competence, and 
this because that competence is precisely that, i.e. tacit.
More generally, it is by no means clear just how much meta-linguistic, or para- 
linguistic, knowledge might be brought into play when a speaker is asked to make a
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judgement of a sentence's acceptability. By "meta-linguistic knowledge" I mean 
knowledge (or opinion) about language that one might pick up by virtue of being a 
speaker of a language or by virtue of being educated about a language, i.e. as distinct 
from the putative strictly sui generic and tacit linguistic knowledge that constitutes the 
final state of the I-language.37 An implicit question here is just how naive is the naive 
linguist and to what extent does this knowledge/opinion intrude into the making of 
judgements? Such meta-linguistic knowledge/opinion, and so the possibility of its 
interference as an intruding "other factor", will be the more likely in the case of the 
educated speaker of a language, and yet more so in the case of the linguist (and it is 
standardly this latter, of course, who supplies linguistic data). More to the present 
point however, these considerations suggest that there is little mileage to be gained in 
the attempt to argue for the psychological reality of a grammar as a "context- 
independent cognitive resource" on the basis of an ability to reanalyze hard to process 
sentences. Of course, one might want such to be the case, but wanting it so does not 
make it so.
To take up our other point: it is unlikely that extraneous performance factors 
can be suppressed because "what you have to remember about parsing is that basically 
it’s a reflex. "38r The point about a reflex is that it is automatic and cannot be 
suppressed nor circumvented in the way that Higginbotham seems to require. 
Moreover, it is not at all clear what it would mean for a judgement to be made directly 
about some linguistic object, on the basis of accessing an autonomous body of 
linguistic knowledge, before that linguistic object has been processed, for what would 
that judgement be about? It could not be about a linguistic object because, before they 
are processed, linguistic objects are no more than acoustic or graphic events and so no 
more linguistic than is the sound I am making typing this or the coffee stain on my 
desk. What we have to conclude is that if performance factors are suppressed, then 
there can be nothing for our clerk to have any opinion about at all. But does this not 
suggest that it is just these performance factors that are constitutive of individuating 
linguistic properties?
These observations do, however, suggest some account of what might be 
going on when we make some judgement. Feasibly, at least initially feasibly, what 
happens is that the parsing process results in some structured object to which our clerk 
either assents or dissents. This might explain how it is that certain sentence types (such 
as multiple centre-embeddings) are deemed unacceptable. Perhaps it is because the 
parsing process simpty fails to provide a structured object for inspection and fails 
because it cannot handle certain levels of complexity. But, if this is the case, then how
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does one get to explain how it is that perfectly processable strings that are 
ungrammatical are judged acceptable? The point is not restricted to, perhaps, one or 
two possibly debatable examples, but is, we are told, quite general:
so called "ungrammatical" or "deviant" sentences are 
often quite readily parsable and are even perfectly 
intelligible, and quite properly used in appropriate 
circumstances.391-
And if they are parsable, then the parser must produce a structured object but, at the 
same time, one which, seemingly, fools our clerk. Perhaps, then, our clerk does not 
know what he knows when he knows a language, or knows it and does not know it at 
the same time. Or maybe he gets confused, or maybe we are doing it wrong and 
applying to the wrong resource and other factors are still intruding. But, if that is the 
case, how do we know when we are doing it right? Perhaps we need a linguist (with 
her armory of techniques) to tell us. But then, just who is it that has an entitlement to 
views about a language, just whose data and which data are directly valid, which 
language is it that we are talking about?
To take a different tack: if our speech is littered with strings that are both 
"properly used" and acceptable, while at the same time their "deviancy" consigns them 
to the technical status of being not in the language, then again one may ask what 
language is it that we are speaking, and which is outside of the proper object of study? 
For it is, seemingly, one that we know by virtue of knowing something other than a 
language, where "language" is defined as an I-language. But, if we need something 
other than an I-language to explain this language, just what is it that an I-language is 
explaining; do we need to posit an I-language that is autonomous of performance to 
account for our ability to have any intuitions of well-formedness? This is, of course, 
what makes sense of the practice of using intuitive judgements as data in the first 
place. Chomsky remarks that it is in fact no more than an "assumption or pretence that 
... informant judgements give us 'direct evidence' as to the structure of the I- 
language",401 but might not the pretence, which we might think of as that which is 
potentially fictional, be the psychological and putative causal status of the I-language? 
Precisely grounds that might be cited for its psychological/causal fictionality are, if we 
insist on the use of intuitive data, the difficulties involved in making coherent an 
account of how this I-language is related to intuitive data, how it is that it can be 
consulted. This is at the centre of the problem, for it seems that in positing a body of
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tacit knowledge in explanation of the forms of linguistic structures, that knowledge is 
taken to be blindly applied and impossible of conscious access. Yet the point of, and 
justification for, taking intuitions as data is that this same body of knowledge is also 
available to be accessed by, and is "visible" to, some subpersonal system, our "clerk", 
independently of the blind following of the rules, which rules constitute the body of 
tacit knowledge. It is a similar point that is made by Wright in respect of explanations 
in general that make use of tacit knowledge.411' Higginbotham summarizes Wrighfs 
contentions as resulting in a dilemma:
either familiar talk of rules or principles of language 
internalized by native speakers should be understood as 
metaphorical merely; or else we must admit 
unconscious rule following, a conception that faces the 
task of explaining how a rule can be blindly applied and 
at the same time something that the organism heeds.421
And, we might add, something that the organism is on occasions incapable of 
heeding, those occasions being those where the data from intuitions are at odds with 
what should be the case if such judgements were to directly reflect the properties and 
parameters of the formal models which articulate Chomskyan linguistic theories.
In sum, it looks suspiciously like the "intrusion of other factors" with the 
correlative "armory of techniques" is no more than a means to interpret the data in 
order to maintain the correspondence of the parameters and properties of such formal 
models with those of some putative, performance-autonomous, psychological system. 
The invocation of these other factors is the condition on maintaining a psychological 
realism for the I-language together with the assumption, correlative of the realism, of 
bivalence: that the determinate set of determinate sentences of a language is already 
given antecedently. It is plausible to suggest that what is happening is precisely an 
instance of some idealization/creation of the object of study along the axis projected 
by the theoretical apparatus that instigates the discourse. Bivalence, at the level of 
sentential syntactic objects, has to be the case because it is a requirement of the formal 
system metaphor, which formal system generates precisely a determinate set of 
sentential syntactic objects. Bivalence is, in short, a skeuomorph.43 What the 
supposedly innocent, and ostensibly methodologically necessaiy, idealization, by way 
of application of the "armory of techniques", is quite plausibly doing where it 
addresses the aforementioned vagaries is no more than packaging and falsifying the
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data so that they can fit into the predetermined patterns as requir ed by the formal 
system metaphor. The evidence for the fictionality being none other than the 
indeterminacies of the primary data.
However, the rationale that provides a justification for the interpretation of 
data as giving access onto the psychologically realized competence grammar results, 
on the one hand, in the dilemma, amounting to the anomaly, if not incoherence, 
which we have observed, while, on the other hand, the attempt to negotiate the 
discrepancy between what is required by a realism (a given and determinate, 
denumerably infinite set of sentences) and the actual data (which, prima facie, is 
compatible with neither the infinitude nor the bivalence of the linguistic) results in the 
need to posit the intrusion of performance factors to counter the bifurcation and loss 
of contact between the two sets of putatively cognitive facts: those of what our 
intuitions tell us and those that our intuitions ought to be telling us if they were to 
reflect the informational content of the I-language. But, all that this recourse to other 
factors does is to undermine the interpretation of the data as being in some sort of 
relation to a psychologically realized competence grammar; this because it brings into 
question the explanatory role of the I-language (knowledge of sentences defined on a 
syntactic axis) as an autonomous locus for a speaker's knowledge of language. For 
once such "intrusion" is admitted of in intuitive judgements, then, by parity, it 
becomes perfectly cogent to canvas the possibility that these (performance/pragmatic) 
intruding factors are crucially involved in, and constitutive of, linguistic ability in 
general. What obtrudes, if we follow this reasoning, is the possibility that those 
properties that individuate linguistic entities are always and only to be found in actual 
linguistic events; it is not so much that other (performance) factors intrude, as that 
they constitute the linguistic phenomenon. To use a theological metaphor, the 
linguistic is not so much begotten, as made. Such a possibility would shift the 
explanation for the individuating properties of linguistic entities, at least in some part, 
onto the systems that are involved in performance, a move entir ely in consonance with 
a constructivist emphasis on algorithm and the actualizing cognitive operations: it 
would be the algorithms that are to be accommodated as central to an explanatory 
account.44
To come to the same point somewhat more directly: it is simply not the case 
that an always and already metaphysical and psychological realism, with a correlative 
principle of bivalence, may be comfortably or naturally deemed appropriate to 
linguistic objects, not unless we accept the bifurcation of the psychological into the
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non-transcendent and the transcendent. One may cite as evidence: firstly, the above 
mentioned apparent vagaries of native-speaker judgements, (they are only vagaries on 
the assumption of the autonomy of the linguistic from performance). Secondly, is the 
reported fact of the crucial role that context plays in determining acceptability 
judgements and interpretations in garden-paths and lexically or syntactically 
ambiguous strings.45 In other words, if we follow Chomsky's line and identify what it 
is that confers on us an ability to have such judgements with what our inquiry is 
about, then we have to recognize the substantive role that performance and context 
plays in fixing the syntactic properties of natural language strings.
The other option is to accept the breaking of contact and the verification 
transcendence of linguistic objects, maintain the generativist’s object of study, and to 
take, for the reasons cited (infinitude and the putative fallibility of intuitions), the 
realist and Platonic/autonomous road. Perhaps:
We want to say that there can't be any vagueness ....
The idea now absorbs us, that the ideal 'must' be found 
in reality. ... We think it must be in reality; for we think 
we already see it there.461
And, indeed, we do already see it there as something to be answered to, and 
what we see has a certain objective content: what we see is an object that is the 
denotation of the everyday notion of a language. It is some such cultural and socio- 
historic artefact that, for instance, the Academie fran^aise talks sense about (I 
exaggerate); it is what we refer to when we refer, in our everyday way, to "English" or 
"Italian": an always and already compendium filtered thr ough some melange of socio­
political and cultural concerns. It is in reference to such an object that one can 
sensibly produce a volume entitled "A Guide to Common Errors in English". But, just 
what is the nature of this entity, "English", that is referred to and to which, apparently, 
such objective content can be ascribed?
Cultural artefacts and institutions such as this notion of "English" are just as 
much objects as are any others 47 Notably, and the point of this excursion, both 
languages, in this artefactual sense, and "the lexicon" are taken to be proper and 
primary objects of study for linguistics, by Katz, in the case of the former,48r and by 
Carr in the case of the latter (both are also not obviously distinguishable from the 
objects anived at through the process of "abstraction and idealization" which is 
claimed to be a methodological requirement of an enquiry from Chomsky's 
"standpoint of individual psychology": again a blurring, if not erasing, of any
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contentful distinctions between the ontological positions). Indeed, it is the 
incompatibility of the notion of a "lexicon of a language" with a perspective from 
individual psychology that Carr uses to argue, in tandem with the argument from 
infinitude, for the inadequacy of a psychological ontology for the linguistic:
Given that, in the generative enterprise, we take 
knowledge of the grammar of a language to define 
what it is we know when we know a language, it is 
clear that we want to claim that the lexicon of a 
language is a linguistic reality. But that reality is not 
clearly an object of individual knowledge; it is not clear 
what it would mean to claim that each of us, as 
members of a speech community, possesses the lexicon 
per se. ... Rather, the [lexicon of a language] is more 
easily interpretable as a public object.491"
This is undoubtedly the case. And it is also undoubted (at least here) that such 
objects constitute valid objects for some enquiiy: as Wittgenstein's remark, cited 
prefatory to this chapter, reminds us, "it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon 
in a variety of ways." However, it is not the case that such objects need be taken as 
normative, as some pre-theoretic and umeducible given, such as to define a necessaiy 
and only object of enquiiy that has to be answered to in and of itself. Arguably, such 
objects (e.g. as correspond to these notions of a language or the lexicon) are 
constructions and idealizations out of our meta-talk and our thinking about linguistic 
behaviours; we might term such constructions second-order phenomena. As objects 
of study such constructions are within the province of the social sciences (widely 
construed). However, it is the first-order individual linguistic behaviours - along with 
the facts of acquisition - which appear to have the more obvious claims to be a 
primary phenomenon, for they are what there is meta-talk about. Indeed, also 
arguably, when we are seduced by the familiarity of the resulting artefacts into 
thinking them primaiy, it is at least possible that we get things the wrong way round 
and are answering to no more than some second-order idea and ideal of the linguistic 
constructed out of our generalizing over actual and individual linguistic behaviours.50 
(In the following section we adduce gr ounds for the fictionality of this idea/ideal.)
One might, however, speculate as to the extent to which this ideal and socio­
cultural artefact feeds into (either as constitutive of, or supplementary to,) an 
individual's instantiated knowledge of language which is involved in the aetiology of 
linguistic behaviours. For example, consider how considerations relevant to a
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description of Latin were transposed onto English such as to tell us not to ignorantly 
split infinitives and that prepositions are bad words to end sentences with. It is this 
artefactual language, up with which one can just about put, which that indefatigable 
writer of letters of complaint to the BBC, "disgusted" of Tunbridge Wells, appears to 
speak as a native and by whom departures from this standard would undoubtedly be 
judged unacceptable - that’s why he complains so much. At this point the linguist 
appears and tells ’’disgusted" of Tunbridge Wells that he is mistaken as to his 
judgements. To which it would not be unreasonable for him to reply, in Chomsky's 
words, "What do you mean ... ? I am a native speaker of the English language."51r At 
this juncture, the notion of an idiolect comes to the rescue together with the reminder 
that enquiiy requires a certain degree of idealization, i.e. a licence to ignore 
"disgusted" of Tunbridge Wells, in other words, a licence to accommodate any 
problematic data by idealizing along the lines suggested by one's competence 
grammar: the supplementarity (as opposed to the properly constitutive) nature of this 
"knowledge" is shown to be the case precisely and unsatisfactorily by assuming it to 
be supplementary. Its one of the "armory of techniques". (Of course, one gets to tell a 
coherent stoiy; but then how could one not?)
Such observations raise, to be left as a moot point, the question as to what, if 
anything, constitutes the linguistic counterpart of the noble savage; the question of the 
extent to which normative social and meta-linguistic factors are integrated into, and 
are in some measure constitutive of, actual linguistic phenomena.52
3.0 Anti-realism.
3.1 Wittgenstein on language.
As we have previously argued, if a Platonism/autonomism is the only cogent 
ontological status for the object of study as postulated in Chomsky's generativist 
paradigm, then it is not so much a solution as the deferral of a solution: precisely what 
we do not have, and are precluded from having, is an explanation as to how the 
individual gets to be in any relation with language and so no account as to why human 
languages are as they are. Somewhat paradoxically, the attempt to provide a 
psychological and embodied locus for linguistic knowledge has left that body of 
knowledge peculiarly disembodied. What we are also committed to, as a requirement, 
in preservation of realist claims, is the verification transcendence of linguistic entities
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and so the correlative breaking of contact between the set of abstract types of the 
linguist's concerns (defined either in intension or in extension) and the actual, this- 
world products of linguistic behaviour. (We are asked to imagine, or feign the 
existence of, as we can and do, the Cheshire cat's grin when the cat has disappeared.) 
Indeed, Burton-Roberts suggests that recognizing this bifurcation as the case, and so 
recognizing these latter as not being properly linguistic at all, makes better sense of 
("is more consistent with") "Chomsky's thinking ... than some of Chomsky's own 
remarks. "53r
What we have is a picture of a grammar, (in cognitivist terms a level one 
function,) as a "superlative fact". A fact that is incorrigible by any mere actuality, but 
which prefigures that actuality as its always and already possibility, and of which 
possibility that actuality is a more or less flawed copy: the ideal (in the sense of 
pertaining to the idea, the possibility - the grin regardless of there being a cat) is rather 
more real than the actual.
It is such a realist construal of some calculus, some set of rules, as an always 
and already idea, as some superlative fact that is questioned in the Philosophical 
Investigations. Wittgenstein's observations there offer a commentary on our preceding 
remarks and, interpretably, rehearse elements of a mathematical constructivist's anti­
realist perspective for the linguistic.54
A calculus offers, as it were, a picture or a map of the linguistic. Equating the 
linguistic with the "machine" of Wittgenstein's discussion, the calculus figures:
The machine as symbolizing its action: the action of a 
machine [,the "action" of the linguistic "machine",] ... 
seems to be there in it from the start. What does that 
mean? - If we know the machine, everything else, that 
is its movement, seems to be already completely 
determined. ...
"The machine's action seems to be in it from the 
start" means: we are inclined to compare the future 
movements of the machine in their definiteness to 
objects which are already lying in a drawer and which 
we then take out. ...
We might say that a machine, or the picture of 
it, is the first of a series of pictures which we have 
leamt to derive from this one.
But when we reflect that the machine could also 
have moved differently it may look as if the way it 
moves must be contained in the machine-as-symbol far 
more determinately than in the actual machine. As if it
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were not enough for the movements in question to be 
empirically determined in advance, but they had to be 
really - in a mysterious sense already present.551'
It is this sense of the "already present" that is, as we have noted, the mark of a 
metaphysical realism: the rules are as if "rails invisibly laid to infinity";561- the rules 
define/license, in Putnam's phrase, a "totality which is fixed once and for alT,57r and a 
totality which is, by virtue of its infinitude, independent of any actual exemplification. 
In the linguistic case, moreover, this totality is, for the most part, independent of 
possible data, either actual tokens or intuitions about those events/tokens - it is in this 
way that the rules and the set of objects they generate are somehow more real than 
any linguistic event, are, in other words, verification transcendent.
What results from the tendency to view the linguistic machine as symbol is a 
breaking of contact from the claims of mere actuality, as if this were not our concern, 
as if mere actuality were "too coarse and material". The "movement" of the "machine- 
as-symbol" is not any actual movement, the movement of any illatum, rather it is the 
idea of some movement, derived from the internal logic of the picture we have of the 
"machine", i.e. derived from the "machine-as-symbol":
When does one have the thought: the possible 
movements of the machine are already there in it in 
some mysterious way? ... And what leads us into 
thinking that? The kind of way in which we talk about 
machines. We say, for example, that a machine has 
(possesses) such-and-such possibilities of movement; 
we speak of the ideally rigid machine which can only 
move in such-and-such a way. - What is this possibility 
of movement? It is not the movement, but it does not 
seem to be the mere physical [or, neuro-physical] 
condition for moving either .... The possibility of 
movement is, rather, supposed to be like a shadow of 
the movement itself. But do you know of such a 
shadow? And by a shadow I do not mean some picture 
of the movement - for such a picture would not have to 
be a picture of just this movement. But the possibility 
of this movement must be the possibility of just this 
movement. (See how high the seas of language run 
here.)58r
What this passage is in attempt to show, and what its rhetoric trades upon, is 
the distinction that is available between some object/event in the world (an illatum)
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and our thinking of it in terms of some conceptual apparatus (which apparatus - 
Wittgenstein’s ’’pair of glasses’’ - projects that object as an abstracium, as a 
prefiguring idea, as a type). What Wittgenstein is bringing to question is the 
prefiguring reality of such abstracta - "Do you know of such a shadow", "some non- 
spatial, non-temporal phantasm"59r that subsists, as it were, behind the event and 
which is the prefiguring, pre-existent possibility of the actualized possibility? The 
implicit answer is no; rather, it is the case that there are the events and "an urge to 
misunderstand them"60r in our talk about them when we take on some meta­
perspective,
A homely illustration might be useful here: walking down the High Street I 
noticed, fluttering in the air, half a dozen or so veiy small kites. Approaching, I saw, 
next to the man selling them, a sign proclaiming "The smallest kite in the world". My 
first reaction was to pick up on the uniqueness asseition by way of the superlative 
and, considering the evident plurality of identical kites, to take the sign's statement as 
demonstrably false. But, of course, there was nothing false - at least I would have 
shown misunderstanding had I asked the man which of the kites the sign was referring 
to. For the referent of the sign, what made its uniqueness assertion true, was not the 
instances/tokens, but the singular idea that each kite actualized. It is this Platonic idea 
that, I take it, corresponds to the "shadow" of Wittgenstein's remarks. There is clearly 
objective sense to this "shadow", however, the crucial question is as to whether one 
can get to refer to this idea/type except through its tokenings, its actualizations: where 
is this superlative and prefiguring kite except in its instances; what is the real ground 
of this idea, its source other than in the actual? More particularly and crucially, how 
can one get to identify which idea it is that you are talking about; in other words, how 
can one individuate the idea, in respect of the properties that are criterial of its 
identity, except thr ough its tokening? Is it not "logically impossible to mention the type 
without using a token"?61 What such considerations suggest is a reversal or a 
collapsing of the polarity: it is not the case that there is some antecedent and 
prefiguring idea that is the possibility that licenses and explains the actuality, (recall, 
this is the manner of explanation in the cognitivist paradigm: to explain patterns of 
behaviour one must have already the idea/level one function generating those 
patterns,) rather the actual is the grounds for the idea; it is out of the actual, the 
individual event that the idea is constructed and constmctable; that idea has no 
prefiguring and independent existence otherwise and elsewhere than the event. What 
Wittgenstein's remarks argue for is the wholesale exorcism of the prefiguring ghost 
from the machine.
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It is worth noting that the position Wittgenstein is criticizing here is the 
position that he appears to have held in the Tractatus: "Every proposition must 
already have a sense [, every linguistic expression must already have its individuating 
properties,] it cannot be given a sense [its individuating properties] by affirmation. "62r 
The position that Wittgenstein endorses (or "shews") in Philosophical Investigations 
is the diametric opposite: propositions only have a sense, only have "life" in and by 
the act of affirmation; language is its use.
With a little poetic licence these opposing perspectives are interpretably 
expressed by our prefatory quotation from Eliot ("Words move only in time" - 
language as a series of events - or "the end precedes the beginning" - language as 
always and already). These perspectives, symptomatic of the two means of theoretical 
access we have on linguistic phenomena, are roughly duplicated by what we have 
observed as the orthogonakincommensurable relation between studies of linguistic 
processing/actualization (i.e. studies that are included in but not defining of the 
domain of individual psychology) and studies of linguistic knowledge (i.e. what we 
have suggested resists a mind/brain-intemal ontological status).
A useful way, for our purposes, of figuring these two perspectives is provided 
by some comments by Lemmon. He remarks, contra Strawson's (1950) criticism of 
Russell's theoiy of definite descriptions, that:
It is as though one were to say that we cannot speak of 
a gate as having a definite colour, because the same 
gate may have different colours at different times.63r
Alternatively, however, and pro Strawson (and Wittgenstein), one might say rather 
more problematically, simply by exchanging, in Lockean terminology, primaiy 
qualities for secondary:
It is as though one were to say that we cannot speak of 
a gate as having a definite [shape], because the same 
gate may have different [shapes] at different times.
But just what phantasmic gate is this that has no definite shape? The question appears 
to be one of determining quite what it is, if anything, that is constant (always and 
already) in, for example, a word or sentence type across different occasions of use, 
and what properties, perhaps linguistically crucial and criteria! properties, are to be
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found only in, and provided by, the actualizing event. In other terms, this amounts to 
the question of how the gross phenomenon is to be carved/modularized.
3.2 A "Representational Hypothesis"64
Burton-Roberts' "representational hypothesis" is to the purpose of 
accommodating the obseived breaking of contact between the set of linguistic 
expressions, as specified by an autonomous competence grammar, and the products 
of linguistic behaviour while preserving a realism in respect of that grammar’s 
generative capacity. The proffered solution is that the concrete (acoustic or graphic) 
events that are actualized in behaviours be regarded as not strictly linguistic, but rather 
"physical representations of linguistic expressions"651' which are the para-linguistic 
means of identifying and determining which linguistic expression, as specified by the 
autonomous grammar, is being referred to.
The view we are encouraged to is that these concrete representations are so in 
much the same way as a painter's picture of some object represents, but is itself 
distinct of, that object; the object, with its properties, is not constituted by the picture; 
it exists and has its properties always and already independently of the depiction. In 
the linguistic case, what is represented by (para-) linguistic behaviours are the 
members of the set of linguistic expressions of which the individuating linguistic 
properties (i.e. the tuple including syntactic, semantic and phonological properties) 
are fully specified, one might say begotten, independently and timelessly by the 
grammar.
A corollary of this account is that ambiguities (indeterminacy and apparent 
violations of a principle of bivalence in general) are not viewed as a properly linguistic 
phenomenon, rather they are a property of the indeterminacy and vagueness of the 
para-linguistic representational medium, i.e. the concrete sounds/marks that do the 
representing. An explicit aim of Burton-Roberts' paper is precisely to counter the 
tensions induced for a competence orientated and autonomous linguistics by the 
apparent phenomenon of "pragmatic intrusion" or "context-dependence" where 
pragmatic/performance factors are seemingly required to fix, in Gricean teims, "what 
is said". His solution is to preserve the autonomy of the linguistic and with it a 
correlative principle of bivalence by hiving off this phenomenon onto the para- 
linguistic.
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In more detail: the problem that pragmatic intrusion poses for a realism 
articulated by way of an autonomous competence grammar is that, on this 
competence view, linguistic knowledge, "knowing how linguistic expressions are 
individuated" is "a matter determined uniquely, for each complex expression, by the 
[autonomous] grammar" :66r the individuating properties of linguistic expressions are 
supposed to be specified, "antecedently determined", by the grammar. However, in a 
string such as (Wilson's and Sperber’s example), "refuse to admit them", the crucial 
individuating properties, the fixing of "what is said", can only be resolved in a context 
such as selects for the reading of "admit" as either "allow access to" or "own up to".67
In short, (i) pragmatic, conversational principles are 
supposed to operate upon an antecedently determined 
'what is said'; but (ii) disambiguation is necessary in 
order to derive a unique 'what is said' and (iii) 
pragmatic conversational principles are crucially 
involved in disambiguation and hence in the 
determination of 'what is said'. Given this, there will 
seldom be a sense of 'the meaning of what is said' in 
which reference to the independent intentions of the 
speaker in context is not required - or, therefore, any 
purely linguistic concept [defined as what is specified 
always and already by the competence grammar] of 'the 
meaning of what is said'.681
In other words, this "compelling argument" for pragmatic intrusion suggests that the 
individuating linguistic properties of linguistic expressions are crucially determined by 
performance factors; that the linguistic is not so much begotten and pre-specified as 
constructed, and that the linguistic is inseparable from the actualizing cognitive events 
and procedures.
In the light of these remarks it is illuminating to reprise Read's characterization 
of the substantive distinction between a realism and an anti-realism:
Where the realist says that every potential infinity 
presupposes an actual infinity, the constructivist replies 
that every potential infinity presupposes an operation 
and entails that there is no ["antecedently determined"] 
objective reality. What is true [or existent] is so only in 
virtue of our ability [a practical/performance-type 
ability] to apply the operation to a successful outcome, 
not in virtue of any correspondence with any such 
[antecedent] reality. ...
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[Where, on the one hand, the constructivist 
does,] the realist does not take the notion of 
construction seriously, as imposing [neither] any real 
constraint [and nor as contributing substantive 
properties to the constructed result].691'
It is also worth mentioning, as a somewhat speculative aside, how such an 
anti-realist perspective would appear to give some purchase on the phenomenon that 
Chomsky originally selected as the primaiy puzzle to be explained, that of 
creativity/novelty: it would seem to be accountable, at least in part, not by positing an 
antecedent infinitude, but by the crucial role that context plays in fixing a value for 
radically underdetermined content. From this property of underspecification there 
emerges, as observed by Humboldt, the apparent infinitude of natural languages 
despite their finititude of means:
the property of underspecification, far from being 
aberrant, ensures that natural languages are a highly 
economical vehicle for communication, enabling 
sequences to be used over and over again with different 
interpretation in different contexts ...70r
Chomsky was indeed correct to indicate that the phenomenon is a matter of, and to be 
hived off onto, performance, and he was also arguably correct first time round to 
indicate the centrality of the phenomenon. What comes out of such obseivations is the 
suggestion of the explanatoiy need for a "blurring'' of the distinction between 
competence and performance.711"
Such conclusions are resisted by Burton-Roberts. On his account this 
constitutive role for the actualizing procedures and operations is external to the 
properly, and resolutely always and already, linguistic. Such a performance 
component is concerned with the determination of which member of the set of 
antecedently given linguistic expressions is being represented on any particular 
occasion, but has no constitutive role in fixing the properties of that expression. The 
notion of ’representation' that is intended here is that in which to say 'x represents y' is 
to say that fx is in a relation to y', where y exists independently of its being represented 
by x. It is in this sense that a portrait, for example, standardly represents some 
individual who has an existence independently of being portrayed.
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What, however, is "philosophically puzzling” about the relation of 
representation is that this independent existence need not be the case: "while the 
existence of a relation between two things trivially entails that they exist, this is not 
true for the relation of representation. "72r For example, Botticelli's The Birth o f Venus 
represents an event that, I think it is safe to assume, has not taken place, is not real. 
One might wonder whether that event can be said to have any antecedent existence 
elsewhere than in the representation. Perhaps this is clearer in the case of depictions 
which do not have, unlike the Botticelli case, literaiy or mythic antecedents; a 
surrealist landscape by Dali, for instance, or non-figurative art in general. The crucial 
point is that, in this case, unlike in the case of a portrait, there are no means to pick 
out the individuating properties of what is represented except by reference to the 
representation itself, the x, representans, and the y, representation, of the relation 
cannot be held apart.
The question that emerges out of the canvassing of these considerations is that 
of whether the relational sense of representation, the sense required by Burton- 
Roberts' realism, can be accepted. This returns us to Wittgenstein's remarks (and our 
kites). It is, seemingly, the case that objective sense can be made of the idea that some 
y linguistic expression is being pointed to by some concrete, external behaviour. As 
Burton-Roberts reminds us, when, in some syntax class the teacher asks the students 
to consider some string that she writes on the board, she is not asking them to 
consider the graphic marks, but the expression as an abstract linguistic type.73r In 
much the same way the instanced kite might be conceived as a means to represent the 
ideal kite. But, one might ask, where can we find this ideal kite or sentence, how can 
we individuate its type, how can we point to it, except through the tokening, a 
particular concrete and actual event? If we wish to claim some antecedent and 
independent existence for the type, the representatum, then we are faced with the 
problem of having to claim that it can be represented otherwise, for if something 
exists independently of its representation, then any particular representation can be 
exchanged for some other, just as one can pick out some person by means of different 
portraits. The challenge is similar to one made by Wittgenstein where he asks us to 
separate words and meaning as if they were in the same relation as are the words to 
the music of a song.74r In other words, how do you specify which linguistic entity you 
are referring to without the representing tokens, i.e. these particular tokens in this 
particular context with the corresponding and particular cognitive activity? The two, it 
would appear, are highly resistant to such separation.75
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To take a different tack toward the same destination (and compare with our 
remarks regarding Katz' similar proposal (pg. 106)): suppose we accede to Burton- 
Roberts' proposal, then we appear to have instituted two areas of study, the linguistic 
proper - what is represented by behaviours (and also all those unactualized/ 
unrepresented and indeed, impossible to be represented linguistic expressions) - and a 
study of the para-linguistic means to represent. Suppose this latter enquiiy were to 
make progress and were able to propose some account, presumably in terms of a set 
of cognitive procedures and knowledge about representational elements. If this were 
achieved, if we understood the nature of the actual events, what would be the residue 
for linguistics proper? Why must it be the case (care of some sort of conceptual 
necessity, perhaps) that linguistics proper could not be subsumed by this other 
enquiiy, why must there be anything to be explained other than this means to 
represent, where 'represent' would take on the sense of the conflation of the x and y of 
the relation?
It is. just such a recognition of the inseparability of the constructive, cognitive 
event from the object created by that event that underlies the constmctivist/intuitionist 
project in mathematics. Whereas mathematics is primarily concerned with the nature 
of the objects constructed, with, in Carr's terms, a constitutive account (and 
Wittgenstein reminds us that one can be interested in it in this way), however, 
linguistics, at least as instigated by Chomsky, has set itself the task of offering an 
explanation as to why the natur al linguistic is as it is, and to attempt this by way of 
positing an answer in terms of properties of the human mind/brain. A primaiy burden 
of our discussion has been to suggest that, on the one hand, in positing a body of 
declarative, autonomous and internally represented linguistic knowledge, where any 
temporal/procedural dimension is suppressed, what has been denied is precisely a 
psychological ontological status and explanation for the linguistic, and, on the other 
hand, what our present considerations suggest is that the (metaphysical/atemporal) 
realism that founds this approach, a realism at the level of a set of antecedently given 
sentences, has founded a study that answers not to the actual linguistic, but to some 
second order idea of the linguistic, as if this idea, in effect what is articulated by a 
level one function, were what constitutes the necessary (indeed, conceptually 
necessaiy) and antecedent possibility of the actual. What has been answered to, the 
object of study, has been created, to reprise Saussure’s remark, by taking up the 
atemporal perspective, as articulated by the formal system metaphor, of a 
metaphysical realism - that "natural impulse", as Putnam reminds us - that lays down 
rails as if to infinity and rails, it turns out, that lead us awiy in an attempt at an
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explanation. The suggestion is that what is needed is a perspective that recognizes 
that, at root, the linguistic is an activity, or, to use a Heideggerian turn of phrase, that 
the temporal is the horizon of the linguistic: a language is a series "of structures in 
time ... in which the wholes and parts are events" and to understand its nature we 
need to understand the nature of those events qua events.
4.0 Directions.
Wittgenstein’s strictures in Philosophical Investigations lead to a species of 
linguistic anti-realism/nominalism together with a concomitant subtle, but ultimately 
(and notoriously) anti-explanatoiy behaviourism. What we are encouraged toward is 
the recognition of prefiguring rules, i.e. what articulates a metaphysical realist 
idea/theoiy of the linguistic, as precisely "phantasms"; as, at best (compare our 
previous discussion of Searle and Dennett), instrumental fictions. It is this fictionality 
that Wittgenstein purports to "shew": that we "can adduce only exterior facts about 
language", that we "must do away with all explanation and description must take its 
place."761' As one commentator has put it, "there is nothing to be explained ... it is a 
pseudo-question. "77
A further perspective that interpretably emerges, what is "shewn", is that there 
is no licit meta nor theoretical-perspective on the linguistic to be had; there is no other 
place to be other than in the (E-)language we use and in its individual uses on 
individual occasions. In attempting the transcendence of some meta-perspective, in 
effect the epistemic access of a theoiy-constitutive metaphor, one is guilty of 
wrenching words from their "original home", and, it appears, for Wittgenstein there is 
nowhere else other than this original and normative home: language is only in its use, 
a set of external events that defy, indeed are falsified by, theorizing.78 It is, seemingly, 
the veiy multiplicity and the unsystematic muddle of the pre-theoretical linguistic, i.e. 
the point of theoretical (and this thesis’) departure, that Wittgenstein emphasizes and 
takes to be ineliminable: it is as if this is sufficient to confer on individual linguistic 
objects the status of an unnegotiable and unanalysable uniqueness.
Translating this into an older philosophical idiom (compare our previous 
remarks, chapter V, footnote 8), this refusal to attempt an explanation amounts to a 
general distrust of universals (hence the nominalism): universals are posited, as 
logically and epistemically prior, precisely for the purpose of explaining how it is, and 
what it is, that we get to recognize in some particular event such that that event is a
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particular instance/token of a general type; how it is that different events are 
recognized as evidencing similarity. The Chomskyan (and Fodorean) rationalist 
explanatory strategy is to posit that such (re)-cognition of an event as an instance of 
an x requires that one already has a concept, a mental representation, of an x; to 
recognize something as an instance of a sentence type, one needs to have that 
sentence type pre-specified; to leam a language (and its meanings) one has to have the 
language (and its meanings) always and already: a language is begotten not made.
If, however, we are debarred from positing any universals, in their modem, 
cognitivist guise as mental representations, then we are seemingly debarred from any 
explanatoiy account (for, it will be recalled, these have been taken to be the 
explanatory sine qua non191'), and we are reduced to a science of cataloguing. Yet, the 
reason why universals are posited in the first place, why they appear ineliminable, is 
that they are required to account for perceived or accredited identity between distinct 
spatio-temporal events, for example between these following events: i) word ii) word. 
Moreover, it is seemingly a brute fact that, however we are to understand this 
phenomenon and relate it to properties of the mind/brain, such accredited identity 
between, and replication of patterns and structures in, distinct linguistic events is the 
case: linguistic behaviours are not unanalysably unique (and hence unleamable), there 
do seem to be some such "phantasms", some constancies across different occasions of 
use of the same expressions.
To put these remarks in the obverse: if linguistic phenomena are unanalysably 
unique, this is to say that there is nothing held internally in common between such 
phenomena other than their being members of a set that is definable only vaguely in 
extension (some "family resemblance"), not in intension. Credence for such a view 
requires both an extreme form of scepticism as regards the regularities that linguistic 
enquiiy has repeatedly adduced and a brute, stipulative certainty of the inexplicability 
of the human language faculty. It is difficult to sufficiently motivate either. On the one 
hand, the very fertility of the generativist enterprise in demonstrating regularities 
suggests that there are properly such; on the other hand, one might ask on what might 
this certainty of the impossibility of an explanation be based other than a stipulation of 
the normativity of the pre-theoretical, vague muddle and a correlative stipulative 
disallowance of any reconfiguration of our conceptual access onto the phenomenon. It 
is our contention that such a disallowance, with its explanatoiy nihilism, is undermined 
by even the most cursoiy inspection of the history of science - such reconfiguration is 
precisely the manner in which the sciences achieve themselves. It is our further 
contention that the former of these observations (of the recognition of regularities)
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suggests the possibility of some proper causally explanatoiy account and an account 
which, if we are to accept one prime regularity - the diversity of human language 
within parameters that define a similarity - then we need an account which makes 
reference to some innately prefigured/prefiguring system, but an account that is able 
to take note of and negotiate the concerns we have raised.
The detail of how such a project might be earned out is beyond the present 
meta-theoretical remit, however, we may take the concerns we have raised as 
providing a perspective on an empirical project (Kempson et aVs LDSnl framework) 
that is presently in the course of development. In the following we shall consider how 
this project might answer to our concerns. The purpose is not so much to canvas for 
acceptance of the framework as to illustrate the possibility of developing a linguistic 
theoiy that parallels a mathematical constructivism.
4.1 Realizing a linguistic constructivism.
What we interpret our selection of remarks by Wittgenstein to suggest, in 
pointing us toward the "machine" as opposed to its idea, the "machine-as-symbol", is 
that a fruitful line of enquiiy, one which promises to avoid the breaking of contact we 
have remarked on and would potentially allow for a rapprochement between 
linguistics and psychology/psycholinguistics (construed as a mind/brain-internal 
enquiiy), would be to examine the extent to which linguistic phenomena are 
made/constructed, as opposed to simply begotten; that they achieve their individuating 
properties in the construction process. In other words, this would be to recognize 
linguistic phenomena, first and foremost (in their first-order phenomenology) as 
cognitive events; as, in Hockett’s phrase, "structures in time" in which the 
temporal/dynamic aspect is crucially explanatoiy of their properties.
This would be to reconfigure the domain as constituted by a set of actualizing 
procedures along with a concomitant emphasis on cognitive tokenings. The object of 
study comes to be reconfigured as, in Kempson's phrase, "the cognitive architecture 
that makes language processing possible".801’ This offers to take us away from 
generatmsm's theory-institutional (metaphysical realist) conception of the domain as 
constituted by a conceptually problematic, always and already infinite set of types and, 
in so doing, as we will outline below, this reconfiguration promises to relieve us of 
certain of the attendant conceptual tensions we have indicated.
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From this reconfigured perspective, the actualizing construction/performance 
process is viewed as an integral element of realized/recognized linguistic phenomena, 
conferring individuating properties on cognitive events. Individuating linguistic 
properties emerge, (one might say E-merge,) as is suggested by the phenomenon of 
pragmatic intrusion, in event; a language is not so much something that we know, 
which knowledge is supplied by some set of always and already mentally represented 
axioms, but is, rather, something that we do and make on individual occasions. The 
contention is that it is just such a constructivist perspective, taking the actualizing 
construction procedure as integral of the object of study, which holds out the hope of 
an explanation that is both properly grounded in internal properties of the human 
mind/brain and which renews contact between actual-world linguistic phenomena and 
the objects of linguists’ concerns.
The question posed for an empirical enquiry run along these lines amounts to 
a question of what, from the perspective of individual psychology (and it must be 
individual psychology for there are no linguistic events other than those that involve 
individuals' cognitive acts81), constitutes the basis, not restricted to a body of 
declarative knowledge, for linguistic behaviour. Put in another idiom: what are our 
commitments; what is to be posited as cognitively real and explicitly specified by some 
sui generic language faculty; what is supplementary to, this faculty and what in the 
results of the activity is epiphenomenal? This is to ask how the gross phenomenon of 
the linguistic is to be carved/modularized, and how we are to understand the inter­
relation of such modularity and its realization in the mind/brain. To put it in yet 
another way, the issue, and a resolutely empirical issue (i.e. not a matter of some sort 
of conceptual necessity ran off the formal apparatus applied to the task) is one of 
chickens and eggs, and, recalling Churchland's remarks about nineteenth century 
embryology, what it is in the egg that is responsible for the actual results.
The LDSnl project is to develop a model of utterance interpretation; a model 
of on-line, "left to right" (i.e. temporally sequential) processing. The account is 
expressed through a posited dynamics of how structural properties of interpretation 
are constructed in the course of processing. Syntax becomes dynamic and, rather than 
being defined over strings construed as atemporal objects, is defined over an evolving 
algebra - a series of transitions - of tree descriptions that are the structural basis for 
interpretation. In this way syntax is emergent out of the parsing process: there is no 
body of mentally represented axioms constituting a syntactic competence, rather 
syntax becomes largely epihenomenal (compare chapter 1, footnote 78). This series of
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transitions, the dynamics of the system, is articulated in terms of a parsing schema - a 
set of prespecitled (innate and hardwired) combinatorial and stmcturing operations 
that take as input (as premises to an inferential sequence) the combinatorial properties 
(expressed in a type language) of incoming lexical items. It is this on-line sequential 
input that drives the incremental process of building up structure. The hearer's 
cognitive task is to construct from the input, as given in its sequence, a formula of 
type t, i.e. a propositional content.
This sui generic linguistic system (on the model of a Fodorean input 
system821) is not (pace Fodor) encapsulated from other more general cognitive 
processes. The notion of modularity that is posited is one of an interactive or 
integrative modularity whereby, for instance, more general central processor 
information can be accessed on-line to the puipose of fixing underdetermined lexical 
semantic content (the central processor is assumed to run on relevance-theoretic, most 
cognitive gain for least effort principles). This penetration of the linguistic system is 
circumscribed (i.e. its not a Liberty Hall of free inferential effect) by virtue of the 
hearer being committed to building up a structure by way of incorporating all the 
information (i.e. combinatorial requirements) encoded by the given words in their’ 
particular sequence. What is encoded and sui generic is not defeasible and the 
structure-building process is monotonically incremental (i.e. the hearer cannot, in the 
course of processing, undo what is already done). A judgement of acceptability comes 
to be construed, (hence providing a rationale for the use of speaker judgements as 
relevant data,) as recognition of a sequence as providing information, as presented by 
the on-line series of words, such that all that information is incrementally 
incorporated, in the sequence in which it is given, into the process of deriving a 
structure of which the interpretation has at least one complete propositional content. 
Where that information has to be supplemented, or where the incorporation of the 
information requires considerable processing effort, then acceptability will tail off, on 
a relevance-theoretic story, in proportion to the extent that processing cost does not 
achieve adequate cognitive pay off.83 Although the theory takes on the hearer's 
perspective, in its light the obverse task for a speaker may be figured as one of 
packaging, through a selection of a sequence of lexical items, a program (or a 
cumulative series of sub-programs) that directs the construction of the intended 
propositional content.
The overall result is that the human linguistic faculty becomes integrated 
within, and to a certain extent subsumed by, a theoiy of processing: the human 
language capacity is to be accounted for in terms of the cognitive architecture that
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makes language processing possible. It is not that performance is a supplement in the 
contingent/extraneous sense of "supplement", but is the constructive condition for the 
human language faculty (compare chapter I, footnote 82). This cognitive architecture 
is held to be innate and hard-wired; language acquisition comes to be identified with 
the acquisition of the relation between phonologically individuated lexical items and 
some conceptual content (also deemed to be innate a la Fodor and of which the 
combinatorial properties, i.e. the types, are a reflex**4) together with possible 
idiosyncratic information concerning how each item provides directions to the parsing 
procedure.
In the light of this sketch we are able indicate how it offers to address certain 
of the concerns we have raised.
In postulating a hard-wired parsing schema that characterizes a set of 
procedures, something that, presumably, neurological structures have evolved to do, 
there is an explicit reduction in commitment to explanatory constructs that are 
individuated intensionally and to which an individual is in a relation of tacit 
knowledge:
there are no grounds on this view for seeing control of 
language as involving in any sense a set of axioms to 
which the language user must stand in a propositional 
attitude of knowing.851'
The remaining such commitment is, firstly, to knowledge of lexical items in their 
pairing of a phonological realization and a concept. It is to be noted that this passes 
Searle's criterion of admissibility for intensionally individuated objects "as that which 
is potentially conscious".861' For it is the case that such knowledge can be, to a 
significant extent, consciously retrieved. This leaves somewhat problematic the status 
of the procedural (directions for use) content that a lexical item provides to the parsing 
process. Kempson et al. make an explicit disclaimer as to the retrievability of such 
"knowledge". However, one might be tempted to stretch Searle's notion of being 
"potentially available to consciousness" by remarking that, interpretably, combinatorial 
properties of lexical items are retrievable in the sense that they emerge into 
consciousness in linguistic behaviour. It is the basis for cloze exercises in language 
teaching: fill in the gap, and how do you know, and bring to consciousness, how to fill
in the gap in that way? For example: i) Tom kicked . ii) Tom put the book
______. iii) Although it was raining,__________,87 Furthermore, there is a body of
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psycholinguistic evidence that is consonant with the notion of lexical items 
"projecting" such combinatorial requirements. In a study conducted by Wright and 
Garrett (1984), their experimental findings suggested that word recognition time 
decreases where a lexeme of a specific syntactic type is required (or "projected'') by a 
syntactic context and where that expectation is met. A further experiment by Gorrell 
(1987) duplicated the results in respect of ambiguous lexical items. Here the findings 
were consistent with projections being made for each possible reading of an 
ambiguous lexeme: word recognition time was decreased where a subsequent word, 
consistent with either projection, was encountered in parsing. A subsequent word that 
is not projected for, although a possible grammatical continuation, showed an increase 
in recognition time.
In citing such psycholinguistic studies, in their being deemed relevant at all, 
there is an implicit comment on the canvassed promise of a rapprochement between 
linguistic theoiy and the brain sciences. In other words, in positing a linguistic theoiy 
that takes the cognitive/processing architecture as the primary object of study the 
possibility arises of relieving linguistic theoiy of its questionably principled empirical 
strandedness from other (e.g. psycholinguistic/neuro-scientific) theoretic perspectives 
and the instrumentalist interpretation that this strandedness forces. To put this another 
way: once one posits this object of study, (i.e. the cognitive, processing architecture,) 
then one diminishes the possible grounds one might have to argue for the irrelevance 
of other brain sciences to the task of theoiy (dis-)confirmation. Of course, what also 
accrues from the explicit relevance of such other perspectives is the prospect of 
achieving some other linguistic-theoiy-extemal epistemic access, some other 
"spectacles" and, consequently, some shorting of the "closed-circuit functioning" that 
we have suggested has been the condition of linguistic theorizing in the generativist 
paradigm.
It is to be pointed out that such a rapprochement with psycholinguistics has 
not been investigated in the development of the LDSnl framework. There is a related 
and unaddressed question as to how the inferential dynamics of the parsing process, 
as characterized by the parsing schema, maps onto real-time processing dynamics 
(compare Pylyshyn's remarks cited on pg. 162). However, what is provided by the 
characterization of a parsing schema is a level of description that, interpretably, 
coincides with Peacocke's requirement for a psychologically real theoiy to be pitched 
at, in terms of Man’s hierarchy, level 1.5, in which is specified "the information 
drawn upon by the relevant mechanisms or algorithms in [the] subject."881' (compare 
pgs. 162 ff.)
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It will be recalled that what brought to question the psychological ontological 
status of generativist theories of competence was their taking as an object of study a 
level one function. We argued that such objects require to be taken as having either a 
Platonic or autonomous ontological status for the reason that, on the one hand, they 
exceed, in their generative capacity, the necessaiy finititude of any possible concrete 
realization, hence leading to the uncomfortable position of having to negotiate the 
notion of the possibility of impossible to be actualized objects. On the other hand, the 
abstraction of a level one description makes the properties of any instantiating medium 
irrelevant to their explanation: they are multiply instantiable. Given this property, the 
criteria of identity for any behaviour conforming to the level one description cannot 
contentfully advert to any internal (e.g. mind/brain-intemal) properties. What this 
means is that an explanation of behaviours pitched at level one carries no commitment 
to there being any commonality among the internal states of minds/brains that 
instantiate that function. This is why studies of those states are irrelevant to the 
falsification of posited level one functions. However, it is the case that there is 
precisely evidence for such commonalities/regularities among the mind/brain-intemal 
states of language users - its what makes psycholinguistics, and the neurosciences in 
general, more than a mere random catalogue of experimental findings. Put another 
way: it would be hugely surprising if such regularities were not the case. It would be 
equally surprising if such regularities were not constructive of the nature of natural 
languages, i.e. irrelevant to an explanation of why natural languages are as they are. 
Precisely what a level one account insulates us from is such an explanation and what it 
defers is the commensurability of the constructs of the linguistic and neuro-scientific 
domains.89 What an account pitched at level 1.5 goes some way toward addressing is 
that of the realization relation between an individual and a natural language in terms of 
properties of the internal architecture of the mind/brain.
An objection (compare Burton-Roberts remarks cited pg. 243) that might be 
raised to an account ran along these lines, lines more or less parallel to constructivism 
in mathematics, (and an objection that runs more or less parallel to standard 
objections to mathematical constructivism,) is that we appear to lose the requisite 
generality of the theoiy by failing to answer to the notion of "any sentence of a 
language", the notion that has constituted generativism's pre-theoretical given 
(compare J. Katz (1996, pg. 281)) and to which any adequate linguistic theoiy must 
seemingly address itself.90 It is just this given which, articulated as a set of abstract 
types, (again compare Katz) we "know" is required to be answered to (indeed, it is
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such an object that is implicit, even if hopelessly vague, in the eveiyday idea of 
"English" or whatever). But if this is the case, then what a theoiy as outlined above 
does not answer to is just this set of types, of which the members are fully 
individuated by having their full complement of linguistic properties in respect of the 
syntactic, semantic, phonological et ah tuple. This is because, if all such properties are 
only fixed in respect of a particular context, i.e. in the constructive procedure with its 
attendant vagaries, (care of the feeding of central processing and context-relative 
information into this procedure), then the only linguistically interesting, fully 
linguistically individuated objects are the individual cognitive (and tokening) events. 
We would seem to be returned to something like a study of corpora from which the 
Chomskyan paradigm advantageously departed in the fifties, and what was 
advantageous was just the attainment of this requisite generality.91 Putting this in the 
obverse, if some constructivist account on these lines is in broad terms correct, then 
natural languages, as understood by the generativist paradigm, i.e. as the entities 
which constitute the posited, always and already object of study, do not exist. At least, 
their existence, in their generality, is no other than a feigned and phantasmic existence: 
we end up being anti-realist about languages.
A question then is one of how to readmit/reconfigure some requisite level of 
generality such that the enquiry is any more than a taxonomy; in other words how are 
we to reconfigure the notion of types, which notion is what has articulated this 
generality and enabled us to pass beyond a set of particular events?
Burton-Roberts, it may be recalled, remarks that when, in a syntax class, the 
teacher tokens a string on the board, she asks the students to consider, not the chalk 
marks, but the type that those chalk marks token. However, this abstract object is only 
available to be considered on condition that we can construct some object from our 
processing of the marks of chalk (what Burton-Roberts figures as representing some 
antecedently and independently existing object, i.e. the type). But, as argued, we do 
not, and cannot, get to identify the type without, or otherwise than through, this 
cognitive activity. And, we further suggested, that grounds for questioning the 
antecedent, independent existence of this object is that it cannot be identified 
otheiwise than through this cognitive act, which seems to be antecedent to, or at least 
the condition on, recognizing the type. Moreover, what the phenomenon of pragmatic 
intrusion implies is that it is through this, and only through this context-dependent and 
temporal event that the fully individuating properties of the object are constructed. 
This might suggest an option on construing a type not as antecedent, but posterior to 
the cognitive event. (It might also be pointed out that this act of contemplation, by
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which we get to consider the type, is not obviously a first-order linguistic activity, but 
is, rather, a derived and artificial form of behaviour: one does not, in the ordinary ran 
of things, contemplate linguistic behaviours at all, i.e. take on a theoretical perspective, 
one simply understands them.)
Given these remarks, types come to appear as the shadows cast by some 
constructed objects illuminated by a certain light. They are, to clip the wings of poesy 
somewhat, the ahstracta of some second-order thinking about first-order, cognitive 
phenomena. To reprise Burton-Roberts' phrase again, types are not of language but 
are "of-and-for-the-linguisf': types are not themselves linguistic entities but are the 
projections of our second-order/theoretical thinking about language; they are the 
abstract projections of theories.921'
In the light of this we can revivify the antecedence of types, and the requisite 
generality of the enquiry (i.e. we get to talk about the non-actualized) exactly by 
construing types as abstract projections of the linguist's theoiy; that is as predictions 
made by a theory that constructs and articulates an abstract, multi-dimensional 
categorial space (some tuple of properties, where each property might be figured as 
constituting an axis on a multi-dimensional graph) that actual events either conform to 
by fitting a point in the space of this graph (hence corroborating the theoiy), or do not 
conform to (hence offering disconfhmation of the theoiy.) This abstract space will 
include predictions (i.e. types as ahstracta, points in the graph) that have yet to be 
instantiated; in other words, we get to achieve, through our theoretical apparatus, a 
generality such as the enquiry is not restricted to corpora. We also get a theoiy that is 
potentially (virtually) true, not by being duplicated by a set of axioms (a theoiy) 
mentally represented in the minds/brains of speaker/hearers (and which set gets us to 
know always and already the set of sentences of our language), but potentially true 
because the cognitive, actualizing architecture constitutes a nomological domain (or 
set of interacting nomological domains: it is, by hypothesis, an integrated modular 
system) that is characterized and delineated by some statement of the interacting laws 
of those domains.
Furthermore, one of the relevant parameters, one of the constraining factors 
on the categorial space projected by theoiy, will be the physical limitations of the 
neuro-physical substrate. What this amounts to is, in Russell's phrase, the relevance of 
"the merely medical" contingencies of the cognitive architecture. But these are not, 
from what we know, contingent, for they are the veiy condition for there being 
natural languages at all. What we have is a means to embody the linguistic and a 
perspective that takes cognizance of the actualizing machine. What acciues is that we
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come to negotiate the impossibility of possible strings that are licensed by generativist 
theories: they are outside of the categorial space of the modularly integrated and 
embodied theoiy. In short, we achieve an account for a neglected but obvious fact: 
that of the actual finitude of natural languages from the perspective of individual 
psychology, and with this comes a concomitant rapprochement between linguistic 
theoiy and actual linguistic behaviours. What we get, from this perspective, is no real, 
first-order existence for language apart from the individual cognitive events as 
constrained by the cognitive architecture that makes actual language possible.
Finally, what we also get is, to rework a phrase of Chomsky's,93r an objective 
and autonomous (in Can's sense), second-order existence for language in the theories 
that articulate the phenomenon. Consonant with the internal realist subtext running 
throughout our discussion, theoiy is not the means to transparent access onto the 
world such that a theoiy is to be conflated with the world in itself, but it is one more, 
and ontologically distinct, object by means of which we attempt to understand and 
negotiate our being in the world.
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Footnotes.
* L. Wittgenstein (1958, section 108).
 ^W. von Humboldt (1970, pg. 27).
 ^C. Hockett (1977, pgs. 110 and 108), cited in C. Hutton, (1990, pg. 143).
^ N. Chomsky, (1957, pg. 18). It has been suggested (e.g. R. Harris, 1980) that the conceptualization 
that underlies much thinking about (provides epistemic access onto) the linguistic is that of language 
as writing: a not inaccurate definition of a book, i.e. a collection of writings, is that it is precisely a set 
of always and already sentences. A similar theme, (that thinking on language has invariably taken, and 
perhaps needs, writing as its originary metaphor and means of conceptualization,) runs through 
Derrida's O f Grammatology.
C. Pollard and I. Sag, (1994, pg. 14).
 ^Hutton argues (1990) that type/token thinking, to the extent that it pervades linguistic thought, is a 
primary obstacle to the furnishing of an explanatory linguistics.
^ The phrase is Burton-Roberts' (1994, pg. 188). The points raised in the following rehearse Burton- 
Roberts' observations.
 ^N. Burton-Roberts (1994, pg. 189).
^ Burton-Roberts' paper does the service of taking these problems seriously and attempting a solution 
that preserves the generativisfs given object of study and its coixelative realism. The problem of the 
resistance of types to having constituent parts (hence linguistic properties apparently having to be 
predicated of only tokens) is dealt with by a "Principle of Type-Token Affinity" (pgs. 189 - 191). The 
proposal (compare Bar-Hillel, (1970, pg. 367) is to distinguish between types that have physical 
tokens, and types (e.g. linguistic types) that have tokens/occurrences that are themselves abstract. 
These abstract tokens, properly and in keeping with actual practice, are primary objects of study and 
are of the same ontological category as their types and so, purportedly, unproblematically constituent 
parts of then types. This solution, however, comes with a "health warning" because it disallows the 
type/token distinction from attempting (as we have seen, illicitly attempting) what it has been asked to 
do, namely articulate the relation between the linguist's abstract objects of study and concrete 
actualizations. We still have the problem, as we outline, of the solipsism of the linguistic. We take up 
Burton-Roberts' addressing of this issue below.
^  C. Hutton, (1990, pg. 168).
H T. Moore and C. Carling, (1987, pg. 16). The original has "our everyday notion of a sentence". I do 
not see why we have to take such a notion as normative - compare our mistaken everyday notion of a 
static earth; do we not say that it is the sun that rises and sets.
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2^ it is worth pointing out that Burton-Roberts' abstract tokens (see footnote 9) are supposed to be 
consonant with a psychologism, they are, we are informed, "cognitive". In essence, our following 
remarks are to the purpose of disabusing us of such an ontological status.
12 j. Katz, (1996, pg. 271). It is interesting to note the whiff of Galileanism here, as if the linguistic has 
to be explicated in terms of a grammar, i.e. a mathematical apparatus. It also seems, correlatively, to 
be the case that Katz is privileged in knowing in advance of enquiry (presumably by his Platonisfs 
intuition) quite what it is that is to be accounted for: a remarkable gift. Of course, one has in advance 
of enquiry some concept of a language, but enquiry is not defined by, and constrained to, having to 
explicate that concept.
14 J. Katz, (1996, pgs. 278 - 280). The bold italics are mine and are there to encourage the reader to 
ask a question, one to which we shall return, about the source of this "knowledge". (Here's a. clue: if 
the linguistic is "known" to be denumerably infinite, then our access to this knowledge cannot be 
from experience. So, how do we know of this infinitude, except on the basis of the discourse that 
follows horn the epistemic access provided by some theoretical apparatus (e.g. a generative grammar’, 
a device which packs infinitude) applied to the task of understanding the linguistic? How can we 
ascertain whether it is the linguistic that is indeed infinite or whether the infinitude is no more than 
what is put there/projected (and unfalsifiably) - a skeuomoiph - by the apparatus which provides our 
epistemic access, and which, perhaps, to reprise Saussure, "creates the object of study"? This point is 
not restricted to just the question of the infinitude of natural languages, but to the whole notion, the 
founding generative assumption, of an always and already, given set of sentences that constitutes the 
object of enquiry.)
1^  N. Chomsky, (1980, pg. 34).
I6 J. Katz, (1996, pg. 280). 
l^N. Chomsky, (1982, pg. 16).
18 J. Katz, (1996, pg. 281).
19 The phrase is Kempsoris (e.g. 1996, pg. 594).
90 The Keplerian example we cited is illustrative: his suggestion is that "we have no right to assert that 
a regular heptagon exists until someone has prescribed the geometrical method by which it can be 
constructed with a ruler and a pair of compasses." (J. Barrow, 1993, pg. 190).
21 S. Read, (1995, pg. 215).
22 J. Katz, (1996, pg. 281).
22 A. Markov (1954), quoted in J. Barrow, (1993, pg. 221).
24 Katz (1996, pg. 281, fin. 7) makes the same observation and goes on to remark that Chomsky is 
quite right to insist that length is no determinant of grammaticality because "it runs contrary to the 
deeply structuralist character of syntax." One might also note that it runs contrary to a literal rendering
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of the formal system metaphor out of which, arguably, the infinitude of the natural linguistic is 
derived in the first place.
2^ N. Chomsky, (1991, pg. 19).
26 It is this verification-transcendence which is a primary complaint against realism. The objection is 
to the idea that a sentence (or proposition) is determinately grammatical (or true) independently 
(always and already) of it being recognized or actualized.
22 L. Wittgenstein, (1958, section 120).
2^ Ibid. section 104.
29 N. Smith and D. Wilson (1979, pg. 84). A more sophisticated exemplar of this form of reasoning is 
Postal's and Langendoen's argument (1985, see chapter III, footnote 27).
29 N. Smith and D. Wilson, (1979, pgs. 48 - 49). The same reasoning is used by Newmeyer, and the 
same objections may be raised. (One may also note that his reasoning cites considerations of 
"elegance", as if this were necessarily pertinent to a contingent and evolved faculty.):
It makes sense to postulate the grammaticality of certain 
unacceptable sentences (...), since the most elegant account of 
their ill-foimedness involves the interaction of general linguistic 
principles with principles from outside the domain of grammar 
proper. (F. Newmeyer, (1983, pg. 52)).
21 L. Wittgenstein, (1958, section 218).
22 Carr makes a similar point (P. Carr, 1990, pg. 43).
It might be noted that the considerations canvassed rehearse the central complaints of the 
anti-realist regarding verification transcendence and are parallel to those which Dummett adduces in 
objection to the idea that meaning is to be accounted for in terms of a realist notion of truth. (See M. 
Dummett, (1976).) Dummetfs central contention is that a realist (always and already) notion of truth 
places many sentences (e.g. counterfactuals) beyond our capacity to recognize whether they are true 
or false. (And if the realist notion of truth is supposed to be doing the business of explicating 
meaning, then such verification transcendent sentences, those beyond our capacity to recognize them 
as either true or false, must be meaningless, and they are not.) Similarly, a realist view of the 
generative capacity of a grammar, with its infinitude, places many sentences beyond our capacity to 
recognize them as grammatical, the grammaticality of such sentences becomes a transcendent fact. 
But how can this be, for what constitutes such transcendent facts is the I-language, i.e. what we know, 
so we are in the peculiar position of knowing a language and not knowing it at the same time. Indeed, 
Dummetfs complaints recapitulate those of Hutton and of Moore and Carling and Burton-Roberts' 
observations: a realism articulated through an I-language fails to account for a connection between 
knowledge and use.
22 This example is Carr's (P. Carr, 1990, pg. 43).
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34 Garden path sentences are sentences that, while they are grammatical, systematically give rise to 
judgements of imacceptability. Bever's canonical example being: "The horse meed past the bain fell". 
For a catalogue of types of garden path sentences and further detail see B. Pritchett, (1992). At the 
heart of the phenomenon is ambiguity, either lexical or structural.
35 J. Higginbotham, (1987, pg. 128). Presumably the clerk consults a ledger cataloguing all the always 
and already members of the set of sentences of a language. Notice again that the purchase on the 
linguistic is through a metaphor of language as writing.
36 For example, (N. Chomsky, 1980, pg. 221):
A sentence that is incomprehensible in speech may be intelligible 
if repeated several times or presented on the written page, where 
memory limitations are less severe. ... [In this case,] the same 
knowledge can be applied with fewer extrinsic constraints.
37 See our comments below (pg. 234 ff.). For a related and highly elaborated view of intuitions as 
reflecting knowledge of intersubjective norms, see E. Itkonen (1978), reported in P. Can (1987 and 
1990). See also C. Snow and G. Meijer (1977).
38 This is Garnett's observation quoted as a prefatory remark in Fodor, (1983).
39 N. Chomsky, (1991, pg. 19).
4° N. Chomsky, (1986, pg. 36).
41 C. Wright, (1986, pgs. 204 - 238).
43 J. Higginbotham, (forthcoming).
43 Of course, a principle of bivalence is what comes out very naturally from a common and 
prescriptive idea about language: the idea that makes sense of talk about "English" or "Italian" or 
whatever. In other words, the notion of a language as described and given always and already by, for 
example, a list of rules of proper usage, a view which is beloved by pedants everywhere and is part 
and parcel of everyday (metaphysical realist) thinking about language.
44 Chomsky alludes to such a performance orientated perspective in remarking that:
It is sometimes argued that the language (or "grammar") should 
be identified with the parser, ... Or it is argued that since all 
evidence comes from performance, we have no grounds for 
interpreting the evidence as being about anything but a parser, 
which would be much like the argument that since all evidence 
comes from experiment and observation, we have no grounds for 
interpreting it as bearing on the systems of the world under 
investigation. (N. Chomsky, 1991a, pg. 19)
However, the question which is being begged here, is that of whether there is (or is it that, 
care of some conceptual necessity, there must be?) such a, i.e. just this, "system of the world". For, 
after all, surely a set of processing mechanisms count just as much as world objects.
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47 For experimental findings regarding the effect of context on judgements (and, correlatively, on the 
determining of syntactic structure) see, for example, Crain and Steedman (1985) and Altmann et a t 
(1992). For similar findings in relation to ambiguity in general, see Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1987). 
See also our previous discussion of centre-embeddings and the apparent intrusion of competence- 
extrinsic factors into the fixing of syntactic structure (pg. 231).
4  ^L. Wittgenstein, (1958, section 101).
47 Amongst such artefacts and institutions or, in Durfcheim's phrase, "collective representations", one 
may include "social traits, customs, legal systems [and] languages". These are (compare Popper's 
mind-autonomous world three objects) "said to 'exist outside the individual consciousness'" (quoted 
from the entry for Durkheim in T. Honderich (ed.), 1995).
48 J. Katz, (1981, pg. 79).
49 P. Carr, (1990, pg. 44).
7^ A reminder of the need for precisely a perspective from individual psychology, and that linguistics 
cannot be subsumed by the sociological, is, for salient example, the attested facts of creolization. The 
point here is that in the process of creolization (e.g. in the case of Hawaiian Creole English, (D. 
Bickerton, 1981 and 1982)) there appear, as if spontaneously, grammatical features that are not found 
in any of the contact languages. Even more so than in the case of first language acquisition, a socio- 
linguistic dimension is precluded from providing any explanation. The only available explanatory 
option, and more generally the only way to explain the diversity of human languages within 
parameters defining a similarity, is to point towards some genetically pre-specified cognitive 
properties.
For further reminders of why there seemingly has to be, if we are interested in explanation, a 
perspective on linguistic phenomena from the brain sciences, see chapter III, 3.0.
For the source, see chapter I, footnote 88.
An illustrative and parallel commentary on the above issues is provided by an excursion into some 
recent philosophy of mathematics. Hersh (1998, pg. 22) argues that "mathematical objects are a 
distinct variety of social-historic objects." In doing so he rejects as "futile" Kant's question 
(corresponding to a founding question of Chomsky's generative linguistics) as to "how mathematics 
[is] possible." This rejection goes by way of a variation on tire theme of epistemic boundedness - 
"why should the question have an answer?" (pg. 21) - together with the contention that there is no 
need to look "beyond [mathematics'] social-historic-cultural meaning". Its reality is grounded in its 
being "a form of life" (overtones of Wittgenstein). Further questions as to how it is to be explained - 
perhaps through some cognitive story - are another and only contingently relevant country. One 
might usefully compare this notion of "social-historic objects" with Dawkins' "memes" (1976 and 
1989), i.e. cultural objects/ideas such as beliefs or fashions that can be replicated and in the process 
evolve. In the course of transmission they take on an existence, and constitute a nomological/
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ontological domain, that is autonomous of the biological/psychological systems that instantiate them. 
(Also compare Popper's world three.)
Dehaene (1998) offers a not incompatible two-level perspective, the difference being that he 
is interested in explanation for its own sake, not for what it might add or not add to the mathematical 
enterprise. The picture we are encouraged toward is one of a foundational, innate mathematics 
faculty, a "number sense", which is supplemented by a meta and, in some considerable part, socio­
cultural-historic "evolutionary" process of selection and refinement of the mathematicians' results. (In 
this evolutionary idea Hersh explicitly concurs. Again here the notion of a meme provides some 
useful conceptual access.) In this sense mathematics is artefactual; one might consider mathematics as 
rather like a book of quotations of best work which gets added to and deleted from over time.
What our preceding remarks have suggested is the possibility of the appropriacy of a similar 
two-level perspective on linguistic phenomena. However, in the linguistic case, our contention would 
be that the meta, socio-cultural level is relatively peripheral. This is for the standard reasons and which 
reasons distinguish linguistic from mathematical competence: languages, unlike mathematical ability, 
are common, barring cases of pathology, to all members of our species. Mathematics for the most 
part (i.e. beyond what Dehaene identifies as an innate "number sense") is something that is 
consciously learnt; a language is what one unconsciously acquires. Mathematics is mostly socio- 
historic superstructure, a set of results upon which results, mediated by some second-order reflection, 
further mathematical activity is based; linguistic behaviour is, in contrast, predominantly first-order 
behaviour: the expression of the psychologically instantiated and innate substructure.
N. Burton-Roberts, (1994, pg. 196).
it is worth noting that Wittgenstein's return to philosophy in the late twenties was prompted, 
reportedly, by his attending a lecture by Brouwer (the expositor of the intuitionist/constructivist 
project for mathematics).
^  L. Wittgenstein, (1958, section 193).
^  Ibid. section 218.
^  H. Putnam, (1989, pg. 214).
^  L. Wittgenstein, (ibid,, section 194).
Ibid., section 108.
^  Ibid., section 109.
^  L. Stebbing, (1935, pg. 9, cited in C. Hutton, 1990, pg. 33). In this one is reminded of 
Wittgenstein's famous challenge to "mean a sentence ... without saying [i.e. tokening] anything" 
(1958a, pg. 37).
62 L. Wittgenstein, (1961, 4.064).
E. Lemmon (1966)
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64 n . Burton-Roberts, (1994). More recently, in a talk at SOAS (November, 1997) this has been re- 
tenned a "conjecture''.
65 Ibid. pg. 192.
66 Ibid. pg. 183 -184.
67 Wilson and Sperber, (1981). The syntactic correlate of such ambiguity, where performance factors 
are crucial in determining the individuating properties, would be a string such as "I saw a man with a 
telescope" and garden paths in general (see footnote 45).
68 N. Burton-Roberts, (ibid. pg. 181).
69 S. Read, (1995, pg. 215).
76 R. Kempson et at. (forthcoming, chapter 8).
71 The phrase is Kempson's (1996).
79 This is quoted from the entry for "representation" in T. Honderieh (ed.), (1995).
73 N. Burton-Roberts, (ibid. pg. 188).
74 L. Wittgenstein, (1958a, pg. 37).
76 Speculatively: one might say that such separation is possible in the sense that the point of, and 
what allows for the possibility of, translation between two languages is that some individual 
proposition (in a Language of Thought?) can be picked out by linguistically distinct forms. Similarly, 
in reading or revising a text one may note repetition, but one finds that what is identical between two 
passages is not the linguistic form but the propositional content. In this light, the psychologically 
realized language faculty appears in tire guise of a meta-level, prosthetic procedural device, for the 
purpose of mapping (or directing a hearer) from a signal to a propositional content. (This is essentially 
the line taken by Kempson et al. (forthcoming)).
76 L. Wittgenstein, (1958, section 120 and section 109).
77 J. Russell, (1987, pg. 226). Russell credits such a "Roundhead" interpretation to Baker and Hacker 
(1984). Chomsky notes (1980, pg. 73) Hunter (1973) as a subscriber to similar- views. There are other 
commentators, however, who disagree with this reading of Wittgenstein (e.g. A. Kenny, (1973, pg. 
146)). Compare these remarks with Hersh's position, in respect of mathematics, as discussed in 
footnote 52.
7 0
/0 It is this normative home (compare Husserl's notion of a lebensxvelt (chapter V, footnote 24)) 
which is the basis for Wittgenstein's anti-scientism (see C. Chihara and J. A. Fodor, (1967)). I suspect 
that, on similar grounds, Wittgenstein would look askance at the veritable cottage industry, of which, I 
suppose, this is an example, that involves itself with attempting to inform us, from some transcendent 
and systematic perspective, what Wittgenstein really meant. Perhaps the most sympathetic and 
accurate commentator would simply "shew" us by pointing to the books and asking us to read. (Its 
not veiy career-enhancing though.)
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7Q See Chomsky's citation (1986, pg. 257) of remarks by Demopoulos and Matthews (and which we 
quoted on pg. 179).
Q A
R. Kempson et al. (forthcoming).
Q  1
There is, of course, also thinking and generalizing about those individual acts, i.e. such as gives rise 
to meta-level, second-order objects, the sort of socio-cultural objects that would have claim to 
constitute objects of study that are required to be understood as autonomous of individual minds, as 
being, depending on one's taste in terms, amongst Dawkins' memes or denizens of Popper's world 
three.
82 See J. A. Fodor, (1983).
What may be noted here is that acceptability is a case of incotporating all the on-line encoded 
information, but it is not a case of incoiporating all and only that information. If there is an integrated 
feeding relation between non-specifically linguistic systems and the core linguistic system; if realized 
structures and their individuating properties are not fully determined by this sui generic linguistic 
system, then there would seem to be plenty of scope for positing properties of the core linguistic 
system that are resistant to falsification. Where predictions of (un-)acceptability are not bome out it is 
always available to point towards processing difficulties or processing strategies to make good the 
discrepancy. In other words, we are still potentially in the bind of "closed-circuit functioning" in 
which there is a non-disconfirmatoiy dialectic relation between the linguistic system and central 
processing. We are still in need of other spectacles and other theory-external perspectives.
A further observation to be made is that, if the performance system is that whereby linguistic 
objects are constructed and take on their individuating linguistic properties, i.e. they cognitively E- 
merge in cognitive event, and in which events the vagaries of context and central processing are 
crucially relevant to their construction, then there is questionable room for a linguistically interesting 
notion of grammaticality/weh-formedness, defined over the core linguistic system, that stands discrete 
from individual judgements of acceptability. This is because to get one it is necessary to 
abstract/idealize on an axis (of sui generic competence) that leaves behind certain linguistically 
crucial (performance-consigned) factors, i.e. certain context/performance-dependent, individuating 
properties. Indeed, the linguistically cracial role of such vagaries questions the appropriacy of a 
principle of bivalence applied to linguistic objects, i.e. the metaphysical realist view that some string is 
determinately, irrespective of being constructed or constructable, in or out of a language. It would 
seem that if we want to consider the linguistic domain in terms of a set of sentences then we need a 
fuzzy set with fuzzy members.
Q A
Quite what the nature of tins content is is left as "relatively unexplored". However, a suggestion is 
that items of the mental lexicon, rather than having fixed conceptual content that is constant and 
unsupplemented in context, are to be better understood as points of storage of incomplete concepts 
that act as the means to construct specific concepts relative to a context of use. (One is brought to
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mind of Wittgenstein's observation of family resemblance between category members.) The picture is 
once again of the cognitive E-mergence of linguistic properties.
For a similar proposal (in respect of first language acquisition) regarding a correlation 
between syntactic/combinatorial categories and semantic classes, see J. Grimshaw (1981) and J. 
Macnamara (1982).
8  ^R. Kempson et at, (forthcoming).
86 J. Searle, (1992, pg. 152).
8  ^An observation of this ability, (which, at least as far as language teaching is concerned, is indicative 
of, to the point of testing, knowledge of a language,) was made by D. Milward at a talk at SOAS in 
May, 1996.
88 C. Peacocke, (1989, pg. 114).
89 Churchland and Sejnowski (1990, pg. 230) make a similar observation: in addressing the 
contention that multiple instantiability constitutes a principled obstacle to the relevance of the neuro­
sciences and a reduction of cognitive domains to the neuro-logical they remark:
So what? If, in any given species, we can show that particular 
functional states are identical to specific neuronal configurations 
... that will be sufficient to declare a reduction relative to that 
domain.
99 Compare with an argument, rehearsed by Luntley (1999, pg. 171), to the effect that, if we assume 
the anti-realist principle that a proposition is true on condition that it is knowably true, then the 
unsettling upshot is that the only truths are those that are now known. In other words, we cannot pass 
beyond what is actual.
To make the point in another way (compare footnote 83): a linguistics conducted on the basis of 
the sketched theory becomes problematically predictive. There seems to be no way (because there 
seems no way to predict limits on the inferential effects that central processing might induce) to 
predict, for example, the fully realized properties of some string. It is however possible to place, i.e. 
predict, parameters on the range of structures constructed, because the claim is that the parsing 
process is constrained (by the parsing schema that constitutes the cognitive architecture) to a limited 
set of possible transitions given the sequence of lexical items with then indefeasible combinatorial 
requirements. In this way we can get a notion of well-formedness and, indeed a level of always and 
already generality (a set of licensed strings) but only along one dimension (one of the tuple) of 
linguistic properties, ie. along the combinatorial axis.
We can even, if we wish, get to conjure with a homely, because familiar', infinitude of well- 
formed strings by "abstracting out all considerations of parsing effort, difficulty of retrieval, or how 
derivations might compete in the face of more than one alternative" (Kempson el al., forthcoming). 
But this is, on the one hand, to generate a limitless number of types, and, at the same time, to abstract
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out of the veiy condition for there being languages all, i.e. the rest of the linguistically non-contingent 
cognitive architecture that makes language possible. In other words, it is to hypostasize a ghost in the 
machine, and one which, as ghost, is not constrained by the physical limits of the machine (those that 
define, in Russell's phrase a "purely medical impossibility"). But it is precisely these "medical" limits 
that, by hypothesis, constrain and provide certain constitutive properties of actual, realized linguistic 
behaviours. This is why there is no work to do for a notion of grammaticality/well-formedness that 
does not incorporate these other, actual-language-relevant factors.
Compare this suggestion with Bromberger (1989).
93 "Language has no objective existence apart from its mental representation." (1972, pg. 169).
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